mirror of https://github.com/rails/rails
refactor RemoteIp middleware
- return the last forwarded IP before REMOTE_ADDR to handle proxies - remove completely superfluous RemoteIpGetter class - remove duplication of trusted proxies regexp - remove unused constant from Request - move comments from Request to where they are actually relevant - edit comments for clarity of purpose The original code (confusingly) tried to return REMOTE_ADDR both at the beginning and the end of the chain of options. Since REMOTE_ADDR is _always_ set, this is kind of silly. This change leaves REMOTE_ADDR as the last option, so that proxied requests will be assigned the correct remote IP address.
This commit is contained in:
Andre Arko
parent
c3035e1800
commit
9432163c60
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@ -155,24 +155,7 @@ module ActionDispatch
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@ip ||= super
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end
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# Which IP addresses are "trusted proxies" that can be stripped from
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# the right-hand-side of X-Forwarded-For.
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#
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# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network#Private_IPv4_address_spaces.
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TRUSTED_PROXIES = %r{
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^127\.0\.0\.1$ | # localhost
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^(10 | # private IP 10.x.x.x
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172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]) | # private IP in the range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255
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192\.168 # private IP 192.168.x.x
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)\.
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}x
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# Determines originating IP address. REMOTE_ADDR is the standard
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# but will fail if the user is behind a proxy. HTTP_CLIENT_IP and/or
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# HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR are set by proxies so check for these if
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# REMOTE_ADDR is a proxy. HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR may be a comma-
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# delimited list in the case of multiple chained proxies; the last
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# address which is not trusted is the originating IP.
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# Originating IP address, usually set by the RemoteIp middleware.
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def remote_ip
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@remote_ip ||= (@env["action_dispatch.remote_ip"] || ip).to_s
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end
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@ -2,50 +2,57 @@ module ActionDispatch
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class RemoteIp
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class IpSpoofAttackError < StandardError ; end
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class RemoteIpGetter
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def initialize(env, check_ip_spoofing, trusted_proxies)
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@env = env
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@check_ip_spoofing = check_ip_spoofing
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@trusted_proxies = trusted_proxies
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end
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# IP addresses that are "trusted proxies" that can be stripped from
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# the comma-delimited list in the X-Forwarded-For header. See also:
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# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network#Private_IPv4_address_spaces
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TRUSTED_PROXIES = %r{
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^127\.0\.0\.1$ | # localhost
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^(10 | # private IP 10.x.x.x
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172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]) | # private IP in the range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255
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192\.168 # private IP 192.168.x.x
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)\.
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}x
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def remote_addrs
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@remote_addrs ||= begin
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list = @env['REMOTE_ADDR'] ? @env['REMOTE_ADDR'].split(/[,\s]+/) : []
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list.reject { |addr| addr =~ @trusted_proxies }
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end
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end
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def to_s
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return remote_addrs.first if remote_addrs.any?
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forwarded_ips = @env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] ? @env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'].strip.split(/[,\s]+/) : []
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if client_ip = @env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP']
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if @check_ip_spoofing && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ip)
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# We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user
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raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?!" \
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"HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'].inspect}" \
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"HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'].inspect}"
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end
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return client_ip
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end
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return forwarded_ips.reject { |ip| ip =~ @trusted_proxies }.last || @env["REMOTE_ADDR"]
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end
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end
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def initialize(app, check_ip_spoofing = true, trusted_proxies = nil)
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def initialize(app, check_ip_spoofing = true, custom_proxies = nil)
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@app = app
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@check_ip_spoofing = check_ip_spoofing
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regex = '(^127\.0\.0\.1$|^(10|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|30|31)|192\.168)\.)'
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regex << "|(#{trusted_proxies})" if trusted_proxies
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@trusted_proxies = Regexp.new(regex, "i")
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if custom_proxies
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custom_regexp = Regexp.new(custom_proxies, "i")
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@trusted_proxies = Regexp.union(TRUSTED_PROXIES, custom_regexp)
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else
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@trusted_proxies = TRUSTED_PROXIES
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end
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end
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# Determines originating IP address. REMOTE_ADDR is the standard
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# but will be wrong if the user is behind a proxy. Proxies will set
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# HTTP_CLIENT_IP and/or HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR, so we prioritize those.
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# HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR may be a comma-delimited list in the case of
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# multiple chained proxies. The last address which is not a known proxy
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# will be the originating IP.
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def call(env)
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env["action_dispatch.remote_ip"] = RemoteIpGetter.new(env, @check_ip_spoofing, @trusted_proxies)
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client_ip = env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP']
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forwarded_ips = ips_from(env, 'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR')
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remote_addrs = ips_from(env, 'REMOTE_ADDR')
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if client_ip && @check_ip_spoofing && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ip)
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# We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user
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raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?!" \
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"HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'].inspect}" \
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"HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'].inspect}"
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end
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remote_ip = client_ip || forwarded_ips.last || remote_addrs.last
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env["action_dispatch.remote_ip"] = remote_ip
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@app.call(env)
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end
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protected
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def ips_from(env, header)
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ips = env[header] ? env[header].strip.split(/[,\s]+/) : []
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ips.reject{|ip| ip =~ @trusted_proxies }
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end
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end
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end
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