forked from OSchip/llvm-project
884 lines
33 KiB
C++
884 lines
33 KiB
C++
//== GenericTaintChecker.cpp ----------------------------------- -*- C++ -*--=//
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//
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// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
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// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
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//
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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//
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// This checker defines the attack surface for generic taint propagation.
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//
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// The taint information produced by it might be useful to other checkers. For
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// example, checkers should report errors which involve tainted data more
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// aggressively, even if the involved symbols are under constrained.
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//
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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#include "Taint.h"
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#include "Yaml.h"
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#include "clang/AST/Attr.h"
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#include "clang/Basic/Builtins.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/BuiltinCheckerRegistration.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/BugReporter/BugType.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/Checker.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/CheckerManager.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/CallDescription.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/CallEvent.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/CheckerContext.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/ProgramStateTrait.h"
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#include "llvm/Support/YAMLTraits.h"
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#include <limits>
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#include <memory>
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#include <utility>
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using namespace clang;
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using namespace ento;
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using namespace taint;
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namespace {
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class GenericTaintChecker;
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/// Check for CWE-134: Uncontrolled Format String.
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constexpr llvm::StringLiteral MsgUncontrolledFormatString =
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"Untrusted data is used as a format string "
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"(CWE-134: Uncontrolled Format String)";
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/// Check for:
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/// CERT/STR02-C. "Sanitize data passed to complex subsystems"
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/// CWE-78, "Failure to Sanitize Data into an OS Command"
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constexpr llvm::StringLiteral MsgSanitizeSystemArgs =
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"Untrusted data is passed to a system call "
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"(CERT/STR02-C. Sanitize data passed to complex subsystems)";
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/// Check if tainted data is used as a buffer size in strn.. functions,
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/// and allocators.
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constexpr llvm::StringLiteral MsgTaintedBufferSize =
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"Untrusted data is used to specify the buffer size "
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"(CERT/STR31-C. Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space "
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"for character data and the null terminator)";
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/// Check if tainted data is used as a custom sink's parameter.
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constexpr llvm::StringLiteral MsgCustomSink =
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"Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink";
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using ArgIdxTy = int;
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using ArgVecTy = llvm::SmallVector<ArgIdxTy, 2>;
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/// Denotes the return value.
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constexpr ArgIdxTy ReturnValueIndex{-1};
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static ArgIdxTy fromArgumentCount(unsigned Count) {
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assert(Count <=
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static_cast<std::size_t>(std::numeric_limits<ArgIdxTy>::max()) &&
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"ArgIdxTy is not large enough to represent the number of arguments.");
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return Count;
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}
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/// Check if the region the expression evaluates to is the standard input,
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/// and thus, is tainted.
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/// FIXME: Move this to Taint.cpp.
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bool isStdin(SVal Val, const ASTContext &ACtx) {
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// FIXME: What if Val is NonParamVarRegion?
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// The region should be symbolic, we do not know it's value.
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const auto *SymReg = dyn_cast_or_null<SymbolicRegion>(Val.getAsRegion());
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if (!SymReg)
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return false;
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// Get it's symbol and find the declaration region it's pointing to.
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const auto *Sm = dyn_cast<SymbolRegionValue>(SymReg->getSymbol());
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if (!Sm)
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return false;
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const auto *DeclReg = dyn_cast<DeclRegion>(Sm->getRegion());
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if (!DeclReg)
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return false;
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// This region corresponds to a declaration, find out if it's a global/extern
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// variable named stdin with the proper type.
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if (const auto *D = dyn_cast_or_null<VarDecl>(DeclReg->getDecl())) {
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D = D->getCanonicalDecl();
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// FIXME: This should look for an exact match.
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if (D->getName().contains("stdin") && D->isExternC()) {
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const QualType FILETy = ACtx.getFILEType().getCanonicalType();
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const QualType Ty = D->getType().getCanonicalType();
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if (Ty->isPointerType())
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return Ty->getPointeeType() == FILETy;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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SVal getPointeeOf(const CheckerContext &C, Loc LValue) {
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const QualType ArgTy = LValue.getType(C.getASTContext());
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if (!ArgTy->isPointerType() || !ArgTy->getPointeeType()->isVoidType())
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return C.getState()->getSVal(LValue);
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// Do not dereference void pointers. Treat them as byte pointers instead.
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// FIXME: we might want to consider more than just the first byte.
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return C.getState()->getSVal(LValue, C.getASTContext().CharTy);
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}
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/// Given a pointer/reference argument, return the value it refers to.
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Optional<SVal> getPointeeOf(const CheckerContext &C, SVal Arg) {
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if (auto LValue = Arg.getAs<Loc>())
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return getPointeeOf(C, *LValue);
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return None;
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}
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/// Given a pointer, return the SVal of its pointee or if it is tainted,
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/// otherwise return the pointer's SVal if tainted.
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/// Also considers stdin as a taint source.
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Optional<SVal> getTaintedPointeeOrPointer(const CheckerContext &C, SVal Arg) {
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const ProgramStateRef State = C.getState();
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if (auto Pointee = getPointeeOf(C, Arg))
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if (isTainted(State, *Pointee)) // FIXME: isTainted(...) ? Pointee : None;
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return Pointee;
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if (isTainted(State, Arg))
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return Arg;
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// FIXME: This should be done by the isTainted() API.
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if (isStdin(Arg, C.getASTContext()))
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return Arg;
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return None;
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}
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bool isTaintedOrPointsToTainted(const Expr *E, const ProgramStateRef &State,
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CheckerContext &C) {
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return getTaintedPointeeOrPointer(C, C.getSVal(E)).hasValue();
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}
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/// ArgSet is used to describe arguments relevant for taint detection or
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/// taint application. A discrete set of argument indexes and a variadic
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/// argument list signified by a starting index are supported.
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class ArgSet {
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public:
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ArgSet() = default;
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ArgSet(ArgVecTy &&DiscreteArgs, Optional<ArgIdxTy> VariadicIndex = None)
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: DiscreteArgs(std::move(DiscreteArgs)),
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VariadicIndex(std::move(VariadicIndex)) {}
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bool contains(ArgIdxTy ArgIdx) const {
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if (llvm::is_contained(DiscreteArgs, ArgIdx))
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return true;
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return VariadicIndex && ArgIdx >= *VariadicIndex;
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}
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bool isEmpty() const { return DiscreteArgs.empty() && !VariadicIndex; }
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ArgVecTy ArgsUpTo(ArgIdxTy LastArgIdx) const {
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ArgVecTy Args;
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for (ArgIdxTy I = ReturnValueIndex; I <= LastArgIdx; ++I) {
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if (contains(I))
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Args.push_back(I);
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}
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return Args;
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}
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private:
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ArgVecTy DiscreteArgs;
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Optional<ArgIdxTy> VariadicIndex;
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};
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/// A struct used to specify taint propagation rules for a function.
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///
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/// If any of the possible taint source arguments is tainted, all of the
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/// destination arguments should also be tainted. If ReturnValueIndex is added
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/// to the dst list, the return value will be tainted.
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class GenericTaintRule {
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/// Arguments which are taints sinks and should be checked, and a report
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/// should be emitted if taint reaches these.
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ArgSet SinkArgs;
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/// Arguments which should be sanitized on function return.
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ArgSet FilterArgs;
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/// Arguments which can participate in taint propagationa. If any of the
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/// arguments in PropSrcArgs is tainted, all arguments in PropDstArgs should
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/// be tainted.
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ArgSet PropSrcArgs;
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ArgSet PropDstArgs;
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/// A message that explains why the call is sensitive to taint.
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Optional<StringRef> SinkMsg;
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GenericTaintRule() = default;
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GenericTaintRule(ArgSet &&Sink, ArgSet &&Filter, ArgSet &&Src, ArgSet &&Dst,
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Optional<StringRef> SinkMsg = None)
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: SinkArgs(std::move(Sink)), FilterArgs(std::move(Filter)),
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PropSrcArgs(std::move(Src)), PropDstArgs(std::move(Dst)),
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SinkMsg(SinkMsg) {}
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public:
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/// Make a rule that reports a warning if taint reaches any of \p FilterArgs
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/// arguments.
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static GenericTaintRule Sink(ArgSet &&SinkArgs,
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Optional<StringRef> Msg = None) {
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return {std::move(SinkArgs), {}, {}, {}, Msg};
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}
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/// Make a rule that sanitizes all FilterArgs arguments.
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static GenericTaintRule Filter(ArgSet &&FilterArgs) {
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return {{}, std::move(FilterArgs), {}, {}};
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}
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/// Make a rule that unconditionally taints all Args.
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/// If Func is provided, it must also return true for taint to propagate.
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static GenericTaintRule Source(ArgSet &&SourceArgs) {
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return {{}, {}, {}, std::move(SourceArgs)};
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}
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/// Make a rule that taints all PropDstArgs if any of PropSrcArgs is tainted.
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static GenericTaintRule Prop(ArgSet &&SrcArgs, ArgSet &&DstArgs) {
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return {{}, {}, std::move(SrcArgs), std::move(DstArgs)};
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}
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/// Make a rule that taints all PropDstArgs if any of PropSrcArgs is tainted.
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static GenericTaintRule SinkProp(ArgSet &&SinkArgs, ArgSet &&SrcArgs,
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ArgSet &&DstArgs,
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Optional<StringRef> Msg = None) {
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return {
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std::move(SinkArgs), {}, std::move(SrcArgs), std::move(DstArgs), Msg};
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}
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/// Process a function which could either be a taint source, a taint sink, a
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/// taint filter or a taint propagator.
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void process(const GenericTaintChecker &Checker, const CallEvent &Call,
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CheckerContext &C) const;
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/// Handles the resolution of indexes of type ArgIdxTy to Expr*-s.
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static const Expr *GetArgExpr(ArgIdxTy ArgIdx, const CallEvent &Call) {
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return ArgIdx == ReturnValueIndex ? Call.getOriginExpr()
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: Call.getArgExpr(ArgIdx);
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};
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/// Functions for custom taintedness propagation.
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static bool UntrustedEnv(CheckerContext &C);
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};
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using RuleLookupTy = CallDescriptionMap<GenericTaintRule>;
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/// Used to parse the configuration file.
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struct TaintConfiguration {
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using NameScopeArgs = std::tuple<std::string, std::string, ArgVecTy>;
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enum class VariadicType { None, Src, Dst };
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struct Common {
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std::string Name;
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std::string Scope;
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};
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struct Sink : Common {
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ArgVecTy SinkArgs;
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};
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struct Filter : Common {
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ArgVecTy FilterArgs;
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};
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struct Propagation : Common {
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ArgVecTy SrcArgs;
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ArgVecTy DstArgs;
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VariadicType VarType;
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ArgIdxTy VarIndex;
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};
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std::vector<Propagation> Propagations;
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std::vector<Filter> Filters;
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std::vector<Sink> Sinks;
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TaintConfiguration() = default;
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TaintConfiguration(const TaintConfiguration &) = default;
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TaintConfiguration(TaintConfiguration &&) = default;
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TaintConfiguration &operator=(const TaintConfiguration &) = default;
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TaintConfiguration &operator=(TaintConfiguration &&) = default;
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};
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struct GenericTaintRuleParser {
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GenericTaintRuleParser(CheckerManager &Mgr) : Mgr(Mgr) {}
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/// Container type used to gather call identification objects grouped into
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/// pairs with their corresponding taint rules. It is temporary as it is used
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/// to finally initialize RuleLookupTy, which is considered to be immutable.
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using RulesContTy = std::vector<std::pair<CallDescription, GenericTaintRule>>;
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RulesContTy parseConfiguration(const std::string &Option,
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TaintConfiguration &&Config) const;
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private:
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using NamePartsTy = llvm::SmallVector<SmallString<32>, 2>;
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/// Validate part of the configuration, which contains a list of argument
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/// indexes.
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void validateArgVector(const std::string &Option, const ArgVecTy &Args) const;
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template <typename Config> static NamePartsTy parseNameParts(const Config &C);
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// Takes the config and creates a CallDescription for it and associates a Rule
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// with that.
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template <typename Config>
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static void consumeRulesFromConfig(const Config &C, GenericTaintRule &&Rule,
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RulesContTy &Rules);
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void parseConfig(const std::string &Option, TaintConfiguration::Sink &&P,
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RulesContTy &Rules) const;
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void parseConfig(const std::string &Option, TaintConfiguration::Filter &&P,
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RulesContTy &Rules) const;
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void parseConfig(const std::string &Option,
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TaintConfiguration::Propagation &&P,
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RulesContTy &Rules) const;
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CheckerManager &Mgr;
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};
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class GenericTaintChecker : public Checker<check::PreCall, check::PostCall> {
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public:
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static void *getTag() {
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static int Tag;
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return &Tag;
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}
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void checkPreCall(const CallEvent &Call, CheckerContext &C) const;
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void checkPostCall(const CallEvent &Call, CheckerContext &C) const;
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void printState(raw_ostream &Out, ProgramStateRef State, const char *NL,
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const char *Sep) const override;
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/// Generate a report if the expression is tainted or points to tainted data.
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bool generateReportIfTainted(const Expr *E, StringRef Msg,
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CheckerContext &C) const;
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private:
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const BugType BT{this, "Use of Untrusted Data", "Untrusted Data"};
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bool checkUncontrolledFormatString(const CallEvent &Call,
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CheckerContext &C) const;
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void taintUnsafeSocketProtocol(const CallEvent &Call,
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CheckerContext &C) const;
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/// Default taint rules are initilized with the help of a CheckerContext to
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/// access the names of built-in functions like memcpy.
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void initTaintRules(CheckerContext &C) const;
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/// CallDescription currently cannot restrict matches to the global namespace
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/// only, which is why multiple CallDescriptionMaps are used, as we want to
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/// disambiguate global C functions from functions inside user-defined
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/// namespaces.
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// TODO: Remove separation to simplify matching logic once CallDescriptions
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// are more expressive.
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mutable Optional<RuleLookupTy> StaticTaintRules;
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mutable Optional<RuleLookupTy> DynamicTaintRules;
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};
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} // end of anonymous namespace
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/// YAML serialization mapping.
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LLVM_YAML_IS_SEQUENCE_VECTOR(TaintConfiguration::Sink)
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LLVM_YAML_IS_SEQUENCE_VECTOR(TaintConfiguration::Filter)
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LLVM_YAML_IS_SEQUENCE_VECTOR(TaintConfiguration::Propagation)
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namespace llvm {
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namespace yaml {
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template <> struct MappingTraits<TaintConfiguration> {
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static void mapping(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration &Config) {
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IO.mapOptional("Propagations", Config.Propagations);
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IO.mapOptional("Filters", Config.Filters);
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IO.mapOptional("Sinks", Config.Sinks);
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}
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};
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template <> struct MappingTraits<TaintConfiguration::Sink> {
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static void mapping(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration::Sink &Sink) {
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IO.mapRequired("Name", Sink.Name);
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IO.mapOptional("Scope", Sink.Scope);
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IO.mapRequired("Args", Sink.SinkArgs);
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}
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};
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template <> struct MappingTraits<TaintConfiguration::Filter> {
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static void mapping(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration::Filter &Filter) {
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IO.mapRequired("Name", Filter.Name);
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IO.mapOptional("Scope", Filter.Scope);
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IO.mapRequired("Args", Filter.FilterArgs);
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}
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};
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template <> struct MappingTraits<TaintConfiguration::Propagation> {
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static void mapping(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration::Propagation &Propagation) {
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IO.mapRequired("Name", Propagation.Name);
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IO.mapOptional("Scope", Propagation.Scope);
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IO.mapOptional("SrcArgs", Propagation.SrcArgs);
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IO.mapOptional("DstArgs", Propagation.DstArgs);
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IO.mapOptional("VariadicType", Propagation.VarType);
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IO.mapOptional("VariadicIndex", Propagation.VarIndex);
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}
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};
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template <> struct ScalarEnumerationTraits<TaintConfiguration::VariadicType> {
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static void enumeration(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration::VariadicType &Value) {
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IO.enumCase(Value, "None", TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::None);
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IO.enumCase(Value, "Src", TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::Src);
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IO.enumCase(Value, "Dst", TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::Dst);
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}
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};
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} // namespace yaml
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} // namespace llvm
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/// A set which is used to pass information from call pre-visit instruction
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/// to the call post-visit. The values are signed integers, which are either
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/// ReturnValueIndex, or indexes of the pointer/reference argument, which
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/// points to data, which should be tainted on return.
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REGISTER_SET_WITH_PROGRAMSTATE(TaintArgsOnPostVisit, ArgIdxTy)
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void GenericTaintRuleParser::validateArgVector(const std::string &Option,
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const ArgVecTy &Args) const {
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for (ArgIdxTy Arg : Args) {
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if (Arg < ReturnValueIndex) {
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Mgr.reportInvalidCheckerOptionValue(
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Mgr.getChecker<GenericTaintChecker>(), Option,
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"an argument number for propagation rules greater or equal to -1");
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}
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}
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}
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template <typename Config>
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GenericTaintRuleParser::NamePartsTy
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GenericTaintRuleParser::parseNameParts(const Config &C) {
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NamePartsTy NameParts;
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if (!C.Scope.empty()) {
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// If the Scope argument contains multiple "::" parts, those are considered
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// namespace identifiers.
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llvm::SmallVector<StringRef, 2> NSParts;
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StringRef{C.Scope}.split(NSParts, "::", /*MaxSplit*/ -1,
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/*KeepEmpty*/ false);
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NameParts.append(NSParts.begin(), NSParts.end());
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}
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NameParts.emplace_back(C.Name);
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return NameParts;
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}
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template <typename Config>
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void GenericTaintRuleParser::consumeRulesFromConfig(const Config &C,
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GenericTaintRule &&Rule,
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RulesContTy &Rules) {
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NamePartsTy NameParts = parseNameParts(C);
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llvm::SmallVector<const char *, 2> CallDescParts{NameParts.size()};
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llvm::transform(NameParts, CallDescParts.begin(),
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[](SmallString<32> &S) { return S.c_str(); });
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Rules.emplace_back(CallDescription(CallDescParts), std::move(Rule));
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}
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void GenericTaintRuleParser::parseConfig(const std::string &Option,
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TaintConfiguration::Sink &&S,
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RulesContTy &Rules) const {
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validateArgVector(Option, S.SinkArgs);
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consumeRulesFromConfig(S, GenericTaintRule::Sink(std::move(S.SinkArgs)),
|
|
Rules);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void GenericTaintRuleParser::parseConfig(const std::string &Option,
|
|
TaintConfiguration::Filter &&S,
|
|
RulesContTy &Rules) const {
|
|
validateArgVector(Option, S.FilterArgs);
|
|
consumeRulesFromConfig(S, GenericTaintRule::Filter(std::move(S.FilterArgs)),
|
|
Rules);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void GenericTaintRuleParser::parseConfig(const std::string &Option,
|
|
TaintConfiguration::Propagation &&P,
|
|
RulesContTy &Rules) const {
|
|
validateArgVector(Option, P.SrcArgs);
|
|
validateArgVector(Option, P.DstArgs);
|
|
bool IsSrcVariadic = P.VarType == TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::Src;
|
|
bool IsDstVariadic = P.VarType == TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::Dst;
|
|
Optional<ArgIdxTy> JustVarIndex = P.VarIndex;
|
|
|
|
ArgSet SrcDesc(std::move(P.SrcArgs), IsSrcVariadic ? JustVarIndex : None);
|
|
ArgSet DstDesc(std::move(P.DstArgs), IsDstVariadic ? JustVarIndex : None);
|
|
|
|
consumeRulesFromConfig(
|
|
P, GenericTaintRule::Prop(std::move(SrcDesc), std::move(DstDesc)), Rules);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
GenericTaintRuleParser::RulesContTy
|
|
GenericTaintRuleParser::parseConfiguration(const std::string &Option,
|
|
TaintConfiguration &&Config) const {
|
|
|
|
RulesContTy Rules;
|
|
|
|
for (auto &F : Config.Filters)
|
|
parseConfig(Option, std::move(F), Rules);
|
|
|
|
for (auto &S : Config.Sinks)
|
|
parseConfig(Option, std::move(S), Rules);
|
|
|
|
for (auto &P : Config.Propagations)
|
|
parseConfig(Option, std::move(P), Rules);
|
|
|
|
return Rules;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void GenericTaintChecker::initTaintRules(CheckerContext &C) const {
|
|
// Check for exact name match for functions without builtin substitutes.
|
|
// Use qualified name, because these are C functions without namespace.
|
|
|
|
if (StaticTaintRules || DynamicTaintRules)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
using RulesConstructionTy =
|
|
std::vector<std::pair<CallDescription, GenericTaintRule>>;
|
|
using TR = GenericTaintRule;
|
|
|
|
const Builtin::Context &BI = C.getASTContext().BuiltinInfo;
|
|
|
|
RulesConstructionTy GlobalCRules{
|
|
// Sources
|
|
{{"fdopen"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"fopen"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"freopen"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"getch"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"getchar"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"getchar_unlocked"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"gets"}, TR::Source({{0}, ReturnValueIndex})},
|
|
{{"scanf"}, TR::Source({{}, 1})},
|
|
{{"wgetch"}, TR::Source({{}, ReturnValueIndex})},
|
|
|
|
// Props
|
|
{{"atoi"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"atol"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"atoll"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"fgetc"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"fgetln"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"fgets"}, TR::Prop({{2}}, {{0}, ReturnValueIndex})},
|
|
{{"fscanf"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{}, 2})},
|
|
{{"sscanf"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{}, 2})},
|
|
{{"getc"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"getc_unlocked"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"getdelim"}, TR::Prop({{3}}, {{0}})},
|
|
{{"getline"}, TR::Prop({{2}}, {{0}})},
|
|
{{"getw"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"pread"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1, 2, 3}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"read"}, TR::Prop({{0, 2}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"strchr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"strrchr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"tolower"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{"toupper"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrncat)}},
|
|
TR::Prop({{1, 2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrlcpy)}},
|
|
TR::Prop({{1, 2}}, {{0}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrlcat)}},
|
|
TR::Prop({{1, 2}}, {{0}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"snprintf"}},
|
|
TR::Prop({{1}, 3}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"sprintf"}},
|
|
TR::Prop({{1}, 2}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"strcpy"}},
|
|
TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"stpcpy"}},
|
|
TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"strcat"}},
|
|
TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"strdup"}}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"strdupa"}}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"wcsdup"}}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
|
|
|
|
// Sinks
|
|
{{"system"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{"popen"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{"execl"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{"execle"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{"execlp"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{"execvp"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{"execvP"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{"execve"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{"dlopen"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"malloc"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"calloc"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"alloca"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"memccpy"}}, TR::Sink({{3}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"realloc"}}, TR::Sink({{1}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{{"setproctitle"}}, TR::Sink({{0}, 1}, MsgUncontrolledFormatString)},
|
|
{{{"setproctitle_fast"}},
|
|
TR::Sink({{0}, 1}, MsgUncontrolledFormatString)},
|
|
|
|
// SinkProps
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, BI.getName(Builtin::BImemcpy)},
|
|
TR::SinkProp({{2}}, {{1, 2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}},
|
|
MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BImemmove)}},
|
|
TR::SinkProp({{2}}, {{1, 2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}},
|
|
MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrncpy)}},
|
|
TR::SinkProp({{2}}, {{1, 2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}},
|
|
MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrndup)}},
|
|
TR::SinkProp({{1}}, {{0, 1}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}},
|
|
MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
|
|
{{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"bcopy"}},
|
|
TR::SinkProp({{2}}, {{0, 2}}, {{1}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)}};
|
|
|
|
// `getenv` returns taint only in untrusted environments.
|
|
if (TR::UntrustedEnv(C)) {
|
|
// void setproctitle_init(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
|
|
GlobalCRules.push_back(
|
|
{{{"setproctitle_init"}}, TR::Sink({{2}}, MsgCustomSink)});
|
|
GlobalCRules.push_back({{"getenv"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
StaticTaintRules.emplace(std::make_move_iterator(GlobalCRules.begin()),
|
|
std::make_move_iterator(GlobalCRules.end()));
|
|
|
|
// User-provided taint configuration.
|
|
CheckerManager *Mgr = C.getAnalysisManager().getCheckerManager();
|
|
assert(Mgr);
|
|
GenericTaintRuleParser ConfigParser{*Mgr};
|
|
std::string Option{"Config"};
|
|
StringRef ConfigFile =
|
|
Mgr->getAnalyzerOptions().getCheckerStringOption(this, Option);
|
|
llvm::Optional<TaintConfiguration> Config =
|
|
getConfiguration<TaintConfiguration>(*Mgr, this, Option, ConfigFile);
|
|
if (!Config) {
|
|
// We don't have external taint config, no parsing required.
|
|
DynamicTaintRules = RuleLookupTy{};
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
GenericTaintRuleParser::RulesContTy Rules{
|
|
ConfigParser.parseConfiguration(Option, std::move(Config.getValue()))};
|
|
|
|
DynamicTaintRules.emplace(std::make_move_iterator(Rules.begin()),
|
|
std::make_move_iterator(Rules.end()));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void GenericTaintChecker::checkPreCall(const CallEvent &Call,
|
|
CheckerContext &C) const {
|
|
initTaintRules(C);
|
|
|
|
// FIXME: this should be much simpler.
|
|
if (const auto *Rule =
|
|
Call.isGlobalCFunction() ? StaticTaintRules->lookup(Call) : nullptr)
|
|
Rule->process(*this, Call, C);
|
|
else if (const auto *Rule = DynamicTaintRules->lookup(Call))
|
|
Rule->process(*this, Call, C);
|
|
|
|
// FIXME: These edge cases are to be eliminated from here eventually.
|
|
//
|
|
// Additional check that is not supported by CallDescription.
|
|
// TODO: Make CallDescription be able to match attributes such as printf-like
|
|
// arguments.
|
|
checkUncontrolledFormatString(Call, C);
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Modeling sockets should be done in a specific checker.
|
|
// Socket is a source, which taints the return value.
|
|
taintUnsafeSocketProtocol(Call, C);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void GenericTaintChecker::checkPostCall(const CallEvent &Call,
|
|
CheckerContext &C) const {
|
|
// Set the marked values as tainted. The return value only accessible from
|
|
// checkPostStmt.
|
|
ProgramStateRef State = C.getState();
|
|
|
|
// Depending on what was tainted at pre-visit, we determined a set of
|
|
// arguments which should be tainted after the function returns. These are
|
|
// stored in the state as TaintArgsOnPostVisit set.
|
|
TaintArgsOnPostVisitTy TaintArgs = State->get<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>();
|
|
if (TaintArgs.isEmpty())
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for (ArgIdxTy ArgNum : TaintArgs) {
|
|
// Special handling for the tainted return value.
|
|
if (ArgNum == ReturnValueIndex) {
|
|
State = addTaint(State, Call.getReturnValue());
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The arguments are pointer arguments. The data they are pointing at is
|
|
// tainted after the call.
|
|
if (auto V = getPointeeOf(C, Call.getArgSVal(ArgNum)))
|
|
State = addTaint(State, *V);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Clear up the taint info from the state.
|
|
State = State->remove<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>();
|
|
C.addTransition(State);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void GenericTaintChecker::printState(raw_ostream &Out, ProgramStateRef State,
|
|
const char *NL, const char *Sep) const {
|
|
printTaint(State, Out, NL, Sep);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void GenericTaintRule::process(const GenericTaintChecker &Checker,
|
|
const CallEvent &Call, CheckerContext &C) const {
|
|
ProgramStateRef State = C.getState();
|
|
const ArgIdxTy CallNumArgs = fromArgumentCount(Call.getNumArgs());
|
|
|
|
/// Iterate every call argument, and get their corresponding Expr and SVal.
|
|
const auto ForEachCallArg = [&C, &Call, CallNumArgs](auto &&Fun) {
|
|
for (ArgIdxTy I = ReturnValueIndex; I < CallNumArgs; ++I) {
|
|
const Expr *E = GetArgExpr(I, Call);
|
|
Fun(I, E, C.getSVal(E));
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/// Check for taint sinks.
|
|
ForEachCallArg([this, &Checker, &C, &State](ArgIdxTy I, const Expr *E, SVal) {
|
|
if (SinkArgs.contains(I) && isTaintedOrPointsToTainted(E, State, C))
|
|
Checker.generateReportIfTainted(E, SinkMsg.getValueOr(MsgCustomSink), C);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/// Check for taint filters.
|
|
ForEachCallArg([this, &C, &State](ArgIdxTy I, const Expr *E, SVal S) {
|
|
if (FilterArgs.contains(I)) {
|
|
State = removeTaint(State, S);
|
|
if (auto P = getPointeeOf(C, S))
|
|
State = removeTaint(State, *P);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/// Check for taint propagation sources.
|
|
/// A rule is relevant if PropSrcArgs is empty, or if any of its signified
|
|
/// args are tainted in context of the current CallEvent.
|
|
bool IsMatching = PropSrcArgs.isEmpty();
|
|
ForEachCallArg(
|
|
[this, &C, &IsMatching, &State](ArgIdxTy I, const Expr *E, SVal) {
|
|
IsMatching = IsMatching || (PropSrcArgs.contains(I) &&
|
|
isTaintedOrPointsToTainted(E, State, C));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (!IsMatching)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
const auto WouldEscape = [](SVal V, QualType Ty) -> bool {
|
|
if (!V.getAs<Loc>())
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
const bool IsNonConstRef = Ty->isReferenceType() && !Ty.isConstQualified();
|
|
const bool IsNonConstPtr =
|
|
Ty->isPointerType() && !Ty->getPointeeType().isConstQualified();
|
|
|
|
return IsNonConstRef || IsNonConstPtr;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/// Propagate taint where it is necessary.
|
|
ForEachCallArg(
|
|
[this, &State, WouldEscape](ArgIdxTy I, const Expr *E, SVal V) {
|
|
if (PropDstArgs.contains(I))
|
|
State = State->add<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>(I);
|
|
|
|
// TODO: We should traverse all reachable memory regions via the
|
|
// escaping parameter. Instead of doing that we simply mark only the
|
|
// referred memory region as tainted.
|
|
if (WouldEscape(V, E->getType()))
|
|
State = State->add<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>(I);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
C.addTransition(State);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool GenericTaintRule::UntrustedEnv(CheckerContext &C) {
|
|
return !C.getAnalysisManager()
|
|
.getAnalyzerOptions()
|
|
.ShouldAssumeControlledEnvironment;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool GenericTaintChecker::generateReportIfTainted(const Expr *E, StringRef Msg,
|
|
CheckerContext &C) const {
|
|
assert(E);
|
|
Optional<SVal> TaintedSVal{getTaintedPointeeOrPointer(C, C.getSVal(E))};
|
|
|
|
if (!TaintedSVal)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
// Generate diagnostic.
|
|
if (ExplodedNode *N = C.generateNonFatalErrorNode()) {
|
|
auto report = std::make_unique<PathSensitiveBugReport>(BT, Msg, N);
|
|
report->addRange(E->getSourceRange());
|
|
report->addVisitor(std::make_unique<TaintBugVisitor>(*TaintedSVal));
|
|
C.emitReport(std::move(report));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// TODO: remove checking for printf format attributes and socket whitelisting
|
|
/// from GenericTaintChecker, and that means the following functions:
|
|
/// getPrintfFormatArgumentNum,
|
|
/// GenericTaintChecker::checkUncontrolledFormatString,
|
|
/// GenericTaintChecker::taintUnsafeSocketProtocol
|
|
|
|
static bool getPrintfFormatArgumentNum(const CallEvent &Call,
|
|
const CheckerContext &C,
|
|
ArgIdxTy &ArgNum) {
|
|
// Find if the function contains a format string argument.
|
|
// Handles: fprintf, printf, sprintf, snprintf, vfprintf, vprintf, vsprintf,
|
|
// vsnprintf, syslog, custom annotated functions.
|
|
const Decl *CallDecl = Call.getDecl();
|
|
if (!CallDecl)
|
|
return false;
|
|
const FunctionDecl *FDecl = CallDecl->getAsFunction();
|
|
if (!FDecl)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
const ArgIdxTy CallNumArgs = fromArgumentCount(Call.getNumArgs());
|
|
|
|
for (const auto *Format : FDecl->specific_attrs<FormatAttr>()) {
|
|
ArgNum = Format->getFormatIdx() - 1;
|
|
if ((Format->getType()->getName() == "printf") && CallNumArgs > ArgNum)
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool GenericTaintChecker::checkUncontrolledFormatString(
|
|
const CallEvent &Call, CheckerContext &C) const {
|
|
// Check if the function contains a format string argument.
|
|
ArgIdxTy ArgNum = 0;
|
|
if (!getPrintfFormatArgumentNum(Call, C, ArgNum))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
// If either the format string content or the pointer itself are tainted,
|
|
// warn.
|
|
return generateReportIfTainted(Call.getArgExpr(ArgNum),
|
|
MsgUncontrolledFormatString, C);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void GenericTaintChecker::taintUnsafeSocketProtocol(const CallEvent &Call,
|
|
CheckerContext &C) const {
|
|
if (Call.getNumArgs() < 1)
|
|
return;
|
|
const IdentifierInfo *ID = Call.getCalleeIdentifier();
|
|
if (!ID)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (!ID->getName().equals("socket"))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
SourceLocation DomLoc = Call.getArgExpr(0)->getExprLoc();
|
|
StringRef DomName = C.getMacroNameOrSpelling(DomLoc);
|
|
// Allow internal communication protocols.
|
|
bool SafeProtocol = DomName.equals("AF_SYSTEM") ||
|
|
DomName.equals("AF_LOCAL") || DomName.equals("AF_UNIX") ||
|
|
DomName.equals("AF_RESERVED_36");
|
|
if (SafeProtocol)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
C.addTransition(C.getState()->add<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>(ReturnValueIndex));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Checker registration
|
|
|
|
void ento::registerGenericTaintChecker(CheckerManager &Mgr) {
|
|
Mgr.registerChecker<GenericTaintChecker>();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ento::shouldRegisterGenericTaintChecker(const CheckerManager &mgr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|