forked from OSchip/llvm-project
268 lines
9.0 KiB
C++
268 lines
9.0 KiB
C++
// MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp - Check for malloc overflows -*- C++ -*-=//
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//
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// The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure
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//
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// This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source
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// License. See LICENSE.TXT for details.
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//
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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//
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// This checker detects a common memory allocation security flaw.
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// Suppose 'unsigned int n' comes from an untrusted source. If the
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// code looks like 'malloc (n * 4)', and an attacker can make 'n' be
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// say MAX_UINT/4+2, then instead of allocating the correct 'n' 4-byte
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// elements, this will actually allocate only two because of overflow.
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// Then when the rest of the program attempts to store values past the
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// second element, these values will actually overwrite other items in
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// the heap, probably allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code.
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//
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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#include "ClangSACheckers.h"
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#include "clang/AST/EvaluatedExprVisitor.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/AnalysisManager.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/Checker.h"
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#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/BugReporter/BugReporter.h"
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#include "llvm/ADT/SmallVector.h"
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using namespace clang;
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using namespace ento;
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namespace {
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struct MallocOverflowCheck {
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const BinaryOperator *mulop;
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const Expr *variable;
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MallocOverflowCheck (const BinaryOperator *m, const Expr *v)
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: mulop(m), variable (v)
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{}
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};
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class MallocOverflowSecurityChecker : public Checker<check::ASTCodeBody> {
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public:
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void checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D, AnalysisManager &mgr,
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BugReporter &BR) const;
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void CheckMallocArgument(
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llvm::SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
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const Expr *TheArgument, ASTContext &Context) const;
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void OutputPossibleOverflows(
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llvm::SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
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const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const;
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};
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} // end anonymous namespace
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void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::CheckMallocArgument(
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llvm::SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
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const Expr *TheArgument,
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ASTContext &Context) const {
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/* Look for a linear combination with a single variable, and at least
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one multiplication.
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Reject anything that applies to the variable: an explicit cast,
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conditional expression, an operation that could reduce the range
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of the result, or anything too complicated :-). */
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const Expr * e = TheArgument;
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const BinaryOperator * mulop = NULL;
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for (;;) {
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e = e->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
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if (isa<BinaryOperator>(e)) {
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const BinaryOperator * binop = dyn_cast<BinaryOperator>(e);
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BinaryOperatorKind opc = binop->getOpcode();
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// TODO: ignore multiplications by 1, reject if multiplied by 0.
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if (mulop == NULL && opc == BO_Mul)
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mulop = binop;
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if (opc != BO_Mul && opc != BO_Add && opc != BO_Sub && opc != BO_Shl)
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return;
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const Expr *lhs = binop->getLHS();
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const Expr *rhs = binop->getRHS();
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if (rhs->isEvaluatable(Context))
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e = lhs;
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else if ((opc == BO_Add || opc == BO_Mul)
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&& lhs->isEvaluatable(Context))
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e = rhs;
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else
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return;
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}
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else if (isa<DeclRefExpr>(e) || isa<MemberExpr>(e))
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break;
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else
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return;
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}
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if (mulop == NULL)
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return;
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// We've found the right structure of malloc argument, now save
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// the data so when the body of the function is completely available
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// we can check for comparisons.
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// TODO: Could push this into the innermost scope where 'e' is
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// defined, rather than the whole function.
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PossibleMallocOverflows.push_back(MallocOverflowCheck(mulop, e));
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}
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namespace {
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// A worker class for OutputPossibleOverflows.
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class CheckOverflowOps :
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public EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps> {
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public:
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typedef llvm::SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> theVecType;
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private:
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theVecType &toScanFor;
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ASTContext &Context;
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bool isIntZeroExpr(const Expr *E) const {
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if (!E->getType()->isIntegralOrEnumerationType())
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return false;
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llvm::APSInt Result;
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if (E->EvaluateAsInt(Result, Context))
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return Result == 0;
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return false;
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}
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void CheckExpr(const Expr *E_p) {
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const Expr *E = E_p->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
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theVecType::iterator i = toScanFor.end();
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theVecType::iterator e = toScanFor.begin();
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if (const DeclRefExpr *DR = dyn_cast<DeclRefExpr>(E)) {
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const Decl * EdreD = DR->getDecl();
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while (i != e) {
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--i;
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if (const DeclRefExpr *DR_i = dyn_cast<DeclRefExpr>(i->variable)) {
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if (DR_i->getDecl() == EdreD)
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i = toScanFor.erase(i);
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}
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}
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}
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else if (isa<MemberExpr>(E)) {
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// No points-to analysis, just look at the member
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const Decl * EmeMD = dyn_cast<MemberExpr>(E)->getMemberDecl();
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while (i != e) {
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--i;
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if (isa<MemberExpr>(i->variable)) {
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if (dyn_cast<MemberExpr>(i->variable)->getMemberDecl() == EmeMD)
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i = toScanFor.erase (i);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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public:
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void VisitBinaryOperator(BinaryOperator *E) {
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if (E->isComparisonOp()) {
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const Expr * lhs = E->getLHS();
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const Expr * rhs = E->getRHS();
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// Ignore comparisons against zero, since they generally don't
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// protect against an overflow.
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if (!isIntZeroExpr(lhs) && ! isIntZeroExpr(rhs)) {
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CheckExpr(lhs);
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CheckExpr(rhs);
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}
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}
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EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps>::VisitBinaryOperator(E);
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}
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/* We specifically ignore loop conditions, because they're typically
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not error checks. */
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void VisitWhileStmt(WhileStmt *S) {
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return this->Visit(S->getBody());
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}
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void VisitForStmt(ForStmt *S) {
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return this->Visit(S->getBody());
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}
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void VisitDoStmt(DoStmt *S) {
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return this->Visit(S->getBody());
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}
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CheckOverflowOps(theVecType &v, ASTContext &ctx)
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: EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps>(ctx),
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toScanFor(v), Context(ctx)
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{ }
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};
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}
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// OutputPossibleOverflows - We've found a possible overflow earlier,
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// now check whether Body might contain a comparison which might be
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// preventing the overflow.
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// This doesn't do flow analysis, range analysis, or points-to analysis; it's
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// just a dumb "is there a comparison" scan. The aim here is to
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// detect the most blatent cases of overflow and educate the
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// programmer.
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void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::OutputPossibleOverflows(
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llvm::SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
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const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const {
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// By far the most common case: nothing to check.
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if (PossibleMallocOverflows.empty())
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return;
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// Delete any possible overflows which have a comparison.
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CheckOverflowOps c(PossibleMallocOverflows, BR.getContext());
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c.Visit(mgr.getAnalysisDeclContext(D)->getBody());
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// Output warnings for all overflows that are left.
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for (CheckOverflowOps::theVecType::iterator
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i = PossibleMallocOverflows.begin(),
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e = PossibleMallocOverflows.end();
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i != e;
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++i) {
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SourceRange R = i->mulop->getSourceRange();
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BR.EmitBasicReport(D, "malloc() size overflow", categories::UnixAPI,
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"the computation of the size of the memory allocation may overflow",
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PathDiagnosticLocation::createOperatorLoc(i->mulop,
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BR.getSourceManager()), &R, 1);
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}
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}
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void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D,
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AnalysisManager &mgr,
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BugReporter &BR) const {
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CFG *cfg = mgr.getCFG(D);
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if (!cfg)
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return;
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// A list of variables referenced in possibly overflowing malloc operands.
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llvm::SmallVector<MallocOverflowCheck, 2> PossibleMallocOverflows;
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for (CFG::iterator it = cfg->begin(), ei = cfg->end(); it != ei; ++it) {
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CFGBlock *block = *it;
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for (CFGBlock::iterator bi = block->begin(), be = block->end();
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bi != be; ++bi) {
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if (const CFGStmt *CS = bi->getAs<CFGStmt>()) {
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if (const CallExpr *TheCall = dyn_cast<CallExpr>(CS->getStmt())) {
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// Get the callee.
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const FunctionDecl *FD = TheCall->getDirectCallee();
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if (!FD)
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return;
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// Get the name of the callee. If it's a builtin, strip off the prefix.
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IdentifierInfo *FnInfo = FD->getIdentifier();
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if (!FnInfo)
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return;
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if (FnInfo->isStr ("malloc") || FnInfo->isStr ("_MALLOC")) {
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if (TheCall->getNumArgs() == 1)
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CheckMallocArgument(PossibleMallocOverflows, TheCall->getArg(0),
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mgr.getASTContext());
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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OutputPossibleOverflows(PossibleMallocOverflows, D, BR, mgr);
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}
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void ento::registerMallocOverflowSecurityChecker(CheckerManager &mgr) {
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mgr.registerChecker<MallocOverflowSecurityChecker>();
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}
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