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=======================================================
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Hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer Design Documentation
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=======================================================
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This page is a design document for
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**hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer** (or **HWASAN**)
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a tool similar to :doc:`AddressSanitizer`,
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but based on partial hardware assistance.
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Introduction
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============
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:doc:`AddressSanitizer`
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tags every 8 bytes of the application memory with a 1 byte tag (using *shadow memory*),
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uses *redzones* to find buffer-overflows and
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*quarantine* to find use-after-free.
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The redzones, the quarantine, and, to a less extent, the shadow, are the
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sources of AddressSanitizer's memory overhead.
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See the `AddressSanitizer paper`_ for details.
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AArch64 has `Address Tagging`_ (or top-byte-ignore, TBI), a hardware feature that allows
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software to use the 8 most significant bits of a 64-bit pointer as
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a tag. HWASAN uses `Address Tagging`_
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to implement a memory safety tool, similar to :doc:`AddressSanitizer`,
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but with smaller memory overhead and slightly different (mostly better)
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accuracy guarantees.
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Intel's `Linear Address Masking`_ (LAM) also provides address tagging for
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x86_64, though it is not widely available in hardware yet. For x86_64, HWASAN
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has a limited implementation using page aliasing instead.
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Algorithm
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=========
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* Every heap/stack/global memory object is forcibly aligned by `TG` bytes
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(`TG` is e.g. 16 or 64). We call `TG` the **tagging granularity**.
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* For every such object a random `TS`-bit tag `T` is chosen (`TS`, or tag size, is e.g. 4 or 8)
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* The pointer to the object is tagged with `T`.
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* The memory for the object is also tagged with `T` (using a `TG=>1` shadow memory)
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* Every load and store is instrumented to read the memory tag and compare it
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with the pointer tag, exception is raised on tag mismatch.
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For a more detailed discussion of this approach see https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.09517.pdf
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Short granules
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--------------
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A short granule is a granule of size between 1 and `TG-1` bytes. The size
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of a short granule is stored at the location in shadow memory where the
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granule's tag is normally stored, while the granule's actual tag is stored
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in the last byte of the granule. This means that in order to verify that a
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pointer tag matches a memory tag, HWASAN must check for two possibilities:
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* the pointer tag is equal to the memory tag in shadow memory, or
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* the shadow memory tag is actually a short granule size, the value being loaded
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is in bounds of the granule and the pointer tag is equal to the last byte of
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the granule.
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Pointer tags between 1 to `TG-1` are possible and are as likely as any other
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tag. This means that these tags in memory have two interpretations: the full
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tag interpretation (where the pointer tag is between 1 and `TG-1` and the
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last byte of the granule is ordinary data) and the short tag interpretation
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(where the pointer tag is stored in the granule).
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When HWASAN detects an error near a memory tag between 1 and `TG-1`, it
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will show both the memory tag and the last byte of the granule. Currently,
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it is up to the user to disambiguate the two possibilities.
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Instrumentation
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===============
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Memory Accesses
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---------------
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In the majority of cases, memory accesses are prefixed with a call to
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an outlined instruction sequence that verifies the tags. The code size
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and performance overhead of the call is reduced by using a custom calling
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convention that
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* preserves most registers, and
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* is specialized to the register containing the address, and the type and
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size of the memory access.
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Currently, the following sequence is used:
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.. code-block:: none
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// int foo(int *a) { return *a; }
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// clang -O2 --target=aarch64-linux-android30 -fsanitize=hwaddress -S -o - load.c
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[...]
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foo:
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stp x30, x20, [sp, #-16]!
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adrp x20, :got:__hwasan_shadow // load shadow address from GOT into x20
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ldr x20, [x20, :got_lo12:__hwasan_shadow]
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bl __hwasan_check_x0_2_short_v2 // call outlined tag check
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// (arguments: x0 = address, x20 = shadow base;
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// "2" encodes the access type and size)
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ldr w0, [x0] // inline load
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ldp x30, x20, [sp], #16
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ret
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[...]
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__hwasan_check_x0_2_short_v2:
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sbfx x16, x0, #4, #52 // shadow offset
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ldrb w16, [x20, x16] // load shadow tag
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cmp x16, x0, lsr #56 // extract address tag, compare with shadow tag
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b.ne .Ltmp0 // jump to short tag handler on mismatch
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.Ltmp1:
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ret
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.Ltmp0:
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cmp w16, #15 // is this a short tag?
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b.hi .Ltmp2 // if not, error
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and x17, x0, #0xf // find the address's position in the short granule
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add x17, x17, #3 // adjust to the position of the last byte loaded
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cmp w16, w17 // check that position is in bounds
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b.ls .Ltmp2 // if not, error
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orr x16, x0, #0xf // compute address of last byte of granule
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ldrb w16, [x16] // load tag from it
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cmp x16, x0, lsr #56 // compare with pointer tag
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b.eq .Ltmp1 // if matches, continue
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.Ltmp2:
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stp x0, x1, [sp, #-256]! // save original x0, x1 on stack (they will be overwritten)
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stp x29, x30, [sp, #232] // create frame record
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mov x1, #2 // set x1 to a constant indicating the type of failure
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adrp x16, :got:__hwasan_tag_mismatch_v2 // call runtime function to save remaining registers and report error
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ldr x16, [x16, :got_lo12:__hwasan_tag_mismatch_v2] // (load address from GOT to avoid potential register clobbers in delay load handler)
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br x16
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Heap
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----
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Tagging the heap memory/pointers is done by `malloc`.
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This can be based on any malloc that forces all objects to be TG-aligned.
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`free` tags the memory with a different tag.
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Stack
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-----
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Stack frames are instrumented by aligning all non-promotable allocas
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by `TG` and tagging stack memory in function prologue and epilogue.
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Tags for different allocas in one function are **not** generated
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independently; doing that in a function with `M` allocas would require
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maintaining `M` live stack pointers, significantly increasing register
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pressure. Instead we generate a single base tag value in the prologue,
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and build the tag for alloca number `M` as `ReTag(BaseTag, M)`, where
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ReTag can be as simple as exclusive-or with constant `M`.
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Stack instrumentation is expected to be a major source of overhead,
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but could be optional.
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Globals
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-------
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Most globals in HWASAN instrumented code are tagged. This is accomplished
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using the following mechanisms:
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* The address of each global has a static tag associated with it. The first
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defined global in a translation unit has a pseudorandom tag associated
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with it, based on the hash of the file path. Subsequent global tags are
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incremental from the previously-assigned tag.
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* The global's tag is added to its symbol address in the object file's symbol
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table. This causes the global's address to be tagged when its address is
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taken.
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* When the address of a global is taken directly (i.e. not via the GOT), a special
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instruction sequence needs to be used to add the tag to the address,
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because the tag would otherwise take the address outside of the small code
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model (4GB on AArch64). No changes are required when the address is taken
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via the GOT because the address stored in the GOT will contain the tag.
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* An associated ``hwasan_globals`` section is emitted for each tagged global,
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which indicates the address of the global, its size and its tag. These
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sections are concatenated by the linker into a single ``hwasan_globals``
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section that is enumerated by the runtime (via an ELF note) when a binary
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is loaded and the memory is tagged accordingly.
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A complete example is given below:
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.. code-block:: none
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// int x = 1; int *f() { return &x; }
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// clang -O2 --target=aarch64-linux-android30 -fsanitize=hwaddress -S -o - global.c
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[...]
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f:
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adrp x0, :pg_hi21_nc:x // set bits 12-63 to upper bits of untagged address
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movk x0, #:prel_g3:x+0x100000000 // set bits 48-63 to tag
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add x0, x0, :lo12:x // set bits 0-11 to lower bits of address
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ret
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[...]
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.data
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.Lx.hwasan:
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.word 1
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.globl x
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.set x, .Lx.hwasan+0x2d00000000000000
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[...]
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.section .note.hwasan.globals,"aG",@note,hwasan.module_ctor,comdat
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.Lhwasan.note:
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.word 8 // namesz
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.word 8 // descsz
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.word 3 // NT_LLVM_HWASAN_GLOBALS
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.asciz "LLVM\000\000\000"
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.word __start_hwasan_globals-.Lhwasan.note
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.word __stop_hwasan_globals-.Lhwasan.note
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[...]
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.section hwasan_globals,"ao",@progbits,.Lx.hwasan,unique,2
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.Lx.hwasan.descriptor:
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.word .Lx.hwasan-.Lx.hwasan.descriptor
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.word 0x2d000004 // tag = 0x2d, size = 4
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Error reporting
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---------------
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Errors are generated by the `HLT` instruction and are handled by a signal handler.
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Attribute
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---------
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HWASAN uses its own LLVM IR Attribute `sanitize_hwaddress` and a matching
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C function attribute. An alternative would be to re-use ASAN's attribute
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`sanitize_address`. The reasons to use a separate attribute are:
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* Users may need to disable ASAN but not HWASAN, or vise versa,
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because the tools have different trade-offs and compatibility issues.
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* LLVM (ideally) does not use flags to decide which pass is being used,
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ASAN or HWASAN are being applied, based on the function attributes.
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This does mean that users of HWASAN may need to add the new attribute
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to the code that already uses the old attribute.
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Comparison with AddressSanitizer
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================================
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HWASAN:
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* Is less portable than :doc:`AddressSanitizer`
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as it relies on hardware `Address Tagging`_ (AArch64).
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Address Tagging can be emulated with compiler instrumentation,
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but it will require the instrumentation to remove the tags before
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any load or store, which is infeasible in any realistic environment
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that contains non-instrumented code.
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* May have compatibility problems if the target code uses higher
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pointer bits for other purposes.
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* May require changes in the OS kernels (e.g. Linux seems to dislike
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tagged pointers passed from address space:
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https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.txt).
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* **Does not require redzones to detect buffer overflows**,
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but the buffer overflow detection is probabilistic, with roughly
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`1/(2**TS)` chance of missing a bug (6.25% or 0.39% with 4 and 8-bit TS
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respectively).
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* **Does not require quarantine to detect heap-use-after-free,
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or stack-use-after-return**.
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The detection is similarly probabilistic.
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The memory overhead of HWASAN is expected to be much smaller
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than that of AddressSanitizer:
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`1/TG` extra memory for the shadow
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and some overhead due to `TG`-aligning all objects.
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Supported architectures
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=======================
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HWASAN relies on `Address Tagging`_ which is only available on AArch64.
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For other 64-bit architectures it is possible to remove the address tags
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before every load and store by compiler instrumentation, but this variant
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will have limited deployability since not all of the code is
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typically instrumented.
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On x86_64, HWASAN utilizes page aliasing to place tags in userspace address
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bits. Currently only heap tagging is supported. The page aliases rely on
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shared memory, which will cause heap memory to be shared between processes if
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the application calls ``fork()``. Therefore x86_64 is really only safe for
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applications that do not fork.
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HWASAN does not currently support 32-bit architectures since they do not
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support `Address Tagging`_ and the address space is too constrained to easily
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implement page aliasing.
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Related Work
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============
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* `SPARC ADI`_ implements a similar tool mostly in hardware.
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* `Effective and Efficient Memory Protection Using Dynamic Tainting`_ discusses
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similar approaches ("lock & key").
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* `Watchdog`_ discussed a heavier, but still somewhat similar
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"lock & key" approach.
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* *TODO: add more "related work" links. Suggestions are welcome.*
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.. _Watchdog: https://www.cis.upenn.edu/acg/papers/isca12_watchdog.pdf
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.. _Effective and Efficient Memory Protection Using Dynamic Tainting: https://www.cc.gatech.edu/~orso/papers/clause.doudalis.orso.prvulovic.pdf
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.. _SPARC ADI: https://lazytyped.blogspot.com/2017/09/getting-started-with-adi.html
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.. _AddressSanitizer paper: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/atc12/atc12-final39.pdf
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.. _Address Tagging: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.den0024a/ch12s05s01.html
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.. _Linear Address Masking: https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.html
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