I did this a long time ago with a janky python script, but now
clang-format has built-in support for this. I fed clang-format every
line with a #include and let it re-sort things according to the precise
LLVM rules for include ordering baked into clang-format these days.
I've reverted a number of files where the results of sorting includes
isn't healthy. Either places where we have legacy code relying on
particular include ordering (where possible, I'll fix these separately)
or where we have particular formatting around #include lines that
I didn't want to disturb in this patch.
This patch is *entirely* mechanical. If you get merge conflicts or
anything, just ignore the changes in this patch and run clang-format
over your #include lines in the files.
Sorry for any noise here, but it is important to keep these things
stable. I was seeing an increasing number of patches with irrelevant
re-ordering of #include lines because clang-format was used. This patch
at least isolates that churn, makes it easy to skip when resolving
conflicts, and gets us to a clean baseline (again).
llvm-svn: 304787
Rename the DEBUG_TYPE to match the names of corresponding passes where
it makes sense. Also establish the pattern of simply referencing
DEBUG_TYPE instead of repeating the passname where possible.
llvm-svn: 303921
This provides a new way to access the TargetMachine through
TargetPassConfig, as a dependency.
The patterns replaced here are:
* Passes handling a null TargetMachine call
`getAnalysisIfAvailable<TargetPassConfig>`.
* Passes not handling a null TargetMachine
`addRequired<TargetPassConfig>` and call
`getAnalysis<TargetPassConfig>`.
* MachineFunctionPasses now use MF.getTarget().
* Remove all the TargetMachine constructors.
* Remove INITIALIZE_TM_PASS.
This fixes a crash when running `llc -start-before prologepilog`.
PEI needs StackProtector, which gets constructed without a TargetMachine
by the pass manager. The StackProtector pass doesn't handle the case
where there is no TargetMachine, so it segfaults.
Related to PR30324.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D33222
llvm-svn: 303360
From a user prospective, it forces the use of an annoying nullptr to mark the end of the vararg, and there's not type checking on the arguments.
The variadic template is an obvious solution to both issues.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D31070
llvm-svn: 299949
Module::getOrInsertFunction is using C-style vararg instead of
variadic templates.
From a user prospective, it forces the use of an annoying nullptr
to mark the end of the vararg, and there's not type checking on the
arguments. The variadic template is an obvious solution to both
issues.
llvm-svn: 299925
Module::getOrInsertFunction is using C-style vararg instead of
variadic templates.
From a user prospective, it forces the use of an annoying nullptr
to mark the end of the vararg, and there's not type checking on the
arguments. The variadic template is an obvious solution to both
issues.
Patch by: Serge Guelton <serge.guelton@telecom-bretagne.eu>
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D31070
llvm-svn: 299699
Stack Smash Protection is not completely free, so in hot code, the overhead it causes can cause performance issues. By adding diagnostic information for which functions have SSP and why, a user can quickly determine what they can do to stop SSP being applied to a specific hot function.
This change adds a remark that is reported by the stack protection code when an instruction or attribute is encountered that causes SSP to be applied.
Patch by: James Henderson
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D29023
llvm-svn: 296483
Stack Smash Protection is not completely free, so in hot code, the overhead it causes can cause performance issues. By adding diagnostic information for which function have SSP and why, a user can quickly determine what they can do to stop SSP being applied to a specific hot function.
This change adds an SSP-specific DiagnosticInfo class and uses of it to the Stack Protection code. A subsequent change to clang will cause the remarks to be emitted when enabled.
Patch by: James Henderson
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D29023
llvm-svn: 294590
This check caused us to skip adding layout information for calls to
alloca in sspreq/sspstrong mode. We check properly for sspstrong later
on (and add the correct layout info when doing so), so removing this
shouldn't hurt.
No test is included, since testing this using lit seems to require
checking for exact offsets in asm, which is something that the lit tests
for this avoid. If someone cares deeply, I'm happy to write a unittest
or something to cover this, but that feels like overkill.
Patch by Daniel Micay.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D22714
llvm-svn: 282022
in order to make sure that its TargetMachine constructor is
registered.
This allows us to run the PEI machine pass with MIR input
(see PR30324).
llvm-svn: 281474
Summary:
This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation
The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch.
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx
* To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347
Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation:
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx
* http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/
* http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html
For the following example:
```
int example(int offset, int index) {
char buffer[10];
memset(buffer, 0xCC, index);
return buffer[index];
}
```
The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check:
```
push ebp
mov ebp,esp
sub esp,50h
[1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)]
[2] xor eax,ebp
[3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax
push ebx
push esi
push edi
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
push eax
push 0CCh
lea ecx,[buffer]
push ecx
call _memset (010610B9h)
add esp,0Ch
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax]
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
[4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4]
[5] xor ecx,ebp
[6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h)
mov esp,ebp
pop ebp
ret
```
The instrumentation above is:
* [1] is loading the global security canary,
* [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot,
* [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary,
* [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling.
Overview of the current stack-protection implementation:
* lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp
* There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation.
* The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie.
* An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast).
* Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling.
* Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation.
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp
* There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls).
* see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration.
* The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr).
* 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie)
* The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'.
* include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h
* Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'.
* lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp
* Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm.
Function-based Instrumentation:
* The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions.
* To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is
* adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h),
* If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue.
* modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation,
* generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp),
* if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp).
Modifications
* adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp)
* adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h)
Results
* IR generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input
```
```
*** Final LLVM Code input to ISel ***
; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong
define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 {
entry:
%StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot
%0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot)
%index.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1
store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4
store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4
%arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0
%1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false)
%2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2
%3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1
%conv = sext i8 %3 to i32
%4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot
call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
ret i32 %conv
}
```
* SelectionDAG generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA
```
```
"?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"
# BB#0: # %entry
pushl %esi
subl $16, %esp
movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
movl 28(%esp), %esi
movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot
leal 2(%esp), %eax
pushl %esi
pushl $204
pushl %eax
calll _memset
addl $12, %esp
movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi
movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot
calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
movl %esi, %eax
addl $16, %esp
popl %esi
retl
```
Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk
Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346
llvm-svn: 272053
With this change, ideally IR pass can always generate llvm.stackguard
call to get the stack guard; but for now there are still IR form stack
guard customizations around (see getIRStackGuard()). Future SSP
customization should go through LOAD_STACK_GUARD.
There is a behavior change: stack guard values are not CSEed anymore,
since we should never reuse the value in case that it has been spilled (and
corrupted). See ssp-guard-spill.ll. This also cause the change of stack
size and codegen in X86 and AArch64 test cases.
Ideally we'd like to know if the guard created in llvm.stackprotector() gets
spilled or not. If the value is spilled, discard the value and reload
stack guard; otherwise reuse the value. This can be done by teaching
register allocator to know how to rematerialize LOAD_STACK_GUARD and
force a rematerialization (which seems hard), or check for spilling in
expandPostRAPseudo. It only makes sense when the stack guard is a global
variable, which requires more instructions to load. Anyway, this seems to go out
of the scope of the current patch.
llvm-svn: 266806
Add StackProtector to SafeStack. This adds limited protection against
data corruption in the caller frame. Current implementation treats
all stack protector levels as -fstack-protector-all.
llvm-svn: 266004
This is a cleanup patch for SSP support in LLVM. There is no functional change.
llvm.stackprotectorcheck is not needed, because SelectionDAG isn't
actually lowering it in SelectBasicBlock; rather, it adds check code in
FinishBasicBlock, ignoring the position where the intrinsic is inserted
(See FindSplitPointForStackProtector()).
llvm-svn: 265851
Bionic has a defined thread-local location for the stack protector
cookie. Emit a direct load instead of going through __stack_chk_guard.
llvm-svn: 265481
This patch removes all weight-related interfaces from BPI and replace
them by probability versions. With this patch, we won't use edge weight
anymore in either IR or MC passes. Edge probabilitiy is a better
representation in terms of CFG update and validation.
Differential revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D15519
llvm-svn: 256263
Summary:
This change is part of a series of commits dedicated to have a single
DataLayout during compilation by using always the one owned by the
module.
Reviewers: echristo
Subscribers: llvm-commits, rafael, yaron.keren
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D11010
From: Mehdi Amini <mehdi.amini@apple.com>
llvm-svn: 241646
Canonicalize access to function attributes to use the simpler API.
getAttributes().getAttribute(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex, Kind)
=> getFnAttribute(Kind)
getAttributes().hasAttribute(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex, Kind)
=> hasFnAttribute(Kind)
Also, add `Function::getFnStackAlignment()`, and canonicalize:
getAttributes().getStackAlignment(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex)
=> getFnStackAlignment()
llvm-svn: 229208
This commit fixes a bug in stack protector pass where edge weights were not set
when new basic blocks were added to lists of successor basic blocks.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D5766
llvm-svn: 222987
This is to be consistent with StringSet and ultimately with the standard
library's associative container insert function.
This lead to updating SmallSet::insert to return pair<iterator, bool>,
and then to update SmallPtrSet::insert to return pair<iterator, bool>,
and then to update all the existing users of those functions...
llvm-svn: 222334
Windows defines NULL to 0, which when used as an argument to a variadic
function, is not a null pointer constant. As a result, Clang's
-Wsentinel fires on this code. Using '0' would be wrong on most 64-bit
platforms, but both MSVC and Clang make it work on Windows. Sidestep the
issue with nullptr.
llvm-svn: 221940
define below all header includes in the lib/CodeGen/... tree. While the
current modules implementation doesn't check for this kind of ODR
violation yet, it is likely to grow support for it in the future. It
also removes one layer of macro pollution across all the included
headers.
Other sub-trees will follow.
llvm-svn: 206837
Previously, SSPBufferSize was assigned the value of the "stack-protector-buffer-size"
attribute after all uses of SSPBufferSize. The effect was that the default
SSPBufferSize was always used during analysis. I moved the check for the
attribute before the analysis; now --param ssp-buffer-size= works correctly again.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D3349
llvm-svn: 206486
This requires a number of steps.
1) Move value_use_iterator into the Value class as an implementation
detail
2) Change it to actually be a *Use* iterator rather than a *User*
iterator.
3) Add an adaptor which is a User iterator that always looks through the
Use to the User.
4) Wrap these in Value::use_iterator and Value::user_iterator typedefs.
5) Add the range adaptors as Value::uses() and Value::users().
6) Update *all* of the callers to correctly distinguish between whether
they wanted a use_iterator (and to explicitly dig out the User when
needed), or a user_iterator which makes the Use itself totally
opaque.
Because #6 requires churning essentially everything that walked the
Use-Def chains, I went ahead and added all of the range adaptors and
switched them to range-based loops where appropriate. Also because the
renaming requires at least churning every line of code, it didn't make
any sense to split these up into multiple commits -- all of which would
touch all of the same lies of code.
The result is still not quite optimal. The Value::use_iterator is a nice
regular iterator, but Value::user_iterator is an iterator over User*s
rather than over the User objects themselves. As a consequence, it fits
a bit awkwardly into the range-based world and it has the weird
extra-dereferencing 'operator->' that so many of our iterators have.
I think this could be fixed by providing something which transforms
a range of T&s into a range of T*s, but that *can* be separated into
another patch, and it isn't yet 100% clear whether this is the right
move.
However, this change gets us most of the benefit and cleans up
a substantial amount of code around Use and User. =]
llvm-svn: 203364
StackProtector keeps a ValueMap of alloca instructions to layout kind tags for
use by PEI and other later passes. When stack coloring replaces one alloca with
a bitcast to another one, the key replacement in this map does not work.
Instead, provide an interface to manage this updating directly. This seems like
an improvement over the old behavior, where the layout map would not get
updated at all when the stack slots were merged. In practice, however, there is
likely no observable difference because PEI only did anything special with
'large array' kinds, and if one large array is merged with another, than the
replacement should already have been a large array.
This is an attempt to unbreak the clang-x86_64-darwin11-RA builder.
llvm-svn: 199684
can be used by both the new pass manager and the old.
This removes it from any of the virtual mess of the pass interfaces and
lets it derive cleanly from the DominatorTreeBase<> template. In turn,
tons of boilerplate interface can be nuked and it turns into a very
straightforward extension of the base DominatorTree interface.
The old analysis pass is now a simple wrapper. The names and style of
this split should match the split between CallGraph and
CallGraphWrapperPass. All of the users of DominatorTree have been
updated to match using many of the same tricks as with CallGraph. The
goal is that the common type remains the resulting DominatorTree rather
than the pass. This will make subsequent work toward the new pass
manager significantly easier.
Also in numerous places things became cleaner because I switched from
re-running the pass (!!! mid way through some other passes run!!!) to
directly recomputing the domtree.
llvm-svn: 199104
subsequent changes are easier to review. About to fix some layering
issues, and wanted to separate out the necessary churn.
Also comment and sink the include of "Windows.h" in three .inc files to
match the usage in Memory.inc.
llvm-svn: 198685
This changes the MachineFrameInfo API to use the new SSPLayoutKind information
produced by the StackProtector pass (instead of a boolean flag) and updates a
few pass dependencies (to preserve the SSP analysis).
The stack layout follows the same approach used prior to this change - i.e.,
only LargeArray stack objects will be placed near the canary and everything
else will be laid out normally. After this change, structures containing large
arrays will also be placed near the canary - a case previously missed by the
old implementation.
Out of tree targets will need to update their usage of
MachineFrameInfo::CreateStackObject to remove the MayNeedSP argument.
The next patch will implement the rules for sspstrong and sspreq. The end goal
is to support ssp-strong stack layout rules.
WIP.
Differential Revision: http://llvm-reviews.chandlerc.com/D2158
llvm-svn: 197653
This modifies the pass to classify every SSP-triggering AllocaInst according to
an SSPLayoutKind (LargeArray, SmallArray, AddrOf). This analysis is collected
by the pass and made available for use, but no other pass uses it yet.
The next patch will make use of this analysis in PEI and StackSlot
passes. The end goal is to support ssp-strong stack layout rules.
WIP.
Differential Revision: http://llvm-reviews.chandlerc.com/D1789
llvm-svn: 193653
Eugene Zelenko