```
// llvm-objdump -d output (before)
400000: e8 0b 00 00 00 callq 11
400005: e8 0b 00 00 00 callq 11
// llvm-objdump -d output (after)
400000: e8 0b 00 00 00 callq 0x400010
400005: e8 0b 00 00 00 callq 0x400015
// GNU objdump -d. The lack of 0x is not ideal because the result cannot be re-assembled
400000: e8 0b 00 00 00 callq 400010
400005: e8 0b 00 00 00 callq 400015
```
In llvm-objdump, we pass the address of the next MCInst. Ideally we
should just thread the address of the current address, unfortunately we
cannot call X86MCCodeEmitter::encodeInstruction (X86MCCodeEmitter
requires MCInstrInfo and MCContext) to get the length of the MCInst.
MCInstPrinter::printInst has other callers (e.g llvm-mc -filetype=asm, llvm-mca) which set Address to 0.
They leave MCInstPrinter::PrintBranchImmAsAddress as false and this change is a no-op for them.
Reviewed By: jhenderson
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D76580
The new behavior matches GNU objdump. A pair of angle brackets makes tests slightly easier.
`.foo:` is not unique and thus cannot be used in a `CHECK-LABEL:` directive.
Without `-LABEL`, the CHECK line can match the `Disassembly of section`
line and causes the next `CHECK-NEXT:` to fail.
```
Disassembly of section .foo:
0000000000001634 .foo:
```
Bdragon: <> has metalinguistic connotation. it just "feels right"
Reviewed By: rupprecht
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D75713
Summary:
rL371826 rearranged some output from llvm-objdump for GNU objdump compatability, but there still seem to be some more.
I think this rearrangement is a little closer. Overview of the ordering which matches GNU objdump:
* Archive headers
* File headers
* Section headers
* Symbol table
* Dwarf debugging
* Relocations (if `--disassemble` is not used)
* Section contents
* Disassembly
Reviewers: jhenderson, justice_adams, grimar, ychen, espindola
Reviewed By: jhenderson
Subscribers: aprantl, emaste, arichardson, jrtc27, atanasyan, seiya, llvm-commits, MaskRay
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68066
llvm-svn: 373671
Ported the D64906 technique to EM_386.
If `sh_addralign(.tdata) < sh_addralign(.tbss)`,
we can potentially make `p_vaddr(PT_TLS)%p_align(PT_TLS) != 0`.
ld.so that are known to have problems if p_vaddr%p_align!=0:
* FreeBSD 13.0-CURRENT rtld-elf
* glibc https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=24606
New test i386-tls-vaddr-align.s checks our workaround makes p_vaddr%p_align = 0.
Reviewed By: ruiu
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D65865
llvm-svn: 369347
* Add --no-show-raw-insn to llvm-objdump -d tests
* When linking an executable with %t.so, the path %t.so will be recorded
in the DT_NEEDED entry if %t.so doesn't have DT_SONAME. .dynstr will
have varying lengths on different systems. Add -soname so that the
string in .dynstr is of fixed length to make tests more robust.
* Rename i386-tls-initial-exec-local.s to i386-tls-ie-local.s
* Refactor tls-initial-exec-local.s to x86-64-tls-ie-local.s
llvm-svn: 367533
This improves readability and the behavior is consistent with GNU objdump.
The new test test/tools/llvm-objdump/X86/disassemble-section-name.s
checks we print newlines before and after "Disassembly of section ...:"
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D61127
llvm-svn: 359668
Old: PT_LOAD(.data | PT_GNU_RELRO(.data.rel.ro .bss.rel.ro) | .bss)
New: PT_LOAD(PT_GNU_RELRO(.data.rel.ro .bss.rel.ro) | .data .bss)
The placement of | indicates page alignment caused by PT_GNU_RELRO. The
new layout has simpler rules and saves space for many cases.
Old size: roundup(.data) + roundup(.data.rel.ro)
New size: roundup(.data.rel.ro + .bss.rel.ro) + .data
Other advantages:
* At runtime the 3 memory mappings decrease to 2.
* start(PT_TLS) = start(PT_GNU_RELRO) = start(RW PT_LOAD). This
simplifies binary manipulation tools.
GNU strip before 2.31 discards PT_GNU_RELRO if its
address is not equal to the start of its associated PT_LOAD.
This has been fixed by https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=f2731e0c374e5323ce4cdae2bcc7b7fe22da1a6f
But with this change, we will be compatible with GNU strip before 2.31
* Before, .got.plt (non-relro by default) was placed before .got (relro
by default), which made it impossible to have _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
(start of .got.plt on x86-64) equal to the end of .got (R_GOT*_FROM_END)
(https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36555). With the new ordering, we
can improve on this regard if we'd like to.
Reviewers: ruiu, espindola, pcc
Subscribers: emaste, arichardson, llvm-commits, joerg, jdoerfert
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D56828
llvm-svn: 356117
Summary:
As for x86_64, the default image base for AArch64 and i386 should be
aligned to a superpage appropriate for the architecture.
On AArch64, this is 2 MiB, on i386 it is 4 MiB.
Reviewers: emaste, grimar, javed.absar, espindola, ruiu, peter.smith, srhines, rprichard
Reviewed By: ruiu, peter.smith
Subscribers: jfb, markj, arichardson, krytarowski, kristof.beyls, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D50297
llvm-svn: 342746
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
Fangrui Song