SUMMARY:
In IBM compiler xlclang , there is an option -fnovisibility which suppresses visibility. For more details see: https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSGH3R_16.1.0/com.ibm.xlcpp161.aix.doc/compiler_ref/opt_visibility.html.
We need to add the option -mignore-xcoff-visibility for compatibility with the IBM AIX OS (as the option is enabled by default in AIX). With this option llvm does not emit any visibility attribute to ASM or XCOFF object file.
The option only work on the AIX OS, for other non-AIX OS using the option will report an unsupported options error.
In AIX OS:
1.1 the option -mignore-xcoff-visibility is enabled by default , if there is not -fvisibility=* and -mignore-xcoff-visibility explicitly in the clang command .
1.2 if there is -fvisibility=* explicitly but not -mignore-xcoff-visibility explicitly in the clang command. it will generate visibility attributes.
1.3 if there are both -fvisibility=* and -mignore-xcoff-visibility explicitly in the clang command. The option "-mignore-xcoff-visibility" wins , it do not emit the visibility attribute.
The option -mignore-xcoff-visibility has no effect on visibility attribute when compile with -emit-llvm option to generated LLVM IR.
Reviewer: daltenty,Jason Liu
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D87451
Fixes pr/11710.
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Resubmit after breaking Windows and OSX builds.
Reviewed By: dblaikie
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D80242
We currently have strict floating point/constrained floating point enabled
for all targets. Constrained SDAG nodes get converted to the regular ones
before reaching the target layer. In theory this should be fine.
However, the changes are exposed to users through multiple clang options
already in use in the field, and the changes are _completely_ _untested_
on almost all of our targets. Bugs have already been found, like
"https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45274".
This patch disables constrained floating point options in clang everywhere
except X86 and SystemZ. A warning will be printed when this happens.
Use the new -fexperimental-strict-floating-point flag to force allowing
strict floating point on hosts that aren't already marked as supporting
it (X86 and SystemZ).
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D80952
This patch creates a clang flag to enable SESES. This flag also ensures that
lvi-cfi is on when using seses via clang.
SESES should use lvi-cfi to mitigate returns and indirect branches.
The flag to enable the SESES functionality only without lvi-cfi is now
-x86-seses-enable-without-lvi-cfi to warn users part of the mitigation is not
enabled if they use this flag. This is useful in case folks want to see the
cost of SESES separate from the LVI-CFI.
Reviewed By: sconstab
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D79910
Keep deprecated -fsanitize-coverage-{white,black}list as aliases for compatibility for now.
Reviewed By: echristo
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D82244
This patch adds clang options:
-fbasic-block-sections={all,<filename>,labels,none} and
-funique-basic-block-section-names.
LLVM Support for basic block sections is already enabled.
+ -fbasic-block-sections={all, <file>, labels, none} : Enables/Disables basic
block sections for all or a subset of basic blocks. "labels" only enables
basic block symbols.
+ -funique-basic-block-section-names: Enables unique section names for
basic block sections, disabled by default.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68049
Summary:
Change the default ABI to be compatible with GCC. For 32-bit ELF
targets other than Linux, Clang now returns small structs in registers
r3/r4. This affects FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD. There is no change for
32-bit Linux, where Clang continues to return all structs in memory.
Add clang options -maix-struct-return (to return structs in memory) and
-msvr4-struct-return (to return structs in registers) to be compatible
with gcc. These options are only for PPC32; reject them on PPC64 and
other targets. The options are like -fpcc-struct-return and
-freg-struct-return for X86_32, and use similar code.
To actually return a struct in registers, coerce it to an integer of the
same size. LLVM may optimize the code to remove unnecessary accesses to
memory, and will return i32 in r3 or i64 in r3:r4.
Fixes PR#40736
Patch by George Koehler!
Reviewed By: jhibbits, nemanjai
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D73290
This pass replaces each indirect call/jump with a direct call to a thunk that looks like:
lfence
jmpq *%r11
This ensures that if the value in register %r11 was loaded from memory, then
the value in %r11 is (architecturally) correct prior to the jump.
Also adds a new target feature to X86: +lvi-cfi
("cfi" meaning control-flow integrity)
The feature can be added via clang CLI using -mlvi-cfi.
This is an alternate implementation to https://reviews.llvm.org/D75934 That merges the thunk insertion functionality with the existing X86 retpoline code.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D76812
Passing small data limit to RISCVELFTargetObjectFile by module flag,
So the backend can set small data section threshold by the value.
The data will be put into the small data section if the data smaller than
the threshold.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D57497
After a first attempt to fix the test-suite failures, my first recommit
caused the same failures again. I had updated CMakeList.txt files of
tests that needed -fcommon, but it turns out that there are also
Makefiles which are used by some bots, so I've updated these Makefiles
now too.
See the original commit message for more details on this change:
0a9fc9233e
This includes fixes for:
- test-suite: some benchmarks need to be compiled with -fcommon, see D75557.
- compiler-rt: one test needed -fcommon, and another a change, see D75520.
This reverts commit 0a9fc9233e.
Going to look at the asan failures.
I find the failures in the test suite weird, because they look
like compile time test and I don't understand how that can be
failing, but will have a brief look at that too.
This makes -fno-common the default for all targets because this has performance
and code-size benefits and is more language conforming for C code.
Additionally, GCC10 also defaults to -fno-common and so we get consistent
behaviour with GCC.
With this change, C code that uses tentative definitions as definitions of a
variable in multiple translation units will trigger multiple-definition linker
errors. Generally, this occurs when the use of the extern keyword is neglected
in the declaration of a variable in a header file. In some cases, no specific
translation unit provides a definition of the variable. The previous behavior
can be restored by specifying -fcommon.
As GCC has switched already, we benefit from applications already being ported
and existing documentation how to do this. For example:
- https://gcc.gnu.org/gcc-10/porting_to.html
- https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Gcc_10_porting_notes/fno_common
Differential revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D75056
Implement protection against the stack clash attack [0] through inline stack
probing.
Probe stack allocation every PAGE_SIZE during frame lowering or dynamic
allocation to make sure the page guard, if any, is touched when touching the
stack, in a similar manner to GCC[1].
This extends the existing `probe-stack' mechanism with a special value `inline-asm'.
Technically the former uses function call before stack allocation while this
patch provides inlined stack probes and chunk allocation.
Only implemented for x86.
[0] https://www.qualys.com/2017/06/19/stack-clash/stack-clash.txt
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-patches/2017-07/msg00556.html
This a recommit of 39f50da2a3 with proper LiveIn
declaration, better option handling and more portable testing.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68720
Implement protection against the stack clash attack [0] through inline stack
probing.
Probe stack allocation every PAGE_SIZE during frame lowering or dynamic
allocation to make sure the page guard, if any, is touched when touching the
stack, in a similar manner to GCC[1].
This extends the existing `probe-stack' mechanism with a special value `inline-asm'.
Technically the former uses function call before stack allocation while this
patch provides inlined stack probes and chunk allocation.
Only implemented for x86.
[0] https://www.qualys.com/2017/06/19/stack-clash/stack-clash.txt
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-patches/2017-07/msg00556.html
This a recommit of 39f50da2a3 with proper LiveIn
declaration, better option handling and more portable testing.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68720
Implement protection against the stack clash attack [0] through inline stack
probing.
Probe stack allocation every PAGE_SIZE during frame lowering or dynamic
allocation to make sure the page guard, if any, is touched when touching the
stack, in a similar manner to GCC[1].
This extends the existing `probe-stack' mechanism with a special value `inline-asm'.
Technically the former uses function call before stack allocation while this
patch provides inlined stack probes and chunk allocation.
Only implemented for x86.
[0] https://www.qualys.com/2017/06/19/stack-clash/stack-clash.txt
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-patches/2017-07/msg00556.html
This a recommit of 39f50da2a3 with better option
handling and more portable testing
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68720
Implement protection against the stack clash attack [0] through inline stack
probing.
Probe stack allocation every PAGE_SIZE during frame lowering or dynamic
allocation to make sure the page guard, if any, is touched when touching the
stack, in a similar manner to GCC[1].
This extends the existing `probe-stack' mechanism with a special value `inline-asm'.
Technically the former uses function call before stack allocation while this
patch provides inlined stack probes and chunk allocation.
Only implemented for x86.
[0] https://www.qualys.com/2017/06/19/stack-clash/stack-clash.txt
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-patches/2017-07/msg00556.html
This a recommit of 39f50da2a3 with correct option
flags set.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68720
This reverts commit 39f50da2a3.
The -fstack-clash-protection is being passed to the linker too, which
is not intended.
Reverting and fixing that in a later commit.
Implement protection against the stack clash attack [0] through inline stack
probing.
Probe stack allocation every PAGE_SIZE during frame lowering or dynamic
allocation to make sure the page guard, if any, is touched when touching the
stack, in a similar manner to GCC[1].
This extends the existing `probe-stack' mechanism with a special value `inline-asm'.
Technically the former uses function call before stack allocation while this
patch provides inlined stack probes and chunk allocation.
Only implemented for x86.
[0] https://www.qualys.com/2017/06/19/stack-clash/stack-clash.txt
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-patches/2017-07/msg00556.html
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68720
First attempt at implementing -fsemantic-interposition.
Rely on GlobalValue::isInterposable that already captures most of the expected
behavior.
Rely on a ModuleFlag to state whether we should respect SemanticInterposition or
not. The default remains no.
So this should be a no-op if -fsemantic-interposition isn't used, and if it is,
isInterposable being already used in most optimisation, they should honor it
properly.
Note that it only impacts architecture compiled with -fPIC and no pie.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D72829
This adds a check for the usage of -foptimization-record-file with
multiple -arch options. This is not permitted since it would require us
to rename the file requested by the user to avoid overwriting it for the
second cc1 invocation.
Provides support for using r6-r11 as globally scoped
register variables. This requires a -ffixed-rN flag
in order to reserve rN against general allocation.
If for a given GRV declaration the corresponding flag
is not found, or the the register in question is the
target's FP, we fail with a diagnostic.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68862
Summary:
A new function pass (Transforms/CFGuard/CFGuard.cpp) inserts CFGuard checks on
indirect function calls, using either the check mechanism (X86, ARM, AArch64) or
or the dispatch mechanism (X86-64). The check mechanism requires a new calling
convention for the supported targets. The dispatch mechanism adds the target as
an operand bundle, which is processed by SelectionDAG. Another pass
(CodeGen/CFGuardLongjmp.cpp) identifies and emits valid longjmp targets, as
required by /guard:cf. This feature is enabled using the `cfguard` CC1 option.
Reviewers: thakis, rnk, theraven, pcc
Subscribers: ychen, hans, metalcanine, dmajor, tomrittervg, alex, mehdi_amini, mgorny, javed.absar, kristof.beyls, hiraditya, steven_wu, dexonsmith, cfe-commits, llvm-commits
Tags: #clang, #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D65761
And move the relevant information in the doc.
Summary:
Currently, building a large software like Firefox shows
'Use chrome://tracing or Speedscope App (https://www.speedscope.app) for flamegraph visualization'
for each file.
Reviewers: anton-afanasyev
Reviewed By: anton-afanasyev
Subscribers: cfe-commits
Tags: #clang
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D68260
llvm-svn: 373308
Tianqing Wang