Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Benjamin Kramer dc5f805d31 Do a sweep of symbol internalization. NFC.
llvm-svn: 369803
2019-08-23 19:59:23 +00:00
Daniel Sanders 5ae66e56cf [aarch64] Apply llvm-prefer-register-over-unsigned from clang-tidy to LLVM
Summary:
This clang-tidy check is looking for unsigned integer variables whose initializer
starts with an implicit cast from llvm::Register and changes the type of the
variable to llvm::Register (dropping the llvm:: where possible).

Manual fixups in:
AArch64InstrInfo.cpp - genFusedMultiply() now takes a Register* instead of unsigned*
AArch64LoadStoreOptimizer.cpp - Ternary operator was ambiguous between Register/MCRegister. Settled on Register

Depends on D65919

Reviewers: aemerson

Subscribers: jholewinski, MatzeB, qcolombet, dschuff, jyknight, dylanmckay, sdardis, nemanjai, jvesely, wdng, nhaehnle, sbc100, jgravelle-google, kristof.beyls, hiraditya, aheejin, kbarton, fedor.sergeev, javed.absar, asb, rbar, johnrusso, simoncook, apazos, sabuasal, niosHD, jrtc27, MaskRay, zzheng, edward-jones, atanasyan, rogfer01, MartinMosbeck, brucehoult, the_o, tpr, PkmX, jocewei, jsji, Petar.Avramovic, asbirlea, Jim, s.egerton, llvm-commits

Tags: #llvm

Differential Revision for full review was: https://reviews.llvm.org/D65962

llvm-svn: 368628
2019-08-12 22:40:53 +00:00
Kristof Beyls 3ff5dfd735 [SLH] AArch64: correctly pick temporary register to mask SP
As part of speculation hardening, the stack pointer gets masked with the
taint register (X16) before a function call or before a function return.
Since there are no instructions that can directly mask writing to the
stack pointer, the stack pointer must first be transferred to another
register, where it can be masked, before that value is transferred back
to the stack pointer.
Before, that temporary register was always picked to be x17, since the
ABI allows clobbering x17 on any function call, resulting in the
following instruction pattern being inserted before function calls and
returns/tail calls:

mov x17, sp
and x17, x17, x16
mov sp, x17
However, x17 can be live in those locations, for example when the call
is an indirect call, using x17 as the target address (blr x17).

To fix this, this patch looks for an available register just before the
call or terminator instruction and uses that.

In the rare case when no register turns out to be available (this
situation is only encountered twice across the whole test-suite), just
insert a full speculation barrier at the start of the basic block where
this occurs.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D56717

llvm-svn: 351930
2019-01-23 08:18:39 +00:00
Chandler Carruth 2946cd7010 Update the file headers across all of the LLVM projects in the monorepo
to reflect the new license.

We understand that people may be surprised that we're moving the header
entirely to discuss the new license. We checked this carefully with the
Foundation's lawyer and we believe this is the correct approach.

Essentially, all code in the project is now made available by the LLVM
project under our new license, so you will see that the license headers
include that license only. Some of our contributors have contributed
code under our old license, and accordingly, we have retained a copy of
our old license notice in the top-level files in each project and
repository.

llvm-svn: 351636
2019-01-19 08:50:56 +00:00
Kristof Beyls c650ff77eb Initial AArch64 SLH implementation.
This is an initial implementation for Speculative Load Hardening for
AArch64. It builds on top of the recently introduced
AArch64SpeculationHardening pass.
This doesn't implement (yet) some of the optimizations implemented for
the X86SpeculativeLoadHardening pass. I thought introducing the
optimizations incrementally in follow-up patches should make this easier
to review.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D55929

llvm-svn: 350729
2019-01-09 15:13:34 +00:00
Kristof Beyls e66bc1f756 Introduce control flow speculation tracking pass for AArch64
The pass implements tracking of control flow miss-speculation into a "taint"
register. That taint register can then be used to mask off registers with
sensitive data when executing under miss-speculation, a.k.a. "transient
execution".
This pass is aimed at mitigating against SpectreV1-style vulnarabilities.

At the moment, it implements the tracking of miss-speculation of control
flow into a taint register, but doesn't implement a mechanism yet to then
use that taint register to mask off vulnerable data in registers (something
for a follow-on improvement). Possible strategies to mask out vulnerable
data that can be implemented on top of this are:
- speculative load hardening to automatically mask of data loaded
  in registers.
- using intrinsics to mask of data in registers as indicated by the
  programmer (see https://lwn.net/Articles/759423/).

For AArch64, the following implementation choices are made.
Some of these are different than the implementation choices made in
the similar pass implemented in X86SpeculativeLoadHardening.cpp, as
the instruction set characteristics result in different trade-offs.
- The speculation hardening is done after register allocation. With a
  relative abundance of registers, one register is reserved (X16) to be
  the taint register. X16 is expected to not clash with other register
  reservation mechanisms with very high probability because:
  . The AArch64 ABI doesn't guarantee X16 to be retained across any call.
  . The only way to request X16 to be used as a programmer is through
    inline assembly. In the rare case a function explicitly demands to
    use X16/W16, this pass falls back to hardening against speculation
    by inserting a DSB SYS/ISB barrier pair which will prevent control
    flow speculation.
- It is easy to insert mask operations at this late stage as we have
  mask operations available that don't set flags.
- The taint variable contains all-ones when no miss-speculation is detected,
  and contains all-zeros when miss-speculation is detected. Therefore, when
  masking, an AND instruction (which only changes the register to be masked,
  no other side effects) can easily be inserted anywhere that's needed.
- The tracking of miss-speculation is done by using a data-flow conditional
  select instruction (CSEL) to evaluate the flags that were also used to
  make conditional branch direction decisions. Speculation of the CSEL
  instruction can be limited with a CSDB instruction - so the combination of
  CSEL + a later CSDB gives the guarantee that the flags as used in the CSEL
  aren't speculated. When conditional branch direction gets miss-speculated,
  the semantics of the inserted CSEL instruction is such that the taint
  register will contain all zero bits.
  One key requirement for this to work is that the conditional branch is
  followed by an execution of the CSEL instruction, where the CSEL
  instruction needs to use the same flags status as the conditional branch.
  This means that the conditional branches must not be implemented as one
  of the AArch64 conditional branches that do not use the flags as input
  (CB(N)Z and TB(N)Z). This is implemented by ensuring in the instruction
  selectors to not produce these instructions when speculation hardening
  is enabled. This pass will assert if it does encounter such an instruction.
- On function call boundaries, the miss-speculation state is transferred from
  the taint register X16 to be encoded in the SP register as value 0.

Future extensions/improvements could be:
- Implement this functionality using full speculation barriers, akin to the
  x86-slh-lfence option. This may be more useful for the intrinsics-based
  approach than for the SLH approach to masking.
  Note that this pass already inserts the full speculation barriers if the
  function for some niche reason makes use of X16/W16.
- no indirect branch misprediction gets protected/instrumented; but this
  could be done for some indirect branches, such as switch jump tables.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D54896

llvm-svn: 349456
2018-12-18 08:50:02 +00:00