forked from OSchip/llvm-project
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
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Pablo Barrio
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da33762de8 |
[AArch64] Emit HINT instead of PAC insns in Armv8.2-A or below
Summary: The Pointer Authentication Extension (PAC) was added in Armv8.3-A. Some instructions are implemented in the HINT space to allow compiling code common to CPUs regardless of whether they feature PAC or not, and still benefit from PAC protection in the PAC-enabled CPUs. The 8.3-specific mnemonics were currently enabled in any architecture, and LLVM was emitting them in assembly files when PAC code generation was enabled. This was ok for compilations where both LLVM codegen and the integrated assembler were used. However, the LLVM codegen was not compatible with other assemblers (e.g. GAS). Given the fact that the approach from these assemblers (i.e. to disallow Armv8.3-A mnemonics if compiling for Armv8.2-A or lower) is entirely reasonable, this patch makes LLVM to emit HINT when building for Armv8.2-A and below, instead of PACIASP, AUTIASP and friends. Then, LLVM assembly should be compatible with other assemblers. Reviewers: samparker, chill, LukeCheeseman Subscribers: kristof.beyls, hiraditya, llvm-commits Tags: #llvm Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D71658 |
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Kristof Beyls
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e66bc1f756 |
Introduce control flow speculation tracking pass for AArch64
The pass implements tracking of control flow miss-speculation into a "taint" register. That taint register can then be used to mask off registers with sensitive data when executing under miss-speculation, a.k.a. "transient execution". This pass is aimed at mitigating against SpectreV1-style vulnarabilities. At the moment, it implements the tracking of miss-speculation of control flow into a taint register, but doesn't implement a mechanism yet to then use that taint register to mask off vulnerable data in registers (something for a follow-on improvement). Possible strategies to mask out vulnerable data that can be implemented on top of this are: - speculative load hardening to automatically mask of data loaded in registers. - using intrinsics to mask of data in registers as indicated by the programmer (see https://lwn.net/Articles/759423/). For AArch64, the following implementation choices are made. Some of these are different than the implementation choices made in the similar pass implemented in X86SpeculativeLoadHardening.cpp, as the instruction set characteristics result in different trade-offs. - The speculation hardening is done after register allocation. With a relative abundance of registers, one register is reserved (X16) to be the taint register. X16 is expected to not clash with other register reservation mechanisms with very high probability because: . The AArch64 ABI doesn't guarantee X16 to be retained across any call. . The only way to request X16 to be used as a programmer is through inline assembly. In the rare case a function explicitly demands to use X16/W16, this pass falls back to hardening against speculation by inserting a DSB SYS/ISB barrier pair which will prevent control flow speculation. - It is easy to insert mask operations at this late stage as we have mask operations available that don't set flags. - The taint variable contains all-ones when no miss-speculation is detected, and contains all-zeros when miss-speculation is detected. Therefore, when masking, an AND instruction (which only changes the register to be masked, no other side effects) can easily be inserted anywhere that's needed. - The tracking of miss-speculation is done by using a data-flow conditional select instruction (CSEL) to evaluate the flags that were also used to make conditional branch direction decisions. Speculation of the CSEL instruction can be limited with a CSDB instruction - so the combination of CSEL + a later CSDB gives the guarantee that the flags as used in the CSEL aren't speculated. When conditional branch direction gets miss-speculated, the semantics of the inserted CSEL instruction is such that the taint register will contain all zero bits. One key requirement for this to work is that the conditional branch is followed by an execution of the CSEL instruction, where the CSEL instruction needs to use the same flags status as the conditional branch. This means that the conditional branches must not be implemented as one of the AArch64 conditional branches that do not use the flags as input (CB(N)Z and TB(N)Z). This is implemented by ensuring in the instruction selectors to not produce these instructions when speculation hardening is enabled. This pass will assert if it does encounter such an instruction. - On function call boundaries, the miss-speculation state is transferred from the taint register X16 to be encoded in the SP register as value 0. Future extensions/improvements could be: - Implement this functionality using full speculation barriers, akin to the x86-slh-lfence option. This may be more useful for the intrinsics-based approach than for the SLH approach to masking. Note that this pass already inserts the full speculation barriers if the function for some niche reason makes use of X16/W16. - no indirect branch misprediction gets protected/instrumented; but this could be done for some indirect branches, such as switch jump tables. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D54896 llvm-svn: 349456 |