Three new instructions:
umonitor - Sets up a linear address range to be
monitored by hardware and activates the monitor.
The address range should be a writeback memory
caching type.
umwait - A hint that allows the processor to
stop instruction execution and enter an
implementation-dependent optimized state
until occurrence of a class of events.
tpause - Directs the processor to enter an
implementation-dependent optimized state
until the TSC reaches the value in EDX:EAX.
Also modifying the description of the mfence
instruction, as the rep prefix (0xF3) was allowed
before, which would conflict with umonitor during
disassembly.
Before:
$ echo 0xf3,0x0f,0xae,0xf0 | llvm-mc -disassemble
.text
mfence
After:
$ echo 0xf3,0x0f,0xae,0xf0 | llvm-mc -disassemble
.text
umonitor %rax
Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi
Reviewed By: craig.topper
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45253
llvm-svn: 330462
Hint to hardware to move the cache line containing the
address to a more distant level of the cache without
writing back to memory.
Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi
Reviewed By: craig.topper
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45256
llvm-svn: 329992
Similar to the wbinvd instruction, except this
one does not invalidate caches. Ring 0 only.
The encoding matches a wbinvd instruction with
an F3 prefix.
Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi, ashlykov
Reviewed By: craig.topper
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D43816
llvm-svn: 329847
This patch adds a new function attribute "required-vector-width" that can be set by the frontend to indicate the maximum vector width present in the original source code. The idea is that this would be set based on ABI requirements, intrinsics or explicit vector types being used, maybe simd pragmas, etc. The backend will then use this information to determine if its save to make 512-bit vectors illegal when the preference is for 256-bit vectors.
For code that has no vectors in it originally and only get vectors through the loop and slp vectorizers this allows us to generate code largely similar to our AVX2 only output while still enabling AVX512 features like mask registers and gather/scatter. The loop vectorizer doesn't always obey TTI and will create oversized vectors with the expectation the backend will legalize it. In order to avoid changing the vectorizer and potentially harm our AVX2 codegen this patch tries to make the legalizer behavior similar.
This is restricted to CPUs that support AVX512F and AVX512VL so that we have good fallback options to use 128 and 256-bit vectors and still get masking.
I've qualified every place I could find in X86ISelLowering.cpp and added tests cases for many of them with 2 different values for the attribute to see the codegen differences.
We still need to do frontend work for the attribute and teach the inliner how to merge it, etc. But this gets the codegen layer ready for it.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42724
llvm-svn: 324834
We currently emit up to 15-byte NOPs on all targets (apart from Silvermont), which stalls performance on some targets with decoders that struggle with 2 or 3 more '66' prefixes.
This patch flags recent AMD targets (btver1/znver1) to still emit 15-byte NOPs and bdver* targets to emit 11-byte NOPs. All other targets now emit 10-byte NOPs apart from SilverMont CPUs which still emit 7-byte NOPS.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42616
llvm-svn: 323693
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
This will cause the vectorizers to do some limiting of the vector widths they create. This is not a strict limit. There are reasons I know of that the loop vectorizer will generate larger vectors for.
I've written this in such a way that the interface will only return a properly supported width(0/128/256/512) even if the attribute says something funny like 384 or 10.
This has been split from D41895 with the remainder in a follow up commit.
llvm-svn: 323015
This adds a new instrinsic to support the rdpid instruction. The implementation is a bit weird because the intrinsic is defined as always returning 32-bits, but the assembler support thinks the instruction produces a 64-bit register in 64-bit mode. But really it zeros the upper 32 bits. So I had to add separate patterns where 64-bit mode uses an extract_subreg.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42205
llvm-svn: 322910
After D41349, we can no get a MCSubtargetInfo into the MCAsmBackend constructor. This allows us to get NOPL from a subtarget feature rather than a CPU name blacklist.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41721
llvm-svn: 322227
Note:
- X86ISelLowering: setLibcallName(SINCOS) was superfluous as
InitLibcalls() already does it.
- ARMISelLowering: Setting libcallnames for sincos/sincosf seemed
superfluous as in the darwin case it wouldn't be used while for all
other cases InitLibcalls already does it.
llvm-svn: 321036
Shadow stack solution introduces a new stack for return addresses only.
The HW has a Shadow Stack Pointer (SSP) that points to the next return address.
If we return to a different address, an exception is triggered.
The shadow stack is managed using a series of intrinsics that are introduced in this patch as well as the new register (SSP).
The intrinsics are mapped to new instruction set that implements CET mechanism.
The patch also includes initial infrastructure support for IBT.
For more information, please see the following:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40223
Change-Id: I4daa1f27e88176be79a4ac3b4cd26a459e88fed4
llvm-svn: 318996
Summary:
This adds a new fast gather feature bit to cover all CPUs that support fast gather that we can use independent of whether the AVX512 feature is enabled. I'm only using this new bit to qualify AVX2 codegen. AVX512 is still implicitly assuming fast gather to keep tests working and to match the scatter behavior.
Test command lines have been added for these two cases.
Reviewers: magabari, delena, RKSimon, zvi
Reviewed By: RKSimon
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40282
llvm-svn: 318983
We were handling the non-hidden case in lib/Target/TargetMachine.cpp,
but the hidden case was handled in architecture dependent code and
only X86_64 and AArch64 were covered.
While it is true that some code sequences in some ABIs might be able
to produce the correct value at runtime, that doesn't seem to be the
common case.
I left the AArch64 code in place since it also forces a got access for
non-pic code. It is not clear if that is needed, but it is probably
better to change that in another commit.
llvm-svn: 316799
Turns out we have no patterns on the instructions that were using this feature flag for other reasons. These instructions are slow on all modern CPUs so it seems unlikely that we will spend any effort supporting these instructions going forward. So we might as well just kill of the feature flag and just fix up the comments.
llvm-svn: 315862
Adding x86 Processor families to initialize several uArch properties (based on the family)
This patch shows how gather cost can be initialized based on the proc. family
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D35348
llvm-svn: 313132
Summary:
Currently we determine if macro fusion is supported based on the AVX flag as a proxy for the processor being Sandy Bridge".
This is really strange as now AMD supports AVX. It also means if user explicitly disables AVX we disable macro fusion.
This patch adds an explicit macro fusion feature. I've also enabled for the generic 64-bit CPU (which doesn't have AVX)
This is probably another candidate for being in the MI layer, but for now I at least wanted to correct the overloading of the AVX feature.
Reviewers: spatel, chandlerc, RKSimon, zvi
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D37280
llvm-svn: 312097
Summary: Knights Landing, because it is Atom derived, has slow two memory operand instructions. Mark the Knights Landing CPU model accordingly.
Patch by David Zarzycki.
Reviewers: craig.topper
Reviewed By: craig.topper
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D37224
llvm-svn: 311979
This reverts commit r310425, thus reapplying r310335 with a fix for link
issue of the AArch64 unittests on Linux bots when BUILD_SHARED_LIBS is ON.
Original commit message:
[GlobalISel] Remove the GISelAccessor API.
Its sole purpose was to avoid spreading around ifdefs related to
building global-isel. Since r309990, GlobalISel is not optional anymore,
thus, we can get rid of this mechanism all together.
NFC.
----
The fix for the link issue consists in adding the GlobalISel library in
the list of dependencies for the AArch64 unittests. This dependency
comes from the use of AArch64Subtarget that needs to know how
to destruct the GISel related APIs when being detroyed.
Thanks to Bill Seurer and Ahmed Bougacha for helping me reproducing and
understand the problem.
llvm-svn: 310969
When the access to a weak symbol is not a call, the access has to be
able to produce the value 0 at runtime.
We were sometimes producing code sequences where that was not possible
if the code was leaded more than 4g away from 0.
llvm-svn: 310756
This reverts commit r310115.
It causes a linker failure for the one of the unittests of AArch64 on one
of the linux bot:
http://lab.llvm.org:8011/builders/clang-ppc64le-linux-multistage/builds/3429
: && /home/fedora/gcc/install/gcc-7.1.0/bin/g++ -fPIC
-fvisibility-inlines-hidden -Werror=date-time -std=c++11 -Wall -W
-Wno-unused-parameter -Wwrite-strings -Wcast-qual
-Wno-missing-field-initializers -pedantic -Wno-long-long
-Wno-maybe-uninitialized -Wdelete-non-virtual-dtor -Wno-comment
-ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -O2
-L/home/fedora/gcc/install/gcc-7.1.0/lib64 -Wl,-allow-shlib-undefined
-Wl,-O3 -Wl,--gc-sections
unittests/Target/AArch64/CMakeFiles/AArch64Tests.dir/InstSizes.cpp.o -o
unittests/Target/AArch64/AArch64Tests
lib/libLLVMAArch64CodeGen.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMAArch64Desc.so.6.0.0svn
lib/libLLVMAArch64Info.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMCodeGen.so.6.0.0svn
lib/libLLVMCore.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMMC.so.6.0.0svn
lib/libLLVMMIRParser.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMSelectionDAG.so.6.0.0svn
lib/libLLVMTarget.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMSupport.so.6.0.0svn -lpthread
lib/libgtest_main.so.6.0.0svn lib/libgtest.so.6.0.0svn -lpthread
-Wl,-rpath,/home/buildbots/ppc64le-clang-multistage-test/clang-ppc64le-multistage/stage1/lib
&& :
unittests/Target/AArch64/CMakeFiles/AArch64Tests.dir/InstSizes.cpp.o:(.toc+0x0):
undefined reference to `vtable for llvm::LegalizerInfo'
unittests/Target/AArch64/CMakeFiles/AArch64Tests.dir/InstSizes.cpp.o:(.toc+0x8):
undefined reference to `vtable for llvm::RegisterBankInfo'
The particularity of this bot is that it is built with
BUILD_SHARED_LIBS=ON
However, I was not able to reproduce the problem so far.
Reverting to unblock the bot.
llvm-svn: 310425
Summary:
Direct calls to dllimport functions are very common Windows. We should
add them to the -O0 fast path.
Reviewers: rafael
Subscribers: llvm-commits, hiraditya
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D36197
llvm-svn: 310152
Its sole purpose was to avoid spreading around ifdefs related to
building global-isel. Since r309990, GlobalISel is not optional anymore,
thus, we can get rid of this mechanism all together.
NFC.
llvm-svn: 310115
With this change, the GlobalISel library gets always built. In
particular, this is not possible to opt GlobalISel out of the build
using the LLVM_BUILD_GLOBAL_ISEL variable any more.
llvm-svn: 309990
I did this a long time ago with a janky python script, but now
clang-format has built-in support for this. I fed clang-format every
line with a #include and let it re-sort things according to the precise
LLVM rules for include ordering baked into clang-format these days.
I've reverted a number of files where the results of sorting includes
isn't healthy. Either places where we have legacy code relying on
particular include ordering (where possible, I'll fix these separately)
or where we have particular formatting around #include lines that
I didn't want to disturb in this patch.
This patch is *entirely* mechanical. If you get merge conflicts or
anything, just ignore the changes in this patch and run clang-format
over your #include lines in the files.
Sorry for any noise here, but it is important to keep these things
stable. I was seeing an increasing number of patches with irrelevant
re-ordering of #include lines because clang-format was used. This patch
at least isolates that churn, makes it easy to skip when resolving
conflicts, and gets us to a clean baseline (again).
llvm-svn: 304787
AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ is a new feature set that was published by Intel.
The patch represents the LLVM side of the addition of two new intrinsic based instructions (vpopcntd and vpopcntq).
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D33169
llvm-svn: 303858
Summary:
This causes them to be re-computed more often than necessary but resolves
objections that were raised post-commit on r301750.
Reviewers: qcolombet, ab, t.p.northover, rovka, kristof.beyls
Reviewed By: qcolombet
Subscribers: igorb, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32861
llvm-svn: 303418
According to Intel's Optimization Reference Manual for SNB+:
" For LEA instructions with three source operands and some specific situations, instruction latency has increased to 3 cycles, and must
dispatch via port 1:
- LEA that has all three source operands: base, index, and offset
- LEA that uses base and index registers where the base is EBP, RBP,or R13
- LEA that uses RIP relative addressing mode
- LEA that uses 16-bit addressing mode "
This patch currently handles the first 2 cases only.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32277
llvm-svn: 303333
According to psABI, PLT stub clobbers XMM8-XMM15.
In Regcall calling convention those registers are used for passing parameters.
Thus we need to prevent lazy binding in Regcall.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32430
llvm-svn: 302124
This patch adds support for the the LightWeight Profiling (LWP) instructions which are available on all AMD Bulldozer class CPUs (bdver1 to bdver4).
Reapplied - this time without changing line endings of existing files.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32769
llvm-svn: 302041
This patch adds support for the the LightWeight Profiling (LWP) instructions which are available on all AMD Bulldozer class CPUs (bdver1 to bdver4).
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32769
llvm-svn: 302028
Gabor Buella