The patch adds nocf_check target independent attribute for disabling checks that were enabled by cf-protection flag.
The attribute can be appertained to functions and function pointers.
Attribute name follows GCC's similar attribute name.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41880
llvm-svn: 327768
Summary:
The _get_ssp intrinsic can be used to retrieve the
shadow stack pointer, independent of the current arch -- in
contract with the rdsspd and the rdsspq intrinsics.
Also, this intrinsic returns zero on CPUs which don't
support CET. The rdssp[d|q] instruction is decoded as nop,
essentially just returning the input operand, which is zero.
Example result of compilation:
```
xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, %ecx
rdsspq %rcx # NOP when CET is not supported
movq %rcx, %rax # return zero
```
Reviewers: craig.topper
Subscribers: cfe-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D43814
llvm-svn: 326689
Shadow stack solution introduces a new stack for return addresses only.
The stack has a Shadow Stack Pointer (SSP) that points to the last address to which we expect to return.
If we return to a different address an exception is triggered.
This patch includes shadow stack intrinsics as well as the corresponding CET header.
It includes CET clang flags for shadow stack and Indirect Branch Tracking.
For more information, please see the following:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40224
Change-Id: I79ad0925a028bbc94c8ecad75f6daa2f214171f1
llvm-svn: 318995
Oren Ben Simhon