Summary:
This removes the need for a machine module pass using some deeply
questionable hacks. This should address PR36123 which is a case where in
full LTO the memory usage of a machine module pass actually ended up
being significant.
We should revert this on trunk as soon as we understand and fix the
memory usage issue, but we should include this in any backports of
retpolines themselves.
Reviewers: echristo, MatzeB
Subscribers: sanjoy, mcrosier, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42726
llvm-svn: 323915
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
CET (Control-Flow Enforcement Technology) introduces a new mechanism called IBT (Indirect Branch Tracking).
According to IBT, each Indirect branch should land on dedicated ENDBR instruction (End Branch).
The new pass adds ENDBR instructions for every indirect jmp/call (including jumps using jump tables / switches).
For more information, please see the following:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40482
Change-Id: Icb754489faf483a95248f96982a4e8b1009eb709
llvm-svn: 322062
Clang implements the -finstrument-functions flag inherited from GCC, which
inserts calls to __cyg_profile_func_{enter,exit} on function entry and exit.
This is useful for getting a trace of how the functions in a program are
executed. Normally, the calls remain even if a function is inlined into another
function, but it is useful to be able to turn this off for users who are
interested in a lower-level trace, i.e. one that reflects what functions are
called post-inlining. (We use this to generate link order files for Chromium.)
LLVM already has a pass for inserting similar instrumentation calls to
mcount(), which it does after inlining. This patch renames and extends that
pass to handle calls both to mcount and the cygprofile functions, before and/or
after inlining as controlled by function attributes.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D39287
llvm-svn: 318195
This reverts r317579, originally committed as r317100.
There is a design issue with marking CFI instructions duplicatable. Not
all targets support the CFIInstrInserter pass, and targets like Darwin
can't cope with duplicated prologue setup CFI instructions. The compact
unwind info emission fails.
When the following code is compiled for arm64 on Mac at -O3, the CFI
instructions end up getting tail duplicated, which causes compact unwind
info emission to fail:
int a, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m;
void n(int o, int *b) {
if (g)
f = 0;
for (; f < o; f++) {
m = a;
if (l > j * k > i)
j = i = k = d;
h = b[c] - e;
}
}
We get assembly that looks like this:
; BB#1: ; %if.then
Lloh3:
adrp x9, _f@GOTPAGE
Lloh4:
ldr x9, [x9, _f@GOTPAGEOFF]
mov w8, wzr
Lloh5:
str wzr, [x9]
stp x20, x19, [sp, #-16]! ; 8-byte Folded Spill
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
.cfi_offset w19, -8
.cfi_offset w20, -16
cmp w8, w0
b.lt LBB0_3
b LBB0_7
LBB0_2: ; %entry.if.end_crit_edge
Lloh6:
adrp x8, _f@GOTPAGE
Lloh7:
ldr x8, [x8, _f@GOTPAGEOFF]
Lloh8:
ldr w8, [x8]
stp x20, x19, [sp, #-16]! ; 8-byte Folded Spill
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
.cfi_offset w19, -8
.cfi_offset w20, -16
cmp w8, w0
b.ge LBB0_7
LBB0_3: ; %for.body.lr.ph
Note the multiple .cfi_def* directives. Compact unwind info emission
can't handle that.
llvm-svn: 317726
Reland r317100 with minor fix regarding ComputeCommonTailLength function in
BranchFolding.cpp. Skipping top CFI instructions block needs to executed on
several more return points in ComputeCommonTailLength().
Original r317100 message:
"Correct dwarf unwind information in function epilogue for X86"
This patch aims to provide correct dwarf unwind information in function
epilogue for X86.
It consists of two parts. The first part inserts CFI instructions that set
appropriate cfa offset and cfa register in emitEpilogue() in
X86FrameLowering. This part is X86 specific.
The second part is platform independent and ensures that:
- CFI instructions do not affect code generation
- Unwind information remains correct when a function is modified by
different passes. This is done in a late pass by analyzing information
about cfa offset and cfa register in BBs and inserting additional CFI
directives where necessary.
Changed CFI instructions so that they:
- are duplicable
- are not counted as instructions when tail duplicating or tail merging
- can be compared as equal
Added CFIInstrInserter pass:
- analyzes each basic block to determine cfa offset and register valid at
its entry and exit
- verifies that outgoing cfa offset and register of predecessor blocks match
incoming values of their successors
- inserts additional CFI directives at basic block beginning to correct the
rule for calculating CFA
Having CFI instructions in function epilogue can cause incorrect CFA
calculation rule for some basic blocks. This can happen if, due to basic
block reordering, or the existence of multiple epilogue blocks, some of the
blocks have wrong cfa offset and register values set by the epilogue block
above them.
CFIInstrInserter is currently run only on X86, but can be used by any target
that implements support for adding CFI instructions in epilogue.
Patch by Violeta Vukobrat.
llvm-svn: 317579
This patch aims to provide correct dwarf unwind information in function
epilogue for X86.
It consists of two parts. The first part inserts CFI instructions that set
appropriate cfa offset and cfa register in emitEpilogue() in
X86FrameLowering. This part is X86 specific.
The second part is platform independent and ensures that:
- CFI instructions do not affect code generation
- Unwind information remains correct when a function is modified by
different passes. This is done in a late pass by analyzing information
about cfa offset and cfa register in BBs and inserting additional CFI
directives where necessary.
Changed CFI instructions so that they:
- are duplicable
- are not counted as instructions when tail duplicating or tail merging
- can be compared as equal
Added CFIInstrInserter pass:
- analyzes each basic block to determine cfa offset and register valid at
its entry and exit
- verifies that outgoing cfa offset and register of predecessor blocks match
incoming values of their successors
- inserts additional CFI directives at basic block beginning to correct the
rule for calculating CFA
Having CFI instructions in function epilogue can cause incorrect CFA
calculation rule for some basic blocks. This can happen if, due to basic
block reordering, or the existence of multiple epilogue blocks, some of the
blocks have wrong cfa offset and register values set by the epilogue block
above them.
CFIInstrInserter is currently run only on X86, but can be used by any target
that implements support for adding CFI instructions in epilogue.
Patch by Violeta Vukobrat.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D35844
llvm-svn: 317100
Add optimization remarks support to the PrologueEpilogueInserter. For
now, emit the stack size as an analysis remark, but more additions wrt
shrink-wrapping may be added.
https://reviews.llvm.org/D35645
llvm-svn: 308556
CFI instructions that set appropriate cfa offset and cfa register are now
inserted in emitEpilogue() in X86FrameLowering.
Majority of the changes in this patch:
1. Ensure that CFI instructions do not affect code generation.
2. Enable maintaining correct information about cfa offset and cfa register
in a function when basic blocks are reordered, merged, split, duplicated.
These changes are target independent and described below.
Changed CFI instructions so that they:
1. are duplicable
2. are not counted as instructions when tail duplicating or tail merging
3. can be compared as equal
Add information to each MachineBasicBlock about cfa offset and cfa register
that are valid at its entry and exit (incoming and outgoing CFI info). Add
support for updating this information when basic blocks are merged, split,
duplicated, created. Add a verification pass (CFIInfoVerifier) that checks
that outgoing cfa offset and register of predecessor blocks match incoming
values of their successors.
Incoming and outgoing CFI information is used by a late pass
(CFIInstrInserter) that corrects CFA calculation rule for a basic block if
needed. That means that additional CFI instructions get inserted at basic
block beginning to correct the rule for calculating CFA. Having CFI
instructions in function epilogue can cause incorrect CFA calculation rule
for some basic blocks. This can happen if, due to basic block reordering,
or the existence of multiple epilogue blocks, some of the blocks have wrong
cfa offset and register values set by the epilogue block above them.
Patch by Violeta Vukobrat.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D18046
llvm-svn: 306529
- Move ISel (and pre-isel) pass construction into TargetPassConfig
- Extract AsmPrinter construction into a helper function
Putting the ISel code into TargetPassConfig seems a lot more natural and
both changes together make make it easier to build custom pipelines
involving .mir in an upcoming commit. This moves MachineModuleInfo to an
earlier place in the pass pipeline which shouldn't have any effect.
llvm-svn: 304754
This provides a new way to access the TargetMachine through
TargetPassConfig, as a dependency.
The patterns replaced here are:
* Passes handling a null TargetMachine call
`getAnalysisIfAvailable<TargetPassConfig>`.
* Passes not handling a null TargetMachine
`addRequired<TargetPassConfig>` and call
`getAnalysis<TargetPassConfig>`.
* MachineFunctionPasses now use MF.getTarget().
* Remove all the TargetMachine constructors.
* Remove INITIALIZE_TM_PASS.
This fixes a crash when running `llc -start-before prologepilog`.
PEI needs StackProtector, which gets constructed without a TargetMachine
by the pass manager. The StackProtector pass doesn't handle the case
where there is no TargetMachine, so it segfaults.
Related to PR30324.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D33222
llvm-svn: 303360
Currently, when masked load, store, gather or scatter intrinsics are used, we check in CodeGenPrepare pass if the subtarget support these intrinsics, if not we replace them with scalar code - this is a functional transformation not an optimization (not optional).
CodeGenPrepare pass does not run when the optimization level is set to CodeGenOpt::None (-O0).
Functional transformation should run with all optimization levels, so here I created a new pass which runs on all optimization levels and does no more than this transformation.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32487
llvm-svn: 303050
This pass uses a new target hook to decide whether or not to expand a particular
intrinsic to the shuffevector sequence.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32245
llvm-svn: 302631
This is a follow-up to r302611, which moved an -O0 computation of DT
from SDAGISel to TwoAddress.
Don't use it here either, and avoid computing it completely. The only
use was forwarding the analysis as an optional argument to utility
functions.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32766
llvm-svn: 302612
Before r247167, the pass manager builder controlled which AA
implementations were used, exporting them all in the AliasAnalysis
analysis group.
Now, AAResultsWrapperPass always uses BasicAA, but still uses other AA
implementations if made available in the pass pipeline.
But regardless, SDAGISel is required at O0, and really doesn't need to
be doing fancy optimizations based on useful AA results.
Don't require AA at CodeGenOpt::None, and only use it otherwise.
This does have a functional impact (and one testcase is pessimized
because we can't reuse a load). But I think that's desirable no matter
what.
Note that this alone doesn't result in less DT computations: TwoAddress
was previously able to reuse the DT we computed for SDAG. That will be
fixed separately.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32766
llvm-svn: 302611
We currently require SCEV, which requires DT/LI. Those are expensive to
compute, but the pass only runs for functions that have the safestack
attribute.
Compute DT/LI to build SCEV lazily, only when the pass is actually going
to transform the function.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D31302
llvm-svn: 302610
This should hopefully makes changes to the O0 pipeline obvious; it's
easy to require expensive passes, and this helps make informed
decisions.
Case in point: in the few weeks separating the time when I initially
wrote this patch to the time when I committed, the test regressed as
r302103 added another use of DT!
llvm-svn: 302608
Chandler Carruth