d8faf03807 implemented general-regs-only for X86 by disabling all features
with vector instructions. But the CRC32 instruction in SSE4.2 ISA, which uses
only GPRs, also becomes unavailable. This patch adds a CRC32 feature for this
instruction and allows it to be used with general-regs-only.
Reviewed By: pengfei
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D105462
This patch mainly made the following changes:
1. Support AVX-VNNI instructions;
2. Introduce ExplicitVEXPrefix flag so that vpdpbusd/vpdpbusds/vpdpbusds/vpdpbusds instructions only use vex-encoding when user explicity add {vex} prefix.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D89105
Key Locker provides a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt data with an AES key without having access
to the raw key value by converting AES keys into “handles”. These handles can be used to perform the
same encryption and decryption operations as the original AES keys, but they only work on the current
system and only until they are revoked. If software revokes Key Locker handles (e.g., on a reboot),
then any previous handles can no longer be used.
Reviewed By: craig.topper
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D88398
This patch creates a clang flag to enable SESES. This flag also ensures that
lvi-cfi is on when using seses via clang.
SESES should use lvi-cfi to mitigate returns and indirect branches.
The flag to enable the SESES functionality only without lvi-cfi is now
-x86-seses-enable-without-lvi-cfi to warn users part of the mitigation is not
enabled if they use this flag. This is useful in case folks want to see the
cost of SESES separate from the LVI-CFI.
Reviewed By: sconstab
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D79910
Adds a new data structure, ImmutableGraph, and uses RDF to find LVI gadgets and add them to a MachineGadgetGraph.
More specifically, a new X86 machine pass finds Load Value Injection (LVI) gadgets consisting of a load from memory (i.e., SOURCE), and any operation that may transmit the value loaded from memory over a covert channel, or use the value loaded from memory to determine a branch/call target (i.e., SINK).
Also adds a new target feature to X86: +lvi-load-hardening
The feature can be added via the clang CLI using -mlvi-hardening.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D75936
Adds a new data structure, ImmutableGraph, and uses RDF to find LVI gadgets and add them to a MachineGadgetGraph.
More specifically, a new X86 machine pass finds Load Value Injection (LVI) gadgets consisting of a load from memory (i.e., SOURCE), and any operation that may transmit the value loaded from memory over a covert channel, or use the value loaded from memory to determine a branch/call target (i.e., SINK).
Also adds a new target feature to X86: +lvi-load-hardening
The feature can be added via the clang CLI using -mlvi-hardening.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D75936
This pass replaces each indirect call/jump with a direct call to a thunk that looks like:
lfence
jmpq *%r11
This ensures that if the value in register %r11 was loaded from memory, then
the value in %r11 is (architecturally) correct prior to the jump.
Also adds a new target feature to X86: +lvi-cfi
("cfi" meaning control-flow integrity)
The feature can be added via clang CLI using -mlvi-cfi.
This is an alternate implementation to https://reviews.llvm.org/D75934 That merges the thunk insertion functionality with the existing X86 retpoline code.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D76812
-mvzeroupper will force the vzeroupper insertion pass to run on
CPUs that normally wouldn't. -mno-vzeroupper disables it on CPUs
where it normally runs.
To support this with the default feature handling in clang, we
need a vzeroupper feature flag in X86.td. Since this flag has
the opposite polarity of the fast-partial-ymm-or-zmm-write we
used to use to disable the pass, we now need to add this new
flag to every CPU except KNL/KNM and BTVER2 to keep identical
behavior.
Remove -fast-partial-ymm-or-zmm-write which is no longer used.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D69786
-Deprecate -mmpx and -mno-mpx command line options
-Remove CPUID detection of mpx for -march=native
-Remove MPX from all CPUs
-Remove MPX preprocessor define
I've left the "mpx" string in the backend so we don't fail on old IR, but its not connected to anything.
gcc has also deprecated these command line options. https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GCC-Patch-To-Drop-MPX
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D66669
llvm-svn: 370393
Summary:
1. Enable infrastructure of AVX512_BF16, which is supported for BFLOAT16 in Cooper Lake;
2. Enable intrinsics for VCVTNE2PS2BF16, VCVTNEPS2BF16 and DPBF16PS instructions, which are Vector Neural Network Instructions supporting BFLOAT16 inputs and conversion instructions from IEEE single precision.
For more details about BF16 intrinsic, please refer to the latest ISE document: https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference
Patch by LiuTianle
Reviewers: craig.topper, smaslov, LuoYuanke, wxiao3, annita.zhang, spatel, RKSimon
Reviewed By: craig.topper
Subscribers: mgorny, cfe-commits
Tags: #clang
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D60552
llvm-svn: 360018
Load Hardening.
Wires up the existing pass to work with a proper IR attribute rather
than just a hidden/internal flag. The internal flag continues to work
for now, but I'll likely remove it soon.
Most of the churn here is adding the IR attribute. I talked about this
Kristof Beyls and he seemed at least initially OK with this direction.
The idea of using a full attribute here is that we *do* expect at least
some forms of this for other architectures. There isn't anything
*inherently* x86-specific about this technique, just that we only have
an implementation for x86 at the moment.
While we could potentially expose this as a Clang-level attribute as
well, that seems like a good question to defer for the moment as it
isn't 100% clear whether that or some other programmer interface (or
both?) would be best. We'll defer the programmer interface side of this
for now, but at least get to the point where the feature can be enabled
without relying on implementation details.
This also allows us to do something that was really hard before: we can
enable *just* the indirect call retpolines when using SLH. For x86, we
don't have any other way to mitigate indirect calls. Other architectures
may take a different approach of course, and none of this is surfaced to
user-level flags.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D51157
llvm-svn: 341363
subtarget features for indirect calls and indirect branches.
This is in preparation for enabling *only* the call retpolines when
using speculative load hardening.
I've continued to use subtarget features for now as they continue to
seem the best fit given the lack of other retpoline like constructs so
far.
The LLVM side is pretty simple. I'd like to eventually get rid of the
old feature, but not sure what backwards compatibility issues that will
cause.
This does remove the "implies" from requesting an external thunk. This
always seemed somewhat questionable and is now clearly not desirable --
you specify a thunk the same way no matter which set of things are
getting retpolines.
I really want to keep this nicely isolated from end users and just an
LLVM implementation detail, so I've moved the `-mretpoline` flag in
Clang to no longer rely on a specific subtarget feature by that name and
instead to be directly handled. In some ways this is simpler, but in
order to preserve existing behavior I've had to add some fallback code
so that users who relied on merely passing -mretpoline-external-thunk
continue to get the same behavior. We should eventually remove this
I suspect (we have never tested that it works!) but I've not done that
in this patch.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D51150
llvm-svn: 340515
An intrinsic for an old instruction, as described in the Intel SDM.
Reviewers: craig.topper, rnk
Reviewed By: craig.topper, rnk
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D47142
llvm-svn: 333256
in gcc by https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-cvs/2018-04/msg00534.html.
The -mibt feature flag is being removed, and the -fcf-protection
option now also defines a CET macro and causes errors when used
on non-X86 targets, while X86 targets no longer check for -mibt
and -mshstk to determine if -fcf-protection is supported. -mshstk
is now used only to determine availability of shadow stack intrinsics.
Comes with an LLVM patch (D46882).
Patch by mike.dvoretsky
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D46881
llvm-svn: 332704
The WBNOINVD instruction writes back all modified
cache lines in the processor’s internal cache to main memory
but does not invalidate (flush) the internal caches.
Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi, ashlykov
Reviewed By: craig.topper
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D43817
llvm-svn: 329848
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
added vbmi2 feature recognition
added intrinsics support for vbmi2 instructions
_mm[128,256,512]_mask[z]_compress_epi[16,32]
_mm[128,256,512]_mask_compressstoreu_epi[16,32]
_mm[128,256,512]_mask[z]_expand_epi[16,32]
_mm[128,256,512]_mask[z]_expandloadu_epi[16,32]
_mm[128,256,512]_mask[z]_sh[l,r]di_epi[16,32,64]
_mm[128,256,512]_mask_sh[l,r]dv_epi[16,32,64]
matching a similar work on the backend (D40206)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41557
llvm-svn: 321487
added vpclmulqdq feature recognition
added intrinsics support for vpclmulqdq instructions
_mm256_clmulepi64_epi128
_mm512_clmulepi64_epi128
matching a similar work on the backend (D40101)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41573
llvm-svn: 321480
added vaes feature recognition
added intrinsics support for vaes instructions, matching a similar work on the backend (D40078)
_mm256_aesenc_epi128
_mm512_aesenc_epi128
_mm256_aesenclast_epi128
_mm512_aesenclast_epi128
_mm256_aesdec_epi128
_mm512_aesdec_epi128
_mm256_aesdeclast_epi128
_mm512_aesdeclast_epi128
llvm-svn: 321474
Shadow stack solution introduces a new stack for return addresses only.
The stack has a Shadow Stack Pointer (SSP) that points to the last address to which we expect to return.
If we return to a different address an exception is triggered.
This patch includes shadow stack intrinsics as well as the corresponding CET header.
It includes CET clang flags for shadow stack and Indirect Branch Tracking.
For more information, please see the following:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40224
Change-Id: I79ad0925a028bbc94c8ecad75f6daa2f214171f1
llvm-svn: 318995
1. Adds the command line flag for clzero.
2. Includes the clzero flag under znver1.
3. Defines the macro for clzero.
4. Adds a new file which has the intrinsic definition for clzero instruction.
Patch by Ganesh Gopalasubramanian with some additional tests from me.
Differential revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D29386
llvm-svn: 294559
Add -m[no-]x87 and -m[no-]80387 options to control FeatureX87.
-m[no-]80387 options is added for compatibility with GCC.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D19658
llvm-svn: 268489
Tianqing Wang