llvm-project/lld/test/ELF/aarch64-feature-bti.s

Ignoring revisions in .git-blame-ignore-revs. Click here to bypass and see the normal blame view.

225 lines
8.9 KiB
ArmAsm
Raw Normal View History

[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# REQUIRES: aarch64
# RUN: llvm-mc -filetype=obj -triple=aarch64-linux-gnu %s -o %t.o
# RUN: llvm-mc -filetype=obj -triple=aarch64-linux-gnu %p/Inputs/aarch64-bti1.s -o %t1.o
# RUN: llvm-mc -filetype=obj -triple=aarch64-linux-gnu %p/Inputs/aarch64-func3.s -o %t2.o
# RUN: llvm-mc -filetype=obj -triple=aarch64-linux-gnu %p/Inputs/aarch64-func3-bti.s -o %t3.o
# RUN: llvm-mc -filetype=obj -triple=aarch64-linux-gnu %p/Inputs/aarch64-func2.s -o %tno.o
## We do not add BTI support when the inputs don't have the .note.gnu.property
## field.
# RUN: ld.lld %tno.o %t3.o --shared -o %tno.so
# RUN: llvm-objdump -d --mattr=+bti --no-show-raw-insn %tno.so | FileCheck --check-prefix=NOBTI %s
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# RUN: llvm-readelf -x .got.plt %tno.so | FileCheck --check-prefix SOGOTPLT %s
# RUN: llvm-readelf --dynamic-table %tno.so | FileCheck --check-prefix NOBTIDYN %s
# NOBTIDYN-NOT: 0x0000000070000001 (AARCH64_BTI_PLT)
# NOBTIDYN-NOT: 0x0000000070000003 (AARCH64_PAC_PLT)
# NOBTI: 00000000000102b8 <func2>:
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102b8: bl 0x102f0 <func3@plt>
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102bc: ret
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# NOBTI: Disassembly of section .plt:
# NOBTI: 00000000000102d0 <.plt>:
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102d0: stp x16, x30, [sp, #-16]!
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102d4: adrp x16, 0x30000
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102d8: ldr x17, [x16, #960]
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102dc: add x16, x16, #960
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102e0: br x17
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102e4: nop
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102e8: nop
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102ec: nop
# NOBTI: 00000000000102f0 <func3@plt>:
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102f0: adrp x16, 0x30000
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102f4: ldr x17, [x16, #968]
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102f8: add x16, x16, #968
# NOBTI-NEXT: 102fc: br x17
## The .got.plt should be identical between the BTI and no BTI DSO PLT.
# SOGOTPLT: Hex dump of section '.got.plt'
# SOGOTPLT-NEXT: 0x000303b0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
# SOGOTPLT-NEXT: 0x000303c0 00000000 00000000 d0020100 00000000
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
## Expect a bti c at the start of plt[0], the plt entries do not need bti c as
## their address doesn't escape the shared object, so they can't be indirectly
## called. Expect no other difference.
# RUN: ld.lld %t1.o %t3.o --shared --soname=t.so -o %t.so
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# RUN: llvm-readelf -n %t.so | FileCheck --check-prefix BTIPROP %s
# RUN: llvm-objdump -d --mattr=+bti --no-show-raw-insn %t.so | FileCheck --check-prefix BTISO %s
# RUN: llvm-readelf -x .got.plt %t.so | FileCheck --check-prefix SOGOTPLT2 %s
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# RUN: llvm-readelf --dynamic-table %t.so | FileCheck --check-prefix BTIDYN %s
# BTIPROP: Properties: aarch64 feature: BTI
# BTIDYN: 0x0000000070000001 (AARCH64_BTI_PLT)
# BTIDYN-NOT: 0x0000000070000003 (AARCH64_PAC_PLT)
# BTISO: 0000000000010348 <func2>:
# BTISO-NEXT: 10348: bl 0x10380 <func3@plt>
# BTISO-NEXT: ret
# BTISO: 0000000000010350 <func3>:
# BTISO-NEXT: 10350: ret
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# BTISO: Disassembly of section .plt:
# BTISO: 0000000000010360 <.plt>:
# BTISO-NEXT: 10360: bti c
# BTISO-NEXT: stp x16, x30, [sp, #-16]!
# BTISO-NEXT: adrp x16, 0x30000
# BTISO-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1136]
# BTISO-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1136
# BTISO-NEXT: br x17
# BTISO-NEXT: nop
# BTISO-NEXT: nop
# BTISO: 0000000000010380 <func3@plt>:
# BTISO-NEXT: 10380: adrp x16, 0x30000
# BTISO-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1144]
# BTISO-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1144
# BTISO-NEXT: br x17
# SOGOTPLT2: Hex dump of section '.got.plt'
# SOGOTPLT2-NEXT: 0x00030460 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
# SOGOTPLT2-NEXT: 0x00030470 00000000 00000000 60030100 00000000
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
## Build an executable with all relocatable inputs having the BTI
## .note.gnu.property. We expect a bti c in front of all PLT entries as the
## address of a PLT entry can escape an executable.
# RUN: ld.lld %t2.o --shared --soname=t2.so -o %t2.so
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# RUN: ld.lld %t.o %t.so %t2.so -o %t.exe
# RUN: llvm-readelf --dynamic-table -n %t.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix=BTIPROP %s
# RUN: llvm-objdump -d --mattr=+bti --no-show-raw-insn %t.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix=EXECBTI %s
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# EXECBTI: Disassembly of section .text:
# EXECBTI: 0000000000210348 <func1>:
# EXECBTI-NEXT: 210348: bl 0x210370 <func2@plt>
# EXECBTI-NEXT: ret
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# EXECBTI: Disassembly of section .plt:
# EXECBTI: 0000000000210350 <.plt>:
# EXECBTI-NEXT: 210350: bti c
# EXECBTI-NEXT: stp x16, x30, [sp, #-16]!
# EXECBTI-NEXT: adrp x16, 0x230000
# EXECBTI-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1160]
# EXECBTI-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1160
# EXECBTI-NEXT: br x17
# EXECBTI-NEXT: nop
# EXECBTI-NEXT: nop
# EXECBTI: 0000000000210370 <func2@plt>:
# EXECBTI-NEXT: 210370: bti c
# EXECBTI-NEXT: adrp x16, 0x230000
# EXECBTI-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1168]
# EXECBTI-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1168
# EXECBTI-NEXT: br x17
# EXECBTI-NEXT: nop
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
## We expect the same for PIE, as the address of an ifunc can escape
# RUN: ld.lld --pie %t.o %t.so %t2.so -o %tpie.exe
# RUN: llvm-readelf -n %tpie.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix=BTIPROP %s
# RUN: llvm-readelf --dynamic-table -n %tpie.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix=BTIPROP %s
# RUN: llvm-objdump -d --mattr=+bti --no-show-raw-insn %tpie.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix=PIE %s
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# PIE: Disassembly of section .text:
# PIE: 0000000000010348 <func1>:
# PIE-NEXT: 10348: bl 0x10370 <func2@plt>
# PIE-NEXT: ret
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# PIE: Disassembly of section .plt:
# PIE: 0000000000010350 <.plt>:
# PIE-NEXT: 10350: bti c
# PIE-NEXT: stp x16, x30, [sp, #-16]!
# PIE-NEXT: adrp x16, 0x30000
# PIE-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1176]
# PIE-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1176
# PIE-NEXT: br x17
# PIE-NEXT: nop
# PIE-NEXT: nop
# PIE: 0000000000010370 <func2@plt>:
# PIE-NEXT: 10370: bti c
# PIE-NEXT: adrp x16, 0x30000
# PIE-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1184]
# PIE-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1184
# PIE-NEXT: br x17
# PIE-NEXT: nop
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
## Build and executable with not all relocatable inputs having the BTI
## .note.property, expect no bti c and no .note.gnu.property entry
# RUN: ld.lld %t.o %t2.o %t.so -o %tnobti.exe
# RUN: llvm-readelf --dynamic-table %tnobti.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix NOBTIDYN %s
# RUN: llvm-objdump -d --mattr=+bti --no-show-raw-insn %tnobti.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix=NOEX %s
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# NOEX: Disassembly of section .text:
# NOEX: 00000000002102e0 <func1>:
# NOEX-NEXT: 2102e0: bl 0x210310 <func2@plt>
# NOEX-NEXT: ret
# NOEX: 00000000002102e8 <func3>:
# NOEX-NEXT: 2102e8: ret
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# NOEX: Disassembly of section .plt:
# NOEX: 00000000002102f0 <.plt>:
# NOEX-NEXT: 2102f0: stp x16, x30, [sp, #-16]!
# NOEX-NEXT: adrp x16, 0x230000
# NOEX-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1024]
# NOEX-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1024
# NOEX-NEXT: br x17
# NOEX-NEXT: nop
# NOEX-NEXT: nop
# NOEX-NEXT: nop
# NOEX: 0000000000210310 <func2@plt>:
# NOEX-NEXT: 210310: adrp x16, 0x230000
# NOEX-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1032]
# NOEX-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1032
# NOEX-NEXT: br x17
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
## Force BTI entries with the -z force-bti command line option. Expect a warning
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
## from the file without the .note.gnu.property.
# RUN: ld.lld %t.o %t2.o -z force-bti %t.so -o %tforcebti.exe 2>&1 | FileCheck --check-prefix=FORCE-WARN %s
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# FORCE-WARN: aarch64-feature-bti.s.tmp2.o: -z force-bti: file does not have GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI property
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# RUN: llvm-readelf -n %tforcebti.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix=BTIPROP %s
# RUN: llvm-readelf --dynamic-table %tforcebti.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix BTIDYN %s
# RUN: llvm-objdump -d --mattr=+bti --no-show-raw-insn %tforcebti.exe | FileCheck --check-prefix=FORCE %s
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# FORCE: Disassembly of section .text:
# FORCE: 0000000000210370 <func1>:
# FORCE-NEXT: 210370: bl 0x2103a0 <func2@plt>
# FORCE-NEXT: ret
# FORCE: 0000000000210378 <func3>:
# FORCE-NEXT: 210378: ret
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
# FORCE: Disassembly of section .plt:
# FORCE: 0000000000210380 <.plt>:
# FORCE-NEXT: 210380: bti c
# FORCE-NEXT: stp x16, x30, [sp, #-16]!
# FORCE-NEXT: adrp x16, 0x230000
# FORCE-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1192]
# FORCE-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1192
# FORCE-NEXT: br x17
# FORCE-NEXT: nop
# FORCE-NEXT: nop
# FORCE: 00000000002103a0 <func2@plt>:
# FORCE-NEXT: 2103a0: bti c
# FORCE-NEXT: adrp x16, 0x230000
# FORCE-NEXT: ldr x17, [x16, #1200]
# FORCE-NEXT: add x16, x16, #1200
# FORCE-NEXT: br x17
# FORCE-NEXT: nop
[ELF][AArch64] Support for BTI and PAC Branch Target Identification (BTI) and Pointer Authentication (PAC) are architecture features introduced in v8.5a and 8.3a respectively. The new instructions have been added in the hint space so that binaries take advantage of support where it exists yet still run on older hardware. The impact of each feature is: BTI: For executable pages that have been guarded, all indirect branches must have a destination that is a BTI instruction of the appropriate type. For the static linker, this means that PLT entries must have a "BTI c" as the first instruction in the sequence. BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit, any indirect branch not landing on a valid destination will cause a Branch Target Exception. PAC: The dynamic loader encodes with PACIA the address of the destination that the PLT entry will load from the .plt.got, placing the result in a subset of the top-bits that are not valid virtual addresses. The PLT entry may authenticate these top-bits using the AUTIA instruction before branching to the destination. Use of PAC in PLT sequences is a contract between the dynamic loader and the static linker, it is independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC. BTI and PAC are independent features that can be combined. So we can have several combinations of PLT: - Standard with no BTI or PAC - BTI PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction. - PAC PLT with "AUTIA1716" before the indirect branch to X17. - BTIPAC PLT with "BTI c" as first instruction and "AUTIA1716" before the first indirect branch to X17. The use of BTI and PAC in relocatable object files are encoded by feature bits in the .note.gnu.property section in a similar way to Intel CET. There is one AArch64 specific program property GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND and two target feature bits defined: - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -- All executable sections are compatible with BTI. - GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -- All executable sections have return address signing enabled. Due to the properties of FEATURE_1_AND the static linker can tell when all input relocatable objects have the BTI and PAC feature bits set. The static linker uses this to enable the appropriate PLT sequence. Neither -> standard PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI -> BTI PLT GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC -> PAC PLT Both properties -> BTIPAC PLT In addition to the .note.gnu.properties there are two new command line options: --force-bti : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI and warn for every relocatable object that does not. --pac-plt : Act as if all relocatable inputs had GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC. As PAC is a contract between the loader and static linker no warning is given if it is not present in an input. Two processor specific dynamic tags are used to communicate that a non standard PLT sequence is being used. DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PLT and DTI_AARCH64_BTI_PAC. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 llvm-svn: 362793
2019-06-07 21:00:17 +08:00
.section ".note.gnu.property", "a"
.long 4
.long 0x10
.long 0x5
.asciz "GNU"
.long 0xc0000000 // GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND
.long 4
.long 1 // GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI
.long 0
.text
.globl _start
.type func1,%function
func1:
bl func2
ret