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llvm-project/clang/test/CodeGenCXX/operator-new.cpp

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implement PR5654: add -fassume-sane-operator-new, which is enabled by default, and adds the malloc attribute to the global function new() and to the overloaded new operators. feel free to chage the name to this lengthy argument llvm-svn: 91543
2009-12-17 00:59:22 +08:00
// RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple i686-pc-linux-gnu -emit-llvm -o %t-1.ll %s
// RUN: FileCheck -check-prefix SANE --input-file=%t-1.ll %s
// RUN: %clang_cc1 -triple i686-pc-linux-gnu -emit-llvm -fno-assume-sane-operator-new -o %t-2.ll %s
// RUN: FileCheck -check-prefix SANENOT --input-file=%t-2.ll %s
class teste {
int A;
Turn access control on by default in -cc1. Remove -faccess-control from -cc1; add -fno-access-control. Make the driver pass -fno-access-control by default. Update a bunch of tests to be correct under access control. llvm-svn: 100880
2010-04-10 03:03:51 +08:00
public:
implement PR5654: add -fassume-sane-operator-new, which is enabled by default, and adds the malloc attribute to the global function new() and to the overloaded new operators. feel free to chage the name to this lengthy argument llvm-svn: 91543
2009-12-17 00:59:22 +08:00
teste() : A(2) {}
};
void f1() {
implement rdar://5739832 - operator new should check for overflow in multiply, causing clang to compile this code into something that correctly throws a length error, fixing a potential integer overflow security attack: void *test(long N) { return new int[N]; } int main() { test(1L << 62); } We do this even when exceptions are disabled, because it is better for the code to abort than for the attack to succeed. This is heavily based on a patch that Fariborz wrote. llvm-svn: 108915
2010-07-21 04:19:24 +08:00
// SANE: declare noalias i8* @_Znwj(
// SANENOT: declare i8* @_Znwj(
implement PR5654: add -fassume-sane-operator-new, which is enabled by default, and adds the malloc attribute to the global function new() and to the overloaded new operators. feel free to chage the name to this lengthy argument llvm-svn: 91543
2009-12-17 00:59:22 +08:00
new teste();
}
implement rdar://5739832 - operator new should check for overflow in multiply, causing clang to compile this code into something that correctly throws a length error, fixing a potential integer overflow security attack: void *test(long N) { return new int[N]; } int main() { test(1L << 62); } We do this even when exceptions are disabled, because it is better for the code to abort than for the attack to succeed. This is heavily based on a patch that Fariborz wrote. llvm-svn: 108915
2010-07-21 04:19:24 +08:00
// rdar://5739832 - operator new should check for overflow in multiply.
void *f2(long N) {
return new int[N];
// SANE: call{{.*}}@llvm.umul.with.overflow
// SANE: extractvalue
don't demand names to be on IR. llvm-svn: 108937
2010-07-21 05:34:36 +08:00
// SANE: br i1
// SANE: = phi {{.*}} [ {{.*}} ], [ -1,
Follow the implementation approach suggested by PR6687, which generates more efficient and more obviously conformant code. We now test for overflow of the multiply then force the result to -1 if so. On X86, this generates nice code like this: __Z4testl: ## @_Z4testl ## BB#0: ## %entry subl $12, %esp movl $4, %eax mull 16(%esp) testl %edx, %edx movl $-1, %ecx cmovel %eax, %ecx movl %ecx, (%esp) call __Znam addl $12, %esp ret llvm-svn: 108927
2010-07-21 05:07:09 +08:00
// SANE: call noalias i8* @_Znaj(
implement rdar://5739832 - operator new should check for overflow in multiply, causing clang to compile this code into something that correctly throws a length error, fixing a potential integer overflow security attack: void *test(long N) { return new int[N]; } int main() { test(1L << 62); } We do this even when exceptions are disabled, because it is better for the code to abort than for the attack to succeed. This is heavily based on a patch that Fariborz wrote. llvm-svn: 108915
2010-07-21 04:19:24 +08:00
}