llvm-project/clang/lib/Basic/Targets/X86.cpp

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//===--- X86.cpp - Implement X86 target feature support -------------------===//
//
// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
//
// This file implements X86 TargetInfo objects.
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
#include "X86.h"
#include "clang/Basic/Builtins.h"
#include "clang/Basic/Diagnostic.h"
#include "clang/Basic/TargetBuiltins.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/StringExtras.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/StringRef.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/StringSwitch.h"
#include "llvm/Support/X86TargetParser.h"
namespace clang {
namespace targets {
const Builtin::Info BuiltinInfoX86[] = {
#define BUILTIN(ID, TYPE, ATTRS) \
{#ID, TYPE, ATTRS, nullptr, ALL_LANGUAGES, nullptr},
#define TARGET_BUILTIN(ID, TYPE, ATTRS, FEATURE) \
{#ID, TYPE, ATTRS, nullptr, ALL_LANGUAGES, FEATURE},
#define TARGET_HEADER_BUILTIN(ID, TYPE, ATTRS, HEADER, LANGS, FEATURE) \
{#ID, TYPE, ATTRS, HEADER, LANGS, FEATURE},
#include "clang/Basic/BuiltinsX86.def"
#define BUILTIN(ID, TYPE, ATTRS) \
{#ID, TYPE, ATTRS, nullptr, ALL_LANGUAGES, nullptr},
#define TARGET_BUILTIN(ID, TYPE, ATTRS, FEATURE) \
{#ID, TYPE, ATTRS, nullptr, ALL_LANGUAGES, FEATURE},
#define TARGET_HEADER_BUILTIN(ID, TYPE, ATTRS, HEADER, LANGS, FEATURE) \
{#ID, TYPE, ATTRS, HEADER, LANGS, FEATURE},
#include "clang/Basic/BuiltinsX86_64.def"
};
static const char *const GCCRegNames[] = {
"ax", "dx", "cx", "bx", "si", "di", "bp", "sp",
"st", "st(1)", "st(2)", "st(3)", "st(4)", "st(5)", "st(6)", "st(7)",
"argp", "flags", "fpcr", "fpsr", "dirflag", "frame", "xmm0", "xmm1",
"xmm2", "xmm3", "xmm4", "xmm5", "xmm6", "xmm7", "mm0", "mm1",
"mm2", "mm3", "mm4", "mm5", "mm6", "mm7", "r8", "r9",
"r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15", "xmm8", "xmm9",
"xmm10", "xmm11", "xmm12", "xmm13", "xmm14", "xmm15", "ymm0", "ymm1",
"ymm2", "ymm3", "ymm4", "ymm5", "ymm6", "ymm7", "ymm8", "ymm9",
"ymm10", "ymm11", "ymm12", "ymm13", "ymm14", "ymm15", "xmm16", "xmm17",
"xmm18", "xmm19", "xmm20", "xmm21", "xmm22", "xmm23", "xmm24", "xmm25",
"xmm26", "xmm27", "xmm28", "xmm29", "xmm30", "xmm31", "ymm16", "ymm17",
"ymm18", "ymm19", "ymm20", "ymm21", "ymm22", "ymm23", "ymm24", "ymm25",
"ymm26", "ymm27", "ymm28", "ymm29", "ymm30", "ymm31", "zmm0", "zmm1",
"zmm2", "zmm3", "zmm4", "zmm5", "zmm6", "zmm7", "zmm8", "zmm9",
"zmm10", "zmm11", "zmm12", "zmm13", "zmm14", "zmm15", "zmm16", "zmm17",
"zmm18", "zmm19", "zmm20", "zmm21", "zmm22", "zmm23", "zmm24", "zmm25",
"zmm26", "zmm27", "zmm28", "zmm29", "zmm30", "zmm31", "k0", "k1",
"k2", "k3", "k4", "k5", "k6", "k7",
"cr0", "cr2", "cr3", "cr4", "cr8",
"dr0", "dr1", "dr2", "dr3", "dr6", "dr7",
"bnd0", "bnd1", "bnd2", "bnd3",
"tmm0", "tmm1", "tmm2", "tmm3", "tmm4", "tmm5", "tmm6", "tmm7",
};
const TargetInfo::AddlRegName AddlRegNames[] = {
{{"al", "ah", "eax", "rax"}, 0},
{{"bl", "bh", "ebx", "rbx"}, 3},
{{"cl", "ch", "ecx", "rcx"}, 2},
{{"dl", "dh", "edx", "rdx"}, 1},
{{"esi", "rsi"}, 4},
{{"edi", "rdi"}, 5},
{{"esp", "rsp"}, 7},
{{"ebp", "rbp"}, 6},
{{"r8d", "r8w", "r8b"}, 38},
{{"r9d", "r9w", "r9b"}, 39},
{{"r10d", "r10w", "r10b"}, 40},
{{"r11d", "r11w", "r11b"}, 41},
{{"r12d", "r12w", "r12b"}, 42},
{{"r13d", "r13w", "r13b"}, 43},
{{"r14d", "r14w", "r14b"}, 44},
{{"r15d", "r15w", "r15b"}, 45},
};
} // namespace targets
} // namespace clang
using namespace clang;
using namespace clang::targets;
bool X86TargetInfo::setFPMath(StringRef Name) {
if (Name == "387") {
FPMath = FP_387;
return true;
}
if (Name == "sse") {
FPMath = FP_SSE;
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool X86TargetInfo::initFeatureMap(
llvm::StringMap<bool> &Features, DiagnosticsEngine &Diags, StringRef CPU,
const std::vector<std::string> &FeaturesVec) const {
// FIXME: This *really* should not be here.
// X86_64 always has SSE2.
if (getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::x86_64)
setFeatureEnabled(Features, "sse2", true);
using namespace llvm::X86;
SmallVector<StringRef, 16> CPUFeatures;
getFeaturesForCPU(CPU, CPUFeatures);
for (auto &F : CPUFeatures)
setFeatureEnabled(Features, F, true);
if (!TargetInfo::initFeatureMap(Features, Diags, CPU, FeaturesVec))
return false;
// Can't do this earlier because we need to be able to explicitly enable
// or disable these features and the things that they depend upon.
// Enable popcnt if sse4.2 is enabled and popcnt is not explicitly disabled.
auto I = Features.find("sse4.2");
if (I != Features.end() && I->getValue() &&
llvm::find(FeaturesVec, "-popcnt") == FeaturesVec.end())
Features["popcnt"] = true;
// Additionally, if SSE is enabled and mmx is not explicitly disabled,
// then enable MMX.
I = Features.find("sse");
if (I != Features.end() && I->getValue() &&
llvm::find(FeaturesVec, "-mmx") == FeaturesVec.end())
Features["mmx"] = true;
// Enable xsave if avx is enabled and xsave is not explicitly disabled.
I = Features.find("avx");
if (I != Features.end() && I->getValue() &&
llvm::find(FeaturesVec, "-xsave") == FeaturesVec.end())
Features["xsave"] = true;
return true;
}
void X86TargetInfo::setFeatureEnabled(llvm::StringMap<bool> &Features,
StringRef Name, bool Enabled) const {
if (Name == "sse4") {
// We can get here via the __target__ attribute since that's not controlled
// via the -msse4/-mno-sse4 command line alias. Handle this the same way
// here - turn on the sse4.2 if enabled, turn off the sse4.1 level if
// disabled.
if (Enabled)
Name = "sse4.2";
else
Name = "sse4.1";
}
Features[Name] = Enabled;
llvm::X86::updateImpliedFeatures(Name, Enabled, Features);
}
/// handleTargetFeatures - Perform initialization based on the user
/// configured set of features.
bool X86TargetInfo::handleTargetFeatures(std::vector<std::string> &Features,
DiagnosticsEngine &Diags) {
for (const auto &Feature : Features) {
if (Feature[0] != '+')
continue;
if (Feature == "+aes") {
HasAES = true;
} else if (Feature == "+vaes") {
HasVAES = true;
} else if (Feature == "+pclmul") {
HasPCLMUL = true;
} else if (Feature == "+vpclmulqdq") {
HasVPCLMULQDQ = true;
} else if (Feature == "+lzcnt") {
HasLZCNT = true;
} else if (Feature == "+rdrnd") {
HasRDRND = true;
} else if (Feature == "+fsgsbase") {
HasFSGSBASE = true;
} else if (Feature == "+bmi") {
HasBMI = true;
} else if (Feature == "+bmi2") {
HasBMI2 = true;
} else if (Feature == "+popcnt") {
HasPOPCNT = true;
} else if (Feature == "+rtm") {
HasRTM = true;
} else if (Feature == "+prfchw") {
HasPRFCHW = true;
} else if (Feature == "+rdseed") {
HasRDSEED = true;
} else if (Feature == "+adx") {
HasADX = true;
} else if (Feature == "+tbm") {
HasTBM = true;
} else if (Feature == "+lwp") {
HasLWP = true;
} else if (Feature == "+fma") {
HasFMA = true;
} else if (Feature == "+f16c") {
HasF16C = true;
} else if (Feature == "+gfni") {
HasGFNI = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512cd") {
HasAVX512CD = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512vpopcntdq") {
HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512vnni") {
HasAVX512VNNI = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512bf16") {
HasAVX512BF16 = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512er") {
HasAVX512ER = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512pf") {
HasAVX512PF = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512dq") {
HasAVX512DQ = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512bitalg") {
HasAVX512BITALG = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512bw") {
HasAVX512BW = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512vl") {
HasAVX512VL = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512vbmi") {
HasAVX512VBMI = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512vbmi2") {
HasAVX512VBMI2 = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512ifma") {
HasAVX512IFMA = true;
} else if (Feature == "+avx512vp2intersect") {
HasAVX512VP2INTERSECT = true;
} else if (Feature == "+sha") {
HasSHA = true;
} else if (Feature == "+shstk") {
HasSHSTK = true;
} else if (Feature == "+movbe") {
HasMOVBE = true;
} else if (Feature == "+sgx") {
HasSGX = true;
} else if (Feature == "+cx8") {
HasCX8 = true;
} else if (Feature == "+cx16") {
HasCX16 = true;
} else if (Feature == "+fxsr") {
HasFXSR = true;
} else if (Feature == "+xsave") {
HasXSAVE = true;
} else if (Feature == "+xsaveopt") {
HasXSAVEOPT = true;
} else if (Feature == "+xsavec") {
HasXSAVEC = true;
} else if (Feature == "+xsaves") {
HasXSAVES = true;
} else if (Feature == "+mwaitx") {
HasMWAITX = true;
} else if (Feature == "+pku") {
HasPKU = true;
} else if (Feature == "+clflushopt") {
HasCLFLUSHOPT = true;
} else if (Feature == "+clwb") {
HasCLWB = true;
} else if (Feature == "+wbnoinvd") {
HasWBNOINVD = true;
} else if (Feature == "+prefetchwt1") {
HasPREFETCHWT1 = true;
} else if (Feature == "+clzero") {
HasCLZERO = true;
} else if (Feature == "+cldemote") {
HasCLDEMOTE = true;
} else if (Feature == "+rdpid") {
HasRDPID = true;
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
} else if (Feature == "+retpoline-external-thunk") {
HasRetpolineExternalThunk = true;
} else if (Feature == "+sahf") {
HasLAHFSAHF = true;
} else if (Feature == "+waitpkg") {
HasWAITPKG = true;
} else if (Feature == "+movdiri") {
HasMOVDIRI = true;
} else if (Feature == "+movdir64b") {
HasMOVDIR64B = true;
} else if (Feature == "+pconfig") {
HasPCONFIG = true;
} else if (Feature == "+ptwrite") {
HasPTWRITE = true;
} else if (Feature == "+invpcid") {
HasINVPCID = true;
} else if (Feature == "+enqcmd") {
HasENQCMD = true;
} else if (Feature == "+amx-bf16") {
HasAMXBF16 = true;
} else if (Feature == "+amx-int8") {
HasAMXINT8 = true;
} else if (Feature == "+amx-tile") {
HasAMXTILE = true;
} else if (Feature == "+serialize") {
HasSERIALIZE = true;
} else if (Feature == "+tsxldtrk") {
HasTSXLDTRK = true;
}
X86SSEEnum Level = llvm::StringSwitch<X86SSEEnum>(Feature)
.Case("+avx512f", AVX512F)
.Case("+avx2", AVX2)
.Case("+avx", AVX)
.Case("+sse4.2", SSE42)
.Case("+sse4.1", SSE41)
.Case("+ssse3", SSSE3)
.Case("+sse3", SSE3)
.Case("+sse2", SSE2)
.Case("+sse", SSE1)
.Default(NoSSE);
SSELevel = std::max(SSELevel, Level);
MMX3DNowEnum ThreeDNowLevel = llvm::StringSwitch<MMX3DNowEnum>(Feature)
.Case("+3dnowa", AMD3DNowAthlon)
.Case("+3dnow", AMD3DNow)
.Case("+mmx", MMX)
.Default(NoMMX3DNow);
MMX3DNowLevel = std::max(MMX3DNowLevel, ThreeDNowLevel);
XOPEnum XLevel = llvm::StringSwitch<XOPEnum>(Feature)
.Case("+xop", XOP)
.Case("+fma4", FMA4)
.Case("+sse4a", SSE4A)
.Default(NoXOP);
XOPLevel = std::max(XOPLevel, XLevel);
}
// LLVM doesn't have a separate switch for fpmath, so only accept it if it
// matches the selected sse level.
if ((FPMath == FP_SSE && SSELevel < SSE1) ||
(FPMath == FP_387 && SSELevel >= SSE1)) {
Diags.Report(diag::err_target_unsupported_fpmath)
<< (FPMath == FP_SSE ? "sse" : "387");
return false;
}
SimdDefaultAlign =
hasFeature("avx512f") ? 512 : hasFeature("avx") ? 256 : 128;
return true;
}
/// X86TargetInfo::getTargetDefines - Return the set of the X86-specific macro
/// definitions for this particular subtarget.
void X86TargetInfo::getTargetDefines(const LangOptions &Opts,
MacroBuilder &Builder) const {
// Inline assembly supports X86 flag outputs.
Builder.defineMacro("__GCC_ASM_FLAG_OUTPUTS__");
std::string CodeModel = getTargetOpts().CodeModel;
if (CodeModel == "default")
CodeModel = "small";
Builder.defineMacro("__code_model_" + CodeModel + "__");
// Target identification.
if (getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::x86_64) {
Builder.defineMacro("__amd64__");
Builder.defineMacro("__amd64");
Builder.defineMacro("__x86_64");
Builder.defineMacro("__x86_64__");
if (getTriple().getArchName() == "x86_64h") {
Builder.defineMacro("__x86_64h");
Builder.defineMacro("__x86_64h__");
}
} else {
DefineStd(Builder, "i386", Opts);
}
Builder.defineMacro("__SEG_GS");
Builder.defineMacro("__SEG_FS");
Builder.defineMacro("__seg_gs", "__attribute__((address_space(256)))");
Builder.defineMacro("__seg_fs", "__attribute__((address_space(257)))");
// Subtarget options.
// FIXME: We are hard-coding the tune parameters based on the CPU, but they
// truly should be based on -mtune options.
using namespace llvm::X86;
switch (CPU) {
case CK_None:
break;
case CK_i386:
// The rest are coming from the i386 define above.
Builder.defineMacro("__tune_i386__");
break;
case CK_i486:
case CK_WinChipC6:
case CK_WinChip2:
case CK_C3:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "i486");
break;
case CK_PentiumMMX:
Builder.defineMacro("__pentium_mmx__");
Builder.defineMacro("__tune_pentium_mmx__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case CK_i586:
case CK_Pentium:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "i586");
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "pentium");
break;
case CK_Pentium3:
case CK_PentiumM:
Builder.defineMacro("__tune_pentium3__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case CK_Pentium2:
case CK_C3_2:
Builder.defineMacro("__tune_pentium2__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case CK_PentiumPro:
case CK_i686:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "i686");
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "pentiumpro");
break;
case CK_Pentium4:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "pentium4");
break;
case CK_Yonah:
case CK_Prescott:
case CK_Nocona:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "nocona");
break;
case CK_Core2:
case CK_Penryn:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "core2");
break;
case CK_Bonnell:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "atom");
break;
case CK_Silvermont:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "slm");
break;
case CK_Goldmont:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "goldmont");
break;
case CK_GoldmontPlus:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "goldmont_plus");
break;
case CK_Tremont:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "tremont");
break;
case CK_Nehalem:
case CK_Westmere:
case CK_SandyBridge:
case CK_IvyBridge:
case CK_Haswell:
case CK_Broadwell:
case CK_SkylakeClient:
case CK_SkylakeServer:
case CK_Cascadelake:
case CK_Cooperlake:
case CK_Cannonlake:
case CK_IcelakeClient:
case CK_IcelakeServer:
case CK_Tigerlake:
case CK_SapphireRapids:
// FIXME: Historically, we defined this legacy name, it would be nice to
// remove it at some point. We've never exposed fine-grained names for
// recent primary x86 CPUs, and we should keep it that way.
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "corei7");
break;
case CK_KNL:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "knl");
break;
case CK_KNM:
break;
case CK_Lakemont:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "i586", /*Tuning*/false);
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "pentium", /*Tuning*/false);
Builder.defineMacro("__tune_lakemont__");
break;
case CK_K6_2:
Builder.defineMacro("__k6_2__");
Builder.defineMacro("__tune_k6_2__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case CK_K6_3:
if (CPU != CK_K6_2) { // In case of fallthrough
// FIXME: GCC may be enabling these in cases where some other k6
// architecture is specified but -m3dnow is explicitly provided. The
// exact semantics need to be determined and emulated here.
Builder.defineMacro("__k6_3__");
Builder.defineMacro("__tune_k6_3__");
}
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case CK_K6:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "k6");
break;
case CK_Athlon:
case CK_AthlonXP:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "athlon");
if (SSELevel != NoSSE) {
Builder.defineMacro("__athlon_sse__");
Builder.defineMacro("__tune_athlon_sse__");
}
break;
case CK_K8:
case CK_K8SSE3:
case CK_x86_64:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "k8");
break;
case CK_AMDFAM10:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "amdfam10");
break;
case CK_BTVER1:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "btver1");
break;
case CK_BTVER2:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "btver2");
break;
case CK_BDVER1:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "bdver1");
break;
case CK_BDVER2:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "bdver2");
break;
case CK_BDVER3:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "bdver3");
break;
case CK_BDVER4:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "bdver4");
break;
case CK_ZNVER1:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "znver1");
break;
case CK_ZNVER2:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "znver2");
break;
case CK_Geode:
defineCPUMacros(Builder, "geode");
break;
}
// Target properties.
Builder.defineMacro("__REGISTER_PREFIX__", "");
// Define __NO_MATH_INLINES on linux/x86 so that we don't get inline
// functions in glibc header files that use FP Stack inline asm which the
// backend can't deal with (PR879).
Builder.defineMacro("__NO_MATH_INLINES");
if (HasAES)
Builder.defineMacro("__AES__");
if (HasVAES)
Builder.defineMacro("__VAES__");
if (HasPCLMUL)
Builder.defineMacro("__PCLMUL__");
if (HasVPCLMULQDQ)
Builder.defineMacro("__VPCLMULQDQ__");
if (HasLZCNT)
Builder.defineMacro("__LZCNT__");
if (HasRDRND)
Builder.defineMacro("__RDRND__");
if (HasFSGSBASE)
Builder.defineMacro("__FSGSBASE__");
if (HasBMI)
Builder.defineMacro("__BMI__");
if (HasBMI2)
Builder.defineMacro("__BMI2__");
if (HasPOPCNT)
Builder.defineMacro("__POPCNT__");
if (HasRTM)
Builder.defineMacro("__RTM__");
if (HasPRFCHW)
Builder.defineMacro("__PRFCHW__");
if (HasRDSEED)
Builder.defineMacro("__RDSEED__");
if (HasADX)
Builder.defineMacro("__ADX__");
if (HasTBM)
Builder.defineMacro("__TBM__");
if (HasLWP)
Builder.defineMacro("__LWP__");
if (HasMWAITX)
Builder.defineMacro("__MWAITX__");
if (HasMOVBE)
Builder.defineMacro("__MOVBE__");
switch (XOPLevel) {
case XOP:
Builder.defineMacro("__XOP__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case FMA4:
Builder.defineMacro("__FMA4__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case SSE4A:
Builder.defineMacro("__SSE4A__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case NoXOP:
break;
}
if (HasFMA)
Builder.defineMacro("__FMA__");
if (HasF16C)
Builder.defineMacro("__F16C__");
if (HasGFNI)
Builder.defineMacro("__GFNI__");
if (HasAVX512CD)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512CD__");
if (HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512VPOPCNTDQ__");
if (HasAVX512VNNI)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512VNNI__");
if (HasAVX512BF16)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512BF16__");
if (HasAVX512ER)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512ER__");
if (HasAVX512PF)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512PF__");
if (HasAVX512DQ)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512DQ__");
if (HasAVX512BITALG)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512BITALG__");
if (HasAVX512BW)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512BW__");
if (HasAVX512VL)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512VL__");
if (HasAVX512VBMI)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512VBMI__");
if (HasAVX512VBMI2)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512VBMI2__");
if (HasAVX512IFMA)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512IFMA__");
if (HasAVX512VP2INTERSECT)
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512VP2INTERSECT__");
if (HasSHA)
Builder.defineMacro("__SHA__");
if (HasFXSR)
Builder.defineMacro("__FXSR__");
if (HasXSAVE)
Builder.defineMacro("__XSAVE__");
if (HasXSAVEOPT)
Builder.defineMacro("__XSAVEOPT__");
if (HasXSAVEC)
Builder.defineMacro("__XSAVEC__");
if (HasXSAVES)
Builder.defineMacro("__XSAVES__");
if (HasPKU)
Builder.defineMacro("__PKU__");
if (HasCLFLUSHOPT)
Builder.defineMacro("__CLFLUSHOPT__");
if (HasCLWB)
Builder.defineMacro("__CLWB__");
if (HasWBNOINVD)
Builder.defineMacro("__WBNOINVD__");
if (HasSHSTK)
Builder.defineMacro("__SHSTK__");
if (HasSGX)
Builder.defineMacro("__SGX__");
if (HasPREFETCHWT1)
Builder.defineMacro("__PREFETCHWT1__");
if (HasCLZERO)
Builder.defineMacro("__CLZERO__");
if (HasRDPID)
Builder.defineMacro("__RDPID__");
if (HasCLDEMOTE)
Builder.defineMacro("__CLDEMOTE__");
if (HasWAITPKG)
Builder.defineMacro("__WAITPKG__");
if (HasMOVDIRI)
Builder.defineMacro("__MOVDIRI__");
if (HasMOVDIR64B)
Builder.defineMacro("__MOVDIR64B__");
if (HasPCONFIG)
Builder.defineMacro("__PCONFIG__");
if (HasPTWRITE)
Builder.defineMacro("__PTWRITE__");
if (HasINVPCID)
Builder.defineMacro("__INVPCID__");
if (HasENQCMD)
Builder.defineMacro("__ENQCMD__");
if (HasAMXTILE)
Builder.defineMacro("__AMXTILE__");
if (HasAMXINT8)
Builder.defineMacro("__AMXINT8__");
if (HasAMXBF16)
Builder.defineMacro("__AMXBF16__");
if (HasSERIALIZE)
Builder.defineMacro("__SERIALIZE__");
if (HasTSXLDTRK)
Builder.defineMacro("__TSXLDTRK__");
// Each case falls through to the previous one here.
switch (SSELevel) {
case AVX512F:
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX512F__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case AVX2:
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX2__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case AVX:
Builder.defineMacro("__AVX__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case SSE42:
Builder.defineMacro("__SSE4_2__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case SSE41:
Builder.defineMacro("__SSE4_1__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case SSSE3:
Builder.defineMacro("__SSSE3__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case SSE3:
Builder.defineMacro("__SSE3__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case SSE2:
Builder.defineMacro("__SSE2__");
Builder.defineMacro("__SSE2_MATH__"); // -mfp-math=sse always implied.
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case SSE1:
Builder.defineMacro("__SSE__");
Builder.defineMacro("__SSE_MATH__"); // -mfp-math=sse always implied.
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case NoSSE:
break;
}
if (Opts.MicrosoftExt && getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::x86) {
switch (SSELevel) {
case AVX512F:
case AVX2:
case AVX:
case SSE42:
case SSE41:
case SSSE3:
case SSE3:
case SSE2:
Builder.defineMacro("_M_IX86_FP", Twine(2));
break;
case SSE1:
Builder.defineMacro("_M_IX86_FP", Twine(1));
break;
default:
Builder.defineMacro("_M_IX86_FP", Twine(0));
break;
}
}
// Each case falls through to the previous one here.
switch (MMX3DNowLevel) {
case AMD3DNowAthlon:
Builder.defineMacro("__3dNOW_A__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case AMD3DNow:
Builder.defineMacro("__3dNOW__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case MMX:
Builder.defineMacro("__MMX__");
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
case NoMMX3DNow:
break;
}
if (CPU >= CK_i486 || CPU == CK_None) {
Builder.defineMacro("__GCC_HAVE_SYNC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_1");
Builder.defineMacro("__GCC_HAVE_SYNC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_2");
Builder.defineMacro("__GCC_HAVE_SYNC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_4");
}
if (HasCX8)
Builder.defineMacro("__GCC_HAVE_SYNC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_8");
if (HasCX16 && getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::x86_64)
Builder.defineMacro("__GCC_HAVE_SYNC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_16");
if (HasFloat128)
Builder.defineMacro("__SIZEOF_FLOAT128__", "16");
}
bool X86TargetInfo::isValidFeatureName(StringRef Name) const {
return llvm::StringSwitch<bool>(Name)
.Case("3dnow", true)
.Case("3dnowa", true)
.Case("adx", true)
.Case("aes", true)
.Case("amx-bf16", true)
.Case("amx-int8", true)
.Case("amx-tile", true)
.Case("avx", true)
.Case("avx2", true)
.Case("avx512f", true)
.Case("avx512cd", true)
.Case("avx512vpopcntdq", true)
.Case("avx512vnni", true)
.Case("avx512bf16", true)
.Case("avx512er", true)
.Case("avx512pf", true)
.Case("avx512dq", true)
.Case("avx512bitalg", true)
.Case("avx512bw", true)
.Case("avx512vl", true)
.Case("avx512vbmi", true)
.Case("avx512vbmi2", true)
.Case("avx512ifma", true)
.Case("avx512vp2intersect", true)
.Case("bmi", true)
.Case("bmi2", true)
.Case("cldemote", true)
.Case("clflushopt", true)
.Case("clwb", true)
.Case("clzero", true)
.Case("cx16", true)
.Case("enqcmd", true)
.Case("f16c", true)
.Case("fma", true)
.Case("fma4", true)
.Case("fsgsbase", true)
.Case("fxsr", true)
.Case("gfni", true)
.Case("invpcid", true)
.Case("lwp", true)
.Case("lzcnt", true)
.Case("mmx", true)
.Case("movbe", true)
.Case("movdiri", true)
.Case("movdir64b", true)
.Case("mwaitx", true)
.Case("pclmul", true)
.Case("pconfig", true)
.Case("pku", true)
.Case("popcnt", true)
.Case("prefetchwt1", true)
.Case("prfchw", true)
.Case("ptwrite", true)
.Case("rdpid", true)
.Case("rdrnd", true)
.Case("rdseed", true)
.Case("rtm", true)
.Case("sahf", true)
.Case("serialize", true)
.Case("sgx", true)
.Case("sha", true)
.Case("shstk", true)
.Case("sse", true)
.Case("sse2", true)
.Case("sse3", true)
.Case("ssse3", true)
.Case("sse4", true)
.Case("sse4.1", true)
.Case("sse4.2", true)
.Case("sse4a", true)
.Case("tbm", true)
.Case("tsxldtrk", true)
.Case("vaes", true)
.Case("vpclmulqdq", true)
.Case("wbnoinvd", true)
.Case("waitpkg", true)
.Case("x87", true)
.Case("xop", true)
.Case("xsave", true)
.Case("xsavec", true)
.Case("xsaves", true)
.Case("xsaveopt", true)
.Default(false);
}
bool X86TargetInfo::hasFeature(StringRef Feature) const {
return llvm::StringSwitch<bool>(Feature)
.Case("adx", HasADX)
.Case("aes", HasAES)
.Case("amx-bf16", HasAMXBF16)
.Case("amx-int8", HasAMXINT8)
.Case("amx-tile", HasAMXTILE)
.Case("avx", SSELevel >= AVX)
.Case("avx2", SSELevel >= AVX2)
.Case("avx512f", SSELevel >= AVX512F)
.Case("avx512cd", HasAVX512CD)
.Case("avx512vpopcntdq", HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ)
.Case("avx512vnni", HasAVX512VNNI)
.Case("avx512bf16", HasAVX512BF16)
.Case("avx512er", HasAVX512ER)
.Case("avx512pf", HasAVX512PF)
.Case("avx512dq", HasAVX512DQ)
.Case("avx512bitalg", HasAVX512BITALG)
.Case("avx512bw", HasAVX512BW)
.Case("avx512vl", HasAVX512VL)
.Case("avx512vbmi", HasAVX512VBMI)
.Case("avx512vbmi2", HasAVX512VBMI2)
.Case("avx512ifma", HasAVX512IFMA)
.Case("avx512vp2intersect", HasAVX512VP2INTERSECT)
.Case("bmi", HasBMI)
.Case("bmi2", HasBMI2)
.Case("cldemote", HasCLDEMOTE)
.Case("clflushopt", HasCLFLUSHOPT)
.Case("clwb", HasCLWB)
.Case("clzero", HasCLZERO)
.Case("cx8", HasCX8)
.Case("cx16", HasCX16)
.Case("enqcmd", HasENQCMD)
.Case("f16c", HasF16C)
.Case("fma", HasFMA)
.Case("fma4", XOPLevel >= FMA4)
.Case("fsgsbase", HasFSGSBASE)
.Case("fxsr", HasFXSR)
.Case("gfni", HasGFNI)
.Case("invpcid", HasINVPCID)
.Case("lwp", HasLWP)
.Case("lzcnt", HasLZCNT)
.Case("mm3dnow", MMX3DNowLevel >= AMD3DNow)
.Case("mm3dnowa", MMX3DNowLevel >= AMD3DNowAthlon)
.Case("mmx", MMX3DNowLevel >= MMX)
.Case("movbe", HasMOVBE)
.Case("movdiri", HasMOVDIRI)
.Case("movdir64b", HasMOVDIR64B)
.Case("mwaitx", HasMWAITX)
.Case("pclmul", HasPCLMUL)
.Case("pconfig", HasPCONFIG)
.Case("pku", HasPKU)
.Case("popcnt", HasPOPCNT)
.Case("prefetchwt1", HasPREFETCHWT1)
.Case("prfchw", HasPRFCHW)
.Case("ptwrite", HasPTWRITE)
.Case("rdpid", HasRDPID)
.Case("rdrnd", HasRDRND)
.Case("rdseed", HasRDSEED)
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
.Case("retpoline-external-thunk", HasRetpolineExternalThunk)
.Case("rtm", HasRTM)
.Case("sahf", HasLAHFSAHF)
.Case("serialize", HasSERIALIZE)
.Case("sgx", HasSGX)
.Case("sha", HasSHA)
.Case("shstk", HasSHSTK)
.Case("sse", SSELevel >= SSE1)
.Case("sse2", SSELevel >= SSE2)
.Case("sse3", SSELevel >= SSE3)
.Case("ssse3", SSELevel >= SSSE3)
.Case("sse4.1", SSELevel >= SSE41)
.Case("sse4.2", SSELevel >= SSE42)
.Case("sse4a", XOPLevel >= SSE4A)
.Case("tbm", HasTBM)
.Case("tsxldtrk", HasTSXLDTRK)
.Case("vaes", HasVAES)
.Case("vpclmulqdq", HasVPCLMULQDQ)
.Case("wbnoinvd", HasWBNOINVD)
.Case("waitpkg", HasWAITPKG)
.Case("x86", true)
.Case("x86_32", getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::x86)
.Case("x86_64", getTriple().getArch() == llvm::Triple::x86_64)
.Case("xop", XOPLevel >= XOP)
.Case("xsave", HasXSAVE)
.Case("xsavec", HasXSAVEC)
.Case("xsaves", HasXSAVES)
.Case("xsaveopt", HasXSAVEOPT)
.Default(false);
}
// We can't use a generic validation scheme for the features accepted here
// versus subtarget features accepted in the target attribute because the
// bitfield structure that's initialized in the runtime only supports the
// below currently rather than the full range of subtarget features. (See
// X86TargetInfo::hasFeature for a somewhat comprehensive list).
bool X86TargetInfo::validateCpuSupports(StringRef FeatureStr) const {
return llvm::StringSwitch<bool>(FeatureStr)
#define X86_FEATURE_COMPAT(ENUM, STR) .Case(STR, true)
#include "llvm/Support/X86TargetParser.def"
.Default(false);
}
static llvm::X86::ProcessorFeatures getFeature(StringRef Name) {
return llvm::StringSwitch<llvm::X86::ProcessorFeatures>(Name)
#define X86_FEATURE_COMPAT(ENUM, STR) .Case(STR, llvm::X86::FEATURE_##ENUM)
#include "llvm/Support/X86TargetParser.def"
;
// Note, this function should only be used after ensuring the value is
// correct, so it asserts if the value is out of range.
}
static unsigned getFeaturePriority(llvm::X86::ProcessorFeatures Feat) {
enum class FeatPriority {
#define FEATURE(FEAT) FEAT,
#include "clang/Basic/X86Target.def"
};
switch (Feat) {
#define FEATURE(FEAT) \
case llvm::X86::FEAT: \
return static_cast<unsigned>(FeatPriority::FEAT);
#include "clang/Basic/X86Target.def"
default:
llvm_unreachable("No Feature Priority for non-CPUSupports Features");
}
}
unsigned X86TargetInfo::multiVersionSortPriority(StringRef Name) const {
// Valid CPUs have a 'key feature' that compares just better than its key
// feature.
using namespace llvm::X86;
CPUKind Kind = parseArchX86(Name);
if (Kind != CK_None) {
ProcessorFeatures KeyFeature = getKeyFeature(Kind);
return (getFeaturePriority(KeyFeature) << 1) + 1;
}
// Now we know we have a feature, so get its priority and shift it a few so
// that we have sufficient room for the CPUs (above).
return getFeaturePriority(getFeature(Name)) << 1;
}
Implement cpu_dispatch/cpu_specific Multiversioning As documented here: https://software.intel.com/en-us/node/682969 and https://software.intel.com/en-us/node/523346. cpu_dispatch multiversioning is an ICC feature that provides for function multiversioning. This feature is implemented with two attributes: First, cpu_specific, which specifies the individual function versions. Second, cpu_dispatch, which specifies the location of the resolver function and the list of resolvable functions. This is valuable since it provides a mechanism where the resolver's TU can be specified in one location, and the individual implementions each in their own translation units. The goal of this patch is to be source-compatible with ICC, so this implementation diverges from the ICC implementation in a few ways: 1- Linux x86/64 only: This implementation uses ifuncs in order to properly dispatch functions. This is is a valuable performance benefit over the ICC implementation. A future patch will be provided to enable this feature on Windows, but it will obviously more closely fit ICC's implementation. 2- CPU Identification functions: ICC uses a set of custom functions to identify the feature list of the host processor. This patch uses the cpu_supports functionality in order to better align with 'target' multiversioning. 1- cpu_dispatch function def/decl: ICC's cpu_dispatch requires that the function marked cpu_dispatch be an empty definition. This patch supports that as well, however declarations are also permitted, since the linker will solve the issue of multiple emissions. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D47474 llvm-svn: 337552
2018-07-20 22:13:28 +08:00
bool X86TargetInfo::validateCPUSpecificCPUDispatch(StringRef Name) const {
return llvm::StringSwitch<bool>(Name)
#define CPU_SPECIFIC(NAME, MANGLING, FEATURES) .Case(NAME, true)
#define CPU_SPECIFIC_ALIAS(NEW_NAME, NAME) .Case(NEW_NAME, true)
#include "clang/Basic/X86Target.def"
.Default(false);
}
static StringRef CPUSpecificCPUDispatchNameDealias(StringRef Name) {
return llvm::StringSwitch<StringRef>(Name)
#define CPU_SPECIFIC_ALIAS(NEW_NAME, NAME) .Case(NEW_NAME, NAME)
#include "clang/Basic/X86Target.def"
.Default(Name);
}
char X86TargetInfo::CPUSpecificManglingCharacter(StringRef Name) const {
return llvm::StringSwitch<char>(CPUSpecificCPUDispatchNameDealias(Name))
#define CPU_SPECIFIC(NAME, MANGLING, FEATURES) .Case(NAME, MANGLING)
#include "clang/Basic/X86Target.def"
.Default(0);
}
void X86TargetInfo::getCPUSpecificCPUDispatchFeatures(
StringRef Name, llvm::SmallVectorImpl<StringRef> &Features) const {
StringRef WholeList =
llvm::StringSwitch<StringRef>(CPUSpecificCPUDispatchNameDealias(Name))
#define CPU_SPECIFIC(NAME, MANGLING, FEATURES) .Case(NAME, FEATURES)
#include "clang/Basic/X86Target.def"
.Default("");
WholeList.split(Features, ',', /*MaxSplit=*/-1, /*KeepEmpty=*/false);
}
// We can't use a generic validation scheme for the cpus accepted here
// versus subtarget cpus accepted in the target attribute because the
// variables intitialized by the runtime only support the below currently
// rather than the full range of cpus.
bool X86TargetInfo::validateCpuIs(StringRef FeatureStr) const {
return llvm::StringSwitch<bool>(FeatureStr)
#define X86_VENDOR(ENUM, STRING) .Case(STRING, true)
#define X86_CPU_TYPE_ALIAS(ENUM, ALIAS) .Case(ALIAS, true)
#define X86_CPU_TYPE(ENUM, STR) .Case(STR, true)
#define X86_CPU_SUBTYPE(ENUM, STR) .Case(STR, true)
#include "llvm/Support/X86TargetParser.def"
.Default(false);
}
static unsigned matchAsmCCConstraint(const char *&Name) {
auto RV = llvm::StringSwitch<unsigned>(Name)
.Case("@cca", 4)
.Case("@ccae", 5)
.Case("@ccb", 4)
.Case("@ccbe", 5)
.Case("@ccc", 4)
.Case("@cce", 4)
.Case("@ccz", 4)
.Case("@ccg", 4)
.Case("@ccge", 5)
.Case("@ccl", 4)
.Case("@ccle", 5)
.Case("@ccna", 5)
.Case("@ccnae", 6)
.Case("@ccnb", 5)
.Case("@ccnbe", 6)
.Case("@ccnc", 5)
.Case("@ccne", 5)
.Case("@ccnz", 5)
.Case("@ccng", 5)
.Case("@ccnge", 6)
.Case("@ccnl", 5)
.Case("@ccnle", 6)
.Case("@ccno", 5)
.Case("@ccnp", 5)
.Case("@ccns", 5)
.Case("@cco", 4)
.Case("@ccp", 4)
.Case("@ccs", 4)
.Default(0);
return RV;
}
bool X86TargetInfo::validateAsmConstraint(
const char *&Name, TargetInfo::ConstraintInfo &Info) const {
switch (*Name) {
default:
return false;
// Constant constraints.
case 'e': // 32-bit signed integer constant for use with sign-extending x86_64
// instructions.
case 'Z': // 32-bit unsigned integer constant for use with zero-extending
// x86_64 instructions.
case 's':
Info.setRequiresImmediate();
return true;
case 'I':
Info.setRequiresImmediate(0, 31);
return true;
case 'J':
Info.setRequiresImmediate(0, 63);
return true;
case 'K':
Info.setRequiresImmediate(-128, 127);
return true;
case 'L':
Info.setRequiresImmediate({int(0xff), int(0xffff), int(0xffffffff)});
return true;
case 'M':
Info.setRequiresImmediate(0, 3);
return true;
case 'N':
Info.setRequiresImmediate(0, 255);
return true;
case 'O':
Info.setRequiresImmediate(0, 127);
return true;
// Register constraints.
case 'Y': // 'Y' is the first character for several 2-character constraints.
// Shift the pointer to the second character of the constraint.
Name++;
switch (*Name) {
default:
return false;
case 'z': // First SSE register.
case '2':
case 't': // Any SSE register, when SSE2 is enabled.
case 'i': // Any SSE register, when SSE2 and inter-unit moves enabled.
case 'm': // Any MMX register, when inter-unit moves enabled.
case 'k': // AVX512 arch mask registers: k1-k7.
Info.setAllowsRegister();
return true;
}
case 'f': // Any x87 floating point stack register.
// Constraint 'f' cannot be used for output operands.
if (Info.ConstraintStr[0] == '=')
return false;
Info.setAllowsRegister();
return true;
case 'a': // eax.
case 'b': // ebx.
case 'c': // ecx.
case 'd': // edx.
case 'S': // esi.
case 'D': // edi.
case 'A': // edx:eax.
case 't': // Top of floating point stack.
case 'u': // Second from top of floating point stack.
case 'q': // Any register accessible as [r]l: a, b, c, and d.
case 'y': // Any MMX register.
case 'v': // Any {X,Y,Z}MM register (Arch & context dependent)
case 'x': // Any SSE register.
case 'k': // Any AVX512 mask register (same as Yk, additionally allows k0
// for intermideate k reg operations).
case 'Q': // Any register accessible as [r]h: a, b, c, and d.
case 'R': // "Legacy" registers: ax, bx, cx, dx, di, si, sp, bp.
case 'l': // "Index" registers: any general register that can be used as an
// index in a base+index memory access.
Info.setAllowsRegister();
return true;
// Floating point constant constraints.
case 'C': // SSE floating point constant.
case 'G': // x87 floating point constant.
return true;
case '@':
// CC condition changes.
if (auto Len = matchAsmCCConstraint(Name)) {
Name += Len - 1;
Info.setAllowsRegister();
return true;
}
return false;
}
}
// Below is based on the following information:
// +------------------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
// | Processor Name | Cache Line Size (Bytes) | Source |
// +------------------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
// | i386 | 64 | https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/manuals/64-ia-32-architectures-optimization-manual.pdf |
// | i486 | 16 | "four doublewords" (doubleword = 32 bits, 4 bits * 32 bits = 16 bytes) https://en.wikichip.org/w/images/d/d3/i486_MICROPROCESSOR_HARDWARE_REFERENCE_MANUAL_%281990%29.pdf and http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.126.4216&rep=rep1&type=pdf (page 29) |
// | i586/Pentium MMX | 32 | https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/P-MMX.html |
// | i686/Pentium | 32 | https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/P6.html |
// | Netburst/Pentium4 | 64 | https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/P4-180.html |
// | Atom | 64 | https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/Atom.html |
// | Westmere | 64 | https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/sandy_bridge_(client) "Cache Architecture" |
// | Sandy Bridge | 64 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandy_Bridge and https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/SandyBridge.html |
// | Ivy Bridge | 64 | https://blog.stuffedcow.net/2013/01/ivb-cache-replacement/ and https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/IvyBridge.html |
// | Haswell | 64 | https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/Haswell.html |
// | Boadwell | 64 | https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/Broadwell.html |
// | Skylake (including skylake-avx512) | 64 | https://www.nas.nasa.gov/hecc/support/kb/skylake-processors_550.html "Cache Hierarchy" |
// | Cascade Lake | 64 | https://www.nas.nasa.gov/hecc/support/kb/cascade-lake-processors_579.html "Cache Hierarchy" |
// | Skylake | 64 | https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/kaby_lake "Memory Hierarchy" |
// | Ice Lake | 64 | https://www.7-cpu.com/cpu/Ice_Lake.html |
// | Knights Landing | 64 | https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-xeon-phi-processor-7200-family-memory-management-optimizations "The Intel® Xeon Phi™ Processor Architecture" |
// | Knights Mill | 64 | https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/9e/bc/64-ia-32-architectures-optimization-manual.pdf?countrylabel=Colombia "2.5.5.2 L1 DCache " |
// +------------------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Optional<unsigned> X86TargetInfo::getCPUCacheLineSize() const {
using namespace llvm::X86;
switch (CPU) {
// i386
case CK_i386:
// i486
case CK_i486:
case CK_WinChipC6:
case CK_WinChip2:
case CK_C3:
// Lakemont
case CK_Lakemont:
return 16;
// i586
case CK_i586:
case CK_Pentium:
case CK_PentiumMMX:
// i686
case CK_PentiumPro:
case CK_i686:
case CK_Pentium2:
case CK_Pentium3:
case CK_PentiumM:
case CK_C3_2:
// K6
case CK_K6:
case CK_K6_2:
case CK_K6_3:
// Geode
case CK_Geode:
return 32;
// Netburst
case CK_Pentium4:
case CK_Prescott:
case CK_Nocona:
// Atom
case CK_Bonnell:
case CK_Silvermont:
case CK_Goldmont:
case CK_GoldmontPlus:
case CK_Tremont:
case CK_Westmere:
case CK_SandyBridge:
case CK_IvyBridge:
case CK_Haswell:
case CK_Broadwell:
case CK_SkylakeClient:
case CK_SkylakeServer:
case CK_Cascadelake:
case CK_Nehalem:
case CK_Cooperlake:
case CK_Cannonlake:
case CK_Tigerlake:
case CK_SapphireRapids:
case CK_IcelakeClient:
case CK_IcelakeServer:
case CK_KNL:
case CK_KNM:
// K7
case CK_Athlon:
case CK_AthlonXP:
// K8
case CK_K8:
case CK_K8SSE3:
case CK_AMDFAM10:
// Bobcat
case CK_BTVER1:
case CK_BTVER2:
// Bulldozer
case CK_BDVER1:
case CK_BDVER2:
case CK_BDVER3:
case CK_BDVER4:
// Zen
case CK_ZNVER1:
case CK_ZNVER2:
// Deprecated
case CK_x86_64:
case CK_Yonah:
case CK_Penryn:
case CK_Core2:
return 64;
// The following currently have unknown cache line sizes (but they are probably all 64):
// Core
case CK_None:
return None;
}
llvm_unreachable("Unknown CPU kind");
}
bool X86TargetInfo::validateOutputSize(const llvm::StringMap<bool> &FeatureMap,
StringRef Constraint,
unsigned Size) const {
// Strip off constraint modifiers.
while (Constraint[0] == '=' || Constraint[0] == '+' || Constraint[0] == '&')
Constraint = Constraint.substr(1);
return validateOperandSize(FeatureMap, Constraint, Size);
}
bool X86TargetInfo::validateInputSize(const llvm::StringMap<bool> &FeatureMap,
StringRef Constraint,
unsigned Size) const {
return validateOperandSize(FeatureMap, Constraint, Size);
}
bool X86TargetInfo::validateOperandSize(const llvm::StringMap<bool> &FeatureMap,
StringRef Constraint,
unsigned Size) const {
switch (Constraint[0]) {
default:
break;
case 'k':
// Registers k0-k7 (AVX512) size limit is 64 bit.
case 'y':
return Size <= 64;
case 'f':
case 't':
case 'u':
return Size <= 128;
case 'Y':
// 'Y' is the first character for several 2-character constraints.
switch (Constraint[1]) {
default:
return false;
case 'm':
// 'Ym' is synonymous with 'y'.
case 'k':
return Size <= 64;
case 'z':
// XMM0/YMM/ZMM0
if (FeatureMap.lookup("avx512f"))
// ZMM0 can be used if target supports AVX512F.
return Size <= 512U;
else if (FeatureMap.lookup("avx"))
// YMM0 can be used if target supports AVX.
return Size <= 256U;
else if (FeatureMap.lookup("sse"))
return Size <= 128U;
return false;
case 'i':
case 't':
case '2':
// 'Yi','Yt','Y2' are synonymous with 'x' when SSE2 is enabled.
if (SSELevel < SSE2)
return false;
break;
}
break;
case 'v':
case 'x':
if (FeatureMap.lookup("avx512f"))
// 512-bit zmm registers can be used if target supports AVX512F.
return Size <= 512U;
else if (FeatureMap.lookup("avx"))
// 256-bit ymm registers can be used if target supports AVX.
return Size <= 256U;
return Size <= 128U;
}
return true;
}
std::string X86TargetInfo::convertConstraint(const char *&Constraint) const {
switch (*Constraint) {
case '@':
if (auto Len = matchAsmCCConstraint(Constraint)) {
std::string Converted = "{" + std::string(Constraint, Len) + "}";
Constraint += Len - 1;
return Converted;
}
return std::string(1, *Constraint);
case 'a':
return std::string("{ax}");
case 'b':
return std::string("{bx}");
case 'c':
return std::string("{cx}");
case 'd':
return std::string("{dx}");
case 'S':
return std::string("{si}");
case 'D':
return std::string("{di}");
case 'p': // address
return std::string("im");
case 't': // top of floating point stack.
return std::string("{st}");
case 'u': // second from top of floating point stack.
return std::string("{st(1)}"); // second from top of floating point stack.
case 'Y':
switch (Constraint[1]) {
default:
// Break from inner switch and fall through (copy single char),
// continue parsing after copying the current constraint into
// the return string.
break;
case 'k':
case 'm':
case 'i':
case 't':
case 'z':
case '2':
// "^" hints llvm that this is a 2 letter constraint.
// "Constraint++" is used to promote the string iterator
// to the next constraint.
return std::string("^") + std::string(Constraint++, 2);
}
LLVM_FALLTHROUGH;
default:
return std::string(1, *Constraint);
}
}
void X86TargetInfo::fillValidCPUList(SmallVectorImpl<StringRef> &Values) const {
bool Only64Bit = getTriple().getArch() != llvm::Triple::x86;
llvm::X86::fillValidCPUArchList(Values, Only64Bit);
}
void X86TargetInfo::fillValidTuneCPUList(SmallVectorImpl<StringRef> &Values) const {
llvm::X86::fillValidCPUArchList(Values);
}
ArrayRef<const char *> X86TargetInfo::getGCCRegNames() const {
return llvm::makeArrayRef(GCCRegNames);
}
ArrayRef<TargetInfo::AddlRegName> X86TargetInfo::getGCCAddlRegNames() const {
return llvm::makeArrayRef(AddlRegNames);
}
ArrayRef<Builtin::Info> X86_32TargetInfo::getTargetBuiltins() const {
return llvm::makeArrayRef(BuiltinInfoX86, clang::X86::LastX86CommonBuiltin -
Builtin::FirstTSBuiltin + 1);
}
ArrayRef<Builtin::Info> X86_64TargetInfo::getTargetBuiltins() const {
return llvm::makeArrayRef(BuiltinInfoX86,
X86::LastTSBuiltin - Builtin::FirstTSBuiltin);
}