Introduce control flow speculation tracking pass for AArch64
The pass implements tracking of control flow miss-speculation into a "taint"
register. That taint register can then be used to mask off registers with
sensitive data when executing under miss-speculation, a.k.a. "transient
execution".
This pass is aimed at mitigating against SpectreV1-style vulnarabilities.
At the moment, it implements the tracking of miss-speculation of control
flow into a taint register, but doesn't implement a mechanism yet to then
use that taint register to mask off vulnerable data in registers (something
for a follow-on improvement). Possible strategies to mask out vulnerable
data that can be implemented on top of this are:
- speculative load hardening to automatically mask of data loaded
in registers.
- using intrinsics to mask of data in registers as indicated by the
programmer (see https://lwn.net/Articles/759423/).
For AArch64, the following implementation choices are made.
Some of these are different than the implementation choices made in
the similar pass implemented in X86SpeculativeLoadHardening.cpp, as
the instruction set characteristics result in different trade-offs.
- The speculation hardening is done after register allocation. With a
relative abundance of registers, one register is reserved (X16) to be
the taint register. X16 is expected to not clash with other register
reservation mechanisms with very high probability because:
. The AArch64 ABI doesn't guarantee X16 to be retained across any call.
. The only way to request X16 to be used as a programmer is through
inline assembly. In the rare case a function explicitly demands to
use X16/W16, this pass falls back to hardening against speculation
by inserting a DSB SYS/ISB barrier pair which will prevent control
flow speculation.
- It is easy to insert mask operations at this late stage as we have
mask operations available that don't set flags.
- The taint variable contains all-ones when no miss-speculation is detected,
and contains all-zeros when miss-speculation is detected. Therefore, when
masking, an AND instruction (which only changes the register to be masked,
no other side effects) can easily be inserted anywhere that's needed.
- The tracking of miss-speculation is done by using a data-flow conditional
select instruction (CSEL) to evaluate the flags that were also used to
make conditional branch direction decisions. Speculation of the CSEL
instruction can be limited with a CSDB instruction - so the combination of
CSEL + a later CSDB gives the guarantee that the flags as used in the CSEL
aren't speculated. When conditional branch direction gets miss-speculated,
the semantics of the inserted CSEL instruction is such that the taint
register will contain all zero bits.
One key requirement for this to work is that the conditional branch is
followed by an execution of the CSEL instruction, where the CSEL
instruction needs to use the same flags status as the conditional branch.
This means that the conditional branches must not be implemented as one
of the AArch64 conditional branches that do not use the flags as input
(CB(N)Z and TB(N)Z). This is implemented by ensuring in the instruction
selectors to not produce these instructions when speculation hardening
is enabled. This pass will assert if it does encounter such an instruction.
- On function call boundaries, the miss-speculation state is transferred from
the taint register X16 to be encoded in the SP register as value 0.
Future extensions/improvements could be:
- Implement this functionality using full speculation barriers, akin to the
x86-slh-lfence option. This may be more useful for the intrinsics-based
approach than for the SLH approach to masking.
Note that this pass already inserts the full speculation barriers if the
function for some niche reason makes use of X16/W16.
- no indirect branch misprediction gets protected/instrumented; but this
could be done for some indirect branches, such as switch jump tables.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D54896
llvm-svn: 349456
2018-12-18 16:50:02 +08:00
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; RUN: sed -e 's/SLHATTR/speculative_load_hardening/' %s | llc -verify-machineinstrs -mtriple=aarch64-none-linux-gnu | FileCheck %s --check-prefixes=CHECK,SLH --dump-input-on-failure
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; RUN: sed -e 's/SLHATTR//' %s | llc -verify-machineinstrs -mtriple=aarch64-none-linux-gnu | FileCheck %s --check-prefixes=CHECK,NOSLH --dump-input-on-failure
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declare i64 @g(i64, i64) local_unnamed_addr
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define i64 @f_using_reserved_reg_x16(i64 %a, i64 %b) local_unnamed_addr SLHATTR {
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; CHECK-LABEL: f_using_reserved_reg_x16
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; SLH: dsb sy
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; SLH: isb
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; NOSLH-NOT: dsb sy
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; NOSLH-NOT: isb
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entry:
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%cmp = icmp ugt i64 %a, %b
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br i1 %cmp, label %if.then, label %cleanup
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; CHECK: b.ls
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; SLH: dsb sy
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; SLH: isb
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; NOSLH-NOT: dsb sy
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; NOSLH-NOT: isb
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if.then:
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[AArch64] Emit HINT instead of PAC insns in Armv8.2-A or below
Summary:
The Pointer Authentication Extension (PAC) was added in Armv8.3-A. Some
instructions are implemented in the HINT space to allow compiling code
common to CPUs regardless of whether they feature PAC or not, and still
benefit from PAC protection in the PAC-enabled CPUs.
The 8.3-specific mnemonics were currently enabled in any architecture, and
LLVM was emitting them in assembly files when PAC code generation was
enabled. This was ok for compilations where both LLVM codegen and the
integrated assembler were used. However, the LLVM codegen was not
compatible with other assemblers (e.g. GAS). Given the fact that the
approach from these assemblers (i.e. to disallow Armv8.3-A mnemonics if
compiling for Armv8.2-A or lower) is entirely reasonable, this patch makes
LLVM to emit HINT when building for Armv8.2-A and below, instead of
PACIASP, AUTIASP and friends. Then, LLVM assembly should be compatible
with other assemblers.
Reviewers: samparker, chill, LukeCheeseman
Subscribers: kristof.beyls, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D71658
2020-01-11 01:51:21 +08:00
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%0 = tail call i64 asm "hint #12", "={x17},{x16},0"(i64 %b, i64 %a)
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Introduce control flow speculation tracking pass for AArch64
The pass implements tracking of control flow miss-speculation into a "taint"
register. That taint register can then be used to mask off registers with
sensitive data when executing under miss-speculation, a.k.a. "transient
execution".
This pass is aimed at mitigating against SpectreV1-style vulnarabilities.
At the moment, it implements the tracking of miss-speculation of control
flow into a taint register, but doesn't implement a mechanism yet to then
use that taint register to mask off vulnerable data in registers (something
for a follow-on improvement). Possible strategies to mask out vulnerable
data that can be implemented on top of this are:
- speculative load hardening to automatically mask of data loaded
in registers.
- using intrinsics to mask of data in registers as indicated by the
programmer (see https://lwn.net/Articles/759423/).
For AArch64, the following implementation choices are made.
Some of these are different than the implementation choices made in
the similar pass implemented in X86SpeculativeLoadHardening.cpp, as
the instruction set characteristics result in different trade-offs.
- The speculation hardening is done after register allocation. With a
relative abundance of registers, one register is reserved (X16) to be
the taint register. X16 is expected to not clash with other register
reservation mechanisms with very high probability because:
. The AArch64 ABI doesn't guarantee X16 to be retained across any call.
. The only way to request X16 to be used as a programmer is through
inline assembly. In the rare case a function explicitly demands to
use X16/W16, this pass falls back to hardening against speculation
by inserting a DSB SYS/ISB barrier pair which will prevent control
flow speculation.
- It is easy to insert mask operations at this late stage as we have
mask operations available that don't set flags.
- The taint variable contains all-ones when no miss-speculation is detected,
and contains all-zeros when miss-speculation is detected. Therefore, when
masking, an AND instruction (which only changes the register to be masked,
no other side effects) can easily be inserted anywhere that's needed.
- The tracking of miss-speculation is done by using a data-flow conditional
select instruction (CSEL) to evaluate the flags that were also used to
make conditional branch direction decisions. Speculation of the CSEL
instruction can be limited with a CSDB instruction - so the combination of
CSEL + a later CSDB gives the guarantee that the flags as used in the CSEL
aren't speculated. When conditional branch direction gets miss-speculated,
the semantics of the inserted CSEL instruction is such that the taint
register will contain all zero bits.
One key requirement for this to work is that the conditional branch is
followed by an execution of the CSEL instruction, where the CSEL
instruction needs to use the same flags status as the conditional branch.
This means that the conditional branches must not be implemented as one
of the AArch64 conditional branches that do not use the flags as input
(CB(N)Z and TB(N)Z). This is implemented by ensuring in the instruction
selectors to not produce these instructions when speculation hardening
is enabled. This pass will assert if it does encounter such an instruction.
- On function call boundaries, the miss-speculation state is transferred from
the taint register X16 to be encoded in the SP register as value 0.
Future extensions/improvements could be:
- Implement this functionality using full speculation barriers, akin to the
x86-slh-lfence option. This may be more useful for the intrinsics-based
approach than for the SLH approach to masking.
Note that this pass already inserts the full speculation barriers if the
function for some niche reason makes use of X16/W16.
- no indirect branch misprediction gets protected/instrumented; but this
could be done for some indirect branches, such as switch jump tables.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D54896
llvm-svn: 349456
2018-12-18 16:50:02 +08:00
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; CHECK: bl g
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; SLH: dsb sy
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; SLH: isb
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; NOSLH-NOT: dsb sy
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; NOSLH-NOT: isb
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; CHECK: ret
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%call = tail call i64 @g(i64 %a, i64 %b) #3
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%add = add i64 %call, %0
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br label %cleanup
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cleanup:
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; SLH: dsb sy
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; SLH: isb
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; NOSLH-NOT: dsb sy
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; NOSLH-NOT: isb
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; SLH: ret
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%retval.0 = phi i64 [ %add, %if.then ], [ %b, %entry ]
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ret i64 %retval.0
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}
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define i32 @f_clobbered_reg_w16(i32 %a, i32 %b) local_unnamed_addr SLHATTR {
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; CHECK-LABEL: f_clobbered_reg_w16
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entry:
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; SLH: dsb sy
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; SLH: isb
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; NOSLH-NOT: dsb sy
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; NOSLH-NOT: isb
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%cmp = icmp sgt i32 %a, %b
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br i1 %cmp, label %if.then, label %if.end
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; CHECK: b.le
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if.then:
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; SLH: dsb sy
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; SLH: isb
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; NOSLH-NOT: dsb sy
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; NOSLH-NOT: isb
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; CHECK: mov w16, w0
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tail call void asm sideeffect "mov w16, ${0:w}", "r,~{w16}"(i32 %a)
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br label %if.end
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; SLH: ret
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if.end:
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%add = add nsw i32 %b, %a
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ret i32 %add
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; SLH: dsb sy
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; SLH: isb
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; NOSLH-NOT: dsb sy
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; NOSLH-NOT: isb
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; SLH: ret
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}
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