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llvm-project/llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/stack-protector-weight.ll

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[stack-protection] Add support for MSVC buffer security check Summary: This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch. * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx * To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347 Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation: * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx * http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/ * http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html For the following example: ``` int example(int offset, int index) { char buffer[10]; memset(buffer, 0xCC, index); return buffer[index]; } ``` The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check: ``` push ebp mov ebp,esp sub esp,50h [1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)] [2] xor eax,ebp [3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax push ebx push esi push edi mov eax,dword ptr [index] push eax push 0CCh lea ecx,[buffer] push ecx call _memset (010610B9h) add esp,0Ch mov eax,dword ptr [index] movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax] pop edi pop esi pop ebx [4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4] [5] xor ecx,ebp [6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h) mov esp,ebp pop ebp ret ``` The instrumentation above is: * [1] is loading the global security canary, * [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot, * [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary, * [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling. Overview of the current stack-protection implementation: * lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp * There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation. * The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie. * An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast). * Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling. * Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation. * lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp * lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp * There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls). * see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration. * The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr). * 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie) * The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'. * include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h * Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'. * lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp * Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm. Function-based Instrumentation: * The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions. * To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is * adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h), * If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue. * modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation, * generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp), * if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp). Modifications * adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp) * adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h) Results * IR generated instrumentation: ``` clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input ``` ``` *** Final LLVM Code input to ISel *** ; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 { entry: %StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot %0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot) %index.addr = alloca i32, align 4 %offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4 %buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1 store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4 store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4 %arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0 %1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4 call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false) %2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4 %arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2 %3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1 %conv = sext i8 %3 to i32 %4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check ret i32 %conv } ``` * SelectionDAG generated instrumentation: ``` clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA ``` ``` "?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z" # BB#0: # %entry pushl %esi subl $16, %esp movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value movl 28(%esp), %esi movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot leal 2(%esp), %eax pushl %esi pushl $204 pushl %eax calll _memset addl $12, %esp movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check movl %esi, %eax addl $16, %esp popl %esi retl ``` Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346 llvm-svn: 272053
2016-06-08 04:15:35 +08:00
; RUN: llc -mtriple=x86_64-apple-darwin -print-machineinstrs=expand-isel-pseudos -enable-selectiondag-sp=true %s -o /dev/null 2>&1 | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=DARWIN-SELDAG
; RUN: llc -mtriple=x86_64-apple-darwin -print-machineinstrs=expand-isel-pseudos -enable-selectiondag-sp=false %s -o /dev/null 2>&1 | FileCheck %s --check-prefix=DARWIN-IR
; RUN: llc -mtriple=i386-pc-windows-msvc -print-machineinstrs=expand-isel-pseudos -enable-selectiondag-sp=true %s -o /dev/null 2>&1 | FileCheck %s -check-prefix=MSVC-SELDAG
; RUN: llc -mtriple=i386-pc-windows-msvc -print-machineinstrs=expand-isel-pseudos -enable-selectiondag-sp=false %s -o /dev/null 2>&1 | FileCheck %s -check-prefix=MSVC-IR
[stack protector] Set edge weights for newly created basic blocks. This commit fixes a bug in stack protector pass where edge weights were not set when new basic blocks were added to lists of successor basic blocks. Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D5766 llvm-svn: 222987
2014-12-01 12:27:03 +08:00
[stack-protection] Add support for MSVC buffer security check Summary: This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch. * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx * To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347 Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation: * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx * http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/ * http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html For the following example: ``` int example(int offset, int index) { char buffer[10]; memset(buffer, 0xCC, index); return buffer[index]; } ``` The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check: ``` push ebp mov ebp,esp sub esp,50h [1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)] [2] xor eax,ebp [3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax push ebx push esi push edi mov eax,dword ptr [index] push eax push 0CCh lea ecx,[buffer] push ecx call _memset (010610B9h) add esp,0Ch mov eax,dword ptr [index] movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax] pop edi pop esi pop ebx [4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4] [5] xor ecx,ebp [6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h) mov esp,ebp pop ebp ret ``` The instrumentation above is: * [1] is loading the global security canary, * [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot, * [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary, * [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling. Overview of the current stack-protection implementation: * lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp * There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation. * The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie. * An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast). * Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling. * Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation. * lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp * lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp * There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls). * see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration. * The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr). * 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie) * The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'. * include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h * Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'. * lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp * Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm. Function-based Instrumentation: * The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions. * To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is * adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h), * If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue. * modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation, * generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp), * if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp). Modifications * adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp) * adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h) Results * IR generated instrumentation: ``` clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input ``` ``` *** Final LLVM Code input to ISel *** ; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 { entry: %StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot %0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot) %index.addr = alloca i32, align 4 %offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4 %buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1 store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4 store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4 %arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0 %1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4 call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false) %2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4 %arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2 %3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1 %conv = sext i8 %3 to i32 %4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check ret i32 %conv } ``` * SelectionDAG generated instrumentation: ``` clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA ``` ``` "?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z" # BB#0: # %entry pushl %esi subl $16, %esp movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value movl 28(%esp), %esi movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot leal 2(%esp), %eax pushl %esi pushl $204 pushl %eax calll _memset addl $12, %esp movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check movl %esi, %eax addl $16, %esp popl %esi retl ``` Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346 llvm-svn: 272053
2016-06-08 04:15:35 +08:00
; DARWIN-SELDAG: # Machine code for function test_branch_weights:
; DARWIN-SELDAG: Successors according to CFG: BB#[[SUCCESS:[0-9]+]]({{[0-9a-fx/= ]+}}100.00%) BB#[[FAILURE:[0-9]+]]
; DARWIN-SELDAG: BB#[[FAILURE]]:
; DARWIN-SELDAG: CALL64pcrel32 <es:__stack_chk_fail>
; DARWIN-SELDAG: BB#[[SUCCESS]]:
[stack protector] Set edge weights for newly created basic blocks. This commit fixes a bug in stack protector pass where edge weights were not set when new basic blocks were added to lists of successor basic blocks. Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D5766 llvm-svn: 222987
2014-12-01 12:27:03 +08:00
[stack-protection] Add support for MSVC buffer security check Summary: This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch. * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx * To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347 Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation: * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx * http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/ * http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html For the following example: ``` int example(int offset, int index) { char buffer[10]; memset(buffer, 0xCC, index); return buffer[index]; } ``` The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check: ``` push ebp mov ebp,esp sub esp,50h [1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)] [2] xor eax,ebp [3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax push ebx push esi push edi mov eax,dword ptr [index] push eax push 0CCh lea ecx,[buffer] push ecx call _memset (010610B9h) add esp,0Ch mov eax,dword ptr [index] movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax] pop edi pop esi pop ebx [4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4] [5] xor ecx,ebp [6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h) mov esp,ebp pop ebp ret ``` The instrumentation above is: * [1] is loading the global security canary, * [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot, * [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary, * [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling. Overview of the current stack-protection implementation: * lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp * There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation. * The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie. * An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast). * Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling. * Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation. * lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp * lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp * There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls). * see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration. * The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr). * 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie) * The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'. * include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h * Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'. * lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp * Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm. Function-based Instrumentation: * The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions. * To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is * adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h), * If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue. * modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation, * generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp), * if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp). Modifications * adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp) * adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h) Results * IR generated instrumentation: ``` clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input ``` ``` *** Final LLVM Code input to ISel *** ; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 { entry: %StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot %0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot) %index.addr = alloca i32, align 4 %offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4 %buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1 store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4 store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4 %arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0 %1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4 call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false) %2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4 %arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2 %3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1 %conv = sext i8 %3 to i32 %4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check ret i32 %conv } ``` * SelectionDAG generated instrumentation: ``` clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA ``` ``` "?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z" # BB#0: # %entry pushl %esi subl $16, %esp movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value movl 28(%esp), %esi movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot leal 2(%esp), %eax pushl %esi pushl $204 pushl %eax calll _memset addl $12, %esp movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check movl %esi, %eax addl $16, %esp popl %esi retl ``` Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346 llvm-svn: 272053
2016-06-08 04:15:35 +08:00
; DARWIN-IR: # Machine code for function test_branch_weights:
; DARWIN-IR: Successors according to CFG: BB#[[SUCCESS:[0-9]+]]({{[0-9a-fx/= ]+}}100.00%) BB#[[FAILURE:[0-9]+]]
; DARWIN-IR: BB#[[SUCCESS]]:
; DARWIN-IR: BB#[[FAILURE]]:
; DARWIN-IR: CALL64pcrel32 <ga:@__stack_chk_fail>
; MSVC-SELDAG: # Machine code for function test_branch_weights:
; MSVC-SELDAG: mem:Volatile LD4[@__security_cookie]
; MSVC-SELDAG: ST4[FixedStack0]
; MSVC-SELDAG: LD4[FixedStack0]
; MSVC-SELDAG: CALLpcrel32 <ga:@__security_check_cookie>
; MSVC-IR: # Machine code for function test_branch_weights:
; MSVC-IR: mem:Volatile LD4[@__security_cookie]
; MSVC-IR: ST4[FixedStack0]
; MSVC-IR: LD4[%StackGuardSlot]
; MSVC-IR: CALLpcrel32 <ga:@__security_check_cookie>
[stack protector] Set edge weights for newly created basic blocks. This commit fixes a bug in stack protector pass where edge weights were not set when new basic blocks were added to lists of successor basic blocks. Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D5766 llvm-svn: 222987
2014-12-01 12:27:03 +08:00
define i32 @test_branch_weights(i32 %n) #0 {
entry:
%a = alloca [128 x i32], align 16
%0 = bitcast [128 x i32]* %a to i8*
Add address space mangling to lifetime intrinsics In preparation for allowing allocas to have non-0 addrspace. llvm-svn: 299876
2017-04-11 04:18:21 +08:00
call void @llvm.lifetime.start.p0i8(i64 512, i8* %0)
[opaque pointer type] Add textual IR support for explicit type parameter to getelementptr instruction One of several parallel first steps to remove the target type of pointers, replacing them with a single opaque pointer type. This adds an explicit type parameter to the gep instruction so that when the first parameter becomes an opaque pointer type, the type to gep through is still available to the instructions. * This doesn't modify gep operators, only instructions (operators will be handled separately) * Textual IR changes only. Bitcode (including upgrade) and changing the in-memory representation will be in separate changes. * geps of vectors are transformed as: getelementptr <4 x float*> %x, ... ->getelementptr float, <4 x float*> %x, ... Then, once the opaque pointer type is introduced, this will ultimately look like: getelementptr float, <4 x ptr> %x with the unambiguous interpretation that it is a vector of pointers to float. * address spaces remain on the pointer, not the type: getelementptr float addrspace(1)* %x ->getelementptr float, float addrspace(1)* %x Then, eventually: getelementptr float, ptr addrspace(1) %x Importantly, the massive amount of test case churn has been automated by same crappy python code. I had to manually update a few test cases that wouldn't fit the script's model (r228970,r229196,r229197,r229198). The python script just massages stdin and writes the result to stdout, I then wrapped that in a shell script to handle replacing files, then using the usual find+xargs to migrate all the files. update.py: import fileinput import sys import re ibrep = re.compile(r"(^.*?[^%\w]getelementptr inbounds )(((?:<\d* x )?)(.*?)(| addrspace\(\d\)) *\*(|>)(?:$| *(?:%|@|null|undef|blockaddress|getelementptr|addrspacecast|bitcast|inttoptr|\[\[[a-zA-Z]|\{\{).*$))") normrep = re.compile( r"(^.*?[^%\w]getelementptr )(((?:<\d* x )?)(.*?)(| addrspace\(\d\)) *\*(|>)(?:$| *(?:%|@|null|undef|blockaddress|getelementptr|addrspacecast|bitcast|inttoptr|\[\[[a-zA-Z]|\{\{).*$))") def conv(match, line): if not match: return line line = match.groups()[0] if len(match.groups()[5]) == 0: line += match.groups()[2] line += match.groups()[3] line += ", " line += match.groups()[1] line += "\n" return line for line in sys.stdin: if line.find("getelementptr ") == line.find("getelementptr inbounds"): if line.find("getelementptr inbounds") != line.find("getelementptr inbounds ("): line = conv(re.match(ibrep, line), line) elif line.find("getelementptr ") != line.find("getelementptr ("): line = conv(re.match(normrep, line), line) sys.stdout.write(line) apply.sh: for name in "$@" do python3 `dirname "$0"`/update.py < "$name" > "$name.tmp" && mv "$name.tmp" "$name" rm -f "$name.tmp" done The actual commands: From llvm/src: find test/ -name *.ll | xargs ./apply.sh From llvm/src/tools/clang: find test/ -name *.mm -o -name *.m -o -name *.cpp -o -name *.c | xargs -I '{}' ../../apply.sh "{}" From llvm/src/tools/polly: find test/ -name *.ll | xargs ./apply.sh After that, check-all (with llvm, clang, clang-tools-extra, lld, compiler-rt, and polly all checked out). The extra 'rm' in the apply.sh script is due to a few files in clang's test suite using interesting unicode stuff that my python script was throwing exceptions on. None of those files needed to be migrated, so it seemed sufficient to ignore those cases. Reviewers: rafael, dexonsmith, grosser Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D7636 llvm-svn: 230786
2015-02-28 03:29:02 +08:00
%arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [128 x i32], [128 x i32]* %a, i64 0, i64 0
[stack protector] Set edge weights for newly created basic blocks. This commit fixes a bug in stack protector pass where edge weights were not set when new basic blocks were added to lists of successor basic blocks. Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D5766 llvm-svn: 222987
2014-12-01 12:27:03 +08:00
call void @foo2(i32* %arraydecay)
%idxprom = sext i32 %n to i64
[opaque pointer type] Add textual IR support for explicit type parameter to getelementptr instruction One of several parallel first steps to remove the target type of pointers, replacing them with a single opaque pointer type. This adds an explicit type parameter to the gep instruction so that when the first parameter becomes an opaque pointer type, the type to gep through is still available to the instructions. * This doesn't modify gep operators, only instructions (operators will be handled separately) * Textual IR changes only. Bitcode (including upgrade) and changing the in-memory representation will be in separate changes. * geps of vectors are transformed as: getelementptr <4 x float*> %x, ... ->getelementptr float, <4 x float*> %x, ... Then, once the opaque pointer type is introduced, this will ultimately look like: getelementptr float, <4 x ptr> %x with the unambiguous interpretation that it is a vector of pointers to float. * address spaces remain on the pointer, not the type: getelementptr float addrspace(1)* %x ->getelementptr float, float addrspace(1)* %x Then, eventually: getelementptr float, ptr addrspace(1) %x Importantly, the massive amount of test case churn has been automated by same crappy python code. I had to manually update a few test cases that wouldn't fit the script's model (r228970,r229196,r229197,r229198). The python script just massages stdin and writes the result to stdout, I then wrapped that in a shell script to handle replacing files, then using the usual find+xargs to migrate all the files. update.py: import fileinput import sys import re ibrep = re.compile(r"(^.*?[^%\w]getelementptr inbounds )(((?:<\d* x )?)(.*?)(| addrspace\(\d\)) *\*(|>)(?:$| *(?:%|@|null|undef|blockaddress|getelementptr|addrspacecast|bitcast|inttoptr|\[\[[a-zA-Z]|\{\{).*$))") normrep = re.compile( r"(^.*?[^%\w]getelementptr )(((?:<\d* x )?)(.*?)(| addrspace\(\d\)) *\*(|>)(?:$| *(?:%|@|null|undef|blockaddress|getelementptr|addrspacecast|bitcast|inttoptr|\[\[[a-zA-Z]|\{\{).*$))") def conv(match, line): if not match: return line line = match.groups()[0] if len(match.groups()[5]) == 0: line += match.groups()[2] line += match.groups()[3] line += ", " line += match.groups()[1] line += "\n" return line for line in sys.stdin: if line.find("getelementptr ") == line.find("getelementptr inbounds"): if line.find("getelementptr inbounds") != line.find("getelementptr inbounds ("): line = conv(re.match(ibrep, line), line) elif line.find("getelementptr ") != line.find("getelementptr ("): line = conv(re.match(normrep, line), line) sys.stdout.write(line) apply.sh: for name in "$@" do python3 `dirname "$0"`/update.py < "$name" > "$name.tmp" && mv "$name.tmp" "$name" rm -f "$name.tmp" done The actual commands: From llvm/src: find test/ -name *.ll | xargs ./apply.sh From llvm/src/tools/clang: find test/ -name *.mm -o -name *.m -o -name *.cpp -o -name *.c | xargs -I '{}' ../../apply.sh "{}" From llvm/src/tools/polly: find test/ -name *.ll | xargs ./apply.sh After that, check-all (with llvm, clang, clang-tools-extra, lld, compiler-rt, and polly all checked out). The extra 'rm' in the apply.sh script is due to a few files in clang's test suite using interesting unicode stuff that my python script was throwing exceptions on. None of those files needed to be migrated, so it seemed sufficient to ignore those cases. Reviewers: rafael, dexonsmith, grosser Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D7636 llvm-svn: 230786
2015-02-28 03:29:02 +08:00
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [128 x i32], [128 x i32]* %a, i64 0, i64 %idxprom
[opaque pointer type] Add textual IR support for explicit type parameter to load instruction Essentially the same as the GEP change in r230786. A similar migration script can be used to update test cases, though a few more test case improvements/changes were required this time around: (r229269-r229278) import fileinput import sys import re pat = re.compile(r"((?:=|:|^)\s*load (?:atomic )?(?:volatile )?(.*?))(| addrspace\(\d+\) *)\*($| *(?:%|@|null|undef|blockaddress|getelementptr|addrspacecast|bitcast|inttoptr|\[\[[a-zA-Z]|\{\{).*$)") for line in sys.stdin: sys.stdout.write(re.sub(pat, r"\1, \2\3*\4", line)) Reviewers: rafael, dexonsmith, grosser Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D7649 llvm-svn: 230794
2015-02-28 05:17:42 +08:00
%1 = load i32, i32* %arrayidx, align 4
Add address space mangling to lifetime intrinsics In preparation for allowing allocas to have non-0 addrspace. llvm-svn: 299876
2017-04-11 04:18:21 +08:00
call void @llvm.lifetime.end.p0i8(i64 512, i8* %0)
[stack protector] Set edge weights for newly created basic blocks. This commit fixes a bug in stack protector pass where edge weights were not set when new basic blocks were added to lists of successor basic blocks. Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D5766 llvm-svn: 222987
2014-12-01 12:27:03 +08:00
ret i32 %1
}
Add address space mangling to lifetime intrinsics In preparation for allowing allocas to have non-0 addrspace. llvm-svn: 299876
2017-04-11 04:18:21 +08:00
declare void @llvm.lifetime.start.p0i8(i64, i8* nocapture)
[stack protector] Set edge weights for newly created basic blocks. This commit fixes a bug in stack protector pass where edge weights were not set when new basic blocks were added to lists of successor basic blocks. Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D5766 llvm-svn: 222987
2014-12-01 12:27:03 +08:00
declare void @foo2(i32*)
Add address space mangling to lifetime intrinsics In preparation for allowing allocas to have non-0 addrspace. llvm-svn: 299876
2017-04-11 04:18:21 +08:00
declare void @llvm.lifetime.end.p0i8(i64, i8* nocapture)
[stack protector] Set edge weights for newly created basic blocks. This commit fixes a bug in stack protector pass where edge weights were not set when new basic blocks were added to lists of successor basic blocks. Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D5766 llvm-svn: 222987
2014-12-01 12:27:03 +08:00
[stack-protection] Add support for MSVC buffer security check Summary: This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch. * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx * To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347 Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation: * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx * http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/ * http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html For the following example: ``` int example(int offset, int index) { char buffer[10]; memset(buffer, 0xCC, index); return buffer[index]; } ``` The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check: ``` push ebp mov ebp,esp sub esp,50h [1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)] [2] xor eax,ebp [3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax push ebx push esi push edi mov eax,dword ptr [index] push eax push 0CCh lea ecx,[buffer] push ecx call _memset (010610B9h) add esp,0Ch mov eax,dword ptr [index] movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax] pop edi pop esi pop ebx [4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4] [5] xor ecx,ebp [6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h) mov esp,ebp pop ebp ret ``` The instrumentation above is: * [1] is loading the global security canary, * [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot, * [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary, * [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling. Overview of the current stack-protection implementation: * lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp * There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation. * The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie. * An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast). * Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling. * Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation. * lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp * lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp * There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls). * see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration. * The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr). * 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie) * The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'. * include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h * Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'. * lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp * Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm. Function-based Instrumentation: * The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions. * To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is * adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h), * If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue. * modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation, * generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp), * if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp). Modifications * adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp) * adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h) Results * IR generated instrumentation: ``` clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input ``` ``` *** Final LLVM Code input to ISel *** ; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 { entry: %StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot %0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot) %index.addr = alloca i32, align 4 %offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4 %buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1 store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4 store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4 %arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0 %1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4 call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false) %2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4 %arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2 %3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1 %conv = sext i8 %3 to i32 %4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check ret i32 %conv } ``` * SelectionDAG generated instrumentation: ``` clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA ``` ``` "?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z" # BB#0: # %entry pushl %esi subl $16, %esp movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value movl 28(%esp), %esi movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot leal 2(%esp), %eax pushl %esi pushl $204 pushl %eax calll _memset addl $12, %esp movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check movl %esi, %eax addl $16, %esp popl %esi retl ``` Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346 llvm-svn: 272053
2016-06-08 04:15:35 +08:00
attributes #0 = { sspstrong "stack-protector-buffer-size"="8" }