2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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//===- X86_64.cpp ---------------------------------------------------------===//
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//
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2019-01-19 16:50:56 +08:00
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// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
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// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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//
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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#include "InputFiles.h"
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2020-04-07 21:48:18 +08:00
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#include "OutputSections.h"
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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#include "Symbols.h"
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#include "SyntheticSections.h"
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#include "Target.h"
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[lld] unified COFF and ELF error handling on new Common/ErrorHandler
Summary:
The COFF linker and the ELF linker have long had similar but separate
Error.h and Error.cpp files to implement error handling. This change
introduces new error handling code in Common/ErrorHandler.h, changes the
COFF and ELF linkers to use it, and removes the old, separate
implementations.
Reviewers: ruiu
Reviewed By: ruiu
Subscribers: smeenai, jyknight, emaste, sdardis, nemanjai, nhaehnle, mgorny, javed.absar, kbarton, fedor.sergeev, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D39259
llvm-svn: 316624
2017-10-26 06:28:38 +08:00
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#include "lld/Common/ErrorHandler.h"
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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#include "llvm/Object/ELF.h"
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#include "llvm/Support/Endian.h"
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using namespace llvm;
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using namespace llvm::object;
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using namespace llvm::support::endian;
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using namespace llvm::ELF;
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2020-05-15 13:18:58 +08:00
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using namespace lld;
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using namespace lld::elf;
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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namespace {
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2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
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class X86_64 : public TargetInfo {
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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public:
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X86_64();
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[PPC64] Set the number of relocations processed for R_PPC64_TLS[GL]D to 2
Summary:
R_PPC64_TLSGD and R_PPC64_TLSLD are used as markers on TLS code sequences. After GD-to-IE or GD-to-LE relaxation, the next relocation R_PPC64_REL24 should be skipped to not create a false dependency on __tls_get_addr. When linking statically, the false dependency may cause an "undefined symbol: __tls_get_addr" error.
R_PPC64_GOT_TLSGD16_HA
R_PPC64_GOT_TLSGD16_LO
R_PPC64_TLSGD R_TLSDESC_CALL
R_PPC64_REL24 __tls_get_addr
Reviewers: ruiu, sfertile, syzaara, espindola
Reviewed By: sfertile
Subscribers: emaste, nemanjai, arichardson, kbarton, jsji, llvm-commits, tamur
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D57673
llvm-svn: 353262
2019-02-06 10:00:24 +08:00
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int getTlsGdRelaxSkip(RelType type) const override;
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2017-11-04 05:21:47 +08:00
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RelExpr getRelExpr(RelType type, const Symbol &s,
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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const uint8_t *loc) const override;
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2018-04-05 20:07:20 +08:00
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RelType getDynRel(RelType type) const override;
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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void writeGotPltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const override;
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2017-11-04 05:21:47 +08:00
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void writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const override;
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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void writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const override;
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2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
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void writePlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &sym,
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uint64_t pltEntryAddr) const override;
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2020-01-23 13:39:16 +08:00
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void relocate(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
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uint64_t val) const override;
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2020-04-07 21:48:18 +08:00
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void applyJumpInstrMod(uint8_t *loc, JumpModType type,
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unsigned size) const override;
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[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter
This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote
using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the
source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual
post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against
lld's code base.
Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style:
https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html
In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable
naming scheme change, and this patch does that.
I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that
is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter.
Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld
repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts
because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But
there's a remedy.
clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your
downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to
a commit after the mass renaming:
1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming,
2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and
3. rebase again to the head.
Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and
for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and
disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by
hand, but that shouldn't be too many.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121
llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
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2020-11-26 00:43:26 +08:00
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RelExpr adjustGotPcExpr(RelType type, int64_t addend,
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const uint8_t *loc) const override;
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2020-01-23 11:42:54 +08:00
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void relaxGot(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
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uint64_t val) const override;
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void relaxTlsGdToIe(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
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uint64_t val) const override;
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void relaxTlsGdToLe(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
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uint64_t val) const override;
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void relaxTlsIeToLe(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
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uint64_t val) const override;
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void relaxTlsLdToLe(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
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uint64_t val) const override;
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2018-10-17 01:13:01 +08:00
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bool adjustPrologueForCrossSplitStack(uint8_t *loc, uint8_t *end,
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uint8_t stOther) const override;
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2020-04-07 21:48:18 +08:00
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bool deleteFallThruJmpInsn(InputSection &is, InputFile *file,
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InputSection *nextIS) const override;
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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};
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} // namespace
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2020-04-07 21:48:18 +08:00
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// This is vector of NOP instructions of sizes from 1 to 8 bytes. The
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// appropriately sized instructions are used to fill the gaps between sections
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// which are executed during fall through.
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static const std::vector<std::vector<uint8_t>> nopInstructions = {
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{0x90},
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{0x66, 0x90},
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{0x0f, 0x1f, 0x00},
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{0x0f, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x00},
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{0x0f, 0x1f, 0x44, 0x00, 0x00},
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{0x66, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x44, 0x00, 0x00},
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{0x0F, 0x1F, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
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{0x0F, 0x1F, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
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{0x66, 0x0F, 0x1F, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}};
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2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
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X86_64::X86_64() {
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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copyRel = R_X86_64_COPY;
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gotRel = R_X86_64_GLOB_DAT;
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2018-09-26 16:11:34 +08:00
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noneRel = R_X86_64_NONE;
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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pltRel = R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT;
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relativeRel = R_X86_64_RELATIVE;
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iRelativeRel = R_X86_64_IRELATIVE;
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2019-06-11 20:59:30 +08:00
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symbolicRel = R_X86_64_64;
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2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
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tlsDescRel = R_X86_64_TLSDESC;
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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tlsGotRel = R_X86_64_TPOFF64;
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tlsModuleIndexRel = R_X86_64_DTPMOD64;
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tlsOffsetRel = R_X86_64_DTPOFF64;
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pltHeaderSize = 16;
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2019-12-15 06:17:35 +08:00
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pltEntrySize = 16;
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ipltEntrySize = 16;
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2018-11-15 05:05:20 +08:00
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trapInstr = {0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc}; // 0xcc = INT3
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2020-04-07 21:48:18 +08:00
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nopInstrs = nopInstructions;
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2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
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// Align to the large page size (known as a superpage or huge page).
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// FreeBSD automatically promotes large, superpage-aligned allocations.
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defaultImageBase = 0x200000;
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}
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2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
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int X86_64::getTlsGdRelaxSkip(RelType type) const { return 2; }
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[PPC64] Set the number of relocations processed for R_PPC64_TLS[GL]D to 2
Summary:
R_PPC64_TLSGD and R_PPC64_TLSLD are used as markers on TLS code sequences. After GD-to-IE or GD-to-LE relaxation, the next relocation R_PPC64_REL24 should be skipped to not create a false dependency on __tls_get_addr. When linking statically, the false dependency may cause an "undefined symbol: __tls_get_addr" error.
R_PPC64_GOT_TLSGD16_HA
R_PPC64_GOT_TLSGD16_LO
R_PPC64_TLSGD R_TLSDESC_CALL
R_PPC64_REL24 __tls_get_addr
Reviewers: ruiu, sfertile, syzaara, espindola
Reviewed By: sfertile
Subscribers: emaste, nemanjai, arichardson, kbarton, jsji, llvm-commits, tamur
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D57673
llvm-svn: 353262
2019-02-06 10:00:24 +08:00
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2020-04-07 21:48:18 +08:00
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// Opcodes for the different X86_64 jmp instructions.
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enum JmpInsnOpcode : uint32_t {
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J_JMP_32,
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J_JNE_32,
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J_JE_32,
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J_JG_32,
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J_JGE_32,
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J_JB_32,
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J_JBE_32,
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J_JL_32,
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J_JLE_32,
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J_JA_32,
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J_JAE_32,
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J_UNKNOWN,
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};
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// Given the first (optional) and second byte of the insn's opcode, this
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// returns the corresponding enum value.
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static JmpInsnOpcode getJmpInsnType(const uint8_t *first,
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const uint8_t *second) {
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if (*second == 0xe9)
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return J_JMP_32;
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if (first == nullptr)
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return J_UNKNOWN;
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if (*first == 0x0f) {
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switch (*second) {
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case 0x84:
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return J_JE_32;
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case 0x85:
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return J_JNE_32;
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case 0x8f:
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return J_JG_32;
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case 0x8d:
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return J_JGE_32;
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case 0x82:
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return J_JB_32;
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case 0x86:
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return J_JBE_32;
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case 0x8c:
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return J_JL_32;
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case 0x8e:
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return J_JLE_32;
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case 0x87:
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return J_JA_32;
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case 0x83:
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return J_JAE_32;
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}
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}
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return J_UNKNOWN;
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}
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// Return the relocation index for input section IS with a specific Offset.
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// Returns the maximum size of the vector if no such relocation is found.
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static unsigned getRelocationWithOffset(const InputSection &is,
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uint64_t offset) {
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unsigned size = is.relocations.size();
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for (unsigned i = size - 1; i + 1 > 0; --i) {
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if (is.relocations[i].offset == offset && is.relocations[i].expr != R_NONE)
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return i;
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}
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return size;
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}
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// Returns true if R corresponds to a relocation used for a jump instruction.
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// TODO: Once special relocations for relaxable jump instructions are available,
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// this should be modified to use those relocations.
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static bool isRelocationForJmpInsn(Relocation &R) {
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return R.type == R_X86_64_PLT32 || R.type == R_X86_64_PC32 ||
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R.type == R_X86_64_PC8;
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}
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// Return true if Relocation R points to the first instruction in the
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// next section.
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// TODO: Delete this once psABI reserves a new relocation type for fall thru
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// jumps.
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static bool isFallThruRelocation(InputSection &is, InputFile *file,
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InputSection *nextIS, Relocation &r) {
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if (!isRelocationForJmpInsn(r))
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return false;
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uint64_t addrLoc = is.getOutputSection()->addr + is.outSecOff + r.offset;
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uint64_t targetOffset = InputSectionBase::getRelocTargetVA(
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file, r.type, r.addend, addrLoc, *r.sym, r.expr);
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// If this jmp is a fall thru, the target offset is the beginning of the
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// next section.
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uint64_t nextSectionOffset =
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nextIS->getOutputSection()->addr + nextIS->outSecOff;
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return (addrLoc + 4 + targetOffset) == nextSectionOffset;
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}
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// Return the jmp instruction opcode that is the inverse of the given
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// opcode. For example, JE inverted is JNE.
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static JmpInsnOpcode invertJmpOpcode(const JmpInsnOpcode opcode) {
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switch (opcode) {
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case J_JE_32:
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return J_JNE_32;
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case J_JNE_32:
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return J_JE_32;
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case J_JG_32:
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return J_JLE_32;
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case J_JGE_32:
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return J_JL_32;
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case J_JB_32:
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return J_JAE_32;
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case J_JBE_32:
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return J_JA_32;
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case J_JL_32:
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return J_JGE_32;
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case J_JLE_32:
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return J_JG_32;
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case J_JA_32:
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return J_JBE_32;
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case J_JAE_32:
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return J_JB_32;
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default:
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return J_UNKNOWN;
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}
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}
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// Deletes direct jump instruction in input sections that jumps to the
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// following section as it is not required. If there are two consecutive jump
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// instructions, it checks if they can be flipped and one can be deleted.
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// For example:
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// .section .text
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// a.BB.foo:
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// ...
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// 10: jne aa.BB.foo
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// 16: jmp bar
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// aa.BB.foo:
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// ...
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//
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// can be converted to:
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// a.BB.foo:
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// ...
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// 10: je bar #jne flipped to je and the jmp is deleted.
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// aa.BB.foo:
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// ...
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bool X86_64::deleteFallThruJmpInsn(InputSection &is, InputFile *file,
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InputSection *nextIS) const {
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const unsigned sizeOfDirectJmpInsn = 5;
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if (nextIS == nullptr)
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return false;
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if (is.getSize() < sizeOfDirectJmpInsn)
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return false;
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// If this jmp insn can be removed, it is the last insn and the
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// relocation is 4 bytes before the end.
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unsigned rIndex = getRelocationWithOffset(is, is.getSize() - 4);
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if (rIndex == is.relocations.size())
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return false;
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Relocation &r = is.relocations[rIndex];
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// Check if the relocation corresponds to a direct jmp.
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const uint8_t *secContents = is.data().data();
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// If it is not a direct jmp instruction, there is nothing to do here.
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if (*(secContents + r.offset - 1) != 0xe9)
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return false;
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if (isFallThruRelocation(is, file, nextIS, r)) {
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// This is a fall thru and can be deleted.
|
|
|
|
r.expr = R_NONE;
|
|
|
|
r.offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
is.drop_back(sizeOfDirectJmpInsn);
|
|
|
|
is.nopFiller = true;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now, check if flip and delete is possible.
|
|
|
|
const unsigned sizeOfJmpCCInsn = 6;
|
|
|
|
// To flip, there must be atleast one JmpCC and one direct jmp.
|
|
|
|
if (is.getSize() < sizeOfDirectJmpInsn + sizeOfJmpCCInsn)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned rbIndex =
|
|
|
|
getRelocationWithOffset(is, (is.getSize() - sizeOfDirectJmpInsn - 4));
|
|
|
|
if (rbIndex == is.relocations.size())
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Relocation &rB = is.relocations[rbIndex];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *jmpInsnB = secContents + rB.offset - 1;
|
|
|
|
JmpInsnOpcode jmpOpcodeB = getJmpInsnType(jmpInsnB - 1, jmpInsnB);
|
|
|
|
if (jmpOpcodeB == J_UNKNOWN)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!isFallThruRelocation(is, file, nextIS, rB))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// jmpCC jumps to the fall thru block, the branch can be flipped and the
|
|
|
|
// jmp can be deleted.
|
|
|
|
JmpInsnOpcode jInvert = invertJmpOpcode(jmpOpcodeB);
|
|
|
|
if (jInvert == J_UNKNOWN)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
is.jumpInstrMods.push_back({jInvert, (rB.offset - 1), 4});
|
|
|
|
// Move R's values to rB except the offset.
|
|
|
|
rB = {r.expr, r.type, rB.offset, r.addend, r.sym};
|
|
|
|
// Cancel R
|
|
|
|
r.expr = R_NONE;
|
|
|
|
r.offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
is.drop_back(sizeOfDirectJmpInsn);
|
|
|
|
is.nopFiller = true;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
RelExpr X86_64::getRelExpr(RelType type, const Symbol &s,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *loc) const {
|
2019-02-07 15:59:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (type == R_X86_64_GOTTPOFF)
|
|
|
|
config->hasStaticTlsModel = true;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_8:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_16:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_32S:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_64:
|
2019-04-22 11:10:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return R_ABS;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_DTPOFF32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_DTPOFF64:
|
2019-04-22 11:10:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return R_DTPREL;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_TPOFF32:
|
2020-12-19 00:24:42 +08:00
|
|
|
return R_TPREL;
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_TLSDESC_CALL:
|
|
|
|
return R_TLSDESC_CALL;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_TLSLD:
|
|
|
|
return R_TLSLD_PC;
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_TLSGD:
|
|
|
|
return R_TLSGD_PC;
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_SIZE32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_SIZE64:
|
|
|
|
return R_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PLT32:
|
|
|
|
return R_PLT_PC;
|
2019-02-07 00:50:09 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC8:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC16:
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC64:
|
|
|
|
return R_PC;
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOT32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOT64:
|
[ELF] Change GOT*_FROM_END (relative to end(.got)) to GOTPLT* (start(.got.plt))
Summary:
This should address remaining issues discussed in PR36555.
Currently R_GOT*_FROM_END are exclusively used by x86 and x86_64 to
express relocations types relative to the GOT base. We have
_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ (GOT base) = start(.got.plt) but end(.got) !=
start(.got.plt)
This can have problems when _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ is used as a symbol, e.g.
glibc dl_machine_dynamic assumes _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ is start(.got.plt),
which is not true.
extern const ElfW(Addr) _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_[] attribute_hidden;
return _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_[0]; // R_X86_64_GOTPC32
In this patch, we
* Change all GOT*_FROM_END to GOTPLT* to fix the problem.
* Add HasGotPltOffRel to denote whether .got.plt should be kept even if
the section is empty.
* Simplify GotSection::empty and GotPltSection::empty by setting
HasGotOffRel and HasGotPltOffRel according to GlobalOffsetTable early.
The change of R_386_GOTPC makes X86::writePltHeader simpler as we don't
have to compute the offset start(.got.plt) - Ebx (it is constant 0).
We still diverge from ld.bfd (at least in most cases) and gold in that
.got.plt and .got are not adjacent, but the advantage doing that is
unclear.
Reviewers: ruiu, sivachandra, espindola
Subscribers: emaste, mehdi_amini, arichardson, dexonsmith, jdoerfert, llvm-commits
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D59594
llvm-svn: 356968
2019-03-26 07:46:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return R_GOTPLT;
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPC32_TLSDESC:
|
|
|
|
return R_TLSDESC_PC;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPCREL:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPCRELX:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_REX_GOTPCRELX:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTTPOFF:
|
|
|
|
return R_GOT_PC;
|
2018-06-13 04:27:16 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTOFF64:
|
[ELF] Change GOT*_FROM_END (relative to end(.got)) to GOTPLT* (start(.got.plt))
Summary:
This should address remaining issues discussed in PR36555.
Currently R_GOT*_FROM_END are exclusively used by x86 and x86_64 to
express relocations types relative to the GOT base. We have
_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ (GOT base) = start(.got.plt) but end(.got) !=
start(.got.plt)
This can have problems when _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ is used as a symbol, e.g.
glibc dl_machine_dynamic assumes _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ is start(.got.plt),
which is not true.
extern const ElfW(Addr) _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_[] attribute_hidden;
return _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_[0]; // R_X86_64_GOTPC32
In this patch, we
* Change all GOT*_FROM_END to GOTPLT* to fix the problem.
* Add HasGotPltOffRel to denote whether .got.plt should be kept even if
the section is empty.
* Simplify GotSection::empty and GotPltSection::empty by setting
HasGotOffRel and HasGotPltOffRel according to GlobalOffsetTable early.
The change of R_386_GOTPC makes X86::writePltHeader simpler as we don't
have to compute the offset start(.got.plt) - Ebx (it is constant 0).
We still diverge from ld.bfd (at least in most cases) and gold in that
.got.plt and .got are not adjacent, but the advantage doing that is
unclear.
Reviewers: ruiu, sivachandra, espindola
Subscribers: emaste, mehdi_amini, arichardson, dexonsmith, jdoerfert, llvm-commits
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D59594
llvm-svn: 356968
2019-03-26 07:46:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return R_GOTPLTREL;
|
2018-06-13 04:18:41 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPC32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPC64:
|
[ELF] Change GOT*_FROM_END (relative to end(.got)) to GOTPLT* (start(.got.plt))
Summary:
This should address remaining issues discussed in PR36555.
Currently R_GOT*_FROM_END are exclusively used by x86 and x86_64 to
express relocations types relative to the GOT base. We have
_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ (GOT base) = start(.got.plt) but end(.got) !=
start(.got.plt)
This can have problems when _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ is used as a symbol, e.g.
glibc dl_machine_dynamic assumes _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ is start(.got.plt),
which is not true.
extern const ElfW(Addr) _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_[] attribute_hidden;
return _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_[0]; // R_X86_64_GOTPC32
In this patch, we
* Change all GOT*_FROM_END to GOTPLT* to fix the problem.
* Add HasGotPltOffRel to denote whether .got.plt should be kept even if
the section is empty.
* Simplify GotSection::empty and GotPltSection::empty by setting
HasGotOffRel and HasGotPltOffRel according to GlobalOffsetTable early.
The change of R_386_GOTPC makes X86::writePltHeader simpler as we don't
have to compute the offset start(.got.plt) - Ebx (it is constant 0).
We still diverge from ld.bfd (at least in most cases) and gold in that
.got.plt and .got are not adjacent, but the advantage doing that is
unclear.
Reviewers: ruiu, sivachandra, espindola
Subscribers: emaste, mehdi_amini, arichardson, dexonsmith, jdoerfert, llvm-commits
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D59594
llvm-svn: 356968
2019-03-26 07:46:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return R_GOTPLTONLY_PC;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_NONE:
|
|
|
|
return R_NONE;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2019-02-15 02:02:20 +08:00
|
|
|
error(getErrorLocation(loc) + "unknown relocation (" + Twine(type) +
|
|
|
|
") against symbol " + toString(s));
|
|
|
|
return R_NONE;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::writeGotPltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const {
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
// The first entry holds the value of _DYNAMIC. It is not clear why that is
|
|
|
|
// required, but it is documented in the psabi and the glibc dynamic linker
|
|
|
|
// seems to use it (note that this is relevant for linking ld.so, not any
|
|
|
|
// other program).
|
2019-06-08 01:57:58 +08:00
|
|
|
write64le(buf, mainPart->dynamic->getVA());
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const {
|
2017-08-31 18:14:10 +08:00
|
|
|
// See comments in X86::writeGotPlt.
|
2018-05-26 02:26:14 +08:00
|
|
|
write64le(buf, s.getPltVA() + 6);
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const {
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t pltData[] = {
|
2017-12-27 14:54:18 +08:00
|
|
|
0xff, 0x35, 0, 0, 0, 0, // pushq GOTPLT+8(%rip)
|
|
|
|
0xff, 0x25, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp *GOTPLT+16(%rip)
|
|
|
|
0x0f, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x00, // nop
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, pltData, sizeof(pltData));
|
2018-09-26 03:26:58 +08:00
|
|
|
uint64_t gotPlt = in.gotPlt->getVA();
|
2019-12-11 10:05:36 +08:00
|
|
|
uint64_t plt = in.ibtPlt ? in.ibtPlt->getVA() : in.plt->getVA();
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 2, gotPlt - plt + 2); // GOTPLT+8
|
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 8, gotPlt - plt + 4); // GOTPLT+16
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::writePlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &sym,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t pltEntryAddr) const {
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t inst[] = {
|
2017-12-27 14:54:18 +08:00
|
|
|
0xff, 0x25, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmpq *got(%rip)
|
|
|
|
0x68, 0, 0, 0, 0, // pushq <relocation index>
|
|
|
|
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmpq plt[0]
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, inst, sizeof(inst));
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 2, sym.getGotPltVA() - pltEntryAddr - 6);
|
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 7, sym.pltIndex);
|
2019-12-15 06:17:35 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 12, in.plt->getVA() - pltEntryAddr - 16);
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
RelType X86_64::getDynRel(RelType type) const {
|
2018-04-05 20:07:20 +08:00
|
|
|
if (type == R_X86_64_64 || type == R_X86_64_PC64 || type == R_X86_64_SIZE32 ||
|
|
|
|
type == R_X86_64_SIZE64)
|
|
|
|
return type;
|
|
|
|
return R_X86_64_NONE;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-23 11:42:54 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::relaxTlsGdToLe(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t val) const {
|
|
|
|
if (rel.type == R_X86_64_TLSGD) {
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
// Convert
|
|
|
|
// .byte 0x66
|
|
|
|
// leaq x@tlsgd(%rip), %rdi
|
|
|
|
// .word 0x6666
|
|
|
|
// rex64
|
|
|
|
// call __tls_get_addr@plt
|
|
|
|
// to the following two instructions.
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t inst[] = {
|
|
|
|
0x64, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0x00, // mov %fs:0x0,%rax
|
|
|
|
0x48, 0x8d, 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, // lea x@tpoff,%rax
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(loc - 4, inst, sizeof(inst));
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
// The original code used a pc relative relocation and so we have to
|
|
|
|
// compensate for the -4 in had in the addend.
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc + 8, val + 4);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// Convert
|
|
|
|
// lea x@tlsgd(%rip), %rax
|
|
|
|
// call *(%rax)
|
|
|
|
// to the following two instructions.
|
2020-01-23 11:42:54 +08:00
|
|
|
assert(rel.type == R_X86_64_GOTPC32_TLSDESC);
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(loc - 3, "\x48\x8d\x05", 3)) {
|
|
|
|
error(getErrorLocation(loc - 3) + "R_X86_64_GOTPC32_TLSDESC must be used "
|
|
|
|
"in callq *x@tlsdesc(%rip), %rax");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// movq $x@tpoff(%rip),%rax
|
|
|
|
loc[-2] = 0xc7;
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0xc0;
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val + 4);
|
|
|
|
// xchg ax,ax
|
|
|
|
loc[4] = 0x66;
|
|
|
|
loc[5] = 0x90;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-23 11:42:54 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::relaxTlsGdToIe(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t val) const {
|
|
|
|
if (rel.type == R_X86_64_TLSGD) {
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
// Convert
|
|
|
|
// .byte 0x66
|
|
|
|
// leaq x@tlsgd(%rip), %rdi
|
|
|
|
// .word 0x6666
|
|
|
|
// rex64
|
|
|
|
// call __tls_get_addr@plt
|
|
|
|
// to the following two instructions.
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t inst[] = {
|
|
|
|
0x64, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0x00, // mov %fs:0x0,%rax
|
|
|
|
0x48, 0x03, 0x05, 0, 0, 0, 0, // addq x@gottpoff(%rip),%rax
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(loc - 4, inst, sizeof(inst));
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
// Both code sequences are PC relatives, but since we are moving the
|
|
|
|
// constant forward by 8 bytes we have to subtract the value by 8.
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc + 8, val - 8);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// Convert
|
|
|
|
// lea x@tlsgd(%rip), %rax
|
|
|
|
// call *(%rax)
|
|
|
|
// to the following two instructions.
|
2020-01-23 11:42:54 +08:00
|
|
|
assert(rel.type == R_X86_64_GOTPC32_TLSDESC);
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(loc - 3, "\x48\x8d\x05", 3)) {
|
|
|
|
error(getErrorLocation(loc - 3) + "R_X86_64_GOTPC32_TLSDESC must be used "
|
|
|
|
"in callq *x@tlsdesc(%rip), %rax");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// movq x@gottpoff(%rip),%rax
|
|
|
|
loc[-2] = 0x8b;
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
// xchg ax,ax
|
|
|
|
loc[4] = 0x66;
|
|
|
|
loc[5] = 0x90;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// In some conditions, R_X86_64_GOTTPOFF relocation can be optimized to
|
|
|
|
// R_X86_64_TPOFF32 so that it does not use GOT.
|
2020-01-23 11:42:54 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::relaxTlsIeToLe(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t val) const {
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *inst = loc - 3;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t reg = loc[-1] >> 3;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *regSlot = loc - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Note that ADD with RSP or R12 is converted to ADD instead of LEA
|
|
|
|
// because LEA with these registers needs 4 bytes to encode and thus
|
|
|
|
// wouldn't fit the space.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(inst, "\x48\x03\x25", 3) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// "addq foo@gottpoff(%rip),%rsp" -> "addq $foo,%rsp"
|
|
|
|
memcpy(inst, "\x48\x81\xc4", 3);
|
|
|
|
} else if (memcmp(inst, "\x4c\x03\x25", 3) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// "addq foo@gottpoff(%rip),%r12" -> "addq $foo,%r12"
|
|
|
|
memcpy(inst, "\x49\x81\xc4", 3);
|
|
|
|
} else if (memcmp(inst, "\x4c\x03", 2) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// "addq foo@gottpoff(%rip),%r[8-15]" -> "leaq foo(%r[8-15]),%r[8-15]"
|
|
|
|
memcpy(inst, "\x4d\x8d", 2);
|
|
|
|
*regSlot = 0x80 | (reg << 3) | reg;
|
|
|
|
} else if (memcmp(inst, "\x48\x03", 2) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// "addq foo@gottpoff(%rip),%reg -> "leaq foo(%reg),%reg"
|
|
|
|
memcpy(inst, "\x48\x8d", 2);
|
|
|
|
*regSlot = 0x80 | (reg << 3) | reg;
|
|
|
|
} else if (memcmp(inst, "\x4c\x8b", 2) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// "movq foo@gottpoff(%rip),%r[8-15]" -> "movq $foo,%r[8-15]"
|
|
|
|
memcpy(inst, "\x49\xc7", 2);
|
|
|
|
*regSlot = 0xc0 | reg;
|
|
|
|
} else if (memcmp(inst, "\x48\x8b", 2) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// "movq foo@gottpoff(%rip),%reg" -> "movq $foo,%reg"
|
|
|
|
memcpy(inst, "\x48\xc7", 2);
|
|
|
|
*regSlot = 0xc0 | reg;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error(getErrorLocation(loc - 3) +
|
|
|
|
"R_X86_64_GOTTPOFF must be used in MOVQ or ADDQ instructions only");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// The original code used a PC relative relocation.
|
|
|
|
// Need to compensate for the -4 it had in the addend.
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val + 4);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-23 11:42:54 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::relaxTlsLdToLe(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t val) const {
|
|
|
|
if (rel.type == R_X86_64_DTPOFF64) {
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
write64le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-23 11:42:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rel.type == R_X86_64_DTPOFF32) {
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t inst[] = {
|
2017-12-27 14:54:18 +08:00
|
|
|
0x66, 0x66, // .word 0x6666
|
|
|
|
0x66, // .byte 0x66
|
|
|
|
0x64, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov %fs:0,%rax
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
2019-01-17 07:28:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (loc[4] == 0xe8) {
|
|
|
|
// Convert
|
|
|
|
// leaq bar@tlsld(%rip), %rdi # 48 8d 3d <Loc>
|
|
|
|
// callq __tls_get_addr@PLT # e8 <disp32>
|
|
|
|
// leaq bar@dtpoff(%rax), %rcx
|
|
|
|
// to
|
|
|
|
// .word 0x6666
|
|
|
|
// .byte 0x66
|
|
|
|
// mov %fs:0,%rax
|
|
|
|
// leaq bar@tpoff(%rax), %rcx
|
|
|
|
memcpy(loc - 3, inst, sizeof(inst));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (loc[4] == 0xff && loc[5] == 0x15) {
|
|
|
|
// Convert
|
|
|
|
// leaq x@tlsld(%rip),%rdi # 48 8d 3d <Loc>
|
|
|
|
// call *__tls_get_addr@GOTPCREL(%rip) # ff 15 <disp32>
|
|
|
|
// to
|
|
|
|
// .long 0x66666666
|
|
|
|
// movq %fs:0,%rax
|
|
|
|
// See "Table 11.9: LD -> LE Code Transition (LP64)" in
|
|
|
|
// https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wiki/hjl-tools/x86-psABI/x86-64-psABI-1.0.pdf
|
|
|
|
loc[-3] = 0x66;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(loc - 2, inst, sizeof(inst));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error(getErrorLocation(loc - 3) +
|
|
|
|
"expected R_X86_64_PLT32 or R_X86_64_GOTPCRELX after R_X86_64_TLSLD");
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-07 21:48:18 +08:00
|
|
|
// A JumpInstrMod at a specific offset indicates that the jump instruction
|
|
|
|
// opcode at that offset must be modified. This is specifically used to relax
|
|
|
|
// jump instructions with basic block sections. This function looks at the
|
|
|
|
// JumpMod and effects the change.
|
|
|
|
void X86_64::applyJumpInstrMod(uint8_t *loc, JumpModType type,
|
|
|
|
unsigned size) const {
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case J_JMP_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4)
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0xe9;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0xeb;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JE_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x84;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x74;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JNE_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x85;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x75;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JG_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x8f;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x7f;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JGE_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x8d;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x7d;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JB_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x82;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x72;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JBE_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x86;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x76;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JL_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x8c;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x7c;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JLE_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x8e;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x7e;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JA_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x87;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x77;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_JAE_32:
|
|
|
|
if (size == 4) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x83;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*loc = 0x73;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case J_UNKNOWN:
|
|
|
|
llvm_unreachable("Unknown Jump Relocation");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-23 13:39:16 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::relocate(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel, uint64_t val) const {
|
|
|
|
switch (rel.type) {
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_8:
|
2020-01-23 13:39:16 +08:00
|
|
|
checkIntUInt(loc, val, 8, rel);
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
*loc = val;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-02-08 02:12:57 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC8:
|
2020-01-23 13:39:16 +08:00
|
|
|
checkInt(loc, val, 8, rel);
|
2019-02-08 02:12:57 +08:00
|
|
|
*loc = val;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_16:
|
2020-01-23 13:39:16 +08:00
|
|
|
checkIntUInt(loc, val, 16, rel);
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
write16le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-02-08 02:12:57 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC16:
|
2020-01-23 13:39:16 +08:00
|
|
|
checkInt(loc, val, 16, rel);
|
2019-02-08 02:12:57 +08:00
|
|
|
write16le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_32:
|
2020-01-23 13:39:16 +08:00
|
|
|
checkUInt(loc, val, 32, rel);
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_32S:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_TPOFF32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOT32:
|
2018-06-13 04:18:41 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPC32:
|
2019-05-29 10:03:56 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPC32_TLSDESC:
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPCREL:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPCRELX:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_REX_GOTPCRELX:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTTPOFF:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PLT32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_TLSGD:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_TLSLD:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_DTPOFF32:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_SIZE32:
|
2020-01-23 13:39:16 +08:00
|
|
|
checkInt(loc, val, 32, rel);
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_64:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_DTPOFF64:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC64:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_SIZE64:
|
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOT64:
|
2018-06-13 04:27:16 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTOFF64:
|
2018-06-13 04:18:41 +08:00
|
|
|
case R_X86_64_GOTPC64:
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
write64le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2019-02-15 02:02:20 +08:00
|
|
|
llvm_unreachable("unknown relocation");
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-11-26 00:43:26 +08:00
|
|
|
RelExpr X86_64::adjustGotPcExpr(RelType type, int64_t addend,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *loc) const {
|
2020-12-01 00:30:19 +08:00
|
|
|
// Only R_X86_64_[REX_]GOTPCRELX can be relaxed. GNU as may emit GOTPCRELX
|
|
|
|
// with addend != -4. Such an instruction does not load the full GOT entry, so
|
|
|
|
// we cannot relax the relocation. E.g. movl x@GOTPCREL+4(%rip), %rax
|
|
|
|
// (addend=0) loads the high 32 bits of the GOT entry.
|
|
|
|
if ((type != R_X86_64_GOTPCRELX && type != R_X86_64_REX_GOTPCRELX) ||
|
|
|
|
addend != -4)
|
2020-11-26 00:43:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return R_GOT_PC;
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t op = loc[-2];
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t modRm = loc[-1];
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// FIXME: When PIC is disabled and foo is defined locally in the
|
|
|
|
// lower 32 bit address space, memory operand in mov can be converted into
|
|
|
|
// immediate operand. Otherwise, mov must be changed to lea. We support only
|
|
|
|
// latter relaxation at this moment.
|
|
|
|
if (op == 0x8b)
|
|
|
|
return R_RELAX_GOT_PC;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Relax call and jmp.
|
|
|
|
if (op == 0xff && (modRm == 0x15 || modRm == 0x25))
|
|
|
|
return R_RELAX_GOT_PC;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-25 06:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
// We don't support test/binop instructions without a REX prefix.
|
|
|
|
if (type == R_X86_64_GOTPCRELX)
|
2020-11-26 00:43:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return R_GOT_PC;
|
2020-10-25 06:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
// Relaxation of test, adc, add, and, cmp, or, sbb, sub, xor.
|
|
|
|
// If PIC then no relaxation is available.
|
2020-11-26 00:43:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return config->isPic ? R_GOT_PC : R_RELAX_GOT_PC_NOPIC;
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// A subset of relaxations can only be applied for no-PIC. This method
|
|
|
|
// handles such relaxations. Instructions encoding information was taken from:
|
|
|
|
// "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual V2"
|
|
|
|
// (http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/manuals/
|
|
|
|
// 64-ia-32-architectures-software-developer-instruction-set-reference-manual-325383.pdf)
|
2019-03-29 01:35:00 +08:00
|
|
|
static void relaxGotNoPic(uint8_t *loc, uint64_t val, uint8_t op,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t modRm) {
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t rex = loc[-3];
|
|
|
|
// Convert "test %reg, foo@GOTPCREL(%rip)" to "test $foo, %reg".
|
|
|
|
if (op == 0x85) {
|
|
|
|
// See "TEST-Logical Compare" (4-428 Vol. 2B),
|
|
|
|
// TEST r/m64, r64 uses "full" ModR / M byte (no opcode extension).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ModR/M byte has form XX YYY ZZZ, where
|
|
|
|
// YYY is MODRM.reg(register 2), ZZZ is MODRM.rm(register 1).
|
|
|
|
// XX has different meanings:
|
|
|
|
// 00: The operand's memory address is in reg1.
|
|
|
|
// 01: The operand's memory address is reg1 + a byte-sized displacement.
|
|
|
|
// 10: The operand's memory address is reg1 + a word-sized displacement.
|
|
|
|
// 11: The operand is reg1 itself.
|
|
|
|
// If an instruction requires only one operand, the unused reg2 field
|
|
|
|
// holds extra opcode bits rather than a register code
|
|
|
|
// 0xC0 == 11 000 000 binary.
|
|
|
|
// 0x38 == 00 111 000 binary.
|
|
|
|
// We transfer reg2 to reg1 here as operand.
|
|
|
|
// See "2.1.3 ModR/M and SIB Bytes" (Vol. 2A 2-3).
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0xc0 | (modRm & 0x38) >> 3; // ModR/M byte.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Change opcode from TEST r/m64, r64 to TEST r/m64, imm32
|
|
|
|
// See "TEST-Logical Compare" (4-428 Vol. 2B).
|
|
|
|
loc[-2] = 0xf7;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Move R bit to the B bit in REX byte.
|
|
|
|
// REX byte is encoded as 0100WRXB, where
|
|
|
|
// 0100 is 4bit fixed pattern.
|
|
|
|
// REX.W When 1, a 64-bit operand size is used. Otherwise, when 0, the
|
|
|
|
// default operand size is used (which is 32-bit for most but not all
|
|
|
|
// instructions).
|
|
|
|
// REX.R This 1-bit value is an extension to the MODRM.reg field.
|
|
|
|
// REX.X This 1-bit value is an extension to the SIB.index field.
|
|
|
|
// REX.B This 1-bit value is an extension to the MODRM.rm field or the
|
|
|
|
// SIB.base field.
|
|
|
|
// See "2.2.1.2 More on REX Prefix Fields " (2-8 Vol. 2A).
|
|
|
|
loc[-3] = (rex & ~0x4) | (rex & 0x4) >> 2;
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// If we are here then we need to relax the adc, add, and, cmp, or, sbb, sub
|
|
|
|
// or xor operations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Convert "binop foo@GOTPCREL(%rip), %reg" to "binop $foo, %reg".
|
|
|
|
// Logic is close to one for test instruction above, but we also
|
|
|
|
// write opcode extension here, see below for details.
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0xc0 | (modRm & 0x38) >> 3 | (op & 0x3c); // ModR/M byte.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Primary opcode is 0x81, opcode extension is one of:
|
|
|
|
// 000b = ADD, 001b is OR, 010b is ADC, 011b is SBB,
|
|
|
|
// 100b is AND, 101b is SUB, 110b is XOR, 111b is CMP.
|
|
|
|
// This value was wrote to MODRM.reg in a line above.
|
|
|
|
// See "3.2 INSTRUCTIONS (A-M)" (Vol. 2A 3-15),
|
|
|
|
// "INSTRUCTION SET REFERENCE, N-Z" (Vol. 2B 4-1) for
|
|
|
|
// descriptions about each operation.
|
|
|
|
loc[-2] = 0x81;
|
|
|
|
loc[-3] = (rex & ~0x4) | (rex & 0x4) >> 2;
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-16 01:20:06 +08:00
|
|
|
void X86_64::relaxGot(uint8_t *loc, const Relocation &rel, uint64_t val) const {
|
|
|
|
checkInt(loc, val, 32, rel);
|
2017-06-17 01:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t op = loc[-2];
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t modRm = loc[-1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Convert "mov foo@GOTPCREL(%rip),%reg" to "lea foo(%rip),%reg".
|
|
|
|
if (op == 0x8b) {
|
|
|
|
loc[-2] = 0x8d;
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (op != 0xff) {
|
|
|
|
// We are relaxing a rip relative to an absolute, so compensate
|
|
|
|
// for the old -4 addend.
|
|
|
|
assert(!config->isPic);
|
|
|
|
relaxGotNoPic(loc, val + 4, op, modRm);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Convert call/jmp instructions.
|
|
|
|
if (modRm == 0x15) {
|
|
|
|
// ABI says we can convert "call *foo@GOTPCREL(%rip)" to "nop; call foo".
|
|
|
|
// Instead we convert to "addr32 call foo" where addr32 is an instruction
|
|
|
|
// prefix. That makes result expression to be a single instruction.
|
|
|
|
loc[-2] = 0x67; // addr32 prefix
|
|
|
|
loc[-1] = 0xe8; // call
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc, val);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Convert "jmp *foo@GOTPCREL(%rip)" to "jmp foo; nop".
|
|
|
|
// jmp doesn't return, so it is fine to use nop here, it is just a stub.
|
|
|
|
assert(modRm == 0x25);
|
|
|
|
loc[-2] = 0xe9; // jmp
|
|
|
|
loc[3] = 0x90; // nop
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc - 1, val + 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-18 07:16:02 +08:00
|
|
|
// A split-stack prologue starts by checking the amount of stack remaining
|
|
|
|
// in one of two ways:
|
|
|
|
// A) Comparing of the stack pointer to a field in the tcb.
|
|
|
|
// B) Or a load of a stack pointer offset with an lea to r10 or r11.
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
bool X86_64::adjustPrologueForCrossSplitStack(uint8_t *loc, uint8_t *end,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t stOther) const {
|
|
|
|
if (!config->is64) {
|
|
|
|
error("Target doesn't support split stacks.");
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-03 02:13:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (loc + 8 >= end)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-18 07:16:02 +08:00
|
|
|
// Replace "cmp %fs:0x70,%rsp" and subsequent branch
|
|
|
|
// with "stc, nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)"
|
2018-08-03 02:13:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(loc, "\x64\x48\x3b\x24\x25", 5) == 0) {
|
2018-07-18 07:16:02 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(loc, "\xf9\x0f\x1f\x84\x00\x00\x00\x00", 8);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-03 02:13:40 +08:00
|
|
|
// Adjust "lea X(%rsp),%rYY" to lea "(X - 0x4000)(%rsp),%rYY" where rYY could
|
|
|
|
// be r10 or r11. The lea instruction feeds a subsequent compare which checks
|
|
|
|
// if there is X available stack space. Making X larger effectively reserves
|
|
|
|
// that much additional space. The stack grows downward so subtract the value.
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(loc, "\x4c\x8d\x94\x24", 4) == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
memcmp(loc, "\x4c\x8d\x9c\x24", 4) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
// The offset bytes are encoded four bytes after the start of the
|
|
|
|
// instruction.
|
|
|
|
write32le(loc + 4, read32le(loc + 4) - 0x4000);
|
2018-07-18 07:16:02 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-11 10:05:36 +08:00
|
|
|
// If Intel Indirect Branch Tracking is enabled, we have to emit special PLT
|
|
|
|
// entries containing endbr64 instructions. A PLT entry will be split into two
|
|
|
|
// parts, one in .plt.sec (writePlt), and the other in .plt (writeIBTPlt).
|
|
|
|
namespace {
|
|
|
|
class IntelIBT : public X86_64 {
|
|
|
|
public:
|
|
|
|
IntelIBT();
|
|
|
|
void writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const override;
|
|
|
|
void writePlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &sym,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t pltEntryAddr) const override;
|
|
|
|
void writeIBTPlt(uint8_t *buf, size_t numEntries) const override;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned IBTPltHeaderSize = 16;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
} // namespace
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IntelIBT::IntelIBT() { pltHeaderSize = 0; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void IntelIBT::writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const {
|
|
|
|
uint64_t va =
|
|
|
|
in.ibtPlt->getVA() + IBTPltHeaderSize + s.pltIndex * pltEntrySize;
|
|
|
|
write64le(buf, va);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void IntelIBT::writePlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &sym,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t pltEntryAddr) const {
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t Inst[] = {
|
|
|
|
0xf3, 0x0f, 0x1e, 0xfa, // endbr64
|
|
|
|
0xff, 0x25, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmpq *got(%rip)
|
|
|
|
0x66, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x44, 0, 0, // nop
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, Inst, sizeof(Inst));
|
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 6, sym.getGotPltVA() - pltEntryAddr - 10);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void IntelIBT::writeIBTPlt(uint8_t *buf, size_t numEntries) const {
|
|
|
|
writePltHeader(buf);
|
|
|
|
buf += IBTPltHeaderSize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t inst[] = {
|
|
|
|
0xf3, 0x0f, 0x1e, 0xfa, // endbr64
|
|
|
|
0x68, 0, 0, 0, 0, // pushq <relocation index>
|
|
|
|
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmpq plt[0]
|
|
|
|
0x66, 0x90, // nop
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < numEntries; ++i) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, inst, sizeof(inst));
|
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 5, i);
|
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 10, -pltHeaderSize - sizeof(inst) * i - 30);
|
|
|
|
buf += sizeof(inst);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-26 05:02:47 +08:00
|
|
|
// These nonstandard PLT entries are to migtigate Spectre v2 security
|
|
|
|
// vulnerability. In order to mitigate Spectre v2, we want to avoid indirect
|
|
|
|
// branch instructions such as `jmp *GOTPLT(%rip)`. So, in the following PLT
|
|
|
|
// entries, we use a CALL followed by MOV and RET to do the same thing as an
|
|
|
|
// indirect jump. That instruction sequence is so-called "retpoline".
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// We have two types of retpoline PLTs as a size optimization. If `-z now`
|
|
|
|
// is specified, all dynamic symbols are resolved at load-time. Thus, when
|
|
|
|
// that option is given, we can omit code for symbol lazy resolution.
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
namespace {
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
class Retpoline : public X86_64 {
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
public:
|
|
|
|
Retpoline();
|
|
|
|
void writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const override;
|
|
|
|
void writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const override;
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
void writePlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &sym,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t pltEntryAddr) const override;
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
class RetpolineZNow : public X86_64 {
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
public:
|
|
|
|
RetpolineZNow();
|
|
|
|
void writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const override {}
|
|
|
|
void writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const override;
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
void writePlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &sym,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t pltEntryAddr) const override;
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
} // namespace
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
Retpoline::Retpoline() {
|
|
|
|
pltHeaderSize = 48;
|
|
|
|
pltEntrySize = 32;
|
2019-12-15 06:17:35 +08:00
|
|
|
ipltEntrySize = 32;
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
void Retpoline::writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const {
|
2018-05-26 05:14:45 +08:00
|
|
|
write64le(buf, s.getPltVA() + 17);
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
void Retpoline::writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const {
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t insn[] = {
|
|
|
|
0xff, 0x35, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 0: pushq GOTPLT+8(%rip)
|
|
|
|
0x4c, 0x8b, 0x1d, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 6: mov GOTPLT+16(%rip), %r11
|
|
|
|
0xe8, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // d: callq next
|
|
|
|
0xf3, 0x90, // 12: loop: pause
|
|
|
|
0x0f, 0xae, 0xe8, // 14: lfence
|
|
|
|
0xeb, 0xf9, // 17: jmp loop
|
|
|
|
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 19: int3; .align 16
|
|
|
|
0x4c, 0x89, 0x1c, 0x24, // 20: next: mov %r11, (%rsp)
|
|
|
|
0xc3, // 24: ret
|
2018-03-29 22:03:01 +08:00
|
|
|
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 25: int3; padding
|
|
|
|
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 2c: int3; padding
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, insn, sizeof(insn));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 03:26:58 +08:00
|
|
|
uint64_t gotPlt = in.gotPlt->getVA();
|
|
|
|
uint64_t plt = in.plt->getVA();
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 2, gotPlt - plt - 6 + 8);
|
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 9, gotPlt - plt - 13 + 16);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
void Retpoline::writePlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &sym,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t pltEntryAddr) const {
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t insn[] = {
|
|
|
|
0x4c, 0x8b, 0x1d, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 0: mov foo@GOTPLT(%rip), %r11
|
2018-03-29 22:03:01 +08:00
|
|
|
0xe8, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 7: callq plt+0x20
|
|
|
|
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // c: jmp plt+0x12
|
|
|
|
0x68, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 11: pushq <relocation index>
|
|
|
|
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 16: jmp plt+0
|
|
|
|
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 1b: int3; padding
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, insn, sizeof(insn));
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-15 06:17:35 +08:00
|
|
|
uint64_t off = pltEntryAddr - in.plt->getVA();
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 3, sym.getGotPltVA() - pltEntryAddr - 7);
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 8, -off - 12 + 32);
|
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 13, -off - 17 + 18);
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 18, sym.pltIndex);
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 23, -off - 27);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
RetpolineZNow::RetpolineZNow() {
|
|
|
|
pltHeaderSize = 32;
|
|
|
|
pltEntrySize = 16;
|
2019-12-15 06:17:35 +08:00
|
|
|
ipltEntrySize = 16;
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
void RetpolineZNow::writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const {
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t insn[] = {
|
|
|
|
0xe8, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // 0: call next
|
|
|
|
0xf3, 0x90, // 5: loop: pause
|
|
|
|
0x0f, 0xae, 0xe8, // 7: lfence
|
|
|
|
0xeb, 0xf9, // a: jmp loop
|
|
|
|
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // c: int3; .align 16
|
|
|
|
0x4c, 0x89, 0x1c, 0x24, // 10: next: mov %r11, (%rsp)
|
|
|
|
0xc3, // 14: ret
|
2018-03-29 22:03:01 +08:00
|
|
|
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 15: int3; padding
|
|
|
|
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 1a: int3; padding
|
|
|
|
0xcc, // 1f: int3; padding
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, insn, sizeof(insn));
|
2017-06-17 04:15:03 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
void RetpolineZNow::writePlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &sym,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t pltEntryAddr) const {
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t insn[] = {
|
2018-03-29 22:03:01 +08:00
|
|
|
0x4c, 0x8b, 0x1d, 0, 0, 0, 0, // mov foo@GOTPLT(%rip), %r11
|
|
|
|
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp plt+0
|
|
|
|
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // int3; padding
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, insn, sizeof(insn));
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-18 05:43:04 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 3, sym.getGotPltVA() - pltEntryAddr - 7);
|
2019-12-15 06:17:35 +08:00
|
|
|
write32le(buf + 8, in.plt->getVA() - pltEntryAddr - 12);
|
2017-06-17 04:15:03 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
static TargetInfo *getTargetInfo() {
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (config->zRetpolineplt) {
|
|
|
|
if (config->zNow) {
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
static RetpolineZNow t;
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
return &t;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
static Retpoline t;
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
return &t;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-11 10:05:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (config->andFeatures & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT) {
|
|
|
|
static IntelIBT t;
|
|
|
|
return &t;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-29 01:31:12 +08:00
|
|
|
static X86_64 t;
|
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
|
|
|
return &t;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-15 13:18:58 +08:00
|
|
|
TargetInfo *elf::getX86_64TargetInfo() { return getTargetInfo(); }
|