llvm-project/llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/O0-pipeline.ll

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; When EXPENSIVE_CHECKS are enabled, the machine verifier appears between each
; pass. Ignore it with 'grep -v'.
; RUN: llc -mtriple=x86_64-- -O0 -debug-pass=Structure < %s -o /dev/null 2>&1 \
; RUN: | grep -v 'Verify generated machine code' | FileCheck %s
; REQUIRES: asserts
; CHECK-LABEL: Pass Arguments:
; CHECK-NEXT: Target Library Information
; CHECK-NEXT: Target Pass Configuration
; CHECK-NEXT: Machine Module Information
; CHECK-NEXT: Target Transform Information
; CHECK-NEXT: Type-Based Alias Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: Scoped NoAlias Alias Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: Assumption Cache Tracker
; CHECK-NEXT: Create Garbage Collector Module Metadata
; CHECK-NEXT: Profile summary info
; CHECK-NEXT: Machine Branch Probability Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: ModulePass Manager
; CHECK-NEXT: Pre-ISel Intrinsic Lowering
; CHECK-NEXT: FunctionPass Manager
; CHECK-NEXT: Expand Atomic instructions
; CHECK-NEXT: Dominator Tree Construction
; CHECK-NEXT: Basic Alias Analysis (stateless AA impl)
; CHECK-NEXT: Module Verifier
; CHECK-NEXT: Lower Garbage Collection Instructions
; CHECK-NEXT: Shadow Stack GC Lowering
; CHECK-NEXT: Lower constant intrinsics
; CHECK-NEXT: Remove unreachable blocks from the CFG
; CHECK-NEXT: Instrument function entry/exit with calls to e.g. mcount() (post inlining)
; CHECK-NEXT: Scalarize Masked Memory Intrinsics
; CHECK-NEXT: Expand reduction intrinsics
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
; CHECK-NEXT: Expand indirectbr instructions
; CHECK-NEXT: Rewrite Symbols
; CHECK-NEXT: FunctionPass Manager
; CHECK-NEXT: Dominator Tree Construction
; CHECK-NEXT: Exception handling preparation
; CHECK-NEXT: Safe Stack instrumentation pass
; CHECK-NEXT: Insert stack protectors
; CHECK-NEXT: Module Verifier
; CHECK-NEXT: Dominator Tree Construction
; CHECK-NEXT: Natural Loop Information
; CHECK-NEXT: Lazy Branch Probability Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: Lazy Block Frequency Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 DAG->DAG Instruction Selection
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 PIC Global Base Reg Initialization
; CHECK-NEXT: Finalize ISel and expand pseudo-instructions
; CHECK-NEXT: Local Stack Slot Allocation
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 speculative load hardening
; CHECK-NEXT: MachineDominator Tree Construction
[x86] Introduce a pass to begin more systematically fixing PR36028 and similar issues. The key idea is to lower COPY nodes populating EFLAGS by scanning the uses of EFLAGS and introducing dedicated code to preserve the necessary state in a GPR. In the vast majority of cases, these uses are cmovCC and jCC instructions. For such cases, we can very easily save and restore the necessary information by simply inserting a setCC into a GPR where the original flags are live, and then testing that GPR directly to feed the cmov or conditional branch. However, things are a bit more tricky if arithmetic is using the flags. This patch handles the vast majority of cases that seem to come up in practice: adc, adcx, adox, rcl, and rcr; all without taking advantage of partially preserved EFLAGS as LLVM doesn't currently model that at all. There are a large number of operations that techinaclly observe EFLAGS currently but shouldn't in this case -- they typically are using DF. Currently, they will not be handled by this approach. However, I have never seen this issue come up in practice. It is already pretty rare to have these patterns come up in practical code with LLVM. I had to resort to writing MIR tests to cover most of the logic in this pass already. I suspect even with its current amount of coverage of arithmetic users of EFLAGS it will be a significant improvement over the current use of pushf/popf. It will also produce substantially faster code in most of the common patterns. This patch also removes all of the old lowering for EFLAGS copies, and the hack that forced us to use a frame pointer when EFLAGS copies were found anywhere in a function so that the dynamic stack adjustment wasn't a problem. None of this is needed as we now lower all of these copies directly in MI and without require stack adjustments. Lots of thanks to Reid who came up with several aspects of this approach, and Craig who helped me work out a couple of things tripping me up while working on this. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45146 llvm-svn: 329657
2018-04-10 09:41:17 +08:00
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 EFLAGS copy lowering
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 WinAlloca Expander
; CHECK-NEXT: Eliminate PHI nodes for register allocation
; CHECK-NEXT: Two-Address instruction pass
; CHECK-NEXT: Fast Register Allocator
; CHECK-NEXT: Bundle Machine CFG Edges
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 FP Stackifier
; CHECK-NEXT: Lazy Machine Block Frequency Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: Machine Optimization Remark Emitter
; CHECK-NEXT: Prologue/Epilogue Insertion & Frame Finalization
; CHECK-NEXT: Post-RA pseudo instruction expansion pass
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 pseudo instruction expansion pass
; CHECK-NEXT: Analyze Machine Code For Garbage Collection
; CHECK-NEXT: Insert fentry calls
; CHECK-NEXT: Insert XRay ops
; CHECK-NEXT: Implement the 'patchable-function' attribute
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 Indirect Branch Tracking
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 vzeroupper inserter
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 Discriminate Memory Operands
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 Insert Cache Prefetches
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 insert wait instruction
; CHECK-NEXT: Contiguously Lay Out Funclets
; CHECK-NEXT: StackMap Liveness Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: Live DEBUG_VALUE analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 Indirect Thunks
Correct dwarf unwind information in function epilogue This patch aims to provide correct dwarf unwind information in function epilogue for X86. It consists of two parts. The first part inserts CFI instructions that set appropriate cfa offset and cfa register in emitEpilogue() in X86FrameLowering. This part is X86 specific. The second part is platform independent and ensures that: * CFI instructions do not affect code generation (they are not counted as instructions when tail duplicating or tail merging) * Unwind information remains correct when a function is modified by different passes. This is done in a late pass by analyzing information about cfa offset and cfa register in BBs and inserting additional CFI directives where necessary. Added CFIInstrInserter pass: * analyzes each basic block to determine cfa offset and register are valid at its entry and exit * verifies that outgoing cfa offset and register of predecessor blocks match incoming values of their successors * inserts additional CFI directives at basic block beginning to correct the rule for calculating CFA Having CFI instructions in function epilogue can cause incorrect CFA calculation rule for some basic blocks. This can happen if, due to basic block reordering, or the existence of multiple epilogue blocks, some of the blocks have wrong cfa offset and register values set by the epilogue block above them. CFIInstrInserter is currently run only on X86, but can be used by any target that implements support for adding CFI instructions in epilogue. Patch by Violeta Vukobrat. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42848 llvm-svn: 330706
2018-04-24 18:32:08 +08:00
; CHECK-NEXT: Check CFA info and insert CFI instructions if needed
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 Load Value Injection (LVI) Ret-Hardening
; CHECK-NEXT: Lazy Machine Block Frequency Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: Machine Optimization Remark Emitter
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 Assembly Printer
; CHECK-NEXT: Free MachineFunction
define void @f() {
ret void
}