unblock earlier than designed. Thanks to Jann Horn from Google's
Project Zero for pointing this out to me.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEK2m5VNv+CHkogTfJ8vlZVpUNgaMFAlrcCWAACgkQ8vlZVpUN
gaOedwf/e1OU7CXMiinCcGfsr5XydZrEivaqS9QmqAKsLzJSNDDu1Jw6N9cbWagp
OEIIRZdaFPImZHosEbjOW12Z3nxnlDC8jtOLyLIRGSA2u4RXd03RupHhQW4cE7ys
EOljEvK5KFDIlPa947R5/k4CzC4O3PGf1GdWhHmkENOgd23GqI/yOTKQq5Z5ZgAp
rZzcXiuCSq1QkLME7ElxoOLQhs+fYiVGoAM/maxLa+2g4M1Y/YlHBDGhG4RB4lLA
3zugbyJ15tNfgNuRvCB4x304WkCp5VDlcsCiKq18LFcrkz1SYGj5LwG/bswDqgkS
0mOtZKu68NhutX8Pcy4vY3iOmMa1/Q==
=RhHb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull /dev/random fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Fix some bugs in the /dev/random driver which causes getrandom(2) to
unblock earlier than designed.
Thanks to Jann Horn from Google's Project Zero for pointing this out
to me"
* tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG
random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying
random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness()
random: fix crng_ready() test