511 lines
15 KiB
C
511 lines
15 KiB
C
/*
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* kaslr.c
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*
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* This contains the routines needed to generate a reasonable level of
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* entropy to choose a randomized kernel base address offset in support
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* of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR). Additionally
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* handles walking the physical memory maps (and tracking memory regions
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* to avoid) in order to select a physical memory location that can
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* contain the entire properly aligned running kernel image.
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*
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*/
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "error.h"
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#include <asm/msr.h>
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#include <asm/archrandom.h>
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#include <asm/e820.h>
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#include <generated/compile.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/uts.h>
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#include <linux/utsname.h>
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#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
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/* Simplified build-specific string for starting entropy. */
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static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
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LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
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#define I8254_PORT_CONTROL 0x43
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#define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0 0x40
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#define I8254_CMD_READBACK 0xC0
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#define I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0 0x02
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#define I8254_STATUS_NOTREADY 0x40
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static inline u16 i8254(void)
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{
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u16 status, timer;
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do {
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outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL,
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I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0);
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status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
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timer = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
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timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
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} while (status & I8254_STATUS_NOTREADY);
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return timer;
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}
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static unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash, const void *area,
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size_t size)
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{
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size_t i;
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unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)area;
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for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) {
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/* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */
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hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7);
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hash ^= ptr[i];
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}
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return hash;
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}
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/* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */
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static unsigned long get_random_boot(void)
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{
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unsigned long hash = 0;
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hash = rotate_xor(hash, build_str, sizeof(build_str));
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hash = rotate_xor(hash, boot_params, sizeof(*boot_params));
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return hash;
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}
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static unsigned long get_random_long(const char *purpose)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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const unsigned long mix_const = 0x5d6008cbf3848dd3UL;
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#else
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const unsigned long mix_const = 0x3f39e593UL;
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#endif
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unsigned long raw, random = get_random_boot();
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bool use_i8254 = true;
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debug_putstr(purpose);
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debug_putstr(" KASLR using");
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if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
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debug_putstr(" RDRAND");
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if (rdrand_long(&raw)) {
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random ^= raw;
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use_i8254 = false;
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}
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}
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if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) {
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debug_putstr(" RDTSC");
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raw = rdtsc();
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random ^= raw;
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use_i8254 = false;
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}
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if (use_i8254) {
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debug_putstr(" i8254");
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random ^= i8254();
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}
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/* Circular multiply for better bit diffusion */
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asm("mul %3"
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: "=a" (random), "=d" (raw)
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: "a" (random), "rm" (mix_const));
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random += raw;
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debug_putstr("...\n");
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return random;
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}
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struct mem_vector {
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unsigned long start;
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unsigned long size;
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};
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enum mem_avoid_index {
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MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE = 0,
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MEM_AVOID_INITRD,
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MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE,
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MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS,
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MEM_AVOID_MAX,
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};
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static struct mem_vector mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MAX];
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static bool mem_contains(struct mem_vector *region, struct mem_vector *item)
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{
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/* Item at least partially before region. */
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if (item->start < region->start)
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return false;
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/* Item at least partially after region. */
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if (item->start + item->size > region->start + region->size)
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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static bool mem_overlaps(struct mem_vector *one, struct mem_vector *two)
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{
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/* Item one is entirely before item two. */
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if (one->start + one->size <= two->start)
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return false;
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/* Item one is entirely after item two. */
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if (one->start >= two->start + two->size)
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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/*
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* In theory, KASLR can put the kernel anywhere in the range of [16M, 64T).
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* The mem_avoid array is used to store the ranges that need to be avoided
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* when KASLR searches for an appropriate random address. We must avoid any
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* regions that are unsafe to overlap with during decompression, and other
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* things like the initrd, cmdline and boot_params. This comment seeks to
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* explain mem_avoid as clearly as possible since incorrect mem_avoid
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* memory ranges lead to really hard to debug boot failures.
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*
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* The initrd, cmdline, and boot_params are trivial to identify for
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* avoiding. They are MEM_AVOID_INITRD, MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE, and
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* MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS respectively below.
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*
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* What is not obvious how to avoid is the range of memory that is used
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* during decompression (MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below). This range must cover
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* the compressed kernel (ZO) and its run space, which is used to extract
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* the uncompressed kernel (VO) and relocs.
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*
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* ZO's full run size sits against the end of the decompression buffer, so
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* we can calculate where text, data, bss, etc of ZO are positioned more
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* easily.
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*
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* For additional background, the decompression calculations can be found
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* in header.S, and the memory diagram is based on the one found in misc.c.
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*
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* The following conditions are already enforced by the image layouts and
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* associated code:
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* - input + input_size >= output + output_size
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* - kernel_total_size <= init_size
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* - kernel_total_size <= output_size (see Note below)
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* - output + init_size >= output + output_size
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*
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* (Note that kernel_total_size and output_size have no fundamental
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* relationship, but output_size is passed to choose_random_location
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* as a maximum of the two. The diagram is showing a case where
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* kernel_total_size is larger than output_size, but this case is
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* handled by bumping output_size.)
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*
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* The above conditions can be illustrated by a diagram:
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*
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* 0 output input input+input_size output+init_size
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* | | | | |
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* | | | | |
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* |-----|--------|--------|--------------|-----------|--|-------------|
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* | | |
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* | | |
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* output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE output+output_size output+kernel_total_size
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*
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* [output, output+init_size) is the entire memory range used for
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* extracting the compressed image.
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*
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* [output, output+kernel_total_size) is the range needed for the
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* uncompressed kernel (VO) and its run size (bss, brk, etc).
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*
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* [output, output+output_size) is VO plus relocs (i.e. the entire
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* uncompressed payload contained by ZO). This is the area of the buffer
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* written to during decompression.
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*
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* [output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE, output+init_size) is the worst-case
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* range of the copied ZO and decompression code. (i.e. the range
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* covered backwards of size ZO_INIT_SIZE, starting from output+init_size.)
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*
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* [input, input+input_size) is the original copied compressed image (ZO)
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* (i.e. it does not include its run size). This range must be avoided
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* because it contains the data used for decompression.
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*
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* [input+input_size, output+init_size) is [_text, _end) for ZO. This
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* range includes ZO's heap and stack, and must be avoided since it
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* performs the decompression.
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*
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* Since the above two ranges need to be avoided and they are adjacent,
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* they can be merged, resulting in: [input, output+init_size) which
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* becomes the MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below.
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*/
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static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
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unsigned long output)
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{
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unsigned long init_size = boot_params->hdr.init_size;
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u64 initrd_start, initrd_size;
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u64 cmd_line, cmd_line_size;
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char *ptr;
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/*
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* Avoid the region that is unsafe to overlap during
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* decompression.
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*/
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start = input;
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size = (output + init_size) - input;
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add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start,
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size);
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/* Avoid initrd. */
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initrd_start = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image << 32;
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initrd_start |= boot_params->hdr.ramdisk_image;
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initrd_size = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_size << 32;
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initrd_size |= boot_params->hdr.ramdisk_size;
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].start = initrd_start;
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].size = initrd_size;
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/* No need to set mapping for initrd, it will be handled in VO. */
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/* Avoid kernel command line. */
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cmd_line = (u64)boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32;
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cmd_line |= boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr;
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/* Calculate size of cmd_line. */
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ptr = (char *)(unsigned long)cmd_line;
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for (cmd_line_size = 0; ptr[cmd_line_size++]; )
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;
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start = cmd_line;
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size = cmd_line_size;
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add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start,
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size);
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/* Avoid boot parameters. */
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start = (unsigned long)boot_params;
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size = sizeof(*boot_params);
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add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start,
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mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size);
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/* We don't need to set a mapping for setup_data. */
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP
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/* Make sure video RAM can be used. */
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add_identity_map(0, PMD_SIZE);
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* Does this memory vector overlap a known avoided area? If so, record the
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* overlap region with the lowest address.
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*/
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static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img,
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struct mem_vector *overlap)
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{
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int i;
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struct setup_data *ptr;
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unsigned long earliest = img->start + img->size;
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bool is_overlapping = false;
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for (i = 0; i < MEM_AVOID_MAX; i++) {
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if (mem_overlaps(img, &mem_avoid[i]) &&
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mem_avoid[i].start < earliest) {
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*overlap = mem_avoid[i];
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is_overlapping = true;
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}
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}
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/* Avoid all entries in the setup_data linked list. */
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ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)boot_params->hdr.setup_data;
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while (ptr) {
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struct mem_vector avoid;
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avoid.start = (unsigned long)ptr;
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avoid.size = sizeof(*ptr) + ptr->len;
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if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid) && (avoid.start < earliest)) {
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*overlap = avoid;
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is_overlapping = true;
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}
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ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)ptr->next;
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}
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return is_overlapping;
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}
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static unsigned long slots[KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN];
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struct slot_area {
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unsigned long addr;
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int num;
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};
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#define MAX_SLOT_AREA 100
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static struct slot_area slot_areas[MAX_SLOT_AREA];
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static unsigned long slot_max;
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static unsigned long slot_area_index;
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static void store_slot_info(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size)
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{
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struct slot_area slot_area;
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if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA)
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return;
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slot_area.addr = region->start;
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slot_area.num = (region->size - image_size) /
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CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + 1;
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if (slot_area.num > 0) {
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slot_areas[slot_area_index++] = slot_area;
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slot_max += slot_area.num;
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}
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}
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static void slots_append(unsigned long addr)
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{
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/* Overflowing the slots list should be impossible. */
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if (slot_max >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN)
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return;
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slots[slot_max++] = addr;
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}
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static unsigned long slots_fetch_random(void)
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{
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/* Handle case of no slots stored. */
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if (slot_max == 0)
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return 0;
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return slots[get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max];
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}
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static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
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unsigned long minimum,
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unsigned long image_size)
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{
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struct mem_vector region, img, overlap;
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/* Skip non-RAM entries. */
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if (entry->type != E820_RAM)
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return;
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/* Ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */
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if (entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
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return;
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/* Ignore entries entirely below our minimum. */
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if (entry->addr + entry->size < minimum)
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return;
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region.start = entry->addr;
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region.size = entry->size;
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/* Potentially raise address to minimum location. */
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if (region.start < minimum)
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region.start = minimum;
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/* Potentially raise address to meet alignment requirements. */
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region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
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/* Did we raise the address above the bounds of this e820 region? */
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if (region.start > entry->addr + entry->size)
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return;
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/* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */
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region.size -= region.start - entry->addr;
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/* Reduce maximum size to fit end of image within maximum limit. */
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if (region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
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region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start;
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/* Walk each aligned slot and check for avoided areas. */
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for (img.start = region.start, img.size = image_size ;
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mem_contains(®ion, &img) ;
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img.start += CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN) {
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if (mem_avoid_overlap(&img, &overlap))
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continue;
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slots_append(img.start);
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}
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}
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static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
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unsigned long image_size)
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{
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int i;
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unsigned long addr;
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/* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
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minimum = ALIGN(minimum, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
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/* Verify potential e820 positions, appending to slots list. */
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for (i = 0; i < boot_params->e820_entries; i++) {
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process_e820_entry(&boot_params->e820_map[i], minimum,
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image_size);
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}
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return slots_fetch_random();
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}
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static unsigned long find_random_virt_addr(unsigned long minimum,
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unsigned long image_size)
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{
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unsigned long slots, random_addr;
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/* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
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minimum = ALIGN(minimum, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
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/* Align image_size for easy slot calculations. */
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image_size = ALIGN(image_size, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
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/*
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* There are how many CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN-sized slots
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* that can hold image_size within the range of minimum to
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* KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE?
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*/
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slots = (KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - minimum - image_size) /
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CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + 1;
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random_addr = get_random_long("Virtual") % slots;
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return random_addr * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + minimum;
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}
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/*
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* Since this function examines addresses much more numerically,
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* it takes the input and output pointers as 'unsigned long'.
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*/
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unsigned char *choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
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unsigned long input_size,
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unsigned long output,
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unsigned long output_size)
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{
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unsigned long choice = output;
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unsigned long random_addr;
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#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
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if (!cmdline_find_option_bool("kaslr")) {
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warn("KASLR disabled: 'kaslr' not on cmdline (hibernation selected).");
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goto out;
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}
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#else
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if (cmdline_find_option_bool("nokaslr")) {
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warn("KASLR disabled: 'nokaslr' on cmdline.");
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goto out;
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}
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#endif
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boot_params->hdr.loadflags |= KASLR_FLAG;
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/* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
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mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, output);
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/* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
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random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(output, output_size);
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if (!random_addr) {
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warn("KASLR disabled: could not find suitable E820 region!");
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goto out;
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}
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/* Always enforce the minimum. */
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if (random_addr < choice)
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goto out;
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choice = random_addr;
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add_identity_map(choice, output_size);
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/* This actually loads the identity pagetable on x86_64. */
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finalize_identity_maps();
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out:
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return (unsigned char *)choice;
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}
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