Use ERR_CAST(x) rather than ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(x)). The former makes more
clear what is the purpose of the operation, which otherwise looks like a
no-op.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
type T;
T x;
identifier f;
@@
T f (...) { <+...
- ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(x))
+ x
...+> }
@@
expression x;
@@
- ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(x))
+ ERR_CAST(x)
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch (applied against 2.6.34) fixes the calculation of the
length of the ABLKCIPHER decrypt request ("cryptlen") after an
asynchronous hash request has been completed in the AUTHENC interface.
Signed-off-by: Shikhar Khattar <shikhark@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When Steffen originally wrote the authenc async hash patch, he
correctly had EINPROGRESS checks in place so that we did not invoke
the original completion handler with it.
Unfortuantely I told him to remove it before the patch was applied.
As only MAY_BACKLOG request completion handlers are required to
handle EINPROGRESS completions, those checks are really needed.
This patch restores them.
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In crypto_authenc_encrypt() we save the IV behind the ablkcipher
request. To save space on the request, we overwrite the ablkcipher
request with a ahash request after encryption. So the IV may be
overwritten by the ahash request. This patch fixes this by placing
the IV in front of the ablkcipher/ahash request.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
We accidentally assigned the ahash update complete function to
the wrong function pointer in crypto_authenc_verify.
This patch fixes this.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch converts authenc to the new ahash interface.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that there are no more legacy hash implementations we can
remove the reference to crypto_hash.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As it is if an algorithm with a zero-length IV is used (e.g.,
NULL encryption) with authenc, authenc may generate an SG entry
of length zero, which will trigger a BUG check in the hash layer.
This patch fixes it by skipping the IV SG generation if the IV
size is zero.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch allows shash algorithms to be used through the old hash
interface. This is a transitional measure so we can convert the
underlying algorithms to shash before converting the users across.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Authenc works in two stages for encryption, it first encrypts and
then computes an ICV. The context memory of the request is used
by both operations. The problem is that when an asynchronous
encryption completes, we will compute the ICV and then reread the
context memory of the encryption to get the original request.
It just happens that we have a buffer of 16 bytes in front of the
request pointer, so ICVs of 16 bytes (such as SHA1) do not trigger
the bug. However, any attempt to uses a larger ICV instantly kills
the machine when the first asynchronous encryption is completed.
This patch fixes this by saving the request pointer before we start
the ICV computation.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch implements the givencrypt function for authenc. It simply
calls the givencrypt operation on the underlying cipher instead of encrypt.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch converts the authenc algorithm over to crypto_grab_skcipher
which is a prerequisite for IV generation.
This patch also changes authenc to set its ASYNC status depending on
the ASYNC status of the underlying skcipher.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The scatterwalk infrastructure is used by algorithms so it needs to
move out of crypto for future users that may live in drivers/crypto
or asm/*/crypto.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch changes gcm/authenc to return EBADMSG instead of EINVAL for
ICV mismatches. This convention has already been adopted by IPsec.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The previous code incorrectly included the hash in the verification which
also meant that we'd crash and burn when it comes to actually verifying
the hash since we'd go past the end of the SG list.
This patch fixes that by subtracting authsize from cryptlen at the start.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Having enckeylen as a template parameter makes it a pain for hardware
devices that implement ciphers with many key sizes since each one would
have to be registered separately.
Since the authenc algorithm is mainly used for legacy purposes where its
key is going to be constructed out of two separate keys, we can in fact
embed this value into the key itself.
This patch does this by prepending an rtnetlink header to the key that
contains the encryption key length.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As it is authsize is an algorithm paramter which cannot be changed at
run-time. This is inconvenient because hardware that implements such
algorithms would have to register each authsize that they support
separately.
Since authsize is a property common to all AEAD algorithms, we can add
a function setauthsize that sets it at run-time, just like setkey.
This patch does exactly that and also changes authenc so that authsize
is no longer a parameter of its template.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since alignment masks are always one less than a power of two, we can
use binary or to find their maximum.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Up until now we have ablkcipher algorithms have been identified as
type BLKCIPHER with the ASYNC bit set. This is suboptimal because
ablkcipher refers to two things. On the one hand it refers to the
top-level ablkcipher interface with requests. On the other hand it
refers to and algorithm type underneath.
As it is you cannot request a synchronous block cipher algorithm
with the ablkcipher interface on top. This is a problem because
we want to be able to eventually phase out the blkcipher top-level
interface.
This patch fixes this by making ABLKCIPHER its own type, just as
we have distinct types for HASH and DIGEST. The type it associated
with the algorithm implementation only.
Which top-level interface is used for synchronous block ciphers is
then determined by the mask that's used. If it's a specific mask
then the old blkcipher interface is given, otherwise we go with the
new ablkcipher interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It seems that newer versions of gcc have regressed in their abilities to
analyse initialisations. This patch moves the initialisations up to avoid
the warnings.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
We do not allow spaces in algorithm names or parameters. Thanks to Joy Latten
for pointing this out.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Julia Lawall