Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 9da3f2b740.
It was well-intentioned, but wrong. Overriding the exception tables for
instructions for random reasons is just wrong, and that is what the new
code did.
It caused problems for tracing, and it caused problems for strncpy_from_user(),
because the new checks made perfectly valid use cases break, rather than
catch things that did bad things.
Unchecked user space accesses are a problem, but that's not a reason to
add invalid checks that then people have to work around with silly flags
(in this case, that 'kernel_uaccess_faults_ok' flag, which is just an
odd way to say "this commit was wrong" and was sprinked into random
places to hide the wrongness).
The real fix to unchecked user space accesses is to get rid of the
special "let's not check __get_user() and __put_user() at all" logic.
Make __{get|put}_user() be just aliases to the regular {get|put}_user()
functions, and make it impossible to access user space without having
the proper checks in places.
The raison d'être of the special double-underscore versions used to be
that the range check was expensive, and if you did multiple user
accesses, you'd do the range check up front (like the signal frame
handling code, for example). But SMAP (on x86) and PAN (on ARM) have
made that optimization pointless, because the _real_ expense is the "set
CPU flag to allow user space access".
Do let's not break the valid cases to catch invalid cases that shouldn't
even exist.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There have been multiple kernel vulnerabilities that permitted userspace to
pass completely unchecked pointers through to userspace accessors:
- the waitid() bug - commit 96ca579a1e ("waitid(): Add missing
access_ok() checks")
- the sg/bsg read/write APIs
- the infiniband read/write APIs
These don't happen all that often, but when they do happen, it is hard to
test for them properly; and it is probably also hard to discover them with
fuzzing. Even when an unmapped kernel address is supplied to such buggy
code, it just returns -EFAULT instead of doing a proper BUG() or at least
WARN().
Try to make such misbehaving code a bit more visible by refusing to do a
fixup in the pagefault handler code when a userspace accessor causes a #PF
on a kernel address and the current context isn't whitelisted.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-7-jannh@google.com
There are several places where parameter descriptions do no match the
actual code. Fix it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516700871-22279-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I'm looking at trying to possibly merge the 32-bit and 64-bit versions
of the x86 uaccess.h implementation, but first this needs to be cleaned
up.
For example, the 32-bit version of "__copy_from_user_inatomic()" is
mostly the special cases for the constant size, and it's actually almost
never relevant. Most users aren't actually using a constant size
anyway, and the few cases that do small constant copies are better off
just using __get_user() instead.
So get rid of the unnecessary complexity.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As far as I can tell, strncpy_from_unsafe never returns -EFAULT. ret is
the result of a __copy_from_user_inatomic(), which is 0 for success and
positive (in this case necessarily 1) for access error - it is never
negative. So we were always returning the length of the, possibly
truncated, destination string.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
probe_kernel_address() is basically the same as the (later added)
probe_kernel_read().
The return value on EFAULT is a bit different: probe_kernel_address()
returns number-of-bytes-not-copied whereas probe_kernel_read() returns
-EFAULT. All callers have been checked, none cared.
probe_kernel_read() can be overridden by the architecture whereas
probe_kernel_address() cannot. parisc, blackfin and um do this, to insert
additional checking. Hence this patch possibly fixes obscure bugs,
although there are only two probe_kernel_address() callsites outside
arch/.
My first attempt involved removing probe_kernel_address() entirely and
converting all callsites to use probe_kernel_read() directly, but that got
tiresome.
This patch shrinks mm/slab_common.o by 218 bytes. For a single
probe_kernel_address() callsite.
Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To fix build errors:
kernel/built-in.o: In function `bpf_trace_printk':
bpf_trace.c:(.text+0x11a254): undefined reference to `strncpy_from_unsafe'
kernel/built-in.o: In function `fetch_memory_string':
trace_kprobe.c:(.text+0x11acf8): undefined reference to `strncpy_from_unsafe'
move strncpy_from_unsafe() next to probe_kernel_read/write()
which use the same memory access style.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Fixes: 1a6877b9c0 ("lib: introduce strncpy_from_unsafe()")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The files changed within are only using the EXPORT_SYMBOL
macro variants. They are not using core modular infrastructure
and hence don't need module.h but only the export.h header.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
The functions probe_kernel_write() and probe_kernel_read() do not modify
the src pointer. Allow const pointers to be passed in without the need
of a typecast.
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1305824936.1465.4.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com
Save the current exception frame pointer in the thread_info struct rather than
in a global variable as the latter makes SMP tricky, especially when preemption
is also enabled.
This also replaces __frame with current_frame() and rearranges header file
inclusions to make it all compile.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Akira Takeuchi <takeuchi.akr@jp.panasonic.com>
Some archs such as blackfin, would like to have an arch specific
probe_kernel_read() and probe_kernel_write() implementation which can
fall back to the generic implementation if no special operations are
needed.
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
probe_kernel_write() gets used to write to the kernel address space.
E.g. to patch the kernel (kgdb, ftrace, kprobes...). Some architectures
however enable write protection for the kernel text section, so that
writes to this region would fault.
This patch allows to specify an architecture specific version of
probe_kernel_write() which allows to handle and bypass write protection
of the text segment.
That way it is still possible to catch random writes to kernel text
and explicitly allow writes via this interface.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Fix two regressions dealing with the kgdb core.
1) kgdb_skipexception and kgdb_post_primary_code are optional
functions that are only required on archs that need special exception
fixups.
2) The kernel address space scope must be set on any probe_kernel_*
function or archs such as ARCH=arm will not allow access to the kernel
memory space. As an example, it is required to allow the full kernel
address space is when you the kernel debugger to inspect a system
call.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
add probe_kernel_read() and probe_kernel_write().
Uninlined and restricted to kernel range memory only, as suggested
by Linus.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Thomas Gleixner