Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature
that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys).
There's a background article at LWN.net:
https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/
The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of
user-controllable permission masks in the pte. So instead of having a
fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change
and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of)
protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively
cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected
virtual memory range.
This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large
amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions. It also
allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the
executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that
below).
This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for
that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys -
if a user-space application calls:
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);
(note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice
this special case, and will set a special protection key on this
memory range. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection
Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable
and unwritable.
So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true'
PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies
PROT_READ as well. Unreadable executable mappings have security
advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out
ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they
cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either.
We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC
mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new
feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion.
There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system
call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this
pull request.
Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature
(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled
(like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime
overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment. If there's
any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or
flip the default"
* 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits
mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support
x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags
x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register
x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state
x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey()
mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()
x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU
x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option
x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps
x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error()
mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods
mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling
...
Here's the big tty/serial driver pull request for 4.6-rc1.
Lots of changes in here, Peter has been on a tear again, with lots of
refactoring and bugs fixes, many thanks to the great work he has been
doing. Lots of driver updates and fixes as well, full details in the
shortlog.
All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'tty-4.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty
Pull tty/serial updates from Greg KH:
"Here's the big tty/serial driver pull request for 4.6-rc1.
Lots of changes in here, Peter has been on a tear again, with lots of
refactoring and bugs fixes, many thanks to the great work he has been
doing. Lots of driver updates and fixes as well, full details in the
shortlog.
All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues"
* tag 'tty-4.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (220 commits)
serial: 8250: describe CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_RSA
serial: samsung: optimize UART rx fifo access routine
serial: pl011: add mark/space parity support
serial: sa1100: make sa1100_register_uart_fns a function
tty: serial: 8250: add MOXA Smartio MUE boards support
serial: 8250: convert drivers to use up_to_u8250p()
serial: 8250/mediatek: fix building with SERIAL_8250=m
serial: 8250/ingenic: fix building with SERIAL_8250=m
serial: 8250/uniphier: fix modular build
Revert "drivers/tty/serial: make 8250/8250_ingenic.c explicitly non-modular"
Revert "drivers/tty/serial: make 8250/8250_mtk.c explicitly non-modular"
serial: mvebu-uart: initial support for Armada-3700 serial port
serial: mctrl_gpio: Add missing module license
serial: ifx6x60: avoid uninitialized variable use
tty/serial: at91: fix bad offset for UART timeout register
tty/serial: at91: restore dynamic driver binding
serial: 8250: Add hardware dependency to RT288X option
TTY, devpts: document pty count limiting
tty: goldfish: support platform_device with id -1
drivers: tty: goldfish: Add device tree bindings
...
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"There are a bunch of fixes to the TPM, IMA, and Keys code, with minor
fixes scattered across the subsystem.
IMA now requires signed policy, and that policy is also now measured
and appraised"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (67 commits)
X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum
akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer
crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad
sign-file: fix build with CMS support disabled
MAINTAINERS: update tpmdd urls
MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy()
certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list
X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTime
X.509: Support leap seconds
Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64()
X.509: Fix leap year handling again
PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want'
firmware: change kernel read fail to dev_dbg()
KEYS: Use the symbol value for list size, updated by scripts/insert-sys-cert
KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds
tpm_tis: fix build warning with tpm_tis_resume
ima: require signed IMA policy
ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself
ima: load policy using path
...
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.6:
API:
- Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert
blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher.
- Remove crypto_hash interface.
- Remove crypto_pcomp interface.
- Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers.
- Add akcipher documentation.
- Add skcipher documentation.
Algorithms:
- Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32.
- Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer.
Drivers:
- Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver.
- Add PIC32 hwrng driver.
- Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver.
- Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat.
- Use crypto engine in omap-aes.
- Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha.
- Make atmel-sha available again.
- Make sahara hashing available again.
- Make ccp hashing available again.
- Make sha1-mb available again.
- Add support for multiple devices in ccp.
- Improve DMA performance in caam.
- Add hashing support to rockchip"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits)
crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration
crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype
hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions
crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls
crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support
crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs
crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model
crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import
lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline"
lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning
hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility
crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode.
crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number
lib/mpi: Endianness fix
crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288
crypto: xts - fix compile errors
crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation
crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling
...
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key
subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the
public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type.
To make this work, the following changes have been made:
(1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the
padding and returns just the message hash.
(2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second
parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this,
and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present.
(3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to
something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does
and and has been merged into public_key.c.
(4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead.
Thoughts:
(*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to
the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates
registered that share most of the code?
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Require the IMA policy to be signed when additional rules can be added.
v1:
- initialize the policy flag
- include IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY in the policy flag
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Add support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy itself.
Changelog v4:
- use braces on both if/else branches, even if single line on one of the
branches - Dmitry
- Use the id mapping - Dmitry
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
We currently cannot do appraisal or signature vetting of IMA policies
since we currently can only load IMA policies by writing the contents
of the policy directly in, as follows:
cat policy-file > <securityfs>/ima/policy
If we provide the kernel the path to the IMA policy so it can load
the policy itself it'd be able to later appraise or vet the file
signature if it has one. This patch adds support to load the IMA
policy with a given path as follows:
echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
Changelog v4+:
- moved kernel_read_file_from_path() error messages to callers
v3:
- moved kernel_read_file_from_path() to a separate patch
v2:
- after re-ordering the patches, replace calling integrity_kernel_read()
to read the file with kernel_read_file_from_path() (Mimi)
- Patch description re-written by Luis R. Rodriguez
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and
initramfs. Two new IMA policy identifiers KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK are defined.
Example policy rules:
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing
the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other
changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a
ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy.
Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks
enum kernel_read_file_id {
...
READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_MAX_ID
enum ima_hooks {
...
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file
eg: enum ima_hooks {
FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID,
MMAP_CHECK,
In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we
would need to specify a struct containing a union.
struct caller_id {
union {
enum ima_hooks func_id;
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id;
};
};
Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id,
perhaps changing the enumeration name.
For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in the ima_hooks.
Changelog v4:
- replaced switch statement with a kernel_read_file_id to an ima_hooks
id mapping array - Dmitry
- renamed ima_hook tokens KEXEC_CHECK and INITRAMFS_CHECK to
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK respectively - Dave Young
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and
the file signature re-appraised, based on policy. As there is no need to
preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and
module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file.
This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file
hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules
from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to
measure/appraise signed kernel modules.
The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior
to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being
loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read
kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module
twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel
module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file()
security hook.
This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security
call.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file
into memory.
Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_read_file()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook,
IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from
being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy.
Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the
firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the
kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on
the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once.
This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call.
Changelog v4+:
- revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky
v3:
- remove kernel_fw_from_file hook
- use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis
v2:
- reordered and squashed firmware patches
- fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring
and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into
memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by
the normal IMA policy based processing.
Changelog v5:
- fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL
v3:
- rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file()
v1:
- split patch
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
The inode_getsecid hook is called from contexts in which sleeping is not
allowed, so we cannot revalidate inode security labels from there. Use
the non-validating version of inode_security() instead.
Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Setting up ahash has some overhead. Only use ahash to calculate the
hash of a buffer, if the buffer is larger than ima_ahash_minsize.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
To differentiate between the kernel_read_file() callers, this patch
defines a new enumeration named kernel_read_file_id and includes the
caller identifier as an argument.
Subsequent patches define READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_FIRMWARE, READING_MODULE, and READING_POLICY.
Changelog v3:
- Replace the IMA specific enumeration with a generic one.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux.
These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just
this though to load a file into a local buffer. There are minor but
important checks differences on each. This patch set is the first
attempt at resolving some of these differences.
This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel
with the corresponding security post-read hook and function.
Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu
v3:
- additional bounds checking - Luis
v2:
- To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cleanup the function arguments by using "ima_hooks" enumerator as needed.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Define and call a function to display the "ima_hooks" rules.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to
read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the
functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read
the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
config BIG_KEYS
bool "Large payload keys"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the modular code that is essentially orphaned, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Before this commit, removing the access property of
a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64
was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned.
This patch fixes that problem.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections
should be enforced in software or not. In general, we enforce
protections when working on our own task, but not when on others.
We call these "current" and "remote" operations.
This patch introduces a new get_user_pages() variant:
get_user_pages_remote()
Which is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on
non-current tsk/mm.
We also introduce a new gup flag: FOLL_REMOTE which can be used
for the "__" gup variants to get this new behavior.
The uprobes is_trap_at_addr() location holds mmap_sem and
calls get_user_pages(current->mm) on an instruction address. This
makes it a pretty unique gup caller. Being an instruction access
and also really originating from the kernel (vs. the app), I opted
to consider this a 'remote' access where protection keys will not
be enforced.
Without protection keys, this patch should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: jack@suse.cz
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210154.3F0E51EA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing
a security module hook that does nothing, as the default
hook would get called if the module did not supply one.
With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds
overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that
don't actually do anything.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option as /proc/keys is now
mandatory if the keyrings facility is enabled (it's used by libkeyutils in
userspace).
The defconfig references were removed with:
perl -p -i -e 's/CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y\n//' \
`git grep -l CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y`
and the integrity Kconfig fixed by hand.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de>
cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically
allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in
tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue.
Fixes: 5beb0c435b ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Without this, using SOCK_DESTROY in enforcing mode results in:
SELinux: unrecognized netlink message type=21 for sclass=32
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ima_check_policy() has no parameters, so use the normal void
parameter convention to make it match the prototype in the header file
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Compiler warns us a lot that it can't find include folder because it's
provided in relative form.
CC security/selinux/netlabel.o
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
Add $(srctree) prefix to the path.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
[PM: minor description edits to fit under 80char width]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP should only be applied to a key if the keyring it is being
linked into has KEY_FLAG_KEEP set.
To this end, partially revert the following patch:
commit 1d6d167c2e
Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu Jan 7 07:46:36 2016 -0500
KEYS: refcount bug fix
to undo the change that made it unconditional (Mimi got it right the first
time).
Without undoing this change, it becomes impossible to delete, revoke or
invalidate keys added to keyrings through __key_instantiate_and_link()
where the keyring has itself been linked to. To test this, run the
following command sequence:
keyctl newring foo @s
keyctl add user a a %:foo
keyctl unlink %user:a %:foo
keyctl clear %:foo
With the commit mentioned above the third and fourth commands fail with
EPERM when they should succeed.
Reported-by: Stephen Gallager <sgallagh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Access to tty->tty_files list is always per-tty, never for all ttys
simultaneously. Replace global tty_files_lock spinlock with per-tty
->files_lock. Initialize when the ->tty_files list is inited, in
alloc_tty_struct().
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).
Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:
3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"All kinds of stuff. That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate
branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag
had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing.
Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and
switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole
of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted
cleanups and fixes from various people, etc.
One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's
lookup_one_len_unlocked(). Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets
called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it. That, of
course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications,
but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine
with that. I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related
changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough... I
*am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try
and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock
taken shared.
There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines
of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of
->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/
inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested(). To quote Linus back then:
-----
| This is an automated patch using
|
| sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[ ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/'
| sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/'
|
| with a very few manual fixups
-----
I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next
gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking
merges)"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls
fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t
fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock
proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common()
logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures
fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe
fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
fs: xattr: Use kvfree()
[s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
nbd: use ->compat_ioctl()
fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper
lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier
fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible
poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll
amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user()
cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user()
rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user()
mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user()
[um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
[um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user()
...
Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro:
"Andreas' xattr cleanup series.
It's a followup to his xattr work that went in last cycle; -0.5KLoC"
* 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
xattr handlers: Simplify list operation
ocfs2: Replace list xattr handler operations
nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattr
xfs: Change how listxattr generates synthetic attributes
tmpfs: listxattr should include POSIX ACL xattrs
tmpfs: Use xattr handler infrastructure
btrfs: Use xattr handler infrastructure
vfs: Distinguish between full xattr names and proper prefixes
posix acls: Remove duplicate xattr name definitions
gfs2: Remove gfs2_xattr_acl_chmod
vfs: Remove vfs_xattr_cmp
Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about
10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call
to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below
the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be
removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original
performance.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch fixes the key_ref leak, removes the unnecessary KEY_FLAG_KEEP
test before setting the flag, and cleans up the if/then brackets style
introduced in commit:
d3600bc KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Nothing in there gives a damn about the buffer alignment - it
just parses its contents. So the use of get_zeroed_page()
doesn't buy us anything - might as well had been kmalloc(),
which makes that code equivalent to open-coded memdup_user_nul()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
A _lot_ of ->write() instances were open-coding it; some are
converted to memdup_user_nul(), a lot more remain...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
There is no need to hold the ima_write_mutex for so long. We only need it
around ima_parse_add_rule().
Changelog:
- The return path now takes into account failed kmalloc() call.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Commit "IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times" assumed that the
policy would be updated at least once.
If there are zero updates, the temporary list head object will get added
to the policy list, and later dereferenced as an IMA policy object, which
means that invalid memory will be accessed.
Changelog:
- Move list_empty() test to ima_release_policy(), before audit msg - Mimi
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types.
Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.
The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so
print the triggering command name and pid.
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make validatetrans decisions available through selinuxfs.
"/validatetrans" is added to selinuxfs for this purpose.
This functionality is needed by file system servers
implemented in userspace or kernelspace without the VFS
layer.
Writing "$oldcontext $newcontext $tclass $taskcontext"
to /validatetrans is expected to return 0 if the transition
is allowed and -EPERM otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru>
CC: andrew.perepechko@seagate.com
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
When fetching an inode's security label, check if it is still valid, and
try reloading it if it is not. Reloading will fail when we are in RCU
context which doesn't allow sleeping, or when we can't find a dentry for
the inode. (Reloading happens via iop->getxattr which takes a dentry
parameter.) When reloading fails, continue using the old, invalid
label.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached
information becomes invalid.
Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes
invalid.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add functions dentry_security and inode_security for accessing
inode->i_security. These functions initially don't do much, but they
will later be used to revalidate the security labels when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
The trusted keys option parsing allows specifying the same option
multiple times. The last option value specified is used.
This is problematic because:
* No gain.
* This makes complicated to specify options that are dependent on other
options.
This patch changes the behavior in a way that option can be specified
only once.
Reported-by: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.
A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.
Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the
driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only.
Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is
updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the
existing policy. This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag. Only when
the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace
from removing keys from the keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Userspace should not be allowed to remove keys from certain keyrings
(eg. blacklist), though the keys themselves can expire.
This patch defines a new key flag named KEY_FLAG_KEEP to prevent
userspace from being able to unlink, revoke, invalidate or timed
out a key on a keyring. When this flag is set on the keyring, all
keys subsequently added are flagged.
In addition, when this flag is set, the keyring itself can not be
cleared.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is
even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.
IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted
before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue.
The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error
get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations. On
success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced.
IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to
writes, the match code is RCU protected. The updater side also does
list splice in RCU manner.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The newly added EVM_LOAD_X509 code can be configured even if
CONFIG_EVM is disabled, but that causes a link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `integrity_load_keys':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.init.text+0x400): undefined reference to `evm_load_x509'
This adds a Kconfig dependency to ensure it is only enabled when
CONFIG_EVM is set as well.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 2ce523eb89 ("evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Al Viro