There is a lot of kern-doc for the LSM internals, but it wasn't visible
in the HTML output. This exposes some formatting flaws in lsm_hooks.h
that will be fixed in a later series of patches.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
integrity: Remove references to module keyring
ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
efi: Add EFI signature data types
integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
ima: add support for arch specific policies
ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
document on perf security, more Italian translations, more
improvements to the memory-management docs, improvements to the
pathname lookup documentation, and the usual array of smaller
fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet:
"A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new document
on perf security, more Italian translations, more improvements to the
memory-management docs, improvements to the pathname lookup
documentation, and the usual array of smaller fixes.
As is often the case, there are a few reaches outside of
Documentation/ to adjust kerneldoc comments"
* tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (38 commits)
docs: improve pathname-lookup document structure
configfs: fix wrong name of struct in documentation
docs/mm-api: link slab_common.c to "The Slab Cache" section
slab: make kmem_cache_create{_usercopy} description proper kernel-doc
doc:process: add links where missing
docs/core-api: make mm-api.rst more structured
x86, boot: documentation whitespace fixup
Documentation: devres: note checking needs when converting
doc🇮🇹 add some process/* translations
doc🇮🇹 fixes in process/1.Intro
Documentation: convert path-lookup from markdown to resturctured text
Documentation/admin-guide: update admin-guide index.rst
Documentation/admin-guide: introduce perf-security.rst file
scripts/kernel-doc: Fix struct and struct field attribute processing
Documentation: dev-tools: Fix typos in index.rst
Correct gen_init_cpio tool's documentation
Document /proc/pid PID reuse behavior
Documentation: update path-lookup.md for parallel lookups
Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"
dmaengine: Add mailing list address to the documentation
...
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Extend the documentation for trusted keys with documentation for how to
set up a key for a TPM 2.0 so it can be used with a TPM 2.0 as well.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Whilst making an unrelated change to some Documentation, Linus sayeth:
| Afaik, even in Britain, "whilst" is unusual and considered more
| formal, and "while" is the common word.
|
| [...]
|
| Can we just admit that we work with computers, and we don't need to
| use þe eald Englisc spelling of words that most of the world never
| uses?
dictionary.com refers to the word as "Chiefly British", which is
probably an undesirable attribute for technical documentation.
Replace all occurrences under Documentation/ with "while".
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull keys updates from James Morris:
"Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to
provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented
for the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key
retained in RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware.
int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out);
int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, const void *in2);
Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces,
they're rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an
operation ID in the params argument to distinguish them.
Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature
instead and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the
expectation that this may well be how a hardware crypto device may
work"
* 'next-keys2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (22 commits)
KEYS: asym_tpm: Add support for the sign operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_sign [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement the decrypt operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_unbind [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver #2]
KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]
KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement pkey_query [ver #2]
KEYS: Add parser for TPM-based keys [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: add skeleton for asym_tpm [ver #2]
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2]
KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]
KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver #2]
KEYS: Allow the public_key struct to hold a private key [ver #2]
KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]
KEYS: Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers supply the sig encoding type [ver #2]
KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2]
...
- Introduces the stackleak gcc plugin ported from grsecurity by Alexander
Popov, with x86 and arm64 support.
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Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook:
"Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin
was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient
stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense
against at least two classes of flaws:
- Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the
compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was
proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too).
- Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid
stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown
cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This
complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but
provides the coverage for stacks.
The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by
Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already
been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and
reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon).
With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for
alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin"
* tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.
(*) Query an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);
Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned
in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:
__u32 supported_ops;
A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is
constructed from a bitwise-OR of:
KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}
__u32 key_size;
The size in bits of the key.
__u16 max_data_size;
__u16 max_sig_size;
__u16 max_enc_size;
__u16 max_dec_size;
The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.
reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand
over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.
If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key,
EOPNOTSUPP is returned.
(*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
const void *in2);
Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
a blob of data.
The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
values:
__s32 key_id;
__u32 in_len;
__u32 out_len;
__u32 in2_len;
For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:
Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len
======================= =============== =============== ===========
KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature -
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature
info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
information.
The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is
intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
required to unlock a key.
If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to
provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented for
the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key retained in
RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware.
int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out);
int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, const void *in2);
Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces, they're
rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an operation ID
in the params argument to distinguish them.
Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature instead
and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the expectation that
this may well be how a hardware crypto device may work.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES updates
including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the unloved and
unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document from Kees, more
MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo fixes and
corrections.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"This is a fairly typical cycle for documentation. There's some welcome
readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES
updates including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the
unloved and unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document
from Kees, more MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo
fixes and corrections"
* tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (41 commits)
docs: Fix typos in histogram.rst
docs: Introduce deprecated APIs list
kernel-doc: fix declaration type determination
doc: fix a typo in adding-syscalls.rst
docs/admin-guide: memory-hotplug: remove table of contents
doc: printk-formats: Remove bogus kobject references for device nodes
Documentation: preempt-locking: Use better example
dm flakey: Document "error_writes" feature
docs/completion.txt: Fix a couple of punctuation nits
LICENSES: Add ISC license text
LICENSES: Add note to CDDL-1.0 license that it should not be used
docs/core-api: memory-hotplug: add some details about locking internals
docs/core-api: rename memory-hotplug-notifier to memory-hotplug
docs: improve readability for people with poorer eyesight
yama: clarify ptrace_scope=2 in Yama documentation
docs/vm: split memory hotplug notifier description to Documentation/core-api
docs: move memory hotplug description into admin-guide/mm
doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfs
docs: fix some broken documentation references
iommu: Fix passthrough option documentation
...
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fix Documentation location reference for where LSM descriptions should
be placed.
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
"FEFEK" was incorrectly used as acronym for "File Encryption Key
Encryption Key". This replaces all occurences with "FEKEK".
Signed-off-by: Felix Eckhofer <felix@eckhofer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add information about STACKLEAK feature to the "Memory poisoning"
section of self-protection.rst.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A number of new docs were added, but they're currently not on
the index.rst from the session they're supposed to be, causing
Sphinx warnings.
Add them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Update SELinux-sctp.rst "SCTP Peer Labeling" section to reflect
how the association permission is validated.
Reported-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SCTP security hooks are explained in:
Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch updates the documentation with the observations that led
to commit bdcf0a423e ("kernel: make groups_sort calling a
responsibility group_info allocators") and the new behaviour required.
Specifically that groups_sort() should be called on a new group_list
before set_groups() or set_current_groups() is called.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
[jc: use proper :c:func: references]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Hashing addresses printed with printk specifier %p was implemented
recently. During development a number of issues were raised regarding
leaking kernel addresses to userspace. Other documentation was updated but
security/self-protection missed out.
Add self-protection documentation regarding printing kernel addresses.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
When keyctl_read() is passed a buffer that is too small, the behavior is
inconsistent. Some key types will fill as much of the buffer as
possible, while others won't copy anything. Moreover, the in-kernel
documentation contradicted the man page on this point.
Update the in-kernel documentation to say that this point is
unspecified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Sphinx will now generate the table of contents automatically, which
avoids having the ToC getting out of sync with the rest of the document.
Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Several paths in the security/keys documentation were incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to
X.509 signature chain verification.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The white space in the big enumerated list was inconsistent, leading to
some strange formatting artifacts.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel
keys, and adjusts for ReST markup.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The existing LSM.txt file covered both usage and development, so split
this into two files, one under admin-guide and one under kernel
development.
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjust IMA-templates.txt for ReST markup and add to the index for
security/, under the Kernel API Documentation.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.
With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.
To restrict a keyring, call:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
const char *restriction)
where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The restrict_link functions used to validate keys as they are linked
to a keyring can be associated with specific key types. Each key type
may be loaded (or not) at runtime, so lookup of restrict_link
functions needs to be part of the key type implementation to ensure
that the requested keys can be examined.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.
The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and
without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to the more sensible CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
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Merge tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull rodata updates from Kees Cook:
"This renames the (now inaccurate) DEBUG_RODATA and related
SET_MODULE_RONX configs to the more sensible STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
STRICT_MODULE_RWX"
* tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX
arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common
Kees Cook