Commit Graph

988 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
James Morris 3e1c2515ac security: remove root_plug
Remove the root_plug example LSM code.  It's unmaintained and
    increasingly broken in various ways.

    Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo!

    Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
    Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-20 14:26:16 +09:00
Stephen Smalley b7f3008ad1 SELinux: fix locking issue introduced with c6d3aaa4e3
Ensure that we release the policy read lock on all exit paths from
security_compute_av.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-20 09:22:07 +09:00
Eric Dumazet c720c7e838 inet: rename some inet_sock fields
In order to have better cache layouts of struct sock (separate zones
for rx/tx paths), we need this preliminary patch.

Goal is to transfert fields used at lookup time in the first
read-mostly cache line (inside struct sock_common) and move sk_refcnt
to a separate cache line (only written by rx path)

This patch adds inet_ prefix to daddr, rcv_saddr, dport, num, saddr,
sport and id fields. This allows a future patch to define these
fields as macros, like sk_refcnt, without name clashes.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-10-18 18:52:53 -07:00
David Howells 21279cfa10 KEYS: get_instantiation_keyring() should inc the keyring refcount in all cases
The destination keyring specified to request_key() and co. is made available to
the process that instantiates the key (the slave process started by
/sbin/request-key typically).  This is passed in the request_key_auth struct as
the dest_keyring member.

keyctl_instantiate_key and keyctl_negate_key() call get_instantiation_keyring()
to get the keyring to attach the newly constructed key to at the end of
instantiation.  This may be given a specific keyring into which a link will be
made later, or it may be asked to find the keyring passed to request_key().  In
the former case, it returns a keyring with the refcount incremented by
lookup_user_key(); in the latter case, it returns the keyring from the
request_key_auth struct - and does _not_ increment the refcount.

The latter case will eventually result in an oops when the keyring prematurely
runs out of references and gets destroyed.  The effect may take some time to
show up as the key is destroyed lazily.

To fix this, the keyring returned by get_instantiation_keyring() must always
have its refcount incremented, no matter where it comes from.

This can be tested by setting /etc/request-key.conf to:

#OP	TYPE	DESCRIPTION	CALLOUT INFO	PROGRAM ARG1 ARG2 ARG3 ...
#======	=======	===============	===============	===============================
create  *	test:*		*		|/bin/false %u %g %d %{user:_display}
negate	*	*		*		/bin/keyctl negate %k 10 @u

and then doing:

	keyctl add user _display aaaaaaaa @u
        while keyctl request2 user test:x test:x @u &&
        keyctl list @u;
        do
                keyctl request2 user test:x test:x @u;
                sleep 31;
                keyctl list @u;
        done

which will oops eventually.  Changing the negate line to have @u rather than
%S at the end is important as that forces the latter case by passing a special
keyring ID rather than an actual keyring ID.

Reported-by: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-10-15 15:19:58 -07:00
Tetsuo Handa 8b8efb4403 LSM: Add security_path_chroot().
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.

This hook is used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-12 10:56:02 +11:00
Tetsuo Handa 89eda06837 LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown().
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown()
operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *",
we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of
notify_change().

These hooks are used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-12 10:56:00 +11:00
Stephen Smalley 941fc5b2bf selinux: drop remapping of netlink classes
Drop remapping of netlink classes and bypass of permission checking
based on netlink message type for policy version < 18.  This removes
compatibility code introduced when the original single netlink
security class used for all netlink sockets was split into
finer-grained netlink classes based on netlink protocol and when
permission checking was added based on netlink message type in Linux
2.6.8.  The only known distribution that shipped with SELinux and
policy < 18 was Fedora Core 2, which was EOL'd on 2005-04-11.

Given that the remapping code was never updated to address the
addition of newer netlink classes, that the corresponding userland
support was dropped in 2005, and that the assumptions made by the
remapping code about the fixed ordering among netlink classes in the
policy may be violated in the future due to the dynamic class/perm
discovery support, we should drop this compatibility code now.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-07 21:56:46 +11:00
Stephen Smalley 8753f6bec3 selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build
Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
security class mapping definitions in classmap.h.  Adding new kernel
classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-07 21:56:44 +11:00
Stephen Smalley c6d3aaa4e3 selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery
Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
logic from libselinux.  A mapping is created between kernel-private
class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
policy values used within the security server.

The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC.  The
interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user
suffix.

The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
thus the kernel class index values are compressed.  The flask.h
definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers.  Going
forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
tied to the policy values.  The next patch introduces a utility to
automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
classmap.h definitions.

The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
policy load to generate the mapping.  The old kernel class validation
logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.

The handle unknown logic is reworked.  reject_unknown=1 is handled
when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
handling by the class validation logic.  allow_unknown=1 is handled
when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
automatically added to the allowed vector.  If the class was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.

avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.

The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
kernel.  It should be noted that this policy will not include any
userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
the kernel-private indices).

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-07 21:56:42 +11:00
Alexey Dobriyan 828c09509b const: constify remaining file_operations
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix KVM]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-10-01 16:11:11 -07:00
Eric Paris af8ff04917 SELinux: reset the security_ops before flushing the avc cache
This patch resets the security_ops to the secondary_ops before it flushes
the avc.  It's still possible that a task on another processor could have
already passed the security_ops dereference and be executing an selinux hook
function which would add a new avc entry.  That entry would still not be
freed.  This should however help to reduce the number of needless avcs the
kernel has when selinux is disabled at run time.  There is no wasted
memory if selinux is disabled on the command line or not compiled.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-30 19:17:06 +10:00
Linus Torvalds 6d39b27f0a Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
  lsm: Use a compressed IPv6 string format in audit events
  Audit: send signal info if selinux is disabled
  Audit: rearrange audit_context to save 16 bytes per struct
  Audit: reorganize struct audit_watch to save 8 bytes
2009-09-24 08:31:04 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan 8d65af789f sysctl: remove "struct file *" argument of ->proc_handler
It's unused.

It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl
shouldn't care about the rest.

It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:21:04 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 0b7570e77f do_wait() wakeup optimization: change __wake_up_parent() to use filtered wakeup
Ratan Nalumasu reported that in a process with many threads doing
unnecessary wakeups.  Every waiting thread in the process wakes up to loop
through the children and see that the only ones it cares about are still
not ready.

Now that we have struct wait_opts we can change do_wait/__wake_up_parent
to use filtered wakeups.

We can make child_wait_callback() more clever later, right now it only
checks eligible_child().

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Ratan Nalumasu <rnalumasu@gmail.com>
Cc: Vitaly Mayatskikh <vmayatsk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:20:59 -07:00
Ben Blum be367d0992 cgroups: let ss->can_attach and ss->attach do whole threadgroups at a time
Alter the ss->can_attach and ss->attach functions to be able to deal with
a whole threadgroup at a time, for use in cgroup_attach_proc.  (This is a
pre-patch to cgroup-procs-writable.patch.)

Currently, new mode of the attach function can only tell the subsystem
about the old cgroup of the threadgroup leader.  No subsystem currently
needs that information for each thread that's being moved, but if one were
to be added (for example, one that counts tasks within a group) this bit
would need to be reworked a bit to tell the subsystem the right
information.

[hidave.darkstar@gmail.com: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Ben Blum <bblum@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:20:58 -07:00
Paul Moore d81165919e lsm: Use a compressed IPv6 string format in audit events
Currently the audit subsystem prints uncompressed IPv6 addresses which not
only differs from common usage but also results in ridiculously large audit
strings which is not a good thing.  This patch fixes this by simply converting
audit to always print compressed IPv6 addresses.

Old message example:

 audit(1253576792.161:30): avc:  denied  { ingress } for
  saddr=0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001 src=5000
  daddr=0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001 dest=35502 netif=lo
  scontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023
  tcontext=system_u:object_r:lo_netif_t:s0-s15:c0.c1023 tclass=netif

New message example:

 audit(1253576792.161:30): avc:  denied  { ingress } for
  saddr=::1 src=5000 daddr=::1 dest=35502 netif=lo
  scontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023
  tcontext=system_u:object_r:lo_netif_t:s0-s15:c0.c1023 tclass=netif

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-09-24 03:50:26 -04:00
Linus Torvalds c82ffab9a8 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
  SELinux: do not destroy the avc_cache_nodep
  KEYS: Have the garbage collector set its timer for live expired keys
  tpm-fixup-pcrs-sysfs-file-update
  creds_are_invalid() needs to be exported for use by modules:
  include/linux/cred.h: fix build

Fix trivial BUILD_BUG_ON-induced conflicts in drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
2009-09-23 15:18:57 -07:00
Eric Paris 5224ee0863 SELinux: do not destroy the avc_cache_nodep
The security_ops reset done when SELinux is disabled at run time is done
after the avc cache is freed and after the kmem_cache for the avc is also
freed.  This means that between the time the selinux disable code destroys
the avc_node_cachep another process could make a security request and could
try to allocate from the cache.  We are just going to leave the cachep around,
like we always have.

SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [<ffffffff81122537>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
last sysfs file:
CPU 1
Modules linked in:
Pid: 12, comm: khelper Not tainted 2.6.31-tip-05525-g0eeacc6-dirty #14819
System Product Name
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81122537>]  [<ffffffff81122537>]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185
RSP: 0018:ffff88003f9258b0  EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000078c0129e
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8130b626 RDI: ffffffff81122528
RBP: ffff88003f925900 R08: 0000000078c0129e R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000078c0129e R12: 0000000000000246
R13: 0000000000008020 R14: ffff88003f8586d8 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880002b00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000001001000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: ffffffff827bd420 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process khelper (pid: 12, threadinfo ffff88003f924000, task
ffff88003f928000)
Stack:
 0000000000000246 0000802000000246 ffffffff8130b626 0000000000000001
<0> 0000000078c0129e 0000000000000000 ffff88003f925a70 0000000000000002
<0> 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 ffff88003f925960 ffffffff8130b626
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8130b626>] ? avc_alloc_node+0x36/0x273
 [<ffffffff8130b626>] avc_alloc_node+0x36/0x273
 [<ffffffff8130b545>] ? avc_latest_notif_update+0x7d/0x9e
 [<ffffffff8130b8b4>] avc_insert+0x51/0x18d
 [<ffffffff8130bcce>] avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x9d/0x128
 [<ffffffff8130bf20>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0x88
 [<ffffffff8130f99d>] current_has_perm+0x52/0x6d
 [<ffffffff8130fbb2>] selinux_task_create+0x2f/0x45
 [<ffffffff81303bf7>] security_task_create+0x29/0x3f
 [<ffffffff8105c6ba>] copy_process+0x82/0xdf0
 [<ffffffff81091578>] ? register_lock_class+0x2f/0x36c
 [<ffffffff81091a13>] ? mark_lock+0x2e/0x1e1
 [<ffffffff8105d596>] do_fork+0x16e/0x382
 [<ffffffff81091578>] ? register_lock_class+0x2f/0x36c
 [<ffffffff810d9166>] ? probe_workqueue_execution+0x57/0xf9
 [<ffffffff81091a13>] ? mark_lock+0x2e/0x1e1
 [<ffffffff810d9166>] ? probe_workqueue_execution+0x57/0xf9
 [<ffffffff8100cdb2>] kernel_thread+0x82/0xe0
 [<ffffffff81078b1f>] ? ____call_usermodehelper+0x0/0x139
 [<ffffffff8100ce10>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20
 [<ffffffff81078aea>] ? __call_usermodehelper+0x65/0x9a
 [<ffffffff8107a5c7>] run_workqueue+0x171/0x27e
 [<ffffffff8107a573>] ? run_workqueue+0x11d/0x27e
 [<ffffffff81078a85>] ? __call_usermodehelper+0x0/0x9a
 [<ffffffff8107a7bc>] worker_thread+0xe8/0x10f
 [<ffffffff810808e2>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x63
 [<ffffffff8107a6d4>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x10f
 [<ffffffff8108042e>] kthread+0x91/0x99
 [<ffffffff8100ce1a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20
 [<ffffffff8100c754>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30
 [<ffffffff8108039d>] ? kthread+0x0/0x99
 [<ffffffff8100ce10>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20
Code: 0f 85 99 00 00 00 9c 58 66 66 90 66 90 49 89 c4 fa 66 66 90 66 66 90
e8 83 34 fb ff e8 d7 e9 26 00 48 98 49 8b 94 c6 10 01 00 00 <48> 8b 1a 44
8b 7a 18 48 85 db 74 0f 8b 42 14 48 8b 04 c3 ff 42
RIP  [<ffffffff81122537>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185
 RSP <ffff88003f9258b0>
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace 42f41a982344e606 ]---

Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23 11:16:20 -07:00
David Howells 606531c316 KEYS: Have the garbage collector set its timer for live expired keys
The key garbage collector sets a timer to start a new collection cycle at the
point the earliest key to expire should be considered garbage.  However, it
currently only does this if the key it is considering hasn't yet expired.

If the key being considering has expired, but hasn't yet reached the collection
time then it is ignored, and won't be collected until some other key provokes a
round of collection.

Make the garbage collector set the timer for the earliest key that hasn't yet
passed its collection time, rather than the earliest key that hasn't yet
expired.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23 11:03:47 -07:00
James Morris 88e9d34c72 seq_file: constify seq_operations
Make all seq_operations structs const, to help mitigate against
revectoring user-triggerable function pointers.

This is derived from the grsecurity patch, although generated from scratch
because it's simpler than extracting the changes from there.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:39:29 -07:00
Nick Black 1fd7317d02 Move magic numbers into magic.h
Move various magic-number definitions into magic.h.

Signed-off-by: Nick Black <dank@qemfd.net>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:39:28 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 1aaf2e5913 Merge branch 'x86-txt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'x86-txt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86
  x86, intel_txt: Handle ACPI_SLEEP without X86_TRAMPOLINE
  x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig help
  x86, intel_txt: Factor out the code for S3 setup
  x86, intel_txt: tboot.c needs <asm/fixmap.h>
  intel_txt: Force IOMMU on for Intel TXT launch
  x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT Sx shutdown support
  x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT reboot/halt shutdown support
  x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot support
2009-09-15 09:19:20 -07:00
David Howells c08ef808ef KEYS: Fix garbage collector
Fix a number of problems with the new key garbage collector:

 (1) A rogue semicolon in keyring_gc() was causing the initial count of dead
     keys to be miscalculated.

 (2) A missing return in keyring_gc() meant that under certain circumstances,
     the keyring semaphore would be unlocked twice.

 (3) The key serial tree iterator (key_garbage_collector()) part of the garbage
     collector has been modified to:

     (a) Complete each scan of the keyrings before setting the new timer.

     (b) Only set the new timer for keys that have yet to expire.  This means
         that the new timer is now calculated correctly, and the gc doesn't
         get into a loop continually scanning for keys that have expired, and
         preventing other things from happening, like RCU cleaning up the old
         keyring contents.

     (c) Perform an extra scan if any keys were garbage collected in this one
     	 as a key might become garbage during a scan, and (b) could mean we
     	 don't set the timer again.

 (4) Made key_schedule_gc() take the time at which to do a collection run,
     rather than the time at which the key expires.  This means the collection
     of dead keys (key type unregistered) can happen immediately.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-15 09:11:02 +10:00
Marc Dionne 5c84342a3e KEYS: Unlock tasklist when exiting early from keyctl_session_to_parent
When we exit early from keyctl_session_to_parent because of permissions or
because the session keyring is the same as the parent, we need to unlock the
tasklist.

The missing unlock causes the system to hang completely when using
keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT) with a keyring shared with the parent.

Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-15 09:10:59 +10:00
Eric Paris 4e6d0bffd3 SELinux: flush the avc before disabling SELinux
Before SELinux is disabled at boot it can create AVC entries.  This patch
will flush those entries before disabling SELinux.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14 12:34:11 +10:00
Eric Paris 008574b111 SELinux: seperate avc_cache flushing
Move the avc_cache flushing into it's own function so it can be reused when
disabling SELinux.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14 12:34:09 +10:00
Eric Paris ed868a5698 Creds: creds->security can be NULL is selinux is disabled
__validate_process_creds should check if selinux is actually enabled before
running tests on the selinux portion of the credentials struct.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14 12:34:07 +10:00
James Morris a3c8b97396 Merge branch 'next' into for-linus 2009-09-11 08:04:49 +10:00
David P. Quigley ddd29ec659 sysfs: Add labeling support for sysfs
This patch adds a setxattr handler to the file, directory, and symlink
inode_operations structures for sysfs. The patch uses hooks introduced in the
previous patch to handle the getting and setting of security information for
the sysfs inodes. As was suggested by Eric Biederman the struct iattr in the
sysfs_dirent structure has been replaced by a structure which contains the
iattr, secdata and secdata length to allow the changes to persist in the event
that the inode representing the sysfs_dirent is evicted. Because sysfs only
stores this information when a change is made all the optional data is moved
into one dynamically allocated field.

This patch addresses an issue where SELinux was denying virtd access to the PCI
configuration entries in sysfs. The lack of setxattr handlers for sysfs
required that a single label be assigned to all entries in sysfs. Granting virtd
access to every entry in sysfs is not an acceptable solution so fine grained
labeling of sysfs is required such that individual entries can be labeled
appropriately.

[sds:  Fixed compile-time warnings, coding style, and setting of inode security init flags.]

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-10 10:11:29 +10:00
David P. Quigley 1ee65e37e9 LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information.
This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get
all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is
used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context
derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the
LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are
for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security
on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's
explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below.

Quote Stephen Smalley

inode_setsecctx:  Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the
in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the
fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
xattrs that represent the context.  Example usage:  NFS server invokes
this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
operation.

inode_notifysecctx:  Notify the security module of what the security
context of an inode should be.  Initializes the incore security context
managed by the security module for this inode.  Example usage:  NFS
client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its
incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the
server returned the file's attributes to the client.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-10 10:11:24 +10:00
Mimi Zohar acd0c93517 IMA: update ima_counts_put
- As ima_counts_put() may be called after the inode has been freed,
verify that the inode is not NULL, before dereferencing it.

- Maintain the IMA file counters in may_open() properly, decrementing
any counter increments on subsequent errors.

Reported-by: Ciprian Docan <docan@eden.rutgers.edu>
Reported-by: J.R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-07 11:54:58 +10:00
David Howells ee18d64c1f KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:22 +10:00
David Howells 7b1b916459 KEYS: Do some whitespace cleanups [try #6]
Do some whitespace cleanups in the key management code.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:16 +10:00
Serge E. Hallyn ad73a717e0 KEYS: Make /proc/keys use keyid not numread as file position [try #6]
Make the file position maintained by /proc/keys represent the ID of the key
just read rather than the number of keys read.  This should make it faster to
perform a lookup as we don't have to scan the key ID tree from the beginning to
find the current position.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:14 +10:00
David Howells 5d135440fa KEYS: Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys. [try #6]
Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys.  This involved
erasing all links to such keys from keyrings that point to them.  At that
point, the key will be deleted in the normal manner.

Keyrings from which garbage collection occurs are shrunk and their quota
consumption reduced as appropriate.

Dead keys (for which the key type has been removed) will be garbage collected
immediately.

Revoked and expired keys will hang around for a number of seconds, as set in
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay before being automatically removed.  The default
is 5 minutes.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:11 +10:00
David Howells f041ae2f99 KEYS: Flag dead keys to induce EKEYREVOKED [try #6]
Set the KEY_FLAG_DEAD flag on keys for which the type has been removed.  This
causes the key_permission() function to return EKEYREVOKED in response to
various commands.  It does not, however, prevent unlinking or clearing of
keyrings from detaching the key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:09 +10:00
David Howells 0c2c9a3fc7 KEYS: Allow keyctl_revoke() on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE perm [try #6]
Allow keyctl_revoke() to operate on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE
permission, rather than only on keys that have WRITE permission.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:06 +10:00
David Howells 5593122eec KEYS: Deal with dead-type keys appropriately [try #6]
Allow keys for which the key type has been removed to be unlinked.  Currently
dead-type keys can only be disposed of by completely clearing the keyrings
that point to them.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:04 +10:00
David Howells e0e817392b CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]
Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management.  The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).

Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.

This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):

	http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:01 +10:00
Ingo Molnar 936e894a97 Merge commit 'v2.6.31-rc8' into x86/txt
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
	security/Kconfig

Merge reason: resolve the conflicts, bump up from rc3 to rc8.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-02 08:17:56 +02:00
Shane Wang 69575d3886 x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86
Move tboot.h from asm to linux to fix the build errors of intel_txt
patch on non-X86 platforms. Remove the tboot code from generic code
init/main.c and kernel/cpu.c.

Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-09-01 18:25:07 -07:00
Paul Moore ed6d76e4c3 selinux: Support for the new TUN LSM hooks
Add support for the new TUN LSM hooks: security_tun_dev_create(),
security_tun_dev_post_create() and security_tun_dev_attach().  This includes
the addition of a new object class, tun_socket, which represents the socks
associated with TUN devices.  The _tun_dev_create() and _tun_dev_post_create()
hooks are fairly similar to the standard socket functions but _tun_dev_attach()
is a bit special.  The _tun_dev_attach() is unique because it involves a
domain attaching to an existing TUN device and its associated tun_socket
object, an operation which does not exist with standard sockets and most
closely resembles a relabel operation.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-01 08:29:52 +10:00
Paul Moore 2b980dbd77 lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver
The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules,
such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by
TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as
QEMU and KVM.  This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the
creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are:

 * security_tun_dev_create()
   Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices

 * security_tun_dev_post_create()
   Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly
   created TUN devices

 * security_tun_dev_attach()
   Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices
   and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-01 08:29:48 +10:00
Linus Torvalds 5311034ddd Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
  IMA: iint put in ima_counts_get and put
2009-08-26 20:17:07 -07:00
Eric Paris 53a7197aff IMA: iint put in ima_counts_get and put
ima_counts_get() calls ima_iint_find_insert_get() which takes a reference
to the iint in question, but does not put that reference at the end of the
function.  This can lead to a nasty memory leak.  Easy enough to reproduce:

#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main (void)
{
	int i;
	void *ptr;

	for (i=0; i < 100000; i++) {
		ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
			   MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
		if (ptr == MAP_FAILED)
			return 2;
		munmap(ptr, 4096);
	}

	return 0;
}

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-27 11:01:03 +10:00
Mimi Zohar 16bfa38b19 ima: hashing large files bug fix
Hashing files larger than INT_MAX causes process to loop.
Dependent on redefining kernel_read() offset type to loff_t.

(http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13909)

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-24 14:58:29 +10:00
Amerigo Wang bc6a6008e5 selinux: adjust rules for ATTR_FORCE
As suggested by OGAWA Hirofumi in thread:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/8/7/132, we should let selinux_inode_setattr()
to match our ATTR_* rules.  ATTR_FORCE should not force things like
ATTR_SIZE.

[hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp: tweaks]
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-21 14:25:30 +10:00
James Morris ece13879e7 Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	security/Kconfig

Manual fix.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-20 09:18:42 +10:00
Andreas Schwab 024e6cb408 security: Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

(Verbs are cool!)

Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-19 08:42:56 +10:00
Dave Jones a58578e47f security: Make LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR default match its help text.
Commit 788084aba2 added the LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
option, whose help text states "For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots
of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems."
Which implies that it's default setting was typoed.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-19 08:38:29 +10:00
Eric Paris 788084aba2 Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.

The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
Eric Paris 8cf948e744 SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap
Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook.  This
means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the
memory space.  This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while
maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero.  This means that processes
which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will
NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:08:48 +10:00
Eric Paris 9c0d90103c Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in
security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY.  This patch moves cap_file_mmap
into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from
security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability
checks are done.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:08:35 +10:00
Thomas Liu 2bf4969032 SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability.

 - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
    avc_audit_data
 - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.

Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit
can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without
doing the actual dump.  This makes it so that the patched version
behaves the same way as the unpatched version.

Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space,
once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the
unpatched.

I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after
this patch.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 08:37:18 +10:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 3c556e4198 x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig help
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-08-14 16:43:15 -07:00
Eric Paris 25354c4fee SELinux: add selinux_kernel_module_request
This patch adds a new selinux hook so SELinux can arbitrate if a given
process should be allowed to trigger a request for the kernel to try to
load a module.  This is a different operation than a process trying to load
a module itself, which is already protected by CAP_SYS_MODULE.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-14 11:18:40 +10:00
Eric Paris 9188499cdb security: introducing security_request_module
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
new module into the kernel.  This can be a dangerous event if the process
able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
binary or the module binary.  This patch adds a new security hook to
request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
to call request_module().

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-14 11:18:37 +10:00
James Morris 314dabb83a SELinux: fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.c
Fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.c

The buffer always needs to be freed here; we either error
out or allocate more memory.

Reported-by: iceberg <strakh@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2009-08-11 08:37:13 +10:00
Eric Paris a2551df7ec Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.

The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-06 09:02:23 +10:00
Eric Paris 84336d1a77 SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap
Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook.  This
means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the
memory space.  This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while
maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero.  This means that processes
which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will
NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-06 09:02:21 +10:00
Eric Paris 7c73875e7d Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in
security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY.  This patch moves cap_file_mmap
into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from
security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability
checks are done.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-06 09:02:17 +10:00
Julia Lawall da34d4248b security/smack: Use AF_INET for sin_family field
Elsewhere the sin_family field holds a value with a name of the form
AF_..., so it seems reasonable to do so here as well.  Also the values of
PF_INET and AF_INET are the same.

The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// <smpl>
@@
struct sockaddr_in sip;
@@

(
sip.sin_family ==
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
|
sip.sin_family !=
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
|
sip.sin_family =
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
)
// </smpl>

Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-06 08:46:15 +10:00
Joseph Cihula 3162534069 x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot support
This patch adds kernel configuration and boot support for Intel Trusted
Execution Technology (Intel TXT).

Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel Trusted Execution
Technology (Intel TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that
provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms.

Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT).

Intel TXT in Brief:
o  Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
o  Data protection in case of improper shutdown
o  Measurement and verification of launched environment

Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some
non-vPro systems.  It is currently available on desktop systems based on
the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP
dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45
Express chipsets.

For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.
This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which
has been updated for the new released platforms.

A much more complete description of how these patches support TXT, how to
configure a system for it, etc. is in the Documentation/intel_txt.txt file
in this patch.

This patch provides the TXT support routines for complete functionality,
documentation for TXT support and for the changes to the boot_params structure,
and boot detection of a TXT launch.  Attempts to shutdown (reboot, Sx) the system
will result in platform resets; subsequent patches will support these shutdown modes
properly.

 Documentation/intel_txt.txt      |  210 +++++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt  |    1
 arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h |    3
 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h    |    3
 arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h     |  197 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile         |    1
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c          |    4
 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c          |  379 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/Kconfig                 |   30 +++
 9 files changed, 827 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Signed-off-by: Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-07-21 11:49:06 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 5bb459bb45 kernel: rename is_single_threaded(task) to current_is_single_threaded(void)
- is_single_threaded(task) is not safe unless task == current,
  we can't use task->signal or task->mm.

- it doesn't make sense unless task == current, the task can
  fork right after the check.

Rename it to current_is_single_threaded() and kill the argument.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-17 09:10:42 +10:00
James Morris be940d6279 Revert "SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h"
This reverts commit 8113a8d80f.

The patch causes a stack overflow on my system during boot.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-13 10:39:36 +10:00
Thomas Liu 8113a8d80f SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability and for less code duplication.

 - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
   avc_audit_data
 - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.

I have tested to make sure that the avcs look the same before and
after this patch.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-13 07:54:48 +10:00
Thomas Liu d4131ded4d security: Make lsm_priv union in lsm_audit.h anonymous
Made the lsm_priv union in include/linux/lsm_audit.h
anonymous.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-10 08:58:39 +10:00
Thomas Liu ed5215a214 Move variable function in lsm_audit.h into SMACK private space
Moved variable function in include/linux/lsm_audit.h into the
smack_audit_data struct since it is never used outside of it.

Also removed setting of function in the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT
macro because that variable is now private to SMACK.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
I-dont-see-any-problems-with-it: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-10 08:54:14 +10:00
James Morris ac7242142b Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-06-30 09:10:35 +10:00
Mimi Zohar 94e5d714f6 integrity: add ima_counts_put (updated)
This patch fixes an imbalance message as reported by J.R. Okajima.
The IMA file counters are incremented in ima_path_check. If the
actual open fails, such as ETXTBSY, decrement the counters to
prevent unnecessary imbalance messages.

Reported-by: J.R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-29 08:59:10 +10:00
Mimi Zohar 79b854c549 integrity: ima audit hash_exists fix
Audit the file name, not the template name.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-29 08:57:49 +10:00
Thomas Liu 89c86576ec selinux: clean up avc node cache when disabling selinux
Added a call to free the avc_node_cache when inside selinux_disable because
it should not waste resources allocated during avc_init if SELinux is disabled
and the cache will never be used.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-25 08:29:16 +10:00
Ingo Molnar 9e48858f7d security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
a retval convention.

Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.

[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-25 00:18:05 +10:00
James Morris 86abcf9ceb keys: annotate seqfile ops with __releases and __acquires
Annotate seqfile ops with __releases and __acquires to stop sparse
complaining about unbalanced locking.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2009-06-25 00:09:12 +10:00
Stephen Smalley 20dda18be9 selinux: restore optimization to selinux_file_permission
Restore the optimization to skip revalidation in selinux_file_permission
if nothing has changed since the dentry_open checks, accidentally removed by
389fb800.  Also remove redundant test from selinux_revalidate_file_permission.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-23 08:19:58 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa 56f8c9bc41 TOMOYO: Remove next_domain from tomoyo_find_next_domain().
We can update bprm->cred->security inside tomoyo_find_next_domain().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-19 18:48:18 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa ccf135f509 TOMOYO: Move tomoyo_delete_domain().
We can mark tomoyo_delete_domain() as a "static" function
by moving it from domain.c to common.c .

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-19 11:32:37 +10:00
James Morris d905163c5b Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-06-19 08:20:55 +10:00
Li Zefan cd5008196f devcgroup: skip superfluous checks when found the DEV_ALL elem
While walking through the whitelist, if the DEV_ALL item is found, no more
check is needed.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-06-18 13:03:47 -07:00
KaiGai Kohei 44c2d9bdd7 Add audit messages on type boundary violations
The attached patch adds support to generate audit messages on two cases.

The first one is a case when a multi-thread process tries to switch its
performing security context using setcon(3), but new security context is
not bounded by the old one.

  type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245311998.599:17):        \
      op=security_bounded_transition result=denied      \
      oldcontext=system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0           \
      newcontext=system_u:system_r:guest_webapp_t:s0

The other one is a case when security_compute_av() masked any permissions
due to the type boundary violation.

  type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245312836.035:32):	\
      op=security_compute_av reason=bounds              \
      scontext=system_u:object_r:user_webapp_t:s0       \
      tcontext=system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0:c0         \
      tclass=file perms=getattr,open

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-19 00:12:28 +10:00
KaiGai Kohei caabbdc07d cleanup in ss/services.c
It is a cleanup patch to cut down a line within 80 columns.

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |    6 +++---
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-18 21:53:44 +10:00
David S. Miller 9cbc1cb8cd Merge branch 'master' of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Conflicts:
	Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt
	drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c
	net/core/drop_monitor.c
	net/core/net-traces.c
2009-06-15 03:02:23 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 3296ca27f5 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits)
  nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition.
  TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
  TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
  integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
  TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
  security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
  TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
  TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
  SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
  TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
  tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
  smack: Remove redundant initialization.
  integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
  rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
  smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
  integrity: move ima_counts_get
  integrity: path_check update
  IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
  IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
  selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
  ...
2009-06-11 10:01:41 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 20f3f3ca49 Merge branch 'rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  rcu: rcu_sched_grace_period(): kill the bogus flush_signals()
  rculist: use list_entry_rcu in places where it's appropriate
  rculist.h: introduce list_entry_rcu() and list_first_entry_rcu()
  rcu: Update RCU tracing documentation for __rcu_pending
  rcu: Add __rcu_pending tracing to hierarchical RCU
  RCU: make treercu be default
2009-06-10 19:50:03 -07:00
Tetsuo Handa c3fa109a58 TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
This patch adds some descriptions of lists and structures.
This patch contains no code changes.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-09 09:30:24 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa 5bf1692f65 TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
TOMOYO 2.2.0 is not using total_len field of "struct tomoyo_path_info".

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-09 09:30:21 +10:00
James Morris 0b4ec6e4e0 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-06-09 09:27:53 +10:00
Mimi Zohar 04288f4203 integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
Until we start appraising measurements, the ima_path_check()
return code should always be 0.

- Update the ima_path_check() return code comment
- Instead of the pr_info, audit the dentry_open failure

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-05 08:02:39 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa bcb86975db TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
TOMOYO 2.2.0 does not check argv[] and envp[] upon execve().
We don't need to pass "struct tomoyo_page_buffer".

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-04 17:35:18 +10:00
Christoph Lameter e0a94c2a63 security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY.
It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096.

mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes
with CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-04 12:07:48 +10:00
Eric Dumazet adf30907d6 net: skb->dst accessors
Define three accessors to get/set dst attached to a skb

struct dst_entry *skb_dst(const struct sk_buff *skb)

void skb_dst_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *dst)

void skb_dst_drop(struct sk_buff *skb)
This one should replace occurrences of :
dst_release(skb->dst)
skb->dst = NULL;

Delete skb->dst field

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-06-03 02:51:04 -07:00
Tetsuo Handa 7d2948b124 TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
We can directly assign the result of tomoyo_io_printf() to done flag.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-03 07:51:51 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa ab588ccadc TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
Remove '/***** START/STOP *****/' markers.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-03 07:50:06 +10:00
Eric Paris 850b0cee16 SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
Audit trees defined 2 new netlink messages but the netlink mapping tables for
selinux permissions were not set up.  This patch maps these 2 new operations
to AUDIT_WRITE.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-03 07:44:53 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa fe67e6f2d6 TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
I forgot to remove on TOMOYO's 15th posting.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-02 21:19:54 +10:00
Serge E. Hallyn fbeb4a9c20 tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
Use task_cred_xxx(task, security) in tomoyo_real_domain() to
avoid a get+put of the target cred.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-02 15:13:13 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa 13b297d943 smack: Remove redundant initialization.
We don't need to explicitly initialize to cap_* because
it will be filled by security_fixup_ops().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-28 11:57:09 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa 76b0187525 rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
We don't need to explicitly initialize to cap_* because
it will be filled by security_fixup_ops().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-27 13:30:46 +10:00
Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski b1338d199d tomoyo: add missing call to cap_bprm_set_creds
cap_bprm_set_creds() has to be called from security_bprm_set_creds().
TOMOYO forgot to call cap_bprm_set_creds() from tomoyo_bprm_set_creds()
and suid executables were not being working.

Make sure we call cap_bprm_set_creds() with TOMOYO, to set credentials
properly inside tomoyo_bprm_set_creds().

Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton@mandriva.com.br>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-27 09:46:48 +10:00
James Morris 2c9e703c61 Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	fs/exec.c

Removed IMA changes (the IMA checks are now performed via may_open()).

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22 18:40:59 +10:00
Roel Kluin 6470c077ca smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
Do not go beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data

Signed-off-by: Roel Kluin <roel.kluin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22 12:34:48 +10:00
Mimi Zohar b9fc745db8 integrity: path_check update
- Add support in ima_path_check() for integrity checking without
incrementing the counts. (Required for nfsd.)
- rename and export opencount_get to ima_counts_get
- replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_counts_get
- export ima_path_check

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22 09:43:41 +10:00
Eric Paris 932995f0ce IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
A number of IMA functions only used during init are not marked with __init.
Add those notations so they are freed automatically.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22 09:34:21 +10:00
Eric Paris 5789ba3bd0 IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
The IMA TCB policy is dangerous.  A normal use can use all of a system's
memory (which cannot be freed) simply by building and running lots of
executables.  The TCB policy is also nearly useless because logging in as root
often causes a policy violation when dealing with utmp, thus rendering the
measurements meaningless.

There is no good fix for this in the kernel.  A full TCB policy would need to
be loaded in userspace using LSM rule matching to get both a protected and
useful system.  But, if too little is measured before userspace can load a real
policy one again ends up with a meaningless set of measurements.  One option
would be to put the policy load inside the initrd in order to get it early
enough in the boot sequence to be useful, but this runs into trouble with the
LSM.  For IMA to measure the LSM policy and the LSM policy loading mechanism
it needs rules to do so, but we already talked about problems with defaulting
to such broad rules....

IMA also depends on the files being measured to be on an FS which implements
and supports i_version.  Since the only FS with this support (ext4) doesn't
even use it by default it seems silly to have any IMA rules by default.

This should reduce the performance overhead of IMA to near 0 while still
letting users who choose to configure their machine as such to inclue the
ima_tcb kernel paramenter and get measurements during boot before they can
load a customized, reasonable policy in userspace.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22 09:31:20 +10:00
Stephen Smalley c5642f4bba selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
On Tue, 2009-05-19 at 00:05 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote:
> Recent versions of coreutils have bumped the read buffer size from 4K to
> 32K in several of the utilities.
>
> This means that "cat /selinux/booleans/xserver_object_manager" no longer
> works, it returns "Invalid argument" on F11.  getsebool works fine.
>
> sel_read_bool has a check for "count > PAGE_SIZE" that doesn't seem to
> be present in the other read functions.  Maybe it could be removed?

Yes, that check is obsoleted by the conversion of those functions to
using simple_read_from_buffer(), which will reduce count if necessary to
what is available in the buffer.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-19 23:56:11 +10:00
Eric Paris 75834fc3b6 SELinux: move SELINUX_MAGIC into magic.h
The selinuxfs superblock magic is used inside the IMA code, but is being
defined in two places and could someday get out of sync.  This patch moves the
declaration into magic.h so it is only done once.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-19 08:19:00 +10:00
Eric Paris c3d20103d0 IMA: do not measure everything opened by root by default
The IMA default policy measures every single file opened by root.  This is
terrible for most users.  Consider a system (like mine) with virtual machine
images.  When those images are touched (which happens at boot for me) those
images are measured.  This is just way too much for the default case.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-15 09:55:44 +10:00
Eric Paris f850a7c040 IMA: remove read permissions on the ima policy file
The IMA policy file does not implement read.  Trying to just open/read/close
the file will load a blank policy and you cannot then change the policy
without a reboot.  This removes the read permission from the file so one must
at least be attempting to write...

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-15 09:55:41 +10:00
Eric Paris d93e4c940f securityfs: securityfs_remove should handle IS_ERR pointers
Both of the securityfs users (TPM and IMA) can call securityfs_remove and pass
an IS_ERR(dentry) in their failure paths.  This patch handles those rather
than panicing when it tries to start deferencing some negative memory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-12 11:06:11 +10:00
Eric Paris 1a62e958fa IMA: open all files O_LARGEFILE
If IMA tried to measure a file which was larger than 4G dentry_open would fail
with -EOVERFLOW since IMA wasn't passing O_LARGEFILE.  This patch passes
O_LARGEFILE to all IMA opens to avoid this problem.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-12 11:06:08 +10:00
Eric Paris f06dd16a03 IMA: Handle dentry_open failures
Currently IMA does not handle failures from dentry_open().  This means that we
leave a pointer set to ERR_PTR(errno) and then try to use it just a few lines
later in fput().  Oops.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-12 11:06:04 +10:00
Eric Paris 37bcbf13d3 IMA: use current_cred() instead of current->cred
Proper invocation of the current credentials is to use current_cred() not
current->cred.  This patches makes IMA use the new method.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-12 11:06:01 +10:00
Al Viro e24977d45f Reduce path_lookup() abuses
... use kern_path() where possible

[folded a fix from rdd]

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-05-09 10:49:42 -04:00
James Morris d254117099 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-05-08 17:56:47 +10:00
Mimi Zohar 07ff7a0b18 integrity: remove __setup auditing msgs
Remove integrity audit messages from __setup()

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-06 10:35:59 +10:00
Mimi Zohar e5e520a715 integrity: use audit_log_string
Based on a request from Eric Paris to simplify parsing, replace
audit_log_format statements containing "%s" with audit_log_string().

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-06 10:35:56 +10:00
Mimi Zohar 53fc0e2259 integrity: lsm audit rule matching fix
An audit subsystem change replaced AUDIT_EQUAL with Audit_equal.
Update calls to security_filter_rule_init()/match() to reflect
the change.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-06 10:35:53 +10:00
Stephen Smalley 65c90bca0d selinux: Fix send_sigiotask hook
The CRED patch incorrectly converted the SELinux send_sigiotask hook to
use the current task SID rather than the target task SID in its
permission check, yielding the wrong permission check.  This fixes the
hook function.  Detected by the ltp selinux testsuite and confirmed to
correct the test failure.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-05 08:31:03 +10:00
Oleg Nesterov ecd6de3c88 selinux: selinux_bprm_committed_creds() should wake up ->real_parent, not ->parent.
We shouldn't worry about the tracer if current is ptraced, exec() must not
succeed if the tracer has no rights to trace this task after cred changing.
But we should notify ->real_parent which is, well, real parent.

Also, we don't need _irq to take tasklist, and we don't need parent's
->siglock to wake_up_interruptible(real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit).
Since we hold tasklist, real_parent->signal must be stable. Otherwise
spin_lock(siglock) is not safe too and can't help anyway.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30 09:08:48 +10:00
David Howells 3bcac0263f SELinux: Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve()
Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve() in SELinux's post cred commit
hook.  This isn't really a security problem: if the SIGKILL came before the
credentials were changed, then we were right to receive it at the time, and
should honour it; if it came after the creds were changed, then we definitely
should honour it; and in any case, all that will happen is that the process
will be scrapped before it ever returns to userspace.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30 09:07:13 +10:00
Eric Paris 88c48db978 SELinux: drop secondary_ops->sysctl
We are still calling secondary_ops->sysctl even though the capabilities
module does not define a sysctl operation.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-30 08:45:56 +10:00
Etienne Basset defc433ba3 Smack: check for SMACK xattr validity in smack_inode_setxattr
the following patch moves checks for SMACK xattr validity
from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user)
to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-18 12:58:25 +10:00
Jiri Pirko 05725f7eb4 rculist: use list_entry_rcu in places where it's appropriate
Use previously introduced list_entry_rcu instead of an open-coded
list_entry + rcu_dereference combination.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com
LKML-Reference: <20090414181715.GA3634@psychotron.englab.brq.redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-04-15 12:05:25 +02:00
Tetsuo Handa 39826a1e17 tomoyo: version bump to 2.2.0.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-14 09:15:02 +10:00
Etienne Basset ecfcc53fef smack: implement logging V3
the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions.
This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does.
As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \

It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch :
0: no logging
1: log denied (default)
2: log accepted
3: log denied&accepted

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-14 09:00:23 +10:00
Etienne Basset 6e837fb152 smack: implement logging V3
This patch creates auditing functions usable by LSM to audit security
events. It provides standard dumping of FS, NET, task etc ... events
(code borrowed from SELinux)
and provides 2 callbacks to define LSM specific auditing, which should be
flexible enough to convert SELinux too.

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-14 09:00:19 +10:00
David Howells 34574dd10b keys: Handle there being no fallback destination keyring for request_key()
When request_key() is called, without there being any standard process
keyrings on which to fall back if a destination keyring is not specified, an
oops is liable to occur when construct_alloc_key() calls down_write() on
dest_keyring's semaphore.

Due to function inlining this may be seen as an oops in down_write() as called
from request_key_and_link().

This situation crops up during boot, where request_key() is called from within
the kernel (such as in CIFS mounts) where nobody is actually logged in, and so
PAM has not had a chance to create a session keyring and user keyrings to act
as the fallback.

To fix this, make construct_alloc_key() not attempt to cache a key if there is
no fallback key if no destination keyring is given specifically.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-09 10:41:19 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn 5bf37ec3e0 cap_prctl: don't set error to 0 at 'no_change'
One-liner: capsh --print is broken without this patch.

In certain cases, cap_prctl returns error > 0 for success.  However,
the 'no_change' label was always setting error to 0.  As a result,
for example, 'prctl(CAP_BSET_READ, N)' would always return 0.
It should return 1 if a process has N in its bounding set (as
by default it does).

I'm keeping the no_change label even though it's now functionally
the same as 'error'.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-09 09:12:03 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa a0558fc349 tomoyo: remove "undelete domain" command.
Since TOMOYO's policy management tools does not use the "undelete domain"
command, we decided to remove that command.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-07 16:08:56 +10:00
Tetsuo Handa 7ba5779533 tomoyo: remove "undelete domain" command.
Since TOMOYO's policy management tools does not use the "undelete domain"
command, we decided to remove that command.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-07 08:17:43 +10:00
David Howells 800a964787 CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles
Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
2009-04-03 16:42:40 +01:00
Linus Torvalds 8fe74cf053 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
  Remove two unneeded exports and make two symbols static in fs/mpage.c
  Cleanup after commit 585d3bc06f
  Trim includes of fdtable.h
  Don't crap into descriptor table in binfmt_som
  Trim includes in binfmt_elf
  Don't mess with descriptor table in load_elf_binary()
  Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h
  New helper - current_umask()
  check_unsafe_exec() doesn't care about signal handlers sharing
  New locking/refcounting for fs_struct
  Take fs_struct handling to new file (fs/fs_struct.c)
  Get rid of bumping fs_struct refcount in pivot_root(2)
  Kill unsharing fs_struct in __set_personality()
2009-04-02 21:09:10 -07:00
Li Zefan b4046f00ee devcgroup: avoid using cgroup_lock
There is nothing special that has to be protected by cgroup_lock,
so introduce devcgroup_mtuex for it's own use.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-02 19:04:55 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn b5f22a59c0 don't raise all privs on setuid-root file with fE set (v2)
Distributions face a backward compatibility problem with starting to use
file capabilities.  For instance, removing setuid root from ping and
doing setcap cap_net_raw=pe means that booting with an older kernel
or one compiled without file capabilities means ping won't work for
non-root users.

In order to replace the setuid root bit on a capability-unaware
program, one has to set the effective, or legacy, file capability,
which makes the capability effective immediately.  This patch
uses the legacy bit as a queue to not automatically add full
privilege to a setuid-root program.

So, with this patch, an ordinary setuid-root program will run with
privilege.  But if /bin/ping has both setuid-root and cap_net_raw in
fP and fE, then ping (when run by non-root user) will not run
with only cap_net_raw.

Changelog:
	Apr 2 2009: Print a message once when such a binary is loaded,
		as per James Morris' suggestion.
	Apr 2 2009: Fix the condition to only catch uid!=0 && euid==0.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-03 11:49:31 +11:00
KaiGai Kohei 8a6f83afd0 Permissive domain in userspace object manager
This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly.

Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive
domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode,
even if the global setting is enforcing mode.
However, we don't have an application program interface to inform
what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not.
It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL
and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly.

This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access
interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace.
If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required
access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should
allow any required actions, as the kernel doing.

This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at
context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions
without read_lock(&policy_rwlock).

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
 security/selinux/avc.c              |    2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    4 +++-
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |    4 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   30 +++++-------------------------
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-04-02 09:23:45 +11:00
Al Viro 5ad4e53bd5 Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly.  sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:27 -04:00
Etienne Basset 4303154e86 smack: Add a new '-CIPSO' option to the network address label configuration
This patch adds a new special option '-CIPSO' to the Smack subsystem. When used
in the netlabel list, it means "use CIPSO networking". A use case is when your
local network speaks CIPSO and you want also to connect to the unlabeled
Internet. This patch also add some documentation describing that. The patch
also corrects an oops when setting a '' SMACK64 xattr to a file.

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:37 +11:00
Paul Moore 07feee8f81 netlabel: Cleanup the Smack/NetLabel code to fix incoming TCP connections
This patch cleans up a lot of the Smack network access control code.  The
largest changes are to fix the labeling of incoming TCP connections in a
manner similar to the recent SELinux changes which use the
security_inet_conn_request() hook to label the request_sock and let the label
move to the child socket via the normal network stack mechanisms.  In addition
to the incoming TCP connection fixes this patch also removes the smk_labled
field from the socket_smack struct as the minor optimization advantage was
outweighed by the difficulty in maintaining it's proper state.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:37 +11:00
Paul Moore 8651d5c0b1 lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook
The socket_post_accept() hook is not currently used by any in-tree modules
and its existence continues to cause problems by confusing people about
what can be safely accomplished using this hook.  If a legitimate need for
this hook arises in the future it can always be reintroduced.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:37 +11:00
Paul Moore 58bfbb51ff selinux: Remove the "compat_net" compatibility code
The SELinux "compat_net" is marked as deprecated, the time has come to
finally remove it from the kernel.  Further code simplifications are
likely in the future, but this patch was intended to be a simple,
straight-up removal of the compat_net code.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:37 +11:00
Paul Moore 389fb800ac netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux
The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but
only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of
standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality
imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints.  The problem is that network sockets
created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire
labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based
on the wire label of the remote peer.  The issue had to do with how IP options
were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in
relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child
sockets.  While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire
label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP
options of the remote peer.

This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook
locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming
connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook.  Besides the
correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant
is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks
which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get
ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies
the NetLabel/SELinux glue code.  In the process of developing this patch I
also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been
fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:36 +11:00
Tetsuo Handa a106cbfd1f TOMOYO: Fix a typo.
Fix a typo.

Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 19:03:44 +11:00
Etienne Basset 7198e2eeb4 smack: convert smack to standard linux lists
the following patch (on top of 2.6.29) converts Smack lists to standard linux lists
Please review and consider for inclusion in 2.6.30-rc

regards,
Etienne

Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2009-03-26 09:17:04 +11:00
James Morris 703a3cd728 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-03-24 10:52:46 +11:00
Eric Paris df7f54c012 SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry drop no dentry printk
Drop the printk message when an inode is found without an associated
dentry.  This should only happen when userspace can't be accessing those
inodes and those labels will get set correctly on the next d_instantiate.
Thus there is no reason to send this message.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-10 08:40:02 +11:00
Eric Paris dd34b5d75a SELinux: new permission between tty audit and audit socket
New selinux permission to separate the ability to turn on tty auditing from
the ability to set audit rules.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-06 08:50:21 +11:00
Eric Paris 6a25b27d60 SELinux: open perm for sock files
When I did open permissions I didn't think any sockets would have an open.
Turns out AF_UNIX sockets can have an open when they are bound to the
filesystem namespace.  This patch adds a new SOCK_FILE__OPEN permission.
It's safe to add this as the open perms are already predicated on
capabilities and capabilities means we have unknown perm handling so
systems should be as backwards compatible as the policy wants them to
be.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=475224

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-06 08:50:18 +11:00
etienne 211a40c087 smack: fixes for unlabeled host support
The following patch (against 2.6.29rc5) fixes a few issues in the
smack/netlabel "unlabeled host support" functionnality that was added in
2.6.29rc.  It should go in before -final.

1) smack_host_label disregard a "0.0.0.0/0 @" rule (or other label),
preventing 'tagged' tasks to access Internet (many systems drop packets with
IP options)

2) netmasks were not handled correctly, they were stored in a way _not
equivalent_ to conversion to be32 (it was equivalent for /0, /8, /16, /24,
/32 masks but not other masks)

3) smack_netlbladdr prefixes (IP/mask) were not consistent (mask&IP was not
done), so there could have been different list entries for the same IP
prefix; if those entries had different labels, well ...

4) they were not sorted

1) 2) 3) are bugs, 4) is a more cosmetic issue.
The patch :

-creates a new helper smk_netlbladdr_insert to insert a smk_netlbladdr,
-sorted by netmask length

-use the new sorted nature of  smack_netlbladdrs list to simplify
 smack_host_label : the first match _will_ be the more specific

-corrects endianness issues in smk_write_netlbladdr &  netlbladdr_seq_show

Signed-off-by: <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-05 08:36:34 +11:00
etienne 113a0e4590 smack: fixes for unlabeled host support
The following patch (against 2.6.29rc5) fixes a few issues in the
smack/netlabel "unlabeled host support" functionnality that was added in
2.6.29rc.  It should go in before -final.

1) smack_host_label disregard a "0.0.0.0/0 @" rule (or other label),
preventing 'tagged' tasks to access Internet (many systems drop packets with
IP options)

2) netmasks were not handled correctly, they were stored in a way _not
equivalent_ to conversion to be32 (it was equivalent for /0, /8, /16, /24,
/32 masks but not other masks)

3) smack_netlbladdr prefixes (IP/mask) were not consistent (mask&IP was not
done), so there could have been different list entries for the same IP
prefix; if those entries had different labels, well ...

4) they were not sorted

1) 2) 3) are bugs, 4) is a more cosmetic issue.
The patch :

-creates a new helper smk_netlbladdr_insert to insert a smk_netlbladdr,
-sorted by netmask length

-use the new sorted nature of  smack_netlbladdrs list to simplify
 smack_host_label : the first match _will_ be the more specific

-corrects endianness issues in smk_write_netlbladdr &  netlbladdr_seq_show

Signed-off-by: <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-05 08:30:01 +11:00
Paul Moore d7f59dc464 selinux: Fix a panic in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()
Rick McNeal from LSI identified a panic in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()
caused by a certain sequence of SUNRPC operations.  The problem appears to be
due to the lack of NULL pointer checking in the function; this patch adds the
pointer checks so the function will exit safely in the cases where the socket
is not completely initialized.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-02 09:30:04 +11:00