Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dave Hansen d61172b4b6 mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
As discussed earlier, we attempt to enforce protection keys in
software.

However, the code checks all faults to ensure that they are not
violating protection key permissions.  It was assumed that all
faults are either write faults where we check PKRU[key].WD (write
disable) or read faults where we check the AD (access disable)
bit.

But, there is a third category of faults for protection keys:
instruction faults.  Instruction faults never run afoul of
protection keys because they do not affect instruction fetches.

So, plumb the PF_INSTR bit down in to the
arch_vma_access_permitted() function where we do the protection
key checks.

We also add a new FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION.  This is because
handle_mm_fault() is not passed the architecture-specific
error_code where we keep PF_INSTR, so we need to encode the
instruction fetch information in to the arch-generic fault
flags.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210224.96928009@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18 19:46:29 +01:00
Dave Hansen 1b2ee1266e mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
We try to enforce protection keys in software the same way that we
do in hardware.  (See long example below).

But, we only want to do this when accessing our *own* process's
memory.  If GDB set PKRU[6].AD=1 (disable access to PKEY 6), then
tried to PTRACE_POKE a target process which just happened to have
some mprotect_pkey(pkey=6) memory, we do *not* want to deny the
debugger access to that memory.  PKRU is fundamentally a
thread-local structure and we do not want to enforce it on access
to _another_ thread's data.

This gets especially tricky when we have workqueues or other
delayed-work mechanisms that might run in a random process's context.
We can check that we only enforce pkeys when operating on our *own* mm,
but delayed work gets performed when a random user context is active.
We might end up with a situation where a delayed-work gup fails when
running randomly under its "own" task but succeeds when running under
another process.  We want to avoid that.

To avoid that, we use the new GUP flag: FOLL_REMOTE and add a
fault flag: FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE.  They indicate that we are
walking an mm which is not guranteed to be the same as
current->mm and should not be subject to protection key
enforcement.

Thanks to Jerome Glisse for pointing out this scenario.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Boaz Harrosh <boaz@plexistor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dominik Dingel <dingel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dominik Vogt <vogt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@akamai.com>
Cc: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18 19:46:28 +01:00
Dave Hansen 33a709b25a mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
Today, for normal faults and page table walks, we check the VMA
and/or PTE to ensure that it is compatible with the action.  For
instance, if we get a write fault on a non-writeable VMA, we
SIGSEGV.

We try to do the same thing for protection keys.  Basically, we
try to make sure that if a user does this:

	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
	*ptr = foo;

they see the same effects with protection keys when they do this:

	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
	set_pkey(ptr, size, 4);
	wrpkru(0xffffff3f); // access disable pkey 4
	*ptr = foo;

The state to do that checking is in the VMA, but we also
sometimes have to do it on the page tables only, like when doing
a get_user_pages_fast() where we have no VMA.

We add two functions and expose them to generic code:

	arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_flags, write)
	arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write)

These are, of course, backed up in x86 arch code with checks
against the PTE or VMA's protection key.

But, there are also cases where we do not want to respect
protection keys.  When we ptrace(), for instance, we do not want
to apply the tracer's PKRU permissions to the PTEs from the
process being traced.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Boaz Harrosh <boaz@plexistor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dominik Dingel <dingel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dominik Vogt <vogt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210219.14D5D715@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18 09:32:44 +01:00
Dave Hansen 62e88b1c00 mm: Make arch_unmap()/bprm_mm_init() available to all architectures
The x86 MPX patch set calls arch_unmap() and arch_bprm_mm_init()
from fs/exec.c, so we need at least a stub for them in all
architectures.  They are only called under an #ifdef for
CONFIG_MMU=y, so we can at least restict this to architectures
with MMU support.

blackfin/c6x have no MMU support, so do not call arch_unmap().
They also do not include mm_hooks.h or mmu_context.h at all and
do not need to be touched.

s390, um and unicore32 do not use asm-generic/mm_hooks.h, so got
their own arch_unmap() versions.  (I also moved um's
arch_dup_mmap() to be closer to the other mm_hooks.h functions).

xtensa only includes mm_hooks when MMU=y, which should be fine
since arch_unmap() is called only from MMU=y code.

For the rest, we use the stub copies of these functions in
asm-generic/mm_hook.h.

I cross compiled defconfigs for cris (to check NOMMU) and s390
to make sure that this works.  I also checked a 64-bit build
of UML and all my normal x86 builds including PARAVIRT on and
off.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141118182350.8B4AA2C2@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2014-11-19 11:54:13 +01:00
Jeremy Fitzhardinge d6dd61c831 [PATCH] x86: PARAVIRT: add hooks to intercept mm creation and destruction
Add hooks to allow a paravirt implementation to track the lifetime of
an mm.  Paravirtualization requires three hooks, but only two are
needed in common code.  They are:

arch_dup_mmap, which is called when a new mmap is created at fork

arch_exit_mmap, which is called when the last process reference to an
  mm is dropped, which typically happens on exit and exec.

The third hook is activate_mm, which is called from the arch-specific
activate_mm() macro/function, and so doesn't need stub versions for
other architectures.  It's called when an mm is first used.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@SteelEye.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2007-05-02 19:27:14 +02:00