Cosmetic. Change setup_new_exec() and task_dumpable() to use
SUID_DUMPABLE_ENABLED for /bin/grep.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Create a new header file, fs/coredump.h, which contains functions only
used by the new coredump.c. It also moves do_coredump to the
include/linux/coredump.h header file, for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Alex Kelly <alex.page.kelly@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This prepares for making core dump functionality optional.
The variable "suid_dumpable" and associated functions are left in fs/exec.c
because they're used elsewhere, such as in ptrace.
Signed-off-by: Alex Kelly <alex.page.kelly@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Selected by __ARCH_WANT_SYS_EXECVE in unistd.h. Requires
* working current_pt_regs()
* *NOT* doing a syscall-in-kernel kind of kernel_execve()
implementation. Using generic kernel_execve() is fine.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
based mostly on arm and alpha versions. Architectures can define
__ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE and use it, provided that
* they have working current_pt_regs(), even for kernel threads.
* kernel_thread-spawned threads do have space for pt_regs
in the normal location. Normally that's as simple as switching to
generic kernel_thread() and making sure that kernel threads do *not*
go through return from syscall path; call the payload from equivalent
of ret_from_fork if we are in a kernel thread (or just have separate
ret_from_kernel_thread and make copy_thread() use it instead of
ret_from_fork in kernel thread case).
* they have ret_from_kernel_execve(); it is called after
successful do_execve() done by kernel_execve() and gets normal
pt_regs location passed to it as argument. It's essentially
a longjmp() analog - it should set sp, etc. to the situation
expected at the return for syscall and go there. Eventually
the need for that sucker will disappear, but that'll take some
surgery on kernel_thread() payloads.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull second vfs pile from Al Viro:
"The stuff in there: fsfreeze deadlock fixes by Jan (essentially, the
deadlock reproduced by xfstests 068), symlink and hardlink restriction
patches, plus assorted cleanups and fixes.
Note that another fsfreeze deadlock (emergency thaw one) is *not*
dealt with - the series by Fernando conflicts a lot with Jan's, breaks
userland ABI (FIFREEZE semantics gets changed) and trades the deadlock
for massive vfsmount leak; this is going to be handled next cycle.
There probably will be another pull request, but that stuff won't be
in it."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to unrelated changes next to each other in
drivers/{staging/gdm72xx/usb_boot.c, usb/gadget/storage_common.c}
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (54 commits)
delousing target_core_file a bit
Documentation: Correct s_umount state for freeze_fs/unfreeze_fs
fs: Remove old freezing mechanism
ext2: Implement freezing
btrfs: Convert to new freezing mechanism
nilfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism
ntfs: Convert to new freezing mechanism
fuse: Convert to new freezing mechanism
gfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism
ocfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism
xfs: Convert to new freezing code
ext4: Convert to new freezing mechanism
fs: Protect write paths by sb_start_write - sb_end_write
fs: Skip atime update on frozen filesystem
fs: Add freezing handling to mnt_want_write() / mnt_drop_write()
fs: Improve filesystem freezing handling
switch the protection of percpu_counter list to spinlock
nfsd: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex
btrfs: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex
fat: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex
...
In commit 898b374af6 ("exec: replace call_usermodehelper_pipe with use
of umh init function and resolve limit"), the core limits recursive
check value was changed from 0 to 1, but the corresponding comments were
not updated.
Signed-off-by: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When suid_dumpable=2, detect unsafe core_pattern settings and warn when
they are seen.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When the suid_dumpable sysctl is set to "2", and there is no core dump
pipe defined in the core_pattern sysctl, a local user can cause core files
to be written to root-writable directories, potentially with
user-controlled content.
This means an admin can unknowningly reintroduce a variation of
CVE-2006-2451, allowing local users to gain root privileges.
$ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable
2
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
core
$ ulimit -c unlimited
$ cd /
$ ls -l core
ls: cannot access core: No such file or directory
$ touch core
touch: cannot touch `core': Permission denied
$ OHAI="evil-string-here" ping localhost >/dev/null 2>&1 &
$ pid=$!
$ sleep 1
$ kill -SEGV $pid
$ ls -l core
-rw------- 1 root kees 458752 Jun 21 11:35 core
$ sudo strings core | grep evil
OHAI=evil-string-here
While cron has been fixed to abort reading a file when there is any
parse error, there are still other sensitive directories that will read
any file present and skip unparsable lines.
Instead of introducing a suid_dumpable=3 mode and breaking all users of
mode 2, this only disables the unsafe portion of mode 2 (writing to disk
via relative path). Most users of mode 2 (e.g. Chrome OS) already use
a core dump pipe handler, so this change will not break them. For the
situations where a pipe handler is not defined but mode 2 is still
active, crash dumps will only be written to fully qualified paths. If a
relative path is defined (e.g. the default "core" pattern), dump
attempts will trigger a printk yelling about the lack of a fully
qualified path.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Recently, glibc made a change to suppress sign-conversion warnings in
FD_SET (glibc commit ceb9e56b3d1). This uncovered an issue with the
kernel's definition of __NFDBITS if applications #include
<linux/types.h> after including <sys/select.h>. A build failure would
be seen when passing the -Werror=sign-compare and -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
flags to gcc.
It was suggested that the kernel should either match the glibc
definition of __NFDBITS or remove that entirely. The current in-kernel
uses of __NFDBITS can be replaced with BITS_PER_LONG, and there are no
uses of the related __FDELT and __FDMASK defines. Given that, we'll
continue the cleanup that was started with commit 8b3d1cda4f
("posix_types: Remove fd_set macros") and drop the remaining unused
macros.
Additionally, linux/time.h has similar macros defined that expand to
nothing so we'll remove those at the same time.
Reported-by: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
[ .. and fix up whitespace as per akpm ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
do_exit() and exec_mmap() call sync_mm_rss() before mm_release() does
put_user(clear_child_tid) which can update task->rss_stat and thus make
mm->rss_stat inconsistent. This triggers the "BUG:" printk in check_mm().
Let's fix this bug in the safest way, and optimize/cleanup this later.
Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This reverts commit 40af1bbdca.
It's horribly and utterly broken for at least the following reasons:
- calling sync_mm_rss() from mmput() is fundamentally wrong, because
there's absolutely no reason to believe that the task that does the
mmput() always does it on its own VM. Example: fork, ptrace, /proc -
you name it.
- calling it *after* having done mmdrop() on it is doubly insane, since
the mm struct may well be gone now.
- testing mm against NULL before you call it is insane too, since a
NULL mm there would have caused oopses long before.
.. and those are just the three bugs I found before I decided to give up
looking for me and revert it asap. I should have caught it before I
even took it, but I trusted Andrew too much.
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mm->rss_stat counters have per-task delta: task->rss_stat. Before
changing task->mm pointer the kernel must flush this delta with
sync_mm_rss().
do_exit() already calls sync_mm_rss() to flush the rss-counters before
committing the rss statistics into task->signal->maxrss, taskstats,
audit and other stuff. Unfortunately the kernel does this before
calling mm_release(), which can call put_user() for processing
task->clear_child_tid. So at this point we can trigger page-faults and
task->rss_stat becomes non-zero again. As a result mm->rss_stat becomes
inconsistent and check_mm() will print something like this:
| BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:ffff88020813c380 idx:1 val:-1
| BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:ffff88020813c380 idx:2 val:1
This patch moves sync_mm_rss() into mm_release(), and moves mm_release()
out of do_exit() and calls it earlier. After mm_release() there should
be no pagefaults.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.4.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
Pull fpu state cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree streamlines further aspects of FPU handling by eliminating
the prepare_to_copy() complication and moving that logic to
arch_dup_task_struct().
It also fixes the FPU dumps in threaded core dumps, removes and old
(and now invalid) assumption plus micro-optimizes the exit path by
avoiding an FPU save for dead tasks."
Fixed up trivial add-add conflict in arch/sh/kernel/process.c that came
in because we now do the FPU handling in arch_dup_task_struct() rather
than the legacy (and now gone) prepare_to_copy().
* 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86, fpu: drop the fpu state during thread exit
x86, xsave: remove thread_has_fpu() bug check in __sanitize_i387_state()
coredump: ensure the fpu state is flushed for proper multi-threaded core dump
fork: move the real prepare_to_copy() users to arch_dup_task_struct()
Nalluru reported hitting the BUG_ON(__thread_has_fpu(tsk)) in
arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c:__sanitize_i387_state() during the coredump
of a multi-threaded application.
A look at the exit seqeuence shows that other threads can still be on the
runqueue potentially at the below shown exit_mm() code snippet:
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&core_state->nr_threads))
complete(&core_state->startup);
===> other threads can still be active here, but we notify the thread
===> dumping core to wakeup from the coredump_wait() after the last thread
===> joins this point. Core dumping thread will continue dumping
===> all the threads state to the core file.
for (;;) {
set_task_state(tsk, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!self.task) /* see coredump_finish() */
break;
schedule();
}
As some of those threads are on the runqueue and didn't call schedule() yet,
their fpu state is still active in the live registers and the thread
proceeding with the coredump will hit the above mentioned BUG_ON while
trying to dump other threads fpustate to the coredump file.
BUG_ON() in arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c:__sanitize_i387_state() is
in the code paths for processors supporting xsaveopt. With or without
xsaveopt, multi-threaded coredump is broken and maynot contain
the correct fpustate at the time of exit.
In coredump_wait(), wait for all the threads to be come inactive, so
that we are sure all the extended register state is flushed to
the memory, so that it can be reliably copied to the core file.
Reported-by: Suresh Nalluru <suresh@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1336692811-30576-2-git-send-email-suresh.b.siddha@intel.com
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
1. TRACE_EVENT(sched_process_exec) forgets to actually use the
old pid argument, it sets ->old_pid = p->pid.
2. search_binary_handler() uses the wrong pid number. tracepoint
needs the global pid_t from the root namespace, while old_pid
is the virtual pid number as it seen by the tracer/parent.
With this patch we have two pid_t's in search_binary_handler(),
not really nice. Perhaps we should switch to "struct pid*", but
in this case it would be better to cleanup the current code
first and move the "depth == 0" code outside.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120330162636.GA4857@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
syscalls.
This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}
* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
x32: Add ptrace for x32
x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
x32: Add x32 VDSO support
x32: Allow x32 to be configured
x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
x32: Handle process creation
x32: Signal-related system calls
x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h>
...
asm/system.h is a cause of circular dependency problems because it contains
commonly used primitive stuff like barrier definitions and uncommonly used
stuff like switch_to() that might require MMU definitions.
asm/system.h has been disintegrated by this point on all arches into the
following common segments:
(1) asm/barrier.h
Moved memory barrier definitions here.
(2) asm/cmpxchg.h
Moved xchg() and cmpxchg() here. #included in asm/atomic.h.
(3) asm/bug.h
Moved die() and similar here.
(4) asm/exec.h
Moved arch_align_stack() here.
(5) asm/elf.h
Moved AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH here.
(6) asm/switch_to.h
Moved switch_to() here.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Merge first batch of patches from Andrew Morton:
"A few misc things and all the MM queue"
* emailed from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (92 commits)
memcg: avoid THP split in task migration
thp: add HPAGE_PMD_* definitions for !CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
memcg: clean up existing move charge code
mm/memcontrol.c: remove unnecessary 'break' in mem_cgroup_read()
mm/memcontrol.c: remove redundant BUG_ON() in mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
mm/memcontrol.c: s/stealed/stolen/
memcg: fix performance of mem_cgroup_begin_update_page_stat()
memcg: remove PCG_FILE_MAPPED
memcg: use new logic for page stat accounting
memcg: remove PCG_MOVE_LOCK flag from page_cgroup
memcg: simplify move_account() check
memcg: remove EXPORT_SYMBOL(mem_cgroup_update_page_stat)
memcg: kill dead prev_priority stubs
memcg: remove PCG_CACHE page_cgroup flag
memcg: let css_get_next() rely upon rcu_read_lock()
cgroup: revert ss_id_lock to spinlock
idr: make idr_get_next() good for rcu_read_lock()
memcg: remove unnecessary thp check in page stat accounting
memcg: remove redundant returns
memcg: enum lru_list lru
...
sync_mm_rss() can only be used for current to avoid race conditions in
iterating and clearing its per-task counters. Remove the task argument
for it and its helper function, __sync_task_rss_stat(), to avoid thinking
it can be used safely for anything other than current.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull vfs pile 1 from Al Viro:
"This is _not_ all; in particular, Miklos' and Jan's stuff is not there
yet."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (64 commits)
ext4: initialization of ext4_li_mtx needs to be done earlier
debugfs-related mode_t whack-a-mole
hfsplus: add an ioctl to bless files
hfsplus: change finder_info to u32
hfsplus: initialise userflags
qnx4: new helper - try_extent()
qnx4: get rid of qnx4_bread/qnx4_getblk
take removal of PF_FORKNOEXEC to flush_old_exec()
trim includes in inode.c
um: uml_dup_mmap() relies on ->mmap_sem being held, but activate_mm() doesn't hold it
um: embed ->stub_pages[] into mmu_context
gadgetfs: list_for_each_safe() misuse
ocfs2: fix leaks on failure exits in module_init
ecryptfs: make register_filesystem() the last potential failure exit
ntfs: forgets to unregister sysctls on register_filesystem() failure
logfs: missing cleanup on register_filesystem() failure
jfs: mising cleanup on register_filesystem() failure
make configfs_pin_fs() return root dentry on success
configfs: configfs_create_dir() has parent dentry in dentry->d_parent
configfs: sanitize configfs_create()
...
Pull kmap_atomic cleanup from Cong Wang.
It's been in -next for a long time, and it gets rid of the (no longer
used) second argument to k[un]map_atomic().
Fix up a few trivial conflicts in various drivers, and do an "evil
merge" to catch some new uses that have come in since Cong's tree.
* 'kmap_atomic' of git://github.com/congwang/linux: (59 commits)
feature-removal-schedule.txt: schedule the deprecated form of kmap_atomic() for removal
highmem: kill all __kmap_atomic() [swarren@nvidia.com: highmem: Fix ARM build break due to __kmap_atomic rename]
drbd: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
zcache: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
gma500: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
dm: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
tomoyo: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
sunrpc: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
rds: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
net: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
mm: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
lib: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
power: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
kdb: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
udf: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
ubifs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
squashfs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
reiserfs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
ocfs2: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
ntfs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
...
Minor cleanup. de_thread()->setmax_mm_hiwater_rss() looks a bit
strange, move it into exec_mmap() which plays with old_mm.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
exit_notify() checks "tsk->self_exec_id != tsk->parent_exec_id"
to handle the "we have changed execution domain" case.
We can change do_thread() to always set ->exit_signal = SIGCHLD
and remove this check to simplify the code.
We could change setup_new_exec() instead, this looks more logical
because it increments ->self_exec_id. But note that de_thread()
already resets ->exit_signal if it changes the leader, let's keep
both changes close to each other.
Note that we change ->exit_signal lockless, this changes the rules.
Thereafter ->exit_signal is not stable under tasklist but this is
fine, the only possible change is OLDSIG -> SIGCHLD. This can race
with eligible_child() but the race is harmless. We can race with
reparent_leader() which changes our ->exit_signal in parallel, but
it does the same change to SIGCHLD.
The noticeable user-visible change is that the execing task is not
"visible" to do_wait()->eligible_child(__WCLONE) right after exec.
To me this looks more logical, and this is consistent with mt case.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that CLONE_VFORK is killable, coredump_wait() no longer needs
complete_vfork_done(). zap_threads() should find and kill all tasks with
the same ->mm, this includes our parent if ->vfork_done is set.
mm_release() becomes the only caller, unexport complete_vfork_done().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
No functional changes.
Move the clear-and-complete-vfork_done code into the new trivial helper,
complete_vfork_done().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Added a minimal exec tracepoint. Exec is an important major event
in the life of a task, like fork(), clone() or exit(), all of
which we already trace.
[ We also do scheduling re-balancing during exec() - so it's useful
from a scheduler instrumentation POV as well. ]
If you want to watch a task start up, when it gets exec'ed is a good place
to start. With the addition of this tracepoint, exec's can be monitored
and better picture of general system activity can be obtained. This
tracepoint will also enable better process life tracking, allowing you to
answer questions like "what process keeps starting up binary X?".
This tracepoint can also be useful in ftrace filtering and trigger
conditions: i.e. starting or stopping filtering when exec is called.
Signed-off-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4F314D19.7030504@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Replace the fd_sets in struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longs and then
use the standard non-atomic bit operations rather than the FD_* macros.
This:
(1) Removes the abuses of struct fd_set:
(a) Since we don't want to allocate a full fd_set the vast majority of the
time, we actually, in effect, just allocate a just-big-enough array of
unsigned longs and cast it to an fd_set type - so why bother with the
fd_set at all?
(b) Some places outside of the core fdtable handling code (such as
SELinux) want to look inside the array of unsigned longs hidden inside
the fd_set struct for more efficient iteration over the entire set.
(2) Eliminates the use of FD_*() macros in the kernel completely.
(3) Permits the __FD_*() macros to be deleted entirely where not exposed to
userspace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174954.23314.48147.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and
close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we
abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under
normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the
fd_sets.
The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted,
since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths.
This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing
close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags:
void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because
they require the caller to hold a lock to use them.
Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the
the array. Possibly that should exist too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Setting the task name is done within setup_new_exec() by accessing
bprm->filename. However this happens after flush_old_exec().
This may result in a use after free bug, flush_old_exec() may
"complete" vfork_done, which will wake up the parent which in turn
may free the passed in filename.
To fix this add a new tcomm field in struct linux_binprm which
contains the now early generated task name until it is used.
Fixes this bug on s390:
Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference at virtual kernel address 0000000039768000
Process kworker/u:3 (pid: 245, task: 000000003a3dc840, ksp: 0000000039453818)
Krnl PSW : 0704000180000000 0000000000282e94 (setup_new_exec+0xa0/0x374)
Call Trace:
([<0000000000282e2c>] setup_new_exec+0x38/0x374)
[<00000000002dd12e>] load_elf_binary+0x402/0x1bf4
[<0000000000280a42>] search_binary_handler+0x38e/0x5bc
[<0000000000282b6c>] do_execve_common+0x410/0x514
[<0000000000282cb6>] do_execve+0x46/0x58
[<00000000005bce58>] kernel_execve+0x28/0x70
[<000000000014ba2e>] ____call_usermodehelper+0x102/0x140
[<00000000005bc8da>] kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc
[<00000000005bc8d4>] kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc
Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[<00000000002830f0>] setup_new_exec+0x2fc/0x374
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops
Reported-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer. One of
problem is that it's inherited at fork(). When a daemon set oom_score_adj
and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set.
This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds
3 trace points.
- creating new task
- renaming a task (exec)
- set oom_score_adj
To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as
# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable
# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable
output will be like this.
# grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
bash-7699 [007] d..3 5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699 [007] ...1 5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
ls-7729 [003] ...2 5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699 [002] ...1 5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
grep-7730 [007] ...2 5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000
Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
some stuff in there can actually become static; some belongs to pnode.h
as it's a private interface between namespace.c and pnode.c...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This removes mm->oom_disable_count entirely since it's unnecessary and
currently buggy. The counter was intended to be per-process but it's
currently decremented in the exit path for each thread that exits, causing
it to underflow.
The count was originally intended to prevent oom killing threads that
share memory with threads that cannot be killed since it doesn't lead to
future memory freeing. The counter could be fixed to represent all
threads sharing the same mm, but it's better to remove the count since:
- it is possible that the OOM_DISABLE thread sharing memory with the
victim is waiting on that thread to exit and will actually cause
future memory freeing, and
- there is no guarantee that a thread is disabled from oom killing just
because another thread sharing its mm is oom disabled.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC
check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and
similar functions.
Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed
number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on
rlimit only. But the check created new security threat: many poorly
written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it
cannot fail if executed with root privileges. So, the check is removed
in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to
buggy programs.
The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons
spawning user processes. Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve().
The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in
setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues.
Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the
limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag. With the change only
this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve()
behaviour is not changed.
Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still
exceeded at the moment of execve(). If the process was sleeping for
days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down
under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was
exceeded days ago would be unexpected. If the limit is not exceeded
anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork().
The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit
was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one.
Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag).
v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user().
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
acct_arg_size() takes ->page_table_lock around add_mm_counter() if
!SPLIT_RSS_COUNTING. This is not needed after commit 172703b08c ("mm:
delete non-atomic mm counter implementation").
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If CONFIG_MODULES=n, it makes no sense to retry the list of binary formats
handler because the list will not be modified by request_module().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, search_binary_handler() tries to load binary loader module
using request_module() if a loader for the requested program is not yet
loaded. But second attempt of request_module() does not affect the result
of search_binary_handler().
If request_module() triggered recursion, calling request_module() twice
causes 2 to the power of MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT (= 50) repetitions. It is
not an infinite loop but is sufficient for users to consider as a hang up.
Therefore, this patch changes not to call request_module() twice, making 1
to the power of MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT repetitions in case of recursion.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit a8bef8ff6e ("mm: migration: avoid race between
shift_arg_pages() and rmap_walk() during migration by not migrating
temporary stacks") introduced a BUG_ON() to ensure that VM_STACK_FLAGS
and VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP do not overlap. The check is a compile
time one, so BUILD_BUG_ON is more appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
do_coredump() assumes that if format_corename() fails it should return
-ENOMEM. This is not true, for example cn_print_exe_file() can propagate
the error from d_path. Even if it was true, this is too fragile. Change
the code to check "ispipe < 0".
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change every occurence of / in comm and hostname to !. If the process
changes its name to contain /, the core is not dumped (if the directory
tree doesn't exist like that). The same with hostname being something
like myhost/3. Fix this behaviour by using the escape loop used in %E.
(We extract it to a separate function.)
Now both with comm == myprocess/1 and hostname == myhost/1, the core is
dumped like (kernel.core_pattern='core.%p.%e.%h):
core.2349.myprocess!1.myhost!1
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If we don't know the file corresponding to the binary (i.e. exe_file is
unknown), use "task->comm (path unknown)" instead of simple "(unknown)"
as suggested by ak.
The fallback is the same as %e except it will append "(path unknown)".
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (107 commits)
vfs: use ERR_CAST for err-ptr tossing in lookup_instantiate_filp
isofs: Remove global fs lock
jffs2: fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() killing a directory
fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() on ramfs et.al.
mm/truncate.c: fix build for CONFIG_BLOCK not enabled
fs:update the NOTE of the file_operations structure
Remove dead code in dget_parent()
AFS: Fix silly characters in a comment
switch d_add_ci() to d_splice_alias() in "found negative" case as well
simplify gfs2_lookup()
jfs_lookup(): don't bother with . or ..
get rid of useless dget_parent() in btrfs rename() and link()
get rid of useless dget_parent() in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
fs: push i_mutex and filemap_write_and_wait down into ->fsync() handlers
drivers: fix up various ->llseek() implementations
fs: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA properly in all fs's that define their own llseek
Ext4: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA generically
Btrfs: implement our own ->llseek
fs: add SEEK_HOLE and SEEK_DATA flags
reiserfs: make reiserfs default to barrier=flush
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_super.c due to the new
shrinker callout for the inode cache, that clashed with the xfs code to
start the periodic workers later.
* 'ptrace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/oleg/misc: (39 commits)
ptrace: do_wait(traced_leader_killed_by_mt_exec) can block forever
ptrace: fix ptrace_signal() && STOP_DEQUEUED interaction
connector: add an event for monitoring process tracers
ptrace: dont send SIGSTOP on auto-attach if PT_SEIZED
ptrace: mv send-SIGSTOP from do_fork() to ptrace_init_task()
ptrace_init_task: initialize child->jobctl explicitly
has_stopped_jobs: s/task_is_stopped/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED/
ptrace: make former thread ID available via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG after PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop
ptrace: wait_consider_task: s/same_thread_group/ptrace_reparented/
ptrace: kill real_parent_is_ptracer() in in favor of ptrace_reparented()
ptrace: ptrace_reparented() should check same_thread_group()
redefine thread_group_leader() as exit_signal >= 0
do not change dead_task->exit_signal
kill task_detached()
reparent_leader: check EXIT_DEAD instead of task_detached()
make do_notify_parent() __must_check, update the callers
__ptrace_detach: avoid task_detached(), check do_notify_parent()
kill tracehook_notify_death()
make do_notify_parent() return bool
ptrace: s/tracehook_tracer_task()/ptrace_parent()/
...
Test-case:
void *tfunc(void *arg)
{
execvp("true", NULL);
return NULL;
}
int main(void)
{
int pid;
if (fork()) {
pthread_t t;
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, tfunc, NULL);
for (;;)
pause();
}
pid = getppid();
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0,0) == 0);
while (wait(NULL) > 0)
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0,0);
return 0;
}
It is racy, exit_notify() does __wake_up_parent() too. But in the
likely case it triggers the problem: de_thread() does release_task()
and the old leader goes away without the notification, the tracer
sleeps in do_wait() without children/tracees.
Change de_thread() to do __wake_up_parent(traced_leader->parent).
Since it is already EXIT_DEAD we can do this without ptrace_unlink(),
EXIT_DEAD threads do not exist from do_wait's pov.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
new helper: would_dump(bprm, file). Checks if we are allowed to
read the file and if we are not - sets ENFORCE_NODUMP. Exported,
used in places that previously open-coded the same logics.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When multithreaded program execs under ptrace,
all traced threads report WIFEXITED status, except for
thread group leader and the thread which execs.
Unless tracer tracks thread group relationship between tracees,
which is a nontrivial task, it will not detect that
execed thread no longer exists.
This patch allows tracer to figure out which thread
performed this exec, by requesting PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG
in PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop.
Another, samller problem which is solved by this patch
is that tracer now can figure out which of the several
concurrent execs in multithreaded program succeeded.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Change de_thread() to set old_leader->exit_signal = -1. This is
good for the consistency, it is no longer the leader and all
sub-threads have exit_signal = -1 set by copy_process(CLONE_THREAD).
And this allows us to micro-optimize thread_group_leader(), it can
simply check exit_signal >= 0. This also makes sense because we
should move ->group_leader from task_struct to signal_struct.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
At this point, tracehooks aren't useful to mainline kernel and mostly
just add an extra layer of obfuscation. Although they have comments,
without actual in-kernel users, it is difficult to tell what are their
assumptions and they're actually trying to achieve. To mainline
kernel, they just aren't worth keeping around.
This patch kills the following clone and exec related tracehooks.
tracehook_prepare_clone()
tracehook_finish_clone()
tracehook_report_clone()
tracehook_report_clone_complete()
tracehook_unsafe_exec()
The changes are mostly trivial - logic is moved to the caller and
comments are merged and adjusted appropriately.
The only exception is in check_unsafe_exec() where LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE*
are OR'd to bprm->unsafe instead of setting it, which produces the
same result as the field is always zero on entry. It also tests
p->ptrace instead of (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) for consistency, which
also gives the same result.
This doesn't introduce any behavior change.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
At this point, tracehooks aren't useful to mainline kernel and mostly
just add an extra layer of obfuscation. Although they have comments,
without actual in-kernel users, it is difficult to tell what are their
assumptions and they're actually trying to achieve. To mainline
kernel, they just aren't worth keeping around.
This patch kills the following trivial tracehooks.
* Ones testing whether task is ptraced. Replace with ->ptrace test.
tracehook_expect_breakpoints()
tracehook_consider_ignored_signal()
tracehook_consider_fatal_signal()
* ptrace_event() wrappers. Call directly.
tracehook_report_exec()
tracehook_report_exit()
tracehook_report_vfork_done()
* ptrace_release_task() wrapper. Call directly.
tracehook_finish_release_task()
* noop
tracehook_prepare_release_task()
tracehook_report_death()
This doesn't introduce any behavior change.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the
subprocess_inf::init() function. The problem is that commit
17f60a7da1 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits
to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with
prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function. This wipes
all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called.
The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to
the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init(). That
means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials
_before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the
system.
This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing
the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to
/sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to
instantiate the key. This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail
with ENOKEY unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This reverts commit 7f81c8890c.
It turns out that it's not actually a build-time check on x86-64 UML,
which does some seriously crazy stuff with VM_STACK_FLAGS.
The VM_STACK_FLAGS define depends on the arch-supplied
VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS value, and on x86-64 UML we have
arch/um/sys-x86_64/shared/sysdep/vm-flags.h:
#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS \
(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? vm_stack_flags32 : vm_stack_flags)
#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS vm_stack_flags
(yes, seriously: two different #define's for that thing, with the first
one being inside an "#ifdef TIF_IA32")
It's possible that it is UML that should just be fixed in this area, but
for now let's just undo the (very small) optimization.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit a8bef8ff6e ("mm: migration: avoid race between shift_arg_pages()
and rmap_walk() during migration by not migrating temporary stacks")
introduced a BUG_ON() to ensure that VM_STACK_FLAGS and
VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP do not overlap. The check is a compile time
one, so BUILD_BUG_ON is more appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Unconditionally changing the address limit to USER_DS and not restoring
it to its old value in the error path is wrong because it prevents us
using kernel memory on repeated calls to this function. This, in fact,
breaks the fallback of hard coded paths to the init program from being
ever successful if the first candidate fails to load.
With this patch applied switching to USER_DS is delayed until the point
of no return is reached which makes it possible to have a multi-arch
rootfs with one arch specific init binary for each of the (hard coded)
probed paths.
Since the address limit is already set to USER_DS when start_thread()
will be invoked, this redundancy can be safely removed.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
JOBCTL_TRAPPING indicates that ptracer is waiting for tracee to
(re)transit into TRACED. task_clear_jobctl_pending() must be called
when either tracee enters TRACED or the transition is cancelled for
some reason. The former is achieved by explicitly calling
task_clear_jobctl_pending() in ptrace_stop() and the latter by calling
it at the end of do_signal_stop().
Calling task_clear_jobctl_trapping() at the end of do_signal_stop()
limits the scope TRAPPING can be used and is fragile in that seemingly
unrelated changes to tracee's control flow can lead to stuck TRAPPING.
We already have task_clear_jobctl_pending() calls on those cancelling
events to clear JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING. Cancellations can be handled by
making those call sites use JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK instead and updating
task_clear_jobctl_pending() such that task_clear_jobctl_trapping() is
called automatically if no stop/trap is pending.
This patch makes the above changes and removes the fallback
task_clear_jobctl_trapping() call from do_signal_stop().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
This patch introduces JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK and replaces
task_clear_jobctl_stop_pending() with task_clear_jobctl_pending()
which takes an extra @mask argument.
JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK is currently equal to JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING but
future patches will add more bits. recalc_sigpending_tsk() is updated
to use JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK instead.
task_clear_jobctl_pending() takes @mask which in subset of
JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK and clears the relevant jobctl bits. If
JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING is set, other STOP bits are cleared together. All
task_clear_jobctl_stop_pending() users are updated to call
task_clear_jobctl_pending() with JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING which is
functionally identical to task_clear_jobctl_stop_pending().
This patch doesn't cause any functional change.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
signal->group_stop currently hosts mostly group stop related flags;
however, it's gonna be used for wider purposes and the GROUP_STOP_
flag prefix becomes confusing. Rename signal->group_stop to
signal->jobctl and rename all GROUP_STOP_* flags to JOBCTL_*.
Bit position macros JOBCTL_*_BIT are defined and JOBCTL_* flags are
defined in terms of them to allow using bitops later.
While at it, reassign JOBCTL_TRAPPING to bit 22 to better accomodate
future additions.
This doesn't cause any functional change.
-v2: JOBCTL_*_BIT macros added as suggested by Linus.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Now, exe_file is not proc FS dependent, so we can use it to name core
file. So we add %E pattern for core file name cration which extract path
from mm_struct->exe_file. Then it converts slashes to exclamation marks
and pastes the result to the core file name itself.
This is useful for environments where binary names are longer than 16
character (the current->comm limitation). Also where there are binaries
with same name but in a different path. Further in case the binery itself
changes its current->comm after exec.
So by doing (s/$/#/ -- # is treated as git comment):
$ sysctl kernel.core_pattern='core.%p.%e.%E'
$ ln /bin/cat cat45678901234567890
$ ./cat45678901234567890
^Z
$ rm cat45678901234567890
$ fg
^\Quit (core dumped)
$ ls core*
we now get:
core.2434.cat456789012345.!root!cat45678901234567890 (deleted)
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Setup and cleanup of mm_struct->exe_file is currently done in fs/proc/.
This was because exe_file was needed only for /proc/<pid>/exe. Since we
will need the exe_file functionality also for core dumps (so core name can
contain full binary path), built this functionality always into the
kernel.
To achieve that move that out of proc FS to the kernel/ where in fact it
should belong. By doing that we can make dup_mm_exe_file static. Also we
can drop linux/proc_fs.h inclusion in fs/exec.c and kernel/fork.c.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Rework the existing mmu_gather infrastructure.
The direct purpose of these patches was to allow preemptible mmu_gather,
but even without that I think these patches provide an improvement to the
status quo.
The first 9 patches rework the mmu_gather infrastructure. For review
purpose I've split them into generic and per-arch patches with the last of
those a generic cleanup.
The next patch provides generic RCU page-table freeing, and the followup
is a patch converting s390 to use this. I've also got 4 patches from
DaveM lined up (not included in this series) that uses this to implement
gup_fast() for sparc64.
Then there is one patch that extends the generic mmu_gather batching.
After that follow the mm preemptibility patches, these make part of the mm
a lot more preemptible. It converts i_mmap_lock and anon_vma->lock to
mutexes which together with the mmu_gather rework makes mmu_gather
preemptible as well.
Making i_mmap_lock a mutex also enables a clean-up of the truncate code.
This also allows for preemptible mmu_notifiers, something that XPMEM I
think wants.
Furthermore, it removes the new and universially detested unmap_mutex.
This patch:
Remove the first obstacle towards a fully preemptible mmu_gather.
The current scheme assumes mmu_gather is always done with preemption
disabled and uses per-cpu storage for the page batches. Change this to
try and allocate a page for batching and in case of failure, use a small
on-stack array to make some progress.
Preemptible mmu_gather is desired in general and usable once i_mmap_lock
becomes a mutex. Doing it before the mutex conversion saves us from
having to rework the code by moving the mmu_gather bits inside the
pte_lock.
Also avoid flushing the tlb batches from under the pte lock, this is
useful even without the i_mmap_lock conversion as it significantly reduces
pte lock hold times.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment tpyo]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently we have expand_upwards exported while expand_downwards is
accessible only via expand_stack or expand_stack_downwards.
check_stack_guard_page is a nice example of the asymmetry. It uses
expand_stack for VM_GROWSDOWN while expand_upwards is called for
VM_GROWSUP case.
Let's clean this up by exporting both functions and make those names
consistent. Let's use expand_{upwards,downwards} because expanding
doesn't always involve stack manipulation (an example is
ia64_do_page_fault which uses expand_upwards for registers backing store
expansion). expand_downwards has to be defined for both
CONFIG_STACK_GROWS{UP,DOWN} because get_arg_page calls the downwards
version in the early process initialization phase for growsup
configuration.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'tty-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty-2.6: (48 commits)
serial: 8250_pci: add support for Cronyx Omega PCI multiserial board.
tty/serial: Fix break handling for PORT_TEGRA
tty/serial: Add explicit PORT_TEGRA type
n_tracerouter and n_tracesink ldisc additions.
Intel PTI implementaiton of MIPI 1149.7.
Kernel documentation for the PTI feature.
export kernel call get_task_comm().
tty: Remove to support serial for S5P6442
pch_phub: Support new device ML7223
8250_pci: Add support for the Digi/IBM PCIe 2-port Adapter
ASoC: Update cx20442 for TTY API change
pch_uart: Support new device ML7223 IOH
parport: Use request_muxed_region for IT87 probe and lock
tty/serial: add support for Xilinx PS UART
n_gsm: Use print_hex_dump_bytes
drivers/tty/moxa.c: Put correct tty value
TTY: tty_io, annotate locking functions
TTY: serial_core, remove superfluous set_task_state
TTY: serial_core, remove invalid test
Char: moxa, fix locking in moxa_write
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c and
drivers/tty/serial/Makefile.
I did the hci_ldisc thing as an evil merge, cleaning things up.
This allows drivers who call this function to be compiled modularly.
Otherwise, a driver who is interested in this type of functionality
has to implement their own get_task_comm() call, causing code
duplication in the Linux source tree.
Signed-off-by: J Freyensee <james_p_freyensee@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Add the appropriate members into struct user_arg_ptr and teach
get_user_arg_ptr() to handle is_compat = T case correctly.
This allows us to remove the compat_do_execve() code from fs/compat.c
and reimplement compat_do_execve() as the trivial wrapper on top of
do_execve_common(is_compat => true).
In fact, this fixes another (minor) bug. "compat_uptr_t str" can
overflow after "str += len" in compat_copy_strings() if a 64bit
application execs via sys32_execve().
Unexport acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), fs/compat.c doesn't
need them any longer.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
No functional changes, preparation.
Introduce struct user_arg_ptr, change do_execve() paths to use it
instead of "char __user * const __user *argv".
This makes the argv/envp arguments opaque, we are ready to handle the
compat case which needs argv pointing to compat_uptr_t.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Introduce get_user_arg_ptr() helper, convert count() and copy_strings()
to use it.
No functional changes, preparation. This helper is trivial, it just
reads the pointer from argv/envp user-space array.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Currently task->signal->group_stop_count is used to decide whether to
stop for group stop. However, if there is a task in the group which
is taking a long time to stop, other tasks which are continued by
ptrace would repeatedly stop for the same group stop until the group
stop is complete.
Conversely, if a ptraced task is in TASK_TRACED state, the debugger
won't get notified of group stops which is inconsistent compared to
the ptraced task in any other state.
This patch introduces GROUP_STOP_PENDING which tracks whether a task
is yet to stop for the group stop in progress. The flag is set when a
group stop starts and cleared when the task stops the first time for
the group stop, and consulted whenever whether the task should
participate in a group stop needs to be determined. Note that now
tasks in TASK_TRACED also participate in group stop.
This results in the following behavior changes.
* For a single group stop, a ptracer would see at most one stop
reported.
* A ptracee in TASK_TRACED now also participates in group stop and the
tracer would get the notification. However, as a ptraced task could
be in TASK_STOPPED state or any ptrace trap could consume group
stop, the notification may still be missing. These will be
addressed with further patches.
* A ptracee may start a group stop while one is still in progress if
the tracer let it continue with stop signal delivery. Group stop
code handles this correctly.
Oleg:
* Spotted that a task might skip signal check even when its
GROUP_STOP_PENDING is set. Fixed by updating
recalc_sigpending_tsk() to check GROUP_STOP_PENDING instead of
group_stop_count.
* Pointed out that task->group_stop should be cleared whenever
task->signal->group_stop_count is cleared. Fixed accordingly.
* Pointed out the behavior inconsistency between TASK_TRACED and
RUNNING and the last behavior change.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Hi,
I was backporting the coredump over pipe feature and noticed this small typo,
I wish I would have something bigger to contribute...
>From 15d6080e0ed4267da103c706917a33b1015e8804 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Holger Hans Peter Freyther <holger@moiji-mobile.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2011 17:42:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fs: Fix a small typo in the comment
The function is called umh_pipe_setup not uhm_pipe_setup.
Signed-off-by: Holger Hans Peter Freyther <holger@moiji-mobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
take calculation of open_flags by open(2) arguments into new helper
in fs/open.c, move filp_open() over there, have it and do_sys_open()
use that helper, switch exec.c callers of do_filp_open() to explicit
(and constant) struct open_flags.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
FMODE_EXEC is a constant type of fmode_t but was used with normal integer
constants. This results in following warnings from sparse. Fix it using
new macro __FMODE_EXEC.
fs/exec.c:116:58: warning: restricted fmode_t degrades to integer
fs/exec.c:689:58: warning: restricted fmode_t degrades to integer
fs/fcntl.c:777:9: warning: restricted fmode_t degrades to integer
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the
vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local
attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting
the available pages for special mappings.
bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, and although I don't think this can
be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have
the security check.
$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
global _start
_start:
mov eax, __NR_pause
int 0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to
4096.
Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Robert Swiecki <swiecki@google.com>
[ Changed to not drop the error code - akpm ]
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Note: this patch targets 2.6.37 and tries to be as simple as possible.
That is why it adds more copy-and-paste horror into fs/compat.c and
uglifies fs/exec.c, this will be cleanuped later.
compat_copy_strings() plays with bprm->vma/mm directly and thus has
two problems: it lacks the RLIMIT_STACK check and argv/envp memory
is not visible to oom killer.
Export acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), change compat_copy_strings()
to use get_arg_page(), change compat_do_execve() to do acct_arg_size(0)
as do_execve() does.
Add the fatal_signal_pending/cond_resched checks into compat_count() and
compat_copy_strings(), this matches the code in fs/exec.c and certainly
makes sense.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Brad Spengler published a local memory-allocation DoS that
evades the OOM-killer (though not the virtual memory RLIMIT):
http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/64bit_dos.c
execve()->copy_strings() can allocate a lot of memory, but
this is not visible to oom-killer, nobody can see the nascent
bprm->mm and take it into account.
With this patch get_arg_page() increments current's MM_ANONPAGES
counter every time we allocate the new page for argv/envp. When
do_execve() succeds or fails, we change this counter back.
Technically this is not 100% correct, we can't know if the new
page is swapped out and turn MM_ANONPAGES into MM_SWAPENTS, but
I don't think this really matters and everything becomes correct
once exec changes ->mm or fails.
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Reviewed-and-discussed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Presently do_execve() turns PF_KTHREAD off before search_binary_handler().
THis has a theorical risk of PF_KTHREAD getting lost. We don't have to
turn PF_KTHREAD off in the ENOEXEC case.
This patch moves this flag modification to after the finding of the
executable file.
This is only a theorical issue because kthreads do not call do_execve()
directly. But fixing would be better.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We met a parameter truncated issue, consider following:
> echo "|/root/core_pattern_pipe_test %p /usr/libexec/blah-blah-blah \
%s %c %p %u %g 11 12345678901234567890123456789012345678 %t" > \
/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
This is okay because the strings is less than CORENAME_MAX_SIZE. "cat
/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern" shows the whole string. but after we run
core_pattern_pipe_test in man page, we found last parameter was truncated
like below:
argc[10]=<12807486>
The root cause is core_pattern allows % specifiers, which need to be
replaced during parse time, but the replace may expand the strings to
larger than CORENAME_MAX_SIZE. So if the last parameter is % specifiers,
the replace code is using snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr, ...), this
will write out of corename array.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Oleg Nesterov pointed out we have to prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec
itself and we can reuse ->cred_guard_mutex for it. Yes, concurrent
execve() has no worth.
Let's move ->cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct. It
naturally prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It's pointless to kill a task if another thread sharing its mm cannot be
killed to allow future memory freeing. A subsequent patch will prevent
kills in such cases, but first it's necessary to have a way to flag a task
that shares memory with an OOM_DISABLE task that doesn't incur an
additional tasklist scan, which would make select_bad_process() an O(n^2)
function.
This patch adds an atomic counter to struct mm_struct that follows how
many threads attached to it have an oom_score_adj of OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN.
They cannot be killed by the kernel, so their memory cannot be freed in
oom conditions.
This only requires task_lock() on the task that we're operating on, it
does not require mm->mmap_sem since task_lock() pins the mm and the
operation is atomic.
[rientjes@google.com: changelog and sys_unshare() code]
[rientjes@google.com: protect oom_disable_count with task_lock in fork]
[rientjes@google.com: use old_mm for oom_disable_count in exec]
Signed-off-by: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If you build aout support as a module, you'll want these exported.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tony Luck reports that the addition of the access_ok() check in commit
0eead9ab41 ("Don't dump task struct in a.out core-dumps") broke the
ia64 compile due to missing the necessary header file includes.
Rather than add yet another include (<asm/unistd.h>) to make everything
happy, just uninline the silly core dump helper functions and move the
bodies to fs/exec.c where they make a lot more sense.
dump_seek() in particular was too big to be an inline function anyway,
and none of them are in any way performance-critical. And we really
don't need to mess up our include file headers more than they already
are.
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
An execve with a very large total of argument/environment strings
can take a really long time in the execve system call. It runs
uninterruptibly to count and copy all the strings. This change
makes it abort the exec quickly if sent a SIGKILL.
Note that this is the conservative change, to interrupt only for
SIGKILL, by using fatal_signal_pending(). It would be perfectly
correct semantics to let any signal interrupt the string-copying in
execve, i.e. use signal_pending() instead of fatal_signal_pending().
We'll save that change for later, since it could have user-visible
consequences, such as having a timer set too quickly make it so that
an execve can never complete, though it always happened to work before.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This adds a preemption point during the copying of the argument and
environment strings for execve, in copy_strings(). There is already
a preemption point in the count() loop, so this doesn't add any new
points in the abstract sense.
When the total argument+environment strings are very large, the time
spent copying them can be much more than a normal user time slice.
So this change improves the interactivity of the rest of the system
when one process is doing an execve with very large arguments.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The CONFIG_STACK_GROWSDOWN variant of setup_arg_pages() does not
check the size of the argument/environment area on the stack.
When it is unworkably large, shift_arg_pages() hits its BUG_ON.
This is exploitable with a very large RLIMIT_STACK limit, to
create a crash pretty easily.
Check that the initial stack is not too large to make it possible
to map in any executable. We're not checking that the actual
executable (or intepreter, for binfmt_elf) will fit. So those
mappings might clobber part of the initial stack mapping. But
that is just userland lossage that userland made happen, not a
kernel problem.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
fs: brlock vfsmount_lock
fs: scale files_lock
lglock: introduce special lglock and brlock spin locks
tty: fix fu_list abuse
fs: cleanup files_lock locking
fs: remove extra lookup in __lookup_hash
fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock
apparmor: use task path helpers
fs: dentry allocation consolidation
fs: fix do_lookup false negative
mbcache: Limit the maximum number of cache entries
hostfs ->follow_link() braino
hostfs: dumb (and usually harmless) tpyo - strncpy instead of strlcpy
remove SWRITE* I/O types
kill BH_Ordered flag
vfs: update ctime when changing the file's permission by setfacl
cramfs: only unlock new inodes
fix reiserfs_evict_inode end_writeback second call
fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock
struct fs_struct.lock is an rwlock with the read-side used to protect root and
pwd members while taking references to them. Taking a reference to a path
typically requires just 2 atomic ops, so the critical section is very small.
Parallel read-side operations would have cacheline contention on the lock, the
dentry, and the vfsmount cachelines, so the rwlock is unlikely to ever give a
real parallelism increase.
Replace it with a spinlock to avoid one or two atomic operations in typical
path lookup fastpath.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles
correctly on ARM:
arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for
the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to. This is
because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to
copy_strings_kernel(). A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename
pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel().
do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv
or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as
const should be fine.
Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match.
This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notify: (132 commits)
fanotify: use both marks when possible
fsnotify: pass both the vfsmount mark and inode mark
fsnotify: walk the inode and vfsmount lists simultaneously
fsnotify: rework ignored mark flushing
fsnotify: remove global fsnotify groups lists
fsnotify: remove group->mask
fsnotify: remove the global masks
fsnotify: cleanup should_send_event
fanotify: use the mark in handler functions
audit: use the mark in handler functions
dnotify: use the mark in handler functions
inotify: use the mark in handler functions
fsnotify: send fsnotify_mark to groups in event handling functions
fsnotify: Exchange list heads instead of moving elements
fsnotify: srcu to protect read side of inode and vfsmount locks
fsnotify: use an explicit flag to indicate fsnotify_destroy_mark has been called
fsnotify: use _rcu functions for mark list traversal
fsnotify: place marks on object in order of group memory address
vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput
fsnotify: store struct file not struct path
...
Fix up trivial delete/modify conflict in fs/notify/inotify/inotify.c.
* 'bkl/core' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/frederic/random-tracing:
do_coredump: Do not take BKL
init: Remove the BKL from startup code
fanotify, the upcoming notification system actually needs a struct path so it can
do opens in the context of listeners, and it needs a file so it can get f_flags
from the original process. Close was the only operation that already was passing
a struct file to the notification hook. This patch passes a file for access,
modify, and open as well as they are easily available to these hooks.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
core_pattern is not actually protected and hasn't been
ever since we introduced procfs support for sysctl -- a
_long_ time. Don't take it here either.
Also nothing inside do_coredump appears to require bkl
protection.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
[ remove smp_lock.h headers ]
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Add the capacility to track data mmap()s. This can be used together
with PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR for data profiling.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
[Updated code for stable perf ABI]
Signed-off-by: Eric B Munson <ebmunson@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
LKML-Reference: <1274193049-25997-1-git-send-email-ebmunson@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
de_thread() and __exit_signal() use signal_struct->count/notify_count for
synchronization. We can simplify the code and use ->notify_count only.
Instead of comparing these two counters, we can change de_thread() to set
->notify_count = nr_of_sub_threads, then change __exit_signal() to
dec-and-test this counter and notify group_exit_task.
Note that __exit_signal() checks "notify_count > 0" just for symmetry with
exit_notify(), we could just check it is != 0.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- move the cprm.mm_flags checks up, before we take mmap_sem
- move down_write(mmap_sem) and ->core_state check from do_coredump()
to coredump_wait()
This simplifies the code and makes the locking symmetrical.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Given that do_coredump() calls put_cred() on exit path, it is a bit ugly
to do put_cred() + "goto fail" twice, just add the new "fail_creds" label.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- kill "int dump_count", argv_split(argcp) accepts argcp == NULL.
- move "int dump_count" under " if (ispipe)" branch, fail_dropcount
can check ispipe.
- move "char **helper_argv" as well, change the code to do argv_free()
right after call_usermodehelper_fns().
- If call_usermodehelper_fns() fails goto close_fail label instead
of closing the file by hand.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
do_coredump() does a lot of file checks after it opens the file or calls
usermode helper. But all of these checks are only needed in !ispipe case.
Move this code into the "else" branch and kill the ugly repetitive ispipe
checks.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The first patch in this series introduced an init function to the
call_usermodehelper api so that processes could be customized by caller.
This patch takes advantage of that fact, by customizing the helper in
do_coredump to create the pipe and set its core limit to one (for our
recusrsion check). This lets us clean up the previous uglyness in the
usermodehelper internals and factor call_usermodehelper out entirely.
While I'm at it, we can also modify the helper setup to look for a core
limit value of 1 rather than zero for our recursion check
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Page migration requires rmap to be able to find all ptes mapping a page
at all times, otherwise the migration entry can be instantiated, but it
is possible to leave one behind if the second rmap_walk fails to find
the page. If this page is later faulted, migration_entry_to_page() will
call BUG because the page is locked indicating the page was migrated by
the migration PTE not cleaned up. For example
kernel BUG at include/linux/swapops.h:105!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810e951a>] handle_mm_fault+0x3f8/0x76a
[<ffffffff8130c7a2>] do_page_fault+0x44a/0x46e
[<ffffffff813099b5>] page_fault+0x25/0x30
[<ffffffff8114de33>] load_elf_binary+0x152a/0x192b
[<ffffffff8111329b>] search_binary_handler+0x173/0x313
[<ffffffff81114896>] do_execve+0x219/0x30a
[<ffffffff8100a5c6>] sys_execve+0x43/0x5e
[<ffffffff8100320a>] stub_execve+0x6a/0xc0
RIP [<ffffffff811094ff>] migration_entry_wait+0xc1/0x129
There is a race between shift_arg_pages and migration that triggers this
bug. A temporary stack is setup during exec and later moved. If
migration moves a page in the temporary stack and the VMA is then removed
before migration completes, the migration PTE may not be found leading to
a BUG when the stack is faulted.
This patch causes pages within the temporary stack during exec to be
skipped by migration. It does this by marking the VMA covering the
temporary stack with an otherwise impossible combination of VMA flags.
These flags are cleared when the temporary stack is moved to its final
location.
[kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com: idea for having migration skip temporary stacks]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Reviewed-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Originally, commit d899bf7b ("procfs: provide stack information for
threads") attempted to introduce a new feature for showing where the
threadstack was located and how many pages are being utilized by the
stack.
Commit c44972f1 ("procfs: disable per-task stack usage on NOMMU") was
applied to fix the NO_MMU case.
Commit 89240ba0 ("x86, fs: Fix x86 procfs stack information for threads on
64-bit") was applied to fix a bug in ia32 executables being loaded.
Commit 9ebd4eba7 ("procfs: fix /proc/<pid>/stat stack pointer for kernel
threads") was applied to fix a bug which had kernel threads printing a
userland stack address.
Commit 1306d603f ('proc: partially revert "procfs: provide stack
information for threads"') was then applied to revert the stack pages
being used to solve a significant performance regression.
This patch nearly undoes the effect of all these patches.
The reason for reverting these is it provides an unusable value in
field 28. For x86_64, a fork will result in the task->stack_start
value being updated to the current user top of stack and not the stack
start address. This unpredictability of the stack_start value makes
it worthless. That includes the intended use of showing how much stack
space a thread has.
Other architectures will get different values. As an example, ia64
gets 0. The do_fork() and copy_process() functions appear to treat the
stack_start and stack_size parameters as architecture specific.
I only partially reverted c44972f1 ("procfs: disable per-task stack usage
on NOMMU") . If I had completely reverted it, I would have had to change
mm/Makefile only build pagewalk.o when CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR is
configured. Since I could not test the builds without significant effort,
I decided to not change mm/Makefile.
I only partially reverted 89240ba0 ("x86, fs: Fix x86 procfs stack
information for threads on 64-bit") . I left the KSTK_ESP() change in
place as that seemed worthwhile.
Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Cc: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Modify uid check in do_coredump so as to not apply it in the case of
pipes.
This just got noticed in testing. The end of do_coredump validates the
uid of the inode for the created file against the uid of the crashing
process to ensure that no one can pre-create a core file with different
ownership and grab the information contained in the core when they
shouldn' tbe able to. This causes failures when using pipes for a core
dumps if the crashing process is not root, which is the uid of the pipe
when it is created.
The fix is simple. Since the check for matching uid's isn't relevant for
pipes (a process can't create a pipe that the uermodehelper code will open
anyway), we can just just skip it in the event ispipe is non-zero
Reverts a pipe-affecting change which was accidentally made in
: commit c46f739dd3
: Author: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
: AuthorDate: Wed Nov 28 13:59:18 2007 +0100
: Commit: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>
: CommitDate: Wed Nov 28 10:58:01 2007 -0800
:
: vfs: coredumping fix
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
User visible change.
do_coredump() kills all threads which share the same ->mm but only the
coredumping process gets the proper exit_code. Other tasks which share
the same ->mm die "silently" and return status == 0 to parent.
This is historical behaviour, not actually a bug. But I think Frank
Heckenbach rightly dislikes the current behaviour. Simple test-case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
int main(void)
{
int stat;
if (!fork()) {
if (!vfork())
kill(getpid(), SIGQUIT);
}
wait(&stat);
printf("stat=%x\n", stat);
return 0;
}
Before this patch it prints "stat=0" despite the fact the child was killed
by SIGQUIT. After this patch the output is "stat=3" which obviously makes
more sense.
Even with this patch, only the task which originates the coredumping gets
"|= 0x80" if the core was actually dumped, but at least the coredumping
signal is visible to do_wait/etc.
Reported-by: Frank Heckenbach <f.heckenbach@fh-soft.de>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pass mm->flags as a coredump parameter for consistency.
---
1787 if (mm->core_state || !get_dumpable(mm)) { <- (1)
1788 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
1789 put_cred(cred);
1790 goto fail;
1791 }
1792
[...]
1798 if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) { /* Setuid core dump mode */ <-(2)
1799 flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */
1800 cred->fsuid = 0; /* Dump root private */
1801 }
---
Since dumpable bits are not protected by lock, there is a chance to change
these bits between (1) and (2).
To solve this issue, this patch copies mm->flags to
coredump_params.mm_flags at the beginning of do_coredump() and uses it
instead of get_dumpable() while dumping core.
This copy is also passed to binfmt->core_dump, since elf*_core_dump() uses
dump_filter bits in mm->flags.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge]
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently we create the initial stack based on the PAGE_SIZE. This is
unnecessary.
This creates this initial stack independent of the PAGE_SIZE.
It also bumps up the number of 4k pages allocated from 20 to 32, to
align with 64K page systems.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make sure compiler won't do weird things with limits. E.g. fetching them
twice may return 2 different values after writable limits are implemented.
I.e. either use rlimit helpers added in commit 3e10e716ab ("resource:
add helpers for fetching rlimits") or ACCESS_ONCE if not applicable.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking
workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent
process and all its child processes.
In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous
pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million
anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one
of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them
all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page.
This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of
1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on
the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark
like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of
thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive
than AIM7, but they are catching up.
This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us
to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child
process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be
instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because
non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children.
This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000
child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system.
This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from
O(N) to 2.
The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a
VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust
can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in
turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions.
A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple
anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under
"the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an
incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit
flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h
to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic
values for the same bitflag.
Some test results:
Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test
box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running
>99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the
pageout code.
With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users.
This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in
system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Considering the nature of per mm stats, it's the shared object among
threads and can be a cache-miss point in the page fault path.
This patch adds per-thread cache for mm_counter. RSS value will be
counted into a struct in task_struct and synchronized with mm's one at
events.
Now, in this patch, the event is the number of calls to handle_mm_fault.
Per-thread value is added to mm at each 64 calls.
rough estimation with small benchmark on parallel thread (2threads) shows
[before]
4.5 cache-miss/faults
[after]
4.0 cache-miss/faults
Anyway, the most contended object is mmap_sem if the number of threads grows.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
803bf5ec25 ("fs/exec.c: restrict initial
stack space expansion to rlimit") attempts to limit the initial stack to
20*PAGE_SIZE. Unfortunately, in attempting ensure the stack is not
reduced in size, we ended up not changing the stack at all.
This size reduction check is not necessary as the expand_stack call does
this already.
This caused a regression in UML resulting in most guest processes being
killed.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When reserving stack space for a new process, make sure we're not
attempting to expand the stack by more than rlimit allows.
This fixes a bug caused by b6a2fea393 ("mm:
variable length argument support") and unmasked by
fc63cf2370 ("exec: setup_arg_pages() fails
to return errors").
This bug means that when limiting the stack to less the 20*PAGE_SIZE (eg.
80K on 4K pages or 'ulimit -s 79') all processes will be killed before
they start. This is particularly bad with 64K pages, where a ulimit below
1280K will kill every process.
To test, do:
'ulimit -s 15; ls'
before and after the patch is applied. Before it's applied, 'ls' should
be killed. After the patch is applied, 'ls' should no longer be killed.
A stack limit of 15KB since it's small enough to trigger 20*PAGE_SIZE.
Also 15KB not a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, which is a trickier case to handle
correctly with this code.
4K pages should be fine to test with.
[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: cleanup]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit 221af7f87b ("Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions") split
the function at the point of no return - ie right where there were no
more error cases to check. That made sense from a technical standpoint,
but when we then also combined it with the actual personality setting
going in between flush_old_exec() and setup_new_exec(), it needs to be a
bit more careful.
In particular, we need to make sure that we really flush the old
personality bits in the 'flush' stage, rather than later in the 'setup'
stage, since otherwise we might be flushing the _new_ personality state
that we're just setting up.
So this moves the flags and personality flushing (and 'flush_thread()',
which is the arch-specific function that generally resets lazy FP state
etc) of the old process into flush_old_exec(), so that it doesn't affect
any state that execve() is setting up for the new process environment.
This was reported by Michal Simek as breaking his Microblaze qemu
environment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@petalogix.com>
Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
'flush_old_exec()' is the point of no return when doing an execve(), and
it is pretty badly misnamed. It doesn't just flush the old executable
environment, it also starts up the new one.
Which is very inconvenient for things like setting up the new
personality, because we want the new personality to affect the starting
of the new environment, but at the same time we do _not_ want the new
personality to take effect if flushing the old one fails.
As a result, the x86-64 '32-bit' personality is actually done using this
insane "I'm going to change the ABI, but I haven't done it yet" bit
(TIF_ABI_PENDING), with SET_PERSONALITY() not actually setting the
personality, but just the "pending" bit, so that "flush_thread()" can do
the actual personality magic.
This patch in no way changes any of that insanity, but it does split the
'flush_old_exec()' function up into a preparatory part that can fail
(still called flush_old_exec()), and a new part that will actually set
up the new exec environment (setup_new_exec()). All callers are changed
to trivially comply with the new world order.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Thanks to Roland who pointed out de_thread() issues.
Currently we add sub-threads to ->real_parent->children list. This buys
nothing but slows down do_wait().
With this patch ->children contains only main threads (group leaders).
The only complication is that forget_original_parent() should iterate over
sub-threads by hand, and de_thread() needs another list_replace() when it
changes ->group_leader.
Henceforth do_wait_thread() can never see task_detached() && !EXIT_DEAD
tasks, we can remove this check (and we can unify do_wait_thread() and
ptrace_do_wait()).
This change can confuse the optimistic search in mm_update_next_owner(),
but this is fixable and minor.
Perhaps badness() and oom_kill_process() should be updated, but they
should be fixed in any case.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Ratan Nalumasu <rnalumasu@gmail.com>
Cc: Vitaly Mayatskikh <vmayatsk@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Setting a thread's comm to be something unique is a very useful ability
and is helpful for debugging complicated threaded applications. However
currently the only way to set a thread name is for the thread to name
itself via the PR_SET_NAME prctl.
However, there may be situations where it would be advantageous for a
thread dispatcher to be naming the threads its managing, rather then
having the threads self-describe themselves. This sort of behavior is
available on other systems via the pthread_setname_np() interface.
This patch exports a task's comm via proc/pid/comm and
proc/pid/task/tid/comm interfaces, and allows thread siblings to write to
these values.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Mike Fulton <fultonm@ca.ibm.com>
Cc: Sean Foley <Sean_Foley@ca.ibm.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In setup_arg_pages we work hard to assign a value to ret, but on exit we
always return 0.
Also remove a now duplicated exit path and branch to out_unlock instead.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive
security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to
the existing security_ hooks.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Because the binfmt is not different between threads in the same process,
it can be moved from task_struct to mm_struct. And binfmt moudle is
handled per mm_struct instead of task_struct.
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
sys_delete_module() can set MODULE_STATE_GOING after
search_binary_handler() does try_module_get(). In this case
set_binfmt()->try_module_get() fails but since none of the callers
check the returned error, the task will run with the wrong old
->binfmt.
The proper fix should change all ->load_binary() methods, but we can
rely on fact that the caller must hold a reference to binfmt->module
and use __module_get() which never fails.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Allow core_pattern pipes to wait for user space to complete
One of the things that user space processes like to do is look at metadata
for a crashing process in their /proc/<pid> directory. this is racy
however, since do_coredump in the kernel doesn't wait for the user space
process to complete before it reaps the crashing process. This patch
corrects that. Allowing the kernel to wait for the user space process to
complete before cleaning up the crashing process. This is a bit tricky to
do for a few reasons:
1) The user space process isn't our child, so we can't sys_wait4 on it
2) We need to close the pipe before waiting for the user process to complete,
since the user process may rely on an EOF condition
I've discussed several solutions with Oleg Nesterov off-list about this,
and this is the one we've come up with. We add ourselves as a pipe reader
(to prevent premature cleanup of the pipe_inode_info), and remove
ourselves as a writer (to provide an EOF condition to the writer in user
space), then we iterate until the user space process exits (which we
detect by pipe->readers == 1, hence the > 1 check in the loop). When we
exit the loop, we restore the proper reader/writer values, then we return
and let filp_close in do_coredump clean up the pipe data properly.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce core pipe limiting sysctl.
Since we can dump cores to pipe, rather than directly to the filesystem,
we create a condition in which a user can create a very high load on the
system simply by running bad applications.
If the pipe reader specified in core_pattern is poorly written, we can
have lots of ourstandig resources and processes in the system.
This sysctl introduces an ability to limit that resource consumption.
core_pipe_limit defines how many in-flight dumps may be run in parallel,
dumps beyond this value are skipped and a note is made in the kernel log.
A special value of 0 in core_pipe_limit denotes unlimited core dumps may
be handled (this is the default value).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change how we detect recursive dumps.
Currently we have a mechanism by which we try to compare pathnames of the
crashing process to the core_pattern path. This is broken for a dozen
reasons, and just doesn't work in any sort of robust way.
I'm replacing it with the use of a 0 RLIMIT_CORE value. Since helper apps
set RLIMIT_CORE to zero, we don't write out core files for any process
with that particular limit set. It the core_pattern is a pipe, any
non-zero limit is translated to RLIM_INFINITY.
This allows complete dumps to be captured, but prevents infinite recursion
in the event that the core_pattern process itself crashes.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A patch to give a better overview of the userland application stack usage,
especially for embedded linux.
Currently you are only able to dump the main process/thread stack usage
which is showed in /proc/pid/status by the "VmStk" Value. But you get no
information about the consumed stack memory of the the threads.
There is an enhancement in the /proc/<pid>/{task/*,}/*maps and which marks
the vm mapping where the thread stack pointer reside with "[thread stack
xxxxxxxx]". xxxxxxxx is the maximum size of stack. This is a value
information, because libpthread doesn't set the start of the stack to the
top of the mapped area, depending of the pthread usage.
A sample output of /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/maps looks like:
08048000-08049000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 8312 /opt/z
08049000-0804a000 rw-p 00001000 03:00 8312 /opt/z
0804a000-0806b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
a7d12000-a7d13000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
a7d13000-a7f13000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [thread stack: 001ff4b4]
a7f13000-a7f14000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
a7f14000-a7f36000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a7f36000-a8069000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 4222 /lib/libc.so.6
a8069000-a806b000 r--p 00133000 03:00 4222 /lib/libc.so.6
a806b000-a806c000 rw-p 00135000 03:00 4222 /lib/libc.so.6
a806c000-a806f000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a806f000-a8083000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 14462 /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8083000-a8084000 r--p 00013000 03:00 14462 /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8084000-a8085000 rw-p 00014000 03:00 14462 /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8085000-a8088000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a8088000-a80a4000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 8317 /lib/ld-linux.so.2
a80a4000-a80a5000 r--p 0001b000 03:00 8317 /lib/ld-linux.so.2
a80a5000-a80a6000 rw-p 0001c000 03:00 8317 /lib/ld-linux.so.2
afaf5000-afb0a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
Also there is a new entry "stack usage" in /proc/<pid>/{task/*,}/status
which will you give the current stack usage in kb.
A sample output of /proc/self/status looks like:
Name: cat
State: R (running)
Tgid: 507
Pid: 507
.
.
.
CapBnd: fffffffffffffeff
voluntary_ctxt_switches: 0
nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches: 0
Stack usage: 12 kB
I also fixed stack base address in /proc/<pid>/{task/*,}/stat to the base
address of the associated thread stack and not the one of the main
process. This makes more sense.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/proc/array.c now needs walk_page_range()]
Signed-off-by: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events!
In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its
initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is
becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging,
monitoring, analysis facility.
Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem
'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending
code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and
less appropriate.
All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance
events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables
and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion)
The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes
it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well.
Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and
suggested a rename.
User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch
should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to
keep the size down.)
This patch has been generated via the following script:
FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config')
sed -i \
-e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \
-e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \
-e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \
-e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \
-e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \
-e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \
$FILES
for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do
M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g')
mv $N $M
done
FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*)
sed -i \
-e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \
-e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \
-e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \
-e 's/counter/event/g' \
-e 's/Counter/Event/g' \
$FILES
... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be
used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts
a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this
change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches
is the smallest: the end of the merge window.
Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some
stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch.
( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal
with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit
over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but
in case there's something left where 'counter' would be
better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis
instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. )
Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <new-submission>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Tom Horsley reports that his debugger hangs when it tries to read
/proc/pid_of_tracee/maps, this happens since
"mm_for_maps: take ->cred_guard_mutex to fix the race with exec"
04b836cbf19e885f8366bccb2e4b0474346c02d
commit in 2.6.31.
But the root of the problem lies in the fact that do_execve() path calls
tracehook_report_exec() which can stop if the tracer sets PT_TRACE_EXEC.
The tracee must not sleep in TASK_TRACED holding this mutex. Even if we
remove ->cred_guard_mutex from mm_for_maps() and proc_pid_attr_write(),
another task doing PTRACE_ATTACH should not hang until it is killed or the
tracee resumes.
With this patch do_execve() does not use ->cred_guard_mutex directly and
we do not hold it throughout, instead:
- introduce prepare_bprm_creds() helper, it locks the mutex
and calls prepare_exec_creds() to initialize bprm->cred.
- install_exec_creds() drops the mutex after commit_creds(),
and thus before tracehook_report_exec()->ptrace_stop().
or, if exec fails,
free_bprm() drops this mutex when bprm->cred != NULL which
indicates install_exec_creds() was not called.
Reported-by: Tom Horsley <tom.horsley@att.net>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
vfs_read() offset is defined as loff_t, but kernel_read()
offset is only defined as unsigned long. Redefine
kernel_read() offset as loff_t.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
do_execve() and ptrace_attach() return -EINTR if
mutex_lock_interruptible(->cred_guard_mutex) fails.
This is not right, change the code to return ERESTARTNOINTR.
Perhaps we should also change proc_pid_attr_write().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'perfcounters-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (574 commits)
perf_counter: Turn off by default
perf_counter: Add counter->id to the throttle event
perf_counter: Better align code
perf_counter: Rename L2 to LL cache
perf_counter: Standardize event names
perf_counter: Rename enums
perf_counter tools: Clean up u64 usage
perf_counter: Rename perf_counter_limit sysctl
perf_counter: More paranoia settings
perf_counter: powerpc: Implement generalized cache events for POWER processors
perf_counters: powerpc: Add support for POWER7 processors
perf_counter: Accurate period data
perf_counter: Introduce struct for sample data
perf_counter tools: Normalize data using per sample period data
perf_counter: Annotate exit ctx recursion
perf_counter tools: Propagate signals properly
perf_counter tools: Small frequency related fixes
perf_counter: More aggressive frequency adjustment
perf_counter/x86: Fix the model number of Intel Core2 processors
perf_counter, x86: Correct some event and umask values for Intel processors
...
- Add support in ima_path_check() for integrity checking without
incrementing the counts. (Required for nfsd.)
- rename and export opencount_get to ima_counts_get
- replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_counts_get
- export ima_path_check
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign
intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The
attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new
credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This fixes the problem introduced by commit 3bfacef412 (get rid of
special-casing the /sbin/loader on alpha): osf/1 ecoff binary segfaults
when binfmt_aout built as module. That happens because aout binary
handler gets on the top of the binfmt list due to late registration, and
kernel attempts to execute the binary without preparatory work that must
be done by binfmt_loader.
Fixed by changing the registration order of the default binfmt handlers
using list_add_tail() and introducing insert_binfmt() function which
places new handler on the top of the binfmt list. This might be generally
useful for installing arch-specific frontends for default handlers or just
for overriding them.
Signed-off-by: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
write_lock(¤t->fs->lock) guarantees we can't wrongly miss
LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE, this is what we care about. Use rcu_read_lock()
instead of ->siglock to iterate over the sub-threads. We must see
all CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_FS threads which didn't pass exit_fs(), it
takes fs->lock too.
With or without this patch we can miss the freshly cloned thread
and set LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE, we don't care.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
[ Fixed lock/unlock typo - Hugh ]
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If do_execve() fails after check_unsafe_exec(), it clears fs->in_exec
unconditionally. This is wrong if we race with our sub-thread which
also does do_execve:
Two threads T1 and T2 and another process P, all share the same
->fs.
T1 starts do_execve(BAD_FILE). It calls check_unsafe_exec(), since
->fs is shared, we set LSM_UNSAFE but not ->in_exec.
P exits and decrements fs->users.
T2 starts do_execve(), calls check_unsafe_exec(), now ->fs is not
shared, we set fs->in_exec.
T1 continues, open_exec(BAD_FILE) fails, we clear ->in_exec and
return to the user-space.
T1 does clone(CLONE_FS /* without CLONE_THREAD */).
T2 continues without LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE while ->fs is shared with
another process.
Change check_unsafe_exec() to return res = 1 if we set ->in_exec, and change
do_execve() to clear ->in_exec depending on res.
When do_execve() suceeds, it is safe to clear ->in_exec unconditionally.
It can be set only if we don't share ->fs with another process, and since
we already killed all sub-threads either ->in_exec == 0 or we are the
only user of this ->fs.
Also, we do not need fs->lock to clear fs->in_exec.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Similar to the mmap data stream, add one that tracks the task COMM field,
so that the userspace reporting knows what to call a task.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090408130409.127422406@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Merge reason: we have gathered quite a few conflicts, need to merge upstream
Conflicts:
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S
arch/x86/mm/iomap_32.c
include/linux/sched.h
kernel/Makefile
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* all changes of current->fs are done under task_lock and write_lock of
old fs->lock
* refcount is not atomic anymore (same protection)
* its decrements are done when removing reference from current; at the
same time we decide whether to free it.
* put_fs_struct() is gone
* new field - ->in_exec. Set by check_unsafe_exec() if we are trying to do
execve() and only subthreads share fs_struct. Cleared when finishing exec
(success and failure alike). Makes CLONE_FS fail with -EAGAIN if set.
* check_unsafe_exec() may fail with -EAGAIN if another execve() from subthread
is in progress.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely,
a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way,
they have a health check running lsof every few minutes.
Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient
use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.
There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count
has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except
while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check.
[Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier
releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().]
Reported-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Narrowed-down-by: Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>
Tested-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch allows LSM modules to determine whether current process is in an
execve operation or not so that they can behave differently while an execve
operation is in progress.
This patch is needed by TOMOYO. Please see another patch titled "LSM adapter
functions." for backgrounds.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The patch:
commit a6f76f23d2
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to
before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now
calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for
fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the
determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the
pthread library.
However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably
damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where
we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the
determination before calling de_thread().
So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing
our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs
(CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and
so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec().
We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES.
We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the
threads we're going to kill.
This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs
using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If
successful, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
--TEST1--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
exec ./test2
--TEST2--
uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0
SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID
and if unsuccessful, something like:
[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
--TEST1--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
exec ./test2
--TEST2--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!
The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as.
[test1.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pthread.h>
static void *thread_func(void *arg)
{
while (1) {}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pthread_t tid;
uid_t uid, euid, suid;
printf("--TEST1--\n");
getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);
if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) {
perror("pthread_create");
exit(1);
}
printf("exec ./test2\n");
execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL);
perror("./test2");
_exit(1);
}
[test2.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
uid_t uid, euid, suid;
getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
printf("--TEST2--\n");
printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);
if (euid != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n");
exit(0);
}
[Makefile]
CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused
all: test1 test2
test1: test1.c
gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread
test2: test2.c
gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c
sudo chown root.root test2
sudo chmod +s test2
Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch replaces the generic integrity hooks, for which IMA registered
itself, with IMA integrity hooks in the appropriate places directly
in the fs directory.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
No one cares do_coredump()'s return value, and also it seems that it
is also not necessary. So make it void.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Untangle the error unwinding in this function, saving a test of local
variable `vma'.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
sys_execve and sys_uselib do not call into fsnotify so inotify does not get
open events for these types of syscalls. This patch simply makes the
requisite fsnotify calls.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... just make it a binfmt handler like #! one.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With all the nameidata removal there's no point anymore for this helper.
Of the three callers left two will go away with the next lookup series
anyway.
Also add proper kerneldoc to inode_permission as this is the main
permission check routine now.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
hrtimers: fix warning in kernel/hrtimer.c
x86: make sure we really have an hpet mapping before using it
x86: enable HPET on Fujitsu u9200
linux/timex.h: cleanup for userspace
posix-timers: simplify de_thread()->exit_itimers() path
posix-timers: check ->it_signal instead of ->it_pid to validate the timer
posix-timers: use "struct pid*" instead of "struct task_struct*"
nohz: suppress needless timer reprogramming
clocksource, acpi_pm.c: put acpi_pm_read_slow() under CONFIG_PCI
nohz: no softirq pending warnings for offline cpus
hrtimer: removing all ur callback modes, fix
hrtimer: removing all ur callback modes, fix hotplug
hrtimer: removing all ur callback modes
x86: correct link to HPET timer specification
rtc-cmos: export second NVRAM bank
Fixed up conflicts in sound/drivers/pcsp/pcsp.c and sound/core/hrtimer.c
manually.
Pavel Machek pointed out that performance counters should be flushed
when crossing protection domains on setuid execution.
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: simplify code
de_thread() postpones release_task(leader) until after exit_itimers().
This was needed because !SIGEV_THREAD_ID timers could use ->group_leader
without get_task_struct(). With the recent changes we can release the
leader earlier and simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The patch 6341c39 "tracehook: exec" introduced a small regression in
2.6.27 regarding binfmt_misc exec event reporting. Since the reporting
is now done in the common search_binary_handler() function, an exec
of a misc binary will result in two (or possibly multiple) exec events
being reported, instead of just a single one, because the misc handler
contains a recursive call to search_binary_handler.
To add to the confusion, if PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC is not active, the multiple
SIGTRAP signals will in fact cause only a single ptrace intercept, as the
signals are not queued. However, if PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC is on, the debugger
will actually see multiple ptrace intercepts (PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC).
The test program included below demonstrates the problem.
This change fixes the bug by calling tracehook_report_exec() only in the
outermost search_binary_handler() call (bprm->recursion_depth == 0).
The additional change to restore bprm->recursion_depth after each binfmt
load_binary call is actually superfluous for this bug, since we test the
value saved on entry to search_binary_handler(). But it keeps the use of
of the depth count to its most obvious expected meaning. Depending on what
binfmt handlers do in certain cases, there could have been false-positive
tests for recursion limits before this change.
/* Test program using PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC.
This forks and exec's the first argument with the rest of the arguments,
while ptrace'ing. It expects to see one PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop and
then a successful exit, with no other signals or events in between.
Test for kernel doing two PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stops for a binfmt_misc exec:
$ gcc -g traceexec.c -o traceexec
$ sudo sh -c 'echo :test:M::foobar::/bin/cat: > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register'
$ echo 'foobar test' > ./foobar
$ chmod +x ./foobar
$ ./traceexec ./foobar; echo $?
==> good <==
foobar test
0
$
==> bad <==
foobar test
unexpected status 0x4057f != 0
3
$
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
static void
wait_for (pid_t child, int expect)
{
int status;
pid_t p = wait (&status);
if (p != child)
{
perror ("wait");
exit (2);
}
if (status != expect)
{
fprintf (stderr, "unexpected status %#x != %#x\n", status, expect);
exit (3);
}
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t child = fork ();
if (child < 0)
{
perror ("fork");
return 127;
}
else if (child == 0)
{
ptrace (PTRACE_TRACEME);
raise (SIGUSR1);
execv (argv[1], &argv[1]);
perror ("execve");
_exit (127);
}
wait_for (child, W_STOPCODE (SIGUSR1));
if (ptrace (PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child,
0L, (void *) (long) PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC) != 0)
{
perror ("PTRACE_SETOPTIONS");
return 4;
}
if (ptrace (PTRACE_CONT, child, 0L, 0L) != 0)
{
perror ("PTRACE_CONT");
return 5;
}
wait_for (child, W_STOPCODE (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC << 8)));
if (ptrace (PTRACE_CONT, child, 0L, 0L) != 0)
{
perror ("PTRACE_CONT");
return 6;
}
wait_for (child, W_EXITCODE (0, 0));
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
CC: Ulrich Weigand <ulrich.weigand@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.
I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.
(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.
This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.
(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.
(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.
(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().
(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).
(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:
(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.
This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).
(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.
(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.
(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.
(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.
(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.
(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.
Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If the coredumping is multi-threaded, format_corename() appends .%pid to
the corename. This was needed before the proper multi-thread core dump
support, now all the threads in the mm go into a single unified core file.
Remove this special case, it is not even documented and we have "%p"
and core_uses_pid.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: La Monte Yarroll <piggy@laurelnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus:
module: remove CONFIG_KMOD in comment after #endif
remove CONFIG_KMOD from fs
remove CONFIG_KMOD from drivers
Manually fix conflict due to include cleanups in drivers/md/md.c
de_thread() checks if the old leader was the ->child_reaper, this is not
possible any longer. With the previous patch ->group_leader itself will
change ->child_reaper on exit.
Henceforth find_new_reaper() is the only function (apart from
initialization) which plays with ->child_reaper.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This change is Alpha-specific. It adds field 'taso' into struct
linux_binprm to remember if the application is TASO. Previously, field
sh_bang was used for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With MAX_ARG_STRINGS set to 0x7FFFFFFF, and being passed to 'count()' and
compat_count(), it would appear that the current max bounds check of
fs/exec.c:394:
if(++i > max)
return -E2BIG;
would never trigger. Since 'i' is of type int, so values would wrap and the
function would continue looping.
Simple fix seems to be chaning ++i to i++ and checking for '>='.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: "Ollie Wild" <aaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Just always compile the code when the kernel is modular.
Convert load_nls to use try_then_request_module to tidy
up the code.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
There's a race between mm->owner assignment and swapoff, more easily
seen when task slab poisoning is turned on. The condition occurs when
try_to_unuse() runs in parallel with an exiting task. A similar race
can occur with callers of get_task_mm(), such as /proc/<pid>/<mmstats>
or ptrace or page migration.
CPU0 CPU1
try_to_unuse
looks at mm = task0->mm
increments mm->mm_users
task 0 exits
mm->owner needs to be updated, but no
new owner is found (mm_users > 1, but
no other task has task->mm = task0->mm)
mm_update_next_owner() leaves
mmput(mm) decrements mm->mm_users
task0 freed
dereferencing mm->owner fails
The fix is to notify the subsystem via mm_owner_changed callback(),
if no new owner is found, by specifying the new task as NULL.
Jiri Slaby:
mm->owner was set to NULL prior to calling cgroup_mm_owner_callbacks(), but
must be set after that, so as not to pass NULL as old owner causing oops.
Daisuke Nishimura:
mm_update_next_owner() may set mm->owner to NULL, but mem_cgroup_from_task()
and its callers need to take account of this situation to avoid oops.
Hugh Dickins:
Lockdep warning and hang below exec_mmap() when testing these patches.
exit_mm() up_reads mmap_sem before calling mm_update_next_owner(),
so exec_mmap() now needs to do the same. And with that repositioning,
there's now no point in mm_need_new_owner() allowing for NULL mm.
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix compilation errors on avr32 and without CONFIG_SWAP, introduced by
ba92a43dba ("exec: remove some includes")
In file included from include/asm/tlb.h:24,
from fs/exec.c:55:
include/asm-generic/tlb.h: In function 'tlb_flush_mmu':
include/asm-generic/tlb.h:76: error: implicit declaration of function 'release_pages'
include/asm-generic/tlb.h: In function 'tlb_remove_page':
include/asm-generic/tlb.h:105: error: implicit declaration of function 'page_cache_release'
make[1]: *** [fs/exec.o] Error 1
This straightforward part-revert is nobody's favourite patch to address
the underlying tlb.h needs swap.h needs pagemap.h (but sparc won't like
that) mess; but appropriate to fix the build now before any overhaul.
Reported-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yoichi_yuasa@tripeaks.co.jp>
Reported-by: Haavard Skinnemoen <haavard.skinnemoen@atmel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Tested-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On Mon, May 19, 2008 at 12:01:49AM +0200, Marcin Slusarz wrote:
> open_exec is needlessly indented, calls ERR_PTR with 0 argument
> (which is not valid errno) and jumps into middle of function
> just to return value.
> So clean it up a bit.
Still looks rather messy. See below for a better version.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This moves all the ptrace hooks related to exec into tracehook.h inlines.
This also lifts the calls for tracing out of the binfmt load_binary hooks
into search_binary_handler() after it calls into the binfmt module. This
change has no effect, since all the binfmt modules' load_binary functions
did the call at the end on success, and now search_binary_handler() does
it immediately after return if successful. We consolidate the repeated
code, and binfmt modules no longer need to import ptrace_notify().
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I don't understand why the multi-thread coredump implies the core_uses_pid
behaviour, but we shouldn't use mm->mm_users for that. This counter can
be incremented by get_task_mm(). Use the valued returned by
coredump_wait() instead.
Also, remove the "const char *pattern" argument, format_corename() can use
core_pattern directly.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Oleg Nesterov