Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.
Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once,
we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names
records.
Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname
requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation
and audit_names records.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.
For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.
This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.
Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In order to accomodate retrying path-based syscalls, we need to add a
new "type" argument to audit_inode_child. This will tell us whether
we're looking for a child entry that represents a create or a delete.
If we find a parent, don't automatically assume that we need to create a
new entry. Instead, use the information we have to try to find an
existing entry first. Update it if one is found and create a new one if
not.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In the cases where we already know the length of the parent, pass it as
a parm so we don't need to recompute it. In the cases where we don't
know the length, pass in AUDIT_NAME_FULL (-1) to indicate that it should
be determined.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.
Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.
While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
For now, we just have two possibilities:
UNKNOWN: for a new audit_names record that we don't know anything about yet
NORMAL: for everything else
In later patches, we'll add other types so we can distinguish and update
records created under different circumstances.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Most of the callers get called with an inode and dentry in the reverse
order. The compiler then has to reshuffle the arg registers and/or
stack in order to pass them on to audit_inode_child.
Reverse those arguments for a micro-optimization.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If name is NULL then the condition in the loop will never be true. Also,
with this change, we can eliminate the check for n->name == NULL since
the equivalence check will never be true if it is.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In some cases, we were passing in NULL even when we have a dentry.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Some security modules and oprofile still uses VM_EXECUTABLE for retrieving
a task's executable file. After this patch they will use mm->exe_file
directly. mm->exe_file is protected with mm->mmap_sem, so locking stays
the same.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> [arch/tile]
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [tomoyo]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
attacks
- Integrity: add digital signature verification
- Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
- IBM vTPM support on ppc64
- Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
- Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"
Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
ima: change flags container data type
Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
ima: audit log hashes
ima: generic IMA action flag handling
ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
audit: export audit_log_task_info
tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
ima: digital signature verification support
ima: add support for different security.ima data types
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
ima: add inode_post_setattr call
ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
ima: allocating iint improvements
ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
ima: integrity appraisal extension
vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
...
- Explicitly format uids gids in audit messges in the initial user
namespace. This is safe because auditd is restrected to be in
the initial user namespace.
- Convert audit_sig_uid into a kuid_t.
- Enable building the audit code and user namespaces at the same time.
The net result is that the audit subsystem now uses kuid_t and kgid_t whenever
possible making it almost impossible to confuse a raw uid_t with a kuid_t
preventing bugs.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Always store audit loginuids in type kuid_t.
Print loginuids by converting them into uids in the appropriate user
namespace, and then printing the resulting uid.
Modify audit_get_loginuid to return a kuid_t.
Modify audit_set_loginuid to take a kuid_t.
Modify /proc/<pid>/loginuid on read to convert the loginuid into the
user namespace of the opener of the file.
Modify /proc/<pid>/loginud on write to convert the loginuid
rom the user namespace of the opener of the file.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> ?
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The audit filter code guarantees that uid are always compared with
uids and gids are always compared with gids, as the comparason
operations are type specific. Take advantage of this proper to define
audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator which use the type safe
comparasons from uidgid.h.
Build on audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator and replace
audit_compare_id with audit_compare_uid and audit_compare_gid. This
is one of those odd cases where being type safe and duplicating code
leads to simpler shorter and more concise code.
Don't allow bitmask operations in uid and gid comparisons in
audit_data_to_entry. Bitmask operations are already denined in
audit_rule_to_entry.
Convert constants in audit_rule_to_entry and audit_data_to_entry into
kuids and kgids when appropriate.
Convert the uid and gid field in struct audit_names to be of type
kuid_t and kgid_t respectively, so that the new uid and gid comparators
can be applied in a type safe manner.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
At the suggestion of eparis@redhat.com, move this chunk of task
logging from audit_log_exit to audit_log_task_info and export this
function so it's usuable elsewhere in the kernel.
This patch is against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity#next-ima-appraisal
Changelog v2:
- add empty audit_log_task_info if CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL isn't set.
Changelog v1:
- Initial post.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
details to the audit log.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: make compat= permanent in the record
v15: added a return code to the audit_seccomp path by wad@chromium.org
(suggested by eparis@redhat.com)
v*: original by keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Fix new kernel-doc warnings in auditsc.c:
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): No description found for parameter 'success'
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): No description found for parameter 'return_code'
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): Excess function parameter 'pt_regs' description in '__audit_syscall_exit'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
audit_log_d_path() injects an additional space before the prefix,
which serves no purpose and doesn't mix well with other audit_log*()
functions that do not sneak extra characters into the log.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In the loop, a size_t "len" is used to hold the return value of
audit_log_single_execve_arg(), which returns -1 on error. In that
case the error handling (len <= 0) will be bypassed since "len" is
unsigned, and the loop continues with (p += len) being wrapped.
Change the type of "len" to signed int to fix the error handling.
size_t len;
...
for (...) {
len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(...);
if (len <= 0)
break;
p += len;
}
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This allows audit to specify rules in which we compare two fields of a
process. Such as is the running process uid != to the running process
euid?
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This completes the matrix of interfield comparisons between uid/gid
information for the current task and the uid/gid information for inodes.
aka I can audit based on differences between the euid of the process and
the uid of fs objects.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Rather than code the same loop over and over implement a helper function which
uses some pointer magic to make it generic enough to be used numerous places
as we implement more audit interfield comparisons
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We wish to be able to audit when a uid=500 task accesses a file which is
uid=0. Or vice versa. This patch introduces a new audit filter type
AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE which takes as an 'enum' which indicates which fields
should be compared. At this point we only define the task->uid vs
inode->uid, but other comparisons can be added.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Just a code cleanup really. We don't need to make a function call just for
it to return on error. This also makes the VFS function even easier to follow
and removes a conditional on a hot path.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset. We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd. Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.
Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should. With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly. The system will restart the service for
them. Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.
If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used! Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The function always deals with current. Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something. You can't.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Much like the ability to filter audit on the uid of an inode collected, we
should be able to filter on the gid of the inode.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Allow syscall exit filter matching based on the uid of the owner of an
inode used in a syscall. aka:
auditctl -a always,exit -S open -F obj_uid=0 -F perm=wa
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Audit entry,always rules are not allowed and are automatically changed in
exit,always rules in userspace. The kernel refuses to load such rules.
Thus a task in the middle of a syscall (and thus in audit_finish_fork())
can only be in one of two states: AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT or AUDIT_DISABLED.
Since the current task cannot be in AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT we aren't every
going to actually use the code in audit_finish_fork() since it will
return without doing anything. Thus drop the code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
A number of audit hooks make function calls before they determine that
auxilary records do not need to be collected. Do those checks as static
inlines since the most common case is going to be that records are not
needed and we can skip the function call overhead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The audit code makes heavy use of likely() and unlikely() macros, but they
don't always make sense. Drop any that seem questionable and let the
computer do it's thing.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Every arch calls:
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
audit_syscall_entry()
which requires knowledge about audit (the existance of audit_context) in
the arch code. Just do it all in static inline in audit.h so that arch's
can remain blissfully ignorant.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to
supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was.
Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things
by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating
success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid
pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the
layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it
in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to
determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic
is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the
value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a
separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure.
We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines
instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void*
for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct
pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit
function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the
arch correct structure to dereference it.
The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we
change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure.
THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it
makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs.
In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old
audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro
regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this
patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3].
For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the
regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is
always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative
before calling the audit code when appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion]
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64]
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml]
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc]
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips]
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
The audit system likes to collect information about processes that end
abnormally (SIGSEGV) as this may me useful intrusion detection information.
This patch adds audit support to collect information when seccomp forces a
task to exit because of misbehavior in a similar way.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The audit system has the ability to filter on the major and minor number of
the device containing the inode being operated upon. Lets say that
/dev/sda1 has major,minor 8,1 and that we mount /dev/sda1 on /boot. Now lets
say we add a watch with a filter on 8,1. If we proceed to open an inode
inside /boot, such as /vboot/vmlinuz, we will match the major,minor filter.
Lets instead assume that one were to use a tool like debugfs and were to
open /dev/sda1 directly and to modify it's contents. We might hope that
this would also be logged, but it isn't. The rules will check the
major,minor of the device containing /dev/sda1. In other words the rule
would match on the major/minor of the tmpfs mounted at /dev.
I believe these rules should trigger on either device. The man page is
devoid of useful information about the intended semantics. It only seems
logical that if you want to know everything that happened on a major,minor
that would include things that happened to the device itself...
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This patch does 2 things. First it reduces the number of audit_names
allocated in every audit context from 20 to 5. 5 should be enough for all
'normal' syscalls (rename being the worst). Some syscalls can still touch
more the 5 inodes such as mount. When rpc filesystem is mounted it will
create inodes and those can exceed 5. To handle that problem this patch will
dynamically allocate audit_names if it needs more than 5. This should
decrease the typicall memory usage while still supporting all the possible
kernel operations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Every other filter that matches part of the inodes list collected by audit
will match against any of the inodes on that list. The filetype matching
however had a strange way of doing things. It allowed userspace to
indicated if it should match on the first of the second name collected by
the kernel. Name collection ordering seems like a kernel internal and
making userspace rules get that right just seems like a bad idea. As it
turns out the userspace audit writers had no idea it was doing this and
thus never overloaded the value field. The kernel always checked the first
name collected which for the tested rules was always correct.
This patch just makes the filetype matching like the major, minor, inode,
and LSM rules in that it will match against any of the names collected. It
also changes the rule validation to reject the old unused rule types.
Noone knew it was there. Noone used it. Why keep around the extra code?
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.
Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h>
(atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h>
Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit c69e8d9c01 ("CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to
release a task's own creds") added calls to get_task_cred and put_cred in
audit_filter_rules. Profiling with a large number of audit rules active
on the exit chain shows that we are spending upto 48% in this routine for
syscall intensive tests, most of which is in the atomic ops.
1. The code should be accessing tsk->cred rather than tsk->real_cred.
2. Since tsk is current (or tsk is being created by copy_process) access to
tsk->cred without rcu read lock is possible. At the request of the audit
maintainer, a new flag has been added to audit_filter_rules in order to make
this explicit and guide future code.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Normal syscall audit doesn't catch 5th argument of syscall. It also
doesn't catch the contents of userland structures pointed to be
syscall argument, so for both old and new mmap(2) ABI it doesn't
record the descriptor we are mapping. For old one it also misses
flags.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add three helpers that retrieve a refcounted copy of the root and cwd
from the supplied fs_struct.
get_fs_root()
get_fs_pwd()
get_fs_root_and_pwd()
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Simply switch audit_trees from using inotify to using fsnotify for it's
inode pinning and disappearing act information.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
No real changes, just cleanup to the audit_watch split patch which we done
with minimal code changes for easy review. Now fix interfaces to make
things work better.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
There have been a number of reports of people seeing the message:
"name_count maxed, losing inode data: dev=00:05, inode=3185"
in dmesg. These usually lead to people reporting problems to the filesystem
group who are in turn clueless what they mean.
Eventually someone finds me and I explain what is going on and that
these come from the audit system. The basics of the problem is that the
audit subsystem never expects a single syscall to 'interact' (for some
wish washy meaning of interact) with more than 20 inodes. But in fact
some operations like loading kernel modules can cause changes to lots of
inodes in debugfs.
There are a couple real fixes being bandied about including removing the
fixed compile time limit of 20 or not auditing changes in debugfs (or
both) but neither are small and obvious so I am not sending them for
immediate inclusion (I hope Al forwards a real solution next devel
window).
In the meantime this patch simply adds 'audit' to the beginning of the
crap message so if a user sees it, they come blame me first and we can
talk about what it means and make sure we understand all of the reasons
it can happen and make sure this gets solved correctly in the long run.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
* pull ACC_MODE to fs.h; we have several copies all over the place
* nightmarish expression calculating f_mode by f_flags deserves a helper
too (OPEN_FMODE(flags))
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
pahole pointed out that on x86_64 struct audit_context can be rearrainged
to save 16 bytes per struct. Since we have an audit_context per task this
can acually be a pretty significant gain.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If syscall removes the root of subtree being watched, we
definitely do not want the rules refering that subtree
to be destroyed without the syscall in question having
a chance to match them.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
A number of places in the audit system we send an op= followed by a string
that includes spaces. Somehow this works but it's just wrong. This patch
moves all of those that I could find to be quoted.
Example:
Change From: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=remove rule
key="number2" list=4 res=0
Change To: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="remove rule"
key="number2" list=4 res=0
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In preparation for converting audit to use fsnotify instead of inotify we
seperate the inode watching code into it's own file. This is similar to
how the audit tree watching code is already seperated into audit_tree.c
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The audit execve record splitting code estimates the length of the message
generated. But it forgot to include the "" that wrap each string in its
estimation. This means that execve messages with lots of tiny (1-2 byte)
arguments could still cause records greater than 8k to be emitted. Simply
fix the estimate.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
audit_log_d_path had spaces in the strings which would be emitted on the
error paths. This patch simply replaces those spaces with an _ or removes
the needless spaces entirely.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
after 0590b9335a audit_set_auditable() is now only
used by the audit tree code. If CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE is unset it will be defined
but unused. This patch simply moves the function inside a CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
block.
cc1: warnings being treated as errors
/home/acme_unencrypted/git/linux-2.6-tip/kernel/auditsc.c:745: error: ‘audit_set_auditable’ defined but not used
make[2]: *** [kernel/auditsc.o] Error 1
make[1]: *** [kernel] Error 2
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The audit subsystem treats syscall return codes as type long, unfortunately
the audit_get_context() function mistakenly converts the return code to an
int type in the parameters which could cause problems on systems where the
sizeof(int) != sizeof(long).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix auditsc kernel-doc notation:
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2156): No description found for parameter 'attr'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2156): Excess function parameter 'u_attr' description in '__audit_mq_open'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2204): No description found for parameter 'notification'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2204): Excess function parameter 'u_notification' description in '__audit_mq_notify'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
(updated)
Added hunk that changes the comment, the rest is the same.
EXECVE records contain a newline after every argument. auditd converts
"\n" to " " so you cannot see newlines even in raw logs, but they're
there nevertheless. If you're not using auditd, you need to work round
them. These '\n' chars are can be easily replaced by spaces when
creating record in kernel. Note there is no need for trailing '\n' in
an audit record.
record before this patch:
"type=EXECVE msg=audit(1231421801.566:31): argc=4 a0=\"./test\"\na1=\"a\"\na2=\"b\"\na3=\"c\"\n"
record after this patch:
"type=EXECVE msg=audit(1231421801.566:31): argc=4 a0=\"./test\" a1=\"a\" a2=\"b\" a3=\"c\""
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Problem: ordering between the rules on exit chain is currently lost;
all watch and inode rules are listed after everything else _and_
exit,never on one kind doesn't stop exit,always on another from
being matched.
Solution: assign priorities to rules, keep track of the current
highest-priority matching rule and its result (always/never).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* don't bother with allocations
* don't do double copy_from_user()
* don't duplicate parts of check for audit_dummy_context()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* logging the original value of *msg_prio in mq_timedreceive(2)
is insane - the argument is write-only (i.e. syscall always
ignores the original value and only overwrites it).
* merge __audit_mq_timed{send,receive}
* don't do copy_from_user() twice
* don't mess with allocations in auditsc part
* ... and don't bother checking !audit_enabled and !context in there -
we'd already checked for audit_dummy_context().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* don't copy_from_user() twice
* don't bother with allocations
* don't duplicate parts of audit_dummy_context()
* make it return void
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
No need to do that more than once per process lifetime; allocating/freeing
on each sendto/accept/etc. is bloody pointless.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Delete excess kernel-doc notation in kernel/auditsc.c:
Warning(linux-2.6.27-git10//kernel/auditsc.c:1481): Excess function parameter or struct member 'tsk' description in 'audit_syscall_entry'
Warning(linux-2.6.27-git10//kernel/auditsc.c:1564): Excess function parameter or struct member 'tsk' description in 'audit_syscall_exit'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.
Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
actual capbilities being added/removed. This patch adds a new record type
which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.
example output if you audit capset syscalls would be:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
non-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set
of known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion
and includes the process's pE, pI, pP. Before and after the bprm capability
are applied. This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls.
an example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid:
setcap "cat_net_raw+pe" /bin/ping
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=1457f30 a1=14606b0 a2=1463940 a3=321b770a70 items=2 ppid=2929 pid=2963 auid=0 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1321] msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): fver=2 fp=0000000000002000 fi=0000000000000000 fe=1 old_pp=0000000000000000 old_pi=0000000000000000 old_pe=0000000000000000 new_pp=0000000000002000 new_pi=0000000000000000 new_pe=0000000000002000
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="127.0.0.1"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): cwd="/home/test"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
records of any file that has file capabilities set. Files which do not
have fcaps set will not have different PATH records.
An example audit record if you run:
setcap "cap_net_admin+pie" /bin/bash
/bin/bash
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=2119230 a1=210da30 a2=20ee290 a3=8 items=2 ppid=2149 pid=2923 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="www.google.com"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0104755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fi=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Various people outside the tty layer still stick their noses in behind the
scenes. We need to make sure they also obey the locking and referencing rules.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
got rid of compilation warning:
ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations and code
Signed-off-by: Cordelia Sam <cordesam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Sorry, I miss a blank between if and "(".
And I add "unlikely" to check "ctx" in audit_match_perm() and audit_match_filetype().
This is a new patch for it.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When calling audit_filter_task(), it calls audit_filter_rules() with audit_context is NULL.
If the key field is set, the result in audit_filter_rules() will be set to 1 and
ctx->filterkey will be set to key.
But the ctx is NULL in this condition, so kernel will panic.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Makes the kernel audit subsystem collect information about the sending
process when that process sends SIGUSR2 to the userspace audit daemon.
SIGUSR2 is a new interesting signal to auditd telling auditd that it
should try to start logging to disk again and the error condition which
caused it to stop logging to disk (usually out of space) has been
rectified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This adds a fast path for 64-bit syscall entry and exit when
TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is set, but no other kind of syscall tracing.
This path does not need to save and restore all registers as
the general case of tracing does. Avoiding the iret return path
when syscall audit is enabled helps performance a lot.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Argument is S_IF... | <index>, where index is normally 0 or 1.
Triggers if chosen element of ctx->names[] is present and the
mode of object in question matches the upper bits of argument.
I.e. for things like "is the argument of that chmod a directory",
etc.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use msglen as the identifier.
kernel/audit.c:724:10: warning: symbol 'len' shadows an earlier one
kernel/audit.c:575:8: originally declared here
Don't use ino_f to check the inode field at the end of the functions.
kernel/auditfilter.c:429:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditfilter.c:420:21: originally declared here
kernel/auditfilter.c:542:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditfilter.c:529:21: originally declared here
i always used as a counter for a for loop and initialized to zero before
use. Eliminate the inner i variables.
kernel/auditsc.c:1295:8: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here
kernel/auditsc.c:1320:7: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Leave audit_sig_{uid|pid|sid} protected by #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.
Noticed by sparse:
kernel/audit.c:73:6: warning: symbol 'audit_ever_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c💯8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_uid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:101:8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_pid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:102:6: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_sid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:117:23: warning: symbol 'audit_ih' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/auditfilter.c:78:18: warning: symbol 'audit_filter_list' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces. No userspace
changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy
work. We have the following string audit interfaces to use:
void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n);
void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf);
void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n);
void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string);
This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that
people have with the string output from the kernel audit system. But we
still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
A couple of audit printk statements did not have a newline.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
the exported SELinux interface.
Basically, use:
security_audit_rule_init
secuirty_audit_rule_free
security_audit_rule_known
security_audit_rule_match
instad of (respectively) :
selinux_audit_rule_init
selinux_audit_rule_free
audit_rule_has_selinux
selinux_audit_rule_match
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
kfree(ctx)
and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
security_release_secctx(ctx, len)
Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx
succeeded.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Fix the following compiler warning by using "%zu" as defined in C99.
CC kernel/auditsc.o
kernel/auditsc.c: In function 'audit_log_single_execve_arg':
kernel/auditsc.c:1074: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but
argument 4 has type 'size_t'
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Clearly this was supposed to be an == not an = in the if statement.
This patch also causes us to stop processing execve args once we have
failed rather than continuing to loop on failure over and over and over.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code. To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Use struct path in fs_struct.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Disabling audit at runtime by auditctl doesn't mean that we can
stop allocating contexts for new processes; we don't want to miss them
when that sucker is reenabled.
(based on work from Al Viro in the RHEL kernel series)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
execve arguments can be quite large. There is no limit on the number of
arguments and a 4G limit on the size of an argument.
this patch prints those aruguments in bite sized pieces. a userspace size
limitation of 8k was discovered so this keeps messages around 7.5k
single arguments larger than 7.5k in length are split into multiple records
and can be identified as aX[Y]=
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
If we fail to get an ab in audit_log_pid_context this may be due to an exclude
rule rather than a memory allocation failure. If it was due to a memory
allocation failue we would have already paniced and no need to do it again.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This patch adds an end of event record type. It will be sent by the kernel as
the last record when a multi-record event is triggered. This will aid realtime
analysis programs since they will now reliably know they have the last record
to complete an event. The audit daemon filters this and will not write it to
disk.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb redhat com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session
id. This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in
almost all messages which currently output the auid. The field is
labeled ses= or oses=
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Add uid, loginuid, and comm collection to OBJ_PID records. This just
gives users a little more information about the task that received a
signal. pid is rather meaningless after the fact, and even though comm
isn't great we can't collect exe reasonably on this code path for
performance reasons.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The syscall exit code will change ERESTART* kernel internal return codes
to EINTR if it does not restart the syscall. Since we collect the audit
info before that point we should fix those in the audit log as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Keeping loginuid in audit_context is racy and results in messier
code. Taken to task_struct, out of the way of ->audit_context
changes.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix kernel-doc for auditsc parameter changes.
Warning(linux-2.6.23-git17//kernel/auditsc.c:1623): No description found for parameter 'dentry'
Warning(linux-2.6.23-git17//kernel/auditsc.c:1666): No description found for parameter 'dentry'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree".
The part that can be sanely implemented, that is. Limitations:
* if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch
it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously)
* if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit
that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees
* if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted
elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there. New command
tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false
positives.
Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places
(multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does
_not_ depend on which one we are using for access.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch cleans up duplicate includes in
kernel/
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This will allow rpc.gssd to use inotify instead of dnotify in order to
locate new rpc upcall pipes.
This also requires the exporting of __audit_inode_child(), which is used by
fsnotify_create() and fsnotify_mkdir(). Ccing David Woodhouse.
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This patch fixes an off-by-one in a BUG_ON() spotted by the Coverity
checker.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Cc: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The check for audit_signals is misplaced and the check for
audit_dummy_context() is missing; as the result, if we send a signal to
auditd from task with NULL ->audit_context while we have audit_signals
!= 0 we end up with an oops.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes not copied, hence 0 is the
expected output.
axi->mm might not be valid anymore when not equal to current->mm, do not
dereference before checking that - thanks to Al for spotting that.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Tested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH
records when audit is disabled. I must admit my stupidity - I assumed
that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of
deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held).
Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way.
It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those.
Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab->gfp_mask for allocations,
kmalloc() in there is not a problem. IOW, the simple fix is sufficient:
let's rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main
record. It's trivial to do.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The mode fields for IPC records are not consistent. Some are hex, others are
octal. This patch makes them all octal.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Remove the arg+env limit of MAX_ARG_PAGES by copying the strings directly from
the old mm into the new mm.
We create the new mm before the binfmt code runs, and place the new stack at
the very top of the address space. Once the binfmt code runs and figures out
where the stack should be, we move it downwards.
It is a bit peculiar in that we have one task with two mm's, one of which is
inactive.
[a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl: limit stack size]
Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
[bunk@stusta.de: unexport bprm_mm_init]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The purpose of audit_bprm() is to log the argv array to a userspace daemon at
the end of the execve system call. Since user-space hasn't had time to run,
this array is still in pristine state on the process' stack; so no need to
copy it, we can just grab it from there.
In order to minimize the damage to audit_log_*() copy each string into a
temporary kernel buffer first.
Currently the audit code requires that the full argument vector fits in a
single packet. So currently it does clip the argv size to a (sysctl) limit,
but only when execve auditing is enabled.
If the audit protocol gets extended to allow for multiple packets this check
can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com>
Cc: <linux-audit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix parameter name in audit_core_dumps for kerneldoc.
Signed-off-by: Henrik Kretzschmar <henne@nachtwindheim.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Hi,
I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit
system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is
when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a
production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a
patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Make more effort to detect previously collected names, so we don't log
multiple PATH records for a single filesystem object. Add
audit_inc_name_count() to reduce duplicate code.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Handle the edge cases for POSIX message queue auditing. Collect inode
info when opening an existing mq, and for send/receive operations. Remove
audit_inode_update() as it has really evolved into the equivalent of
audit_inode().
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Audit contexts can be reused, so initialize a name's osid to the
default in audit_getname(). This ensures we don't log a bogus object
label when no inode data is collected for a name.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
GFP_KERNEL allocations in non-blocking context; fixed by killing
an idiotic use of security_getprocattr().
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Provide an audit record of the descriptor pair returned by pipe() and
socketpair(). Rewritten from the original posted to linux-audit by
John D. Ramsdell <ramsdell@mitre.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix the locking of signal->tty.
Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used
by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current'
or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway.
(NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules)
Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding
tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys
are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty
access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access).
It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing.
(NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to
be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think
it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info
invocations)
[schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA
or ipsec policy is created/deleted.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Hi,
This patch removes the rdev logging from the previous patch
The below patch closes an unbounded use of name_count. This can lead to oopses
in some new file systems.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
On Thu, Sep 28, 2006 at 04:03:06PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> After some looking I did not see a way to get into audit_log_exit
> without having set the ppid. So I am dropping the set from there and
> only doing it at the beginning.
>
> Please comment/ack/nak as soon as possible.
Ehh... That's one hell of an overhead to be had ;-/ Let's be lazy.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add tty locking around the audit and accounting code.
The whole current->signal-> locking is all deeply strange but it's for
someone else to sort out. Add rather than replace the lock for acct.c
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be
consistent with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Eliminate selinux_task_ctxid since it duplicates selinux_task_get_sid.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
When an object is created via a symlink into an audited directory, audit misses
the event due to not having collected the inode data for the directory. Modify
__audit_inode_child() to copy the parent inode data if a parent wasn't found in
audit_names[].
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When the specified path is an existing file or when it is a symlink, audit
collects the wrong inode number, which causes it to miss the open() event.
Adding a second hook to the open() path fixes this.
Also add audit_copy_inode() to consolidate some code.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add support for a rule key, which can be used to tie audit records to audit
rules. This is useful when a watched file is accessed through a link or
symlink, as well as for general audit log analysis.
Because this patch uses a string key instead of an integer key, there is a bit
of extra overhead to do the kstrdup() when a rule fires. However, we're also
allocating memory for the audit record buffer, so it's probably not that
significant. I went ahead with a string key because it seems more
user-friendly.
Note that the user must ensure that filterkeys are unique. The kernel only
checks for duplicate rules.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hpd.com>
Fix kernel-doc parameters in kernel/
Warning(/var/linsrc/linux-2617-g9//kernel/auditsc.c:1376): No description found for parameter 'u_abs_timeout'
Warning(/var/linsrc/linux-2617-g9//kernel/auditsc.c:1420): No description found for parameter 'u_msg_prio'
Warning(/var/linsrc/linux-2617-g9//kernel/auditsc.c:1420): No description found for parameter 'u_abs_timeout'
Warning(/var/linsrc/linux-2617-g9//kernel/acct.c:526): No description found for parameter 'pacct'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Hi,
I was doing some testing and noticed that when the audit system was disabled,
I was still getting messages about the loginuid being set. The following patch
makes audit_set_loginuid look at in_syscall to determine if it should create
an audit event. The loginuid will continue to be set as long as there is a context.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In this implementation, audit registers inotify watches on the parent
directories of paths specified in audit rules. When audit's inotify
event handler is called, it updates any affected rules based on the
filesystem event. If the parent directory is renamed, removed, or its
filesystem is unmounted, audit removes all rules referencing that
inotify watch.
To keep things simple, this implementation limits location-based
auditing to the directory entries in an existing directory. Given
a path-based rule for /foo/bar/passwd, the following table applies:
passwd modified -- audit event logged
passwd replaced -- audit event logged, rules list updated
bar renamed -- rule removed
foo renamed -- untracked, meaning that the rule now applies to
the new location
Audit users typically want to have many rules referencing filesystem
objects, which can significantly impact filtering performance. This
patch also adds an inode-number-based rule hash to mitigate this
situation.
The patch is relative to the audit git tree:
http://kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current.git;a=summary
and uses the inotify kernel API:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/6/1/145
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch adds audit support to POSIX message queues. It applies cleanly to
the lspp.b15 branch of Al Viro's git tree. There are new auxiliary data
structures, and collection and emission routines in kernel/auditsc.c. New hooks
in ipc/mqueue.c collect arguments from the syscalls.
I tested the patch by building the examples from the POSIX MQ library tarball.
Build them -lrt, not against the old MQ library in the tarball. Here's the URL:
http://www.geocities.com/wronski12/posix_ipc/libmqueue-4.41.tar.gz
Do auditctl -a exit,always -S for mq_open, mq_timedsend, mq_timedreceive,
mq_notify, mq_getsetattr. mq_unlink has no new hooks. Please see the
corresponding userspace patch to get correct output from auditd for the new
record types.
[fixes folded]
Signed-off-by: George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The following patch addresses most of the issues with the IPC_SET_PERM
records as described in:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2006-May/msg00010.html
and addresses the comments I received on the record field names.
To summarize, I made the following changes:
1. Changed sys_msgctl() and semctl_down() so that an IPC_SET_PERM
record is emitted in the failure case as well as the success case.
This matches the behavior in sys_shmctl(). I could simplify the
code in sys_msgctl() and semctl_down() slightly but it would mean
that in some error cases we could get an IPC_SET_PERM record
without an IPC record and that seemed odd.
2. No change to the IPC record type, given no feedback on the backward
compatibility question.
3. Removed the qbytes field from the IPC record. It wasn't being
set and when audit_ipc_obj() is called from ipcperms(), the
information isn't available. If we want the information in the IPC
record, more extensive changes will be necessary. Since it only
applies to message queues and it isn't really permission related, it
doesn't seem worth it.
4. Removed the obj field from the IPC_SET_PERM record. This means that
the kern_ipc_perm argument is no longer needed.
5. Removed the spaces and renamed the IPC_SET_PERM field names. Replaced iuid and
igid fields with ouid and ogid in the IPC record.
I tested this with the lspp.22 kernel on an x86_64 box. I believe it
applies cleanly on the latest kernel.
-- ljk
Signed-off-by: Linda Knippers <linda.knippers@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
While testing the watch performance, I noticed that selinux_task_ctxid()
was creeping into the results more than it should. Investigation showed
that the function call was being called whether it was needed or not. The
below patch fixes this.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different
functions:
- audit_ipc_obj()
- audit_ipc_set_perm()
There's a key shift here... The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid,
mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object. This
audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places. Most notably, it
is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the
ipc code permforming a MAC check. Additionally there are several places
where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being
performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby
ipcperms() call. In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to
ensure that the information is captured by the audit system.
The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on
the ipc object changes. In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded
(and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before
each instance).
2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type. This allows
for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC
object and permissions changes. Note that the same struct
audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate
audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message. Finally,
the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle
aux messages of this new type. No more mem leaks I hope ;-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
The patch below builds upon the patch sent earlier and adds subject label to
all audit events generated via the netlink interface. It also cleans up a few
other minor things.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context
string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the
inode audit change patch already being applied.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Previously, we were gathering the context instead of the sid. Now in this patch,
we gather just the sid and convert to context only if an audit event is being
output.
This patch brings the performance hit from 146% down to 23%
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch provides the ability to filter audit messages based on the
elements of the process' SELinux context (user, role, type, mls sensitivity,
and mls clearance). It uses the new interfaces from selinux to opaquely
store information related to the selinux context and to filter based on that
information. It also uses the callback mechanism provided by selinux to
refresh the information when a new policy is loaded.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
[PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
[PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
[PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
[PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
[PATCH] Fix audit operators
[PATCH] promiscuous mode
[PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
[PATCH] add/remove rule update
[PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
[PATCH] SE Linux audit events
[PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
[PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
[PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
[PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
[PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
[PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
[PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
[PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
[PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
...
Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
Simplify audit_free()'s locking: no need to lock a task that we are tearing
down. [the extra locking also caused false positives in the lock
validator]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
>From the RBAC specs:
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide the set of authorized
RBAC administrators with the capability to read the following
audit information from the audit records:
<snip>
(e) The User Session Identifier or Terminal Type
A patch adding the tty for all syscalls is included in this email.
Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This fixes the per-user and per-message-type filtering when syscall
auditing isn't enabled.
[AV: folded followup fix from the same author]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently
added to -mm1:
* fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode
* fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off
due to a missing function in security/dummy.c
* fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing
return just before an error_path label
* some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(),
audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context()
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.
These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.
This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).
[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
- Add a new, 5th filter called "exclude".
- And add a new field AUDIT_MSGTYPE.
- Define a new function audit_filter_exclude() that takes a message type
as input and examines all rules in the filter. It returns '1' if the
message is to be excluded, and '0' otherwise.
- Call the audit_filter_exclude() function near the top of
audit_log_start() just after asserting audit_initialized. If the
message type is not to be audited, return NULL very early, before
doing a lot of work.
[combined with followup fix for bug in original patch, Nov 4, same author]
[combined with later renaming AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE->AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE
and audit_filter_exclude() -> audit_filter_type()]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch augments the collection of inode info during syscall
processing. It represents part of the functionality that was provided
by the auditfs patch included in RHEL4.
Specifically, it:
- Collects information for target inodes created or removed during
syscalls. Previous code only collects information for the target
inode's parent.
- Adds the audit_inode() hook to syscalls that operate on a file
descriptor (e.g. fchown), enabling audit to do inode filtering for
these calls.
- Modifies filtering code to check audit context for either an inode #
or a parent inode # matching a given rule.
- Modifies logging to provide inode # for both parent and child.
- Protect debug info from NULL audit_names.name.
[AV: folded a later typo fix from the same author]
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The audit hooks (to be added shortly) will want to see dentry->d_inode
too, not just the name.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
- add kerneldoc for non-static functions;
- don't init static data to 0;
- limit lines to < 80 columns;
- fix long-format style;
- delete whitespace at end of some lines;
(chrisw: resend and update to current audit-2.6 tree)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
hi,
The motivation behind the patch below was to address messages in
/var/log/messages such as:
Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=252 name_count=0: freeing
multiple contexts (1)
Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=113 name_count=0: freeing
multiple contexts (2)
I can reproduce by running 'get-edid' from:
http://john.fremlin.de/programs/linux/read-edid/.
These messages come about in the log b/c the vm86 calls do not exit via
the normal system call exit paths and thus do not call
'audit_syscall_exit'. The next system call will then free the context for
itself and for the vm86 context, thus generating the above messages. This
patch addresses the issue by simply adding a call to 'audit_syscall_exit'
from the vm86 code.
Besides fixing the above error messages the patch also now allows vm86
system calls to become auditable. This is useful since strace does not
appear to properly record the return values from sys_vm86.
I think this patch is also a step in the right direction in terms of
cleaning up some core auditing code. If we can correct any other paths
that do not properly call the audit exit and entries points, then we can
also eliminate the notion of context chaining.
I've tested this patch by verifying that the log messages no longer
appear, and that the audit records for sys_vm86 appear to be correct.
Also, 'read_edid' produces itentical output.
thanks,
-Jason
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Jeff Layton