Commit Graph

9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Shakeel Butt 991e767385 mm: memcontrol: account kernel stack per node
Currently the kernel stack is being accounted per-zone.  There is no need
to do that.  In addition due to being per-zone, memcg has to keep a
separate MEMCG_KERNEL_STACK_KB.  Make the stat per-node and deprecate
MEMCG_KERNEL_STACK_KB as memcg_stat_item is an extension of
node_stat_item.  In addition localize the kernel stack stats updates to
account_kernel_stack().

Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200630161539.1759185-1-shakeelb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 11:33:25 -07:00
Will Deacon 333ed74689 scs: Report SCS usage in bytes rather than number of entries
Fix the SCS debug usage check so that we report the number of bytes
used, rather than the number of entries.

Fixes: 5bbaf9d1fc ("scs: Add support for stack usage debugging")
Reported-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-06-04 16:14:56 +01:00
Will Deacon aa7a65ae5b scs: Remove references to asm/scs.h from core code
asm/scs.h is no longer needed by the core code, so remove a redundant
header inclusion and update the stale Kconfig text.

Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-05-18 17:47:45 +01:00
Will Deacon 88485be531 scs: Move scs_overflow_check() out of architecture code
There is nothing architecture-specific about scs_overflow_check() as
it's just a trivial wrapper around scs_corrupted().

For parity with task_stack_end_corrupted(), rename scs_corrupted() to
task_scs_end_corrupted() and call it from schedule_debug() when
CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK_is enabled, which better reflects its
purpose as a debug feature to catch inadvertent overflow of the SCS.
Finally, remove the unused scs_overflow_check() function entirely.

This has absolutely no impact on architectures that do not support SCS
(currently arm64 only).

Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-05-18 17:47:40 +01:00
Will Deacon bee348fab0 scs: Move accounting into alloc/free functions
There's no need to perform the shadow stack page accounting independently
of the lifetime of the underlying allocation, so call the accounting code
from the {alloc,free}() functions and simplify the code in the process.

Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-05-18 17:47:33 +01:00
Will Deacon 51189c7a7e arm64: scs: Store absolute SCS stack pointer value in thread_info
Storing the SCS information in thread_info as a {base,offset} pair
introduces an additional load instruction on the ret-to-user path,
since the SCS stack pointer in x18 has to be converted back to an offset
by subtracting the base.

Replace the offset with the absolute SCS stack pointer value instead
and avoid the redundant load.

Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-05-18 17:47:22 +01:00
Sami Tolvanen 5bbaf9d1fc scs: Add support for stack usage debugging
Implements CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE for shadow stacks. When enabled,
also prints out the highest shadow stack usage per process.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
[will: rewrote most of scs_check_usage()]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-05-15 16:35:49 +01:00
Sami Tolvanen 628d06a48f scs: Add page accounting for shadow call stack allocations
This change adds accounting for the memory allocated for shadow stacks.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-05-15 16:35:49 +01:00
Sami Tolvanen d08b9f0ca6 scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack,
which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being
overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here:

  https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html

Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of
shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading
and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack
control flow by modifying the stacks.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
[will: Numerous cosmetic changes]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-05-15 16:35:45 +01:00