Update (or temporarily remove) comments.
Remove or replace some of #define lines.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In order to synchronize with TOMOYO 1.8's syntax,
(1) Remove special handling for allow_read/write permission.
(2) Replace deny_rewrite/allow_rewrite permission with allow_append permission.
(3) Remove file_pattern keyword.
(4) Remove allow_read permission from exception policy.
(5) Allow creating domains in enforcing mode without calling supervisor.
(6) Add permission check for opening directory for reading.
(7) Add permission check for stat() operation.
(8) Make "cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain" behave as if
"cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_flush(), head->r.w[0] holds pointer to string data to be printed.
But head->r.w[0] was updated only when the string data was partially
printed (because head->r.w[0] will be updated by head->r.w[1] later if
completely printed). However, regarding /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query ,
an additional '\0' is printed after the string data was completely printed.
But if free space for read buffer became 0 before printing the additional '\0',
tomoyo_flush() was returning without updating head->r.w[0]. As a result,
tomoyo_flush() forever reprints already printed string data.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_write_profile() since 2.6.34, a lock was by error missing when
replacing profile's comment line. If multiple threads attempted
echo '0-COMMENT=comment' > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile
in parallel, garbage collector will fail to kfree() the old value.
Protect the replacement using a lock. Also, keep the old value rather than
replace with empty string when out of memory error has occurred.
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Wang <wangxiaochen0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Configuration files for TOMOYO 2.3 are not compatible with TOMOYO 2.2.
But current panic() message is too unfriendly and is confusing users.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If domain is NULL then &domain->list is a bogus address. Let's leave
head->r.domain NULL instead of saving an unusable pointer.
This is just a cleanup. The current code always checks head->r.eof
before dereferencing head->r.domain.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
System call entry functions sys_*() are never to be called from
general kernel code. The fact that they aren't declared in header
files should have been a clue. These functions also don't exist on
Alpha since it has sys_getxpid() instead.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fit 80 columns limit.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Split tomoyo_write_profile() into several functions.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When userspace program reads policy from /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/
interface, TOMOYO uses line buffered mode. A line has at least one word.
Commit 006dacc "TOMOYO: Support longer pathname." changed a word's max length
from 4000 bytes to max kmalloc()able bytes. By that commit, a line's max length
changed from 8192 bytes to more than max kmalloc()able bytes.
Max number of words in a line remains finite. This patch changes the way of
buffering so that all words in a line are firstly directly copied to userspace
buffer as much as possible and are secondly queued for next read request.
Words queued are guaranteed to be valid until /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/
interface is close()d.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Policy editor needs to know allow_execute entries in order to build domain
transition tree. Reading all entries is slow. Thus, allow reading only
allow_execute entries.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Change list_for_each_cookie to
(1) start from current position rather than next position
(2) remove temporary cursor
(3) check that srcu_read_lock() is held
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common code for "initialize_domain"/"no_initialize_domain"/"keep_domain"/
"no_keep_domain" keywords.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Some programs behave differently depending on argv[0] passed to execve().
TOMOYO has "alias" keyword in order to allow administrators to define different
domains if requested pathname passed to execve() is a symlink. But "alias"
keyword is incomplete because this keyword assumes that requested pathname and
argv[0] are identical. Thus, remove "alias" keyword (by this patch) and add
syntax for checking argv[0] (by future patches).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common code for "path_group" and "number_group".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Now lists are accessible via array index. Aggregate reader functions using index.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Assign list id and make the lists as array of "struct list_head".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Read functions do not fail. Make them from int to void.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Keyword strings are read-only. We can directly access them to reduce code size.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fix 80 columns limit.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common code for elements using "struct list_head" + "bool" structure.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common "struct list_head" + "bool" structure.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common "struct list_head" + "bool" + "u8" structure and
use common code for elements using that structure.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch allows users to change access control mode for per-operation basis.
This feature comes from non LSM version of TOMOYO which is designed for
permitting users to use SELinux and TOMOYO at the same time.
SELinux does not care filename in a directory whereas TOMOYO does. Change of
filename can change how the file is used. For example, renaming index.txt to
.htaccess will change how the file is used. Thus, letting SELinux to enforce
read()/write()/mmap() etc. restriction and letting TOMOYO to enforce rename()
restriction is an example usage of this feature.
What is unfortunate for me is that currently LSM does not allow users to use
SELinux and LSM version of TOMOYO at the same time...
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch allows users to aggregate programs which provide similar
functionality (e.g. /usr/bin/vi and /usr/bin/emacs ).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Some applications create and execute programs dynamically. We need to accept
wildcard for execute permission because such programs contain random suffix
in their filenames. This patch loosens up regulation of string parameters.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
security/tomoyo/common.c became too large to read.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since the behavior of the system is restricted by policy, we may need to update
policy when you update packages.
We need to update policy in the following cases.
* The pathname of files has changed.
* The dependency of files has changed.
* The access permissions required has increased.
The ideal way to update policy is to rebuild from the scratch using learning
mode. But it is not desirable to change from enforcing mode to other mode if
the system has once entered in production state. Suppose MAC could support
per-application enforcing mode, the MAC becomes useless if an application that
is not running in enforcing mode was cracked. For example, the whole system
becomes vulnerable if only HTTP server application is running in learning mode
to rebuild policy for the application. So, in TOMOYO Linux, updating policy is
done while the system is running in enforcing mode.
This patch implements "interactive enforcing mode" which allows administrators
to judge whether to accept policy violation in enforcing mode or not.
A demo movie is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9q1Jo25LPA .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
mount(2) has three string and one numeric parameters.
Split mount restriction code from security/tomoyo/file.c .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Check numeric parameters for operations that deal them
(e.g. chmod/chown/ioctl).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds numeric values grouping support, which is useful for grouping
numeric values such as file's UID, DAC's mode, ioctl()'s cmd number.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds pathname grouping support, which is useful for grouping
pathnames that cannot be represented using /\{dir\}/ pattern.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use stack memory for pending entry to reduce kmalloc() which will be kfree()d.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Some of TOMOYO's functions may sleep after mutex_lock(). If OOM-killer selected
a process which is waiting at mutex_lock(), the to-be-killed process can't be
killed. Thus, replace mutex_lock() with mutex_lock_interruptible() so that the
to-be-killed process can immediately return from TOMOYO's functions.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In Ubuntu, security_path_*() hooks are exported to Unionfs. Thus, prepare for
being called from inside VFS functions because I'm not sure whether it is safe
to use GFP_KERNEL or not.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
The original code returns a freed pointer. This function is expected to
return NULL on errors.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Variable "atmark" is currently unused.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
__func__ is used for only debug printk(). We can remove it.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use shorter name to reduce newlines needed for 80 columns limit.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds garbage collector support to TOMOYO.
Elements are protected by "struct srcu_struct tomoyo_ss".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Gather structures and constants scattered around security/tomoyo/ directory.
This is for preparation for adding garbage collector since garbage collector
needs to know structures and constants which TOMOYO uses.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add refcounter to "struct tomoyo_name_entry" and replace tomoyo_save_name()
with tomoyo_get_name()/tomoyo_put_name() pair so that we can kfree() when
garbage collector is added.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since the codes for adding an entry and removing an entry are similar, we can
save some lines by using "if (is_delete) { ... } else { ... }" branches.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since list elements are rounded up to kmalloc() size rather than sizeof(int),
saving one byte by using bitfields is no longer helpful.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TOMOYO was using own memory usage counter for detecting memory leak.
But as kernel 2.6.31 introduced memory leak detection mechanism
( CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK ), we no longer need to have own counter.
We remove usage counter for memory used for permission checks, but we keep
usage counter for memory used for policy so that we can apply quota.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently, TOMOYO allocates memory for list elements from memory pool allocated
by kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE). But that makes it difficult to kfree() when garbage
collector is added. Thus, remove memory pool and use kmalloc(sizeof()).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since readers no longer use down_read(), writers no longer
need to use rw_semaphore. Replace individual rw_semaphore by
single mutex.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Replace list operation with RCU primitives and replace
down_read()/up_read() with srcu_read_lock()/srcu_read_unlock().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
LSM hooks for chmod()/chown()/chroot() are now ready.
This patch utilizes these hooks.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TOMOYO 1.7.1 has recursive directory matching operator support.
I want to add it to TOMOYO for Linux 2.6.33 .
----------
[PATCH] TOMOYO: Add recursive directory matching operator support.
This patch introduces new operator /\{dir\}/ which matches
'/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/ /dir/dir/dir/ ).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We can mark tomoyo_delete_domain() as a "static" function
by moving it from domain.c to common.c .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds some descriptions of lists and structures.
This patch contains no code changes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TOMOYO 2.2.0 is not using total_len field of "struct tomoyo_path_info".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We can directly assign the result of tomoyo_io_printf() to done flag.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since TOMOYO's policy management tools does not use the "undelete domain"
command, we decided to remove that command.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This file contains common functions (e.g. policy I/O, pattern matching).
-------------------- About pattern matching --------------------
Since TOMOYO Linux is a name based access control, TOMOYO Linux seriously
considers "safe" string representation.
TOMOYO Linux's string manipulation functions make reviewers feel crazy,
but there are reasons why TOMOYO Linux needs its own string manipulation
functions.
----- Part 1 : preconditions -----
People definitely want to use wild card.
To support pattern matching, we have to support wild card characters.
In a typical Linux system, filenames are likely consists of only alphabets,
numbers, and some characters (e.g. + - ~ . / ).
But theoretically, the Linux kernel accepts all characters but NUL character
(which is used as a terminator of a string).
Some Linux systems can have filenames which contain * ? ** etc.
Therefore, we have to somehow modify string so that we can distinguish
wild card characters and normal characters.
It might be possible for some application's configuration files to restrict
acceptable characters.
It is impossible for kernel to restrict acceptable characters.
We can't accept approaches which will cause troubles for applications.
----- Part 2 : commonly used approaches -----
Text formatted strings separated by space character (0x20) and new line
character (0x0A) is more preferable for users over array of NUL-terminated
string.
Thus, people use text formatted configuration files separated by space
character and new line.
We sometimes need to handle non-printable characters.
Thus, people use \ character (0x5C) as escape character and represent
non-printable characters using octal or hexadecimal format.
At this point, we remind (at least) 3 approaches.
(1) Shell glob style expression
(2) POSIX regular expression (UNIX style regular expression)
(3) Maverick wild card expression
On the surface, (1) and (2) sound good choices. But they have a big pitfall.
All meta-characters in (1) and (2) are legal characters for representing
a pathname, and users easily write incorrect expression. What is worse, users
unlikely notice incorrect expressions because characters used for regular
pathnames unlikely contain meta-characters. This incorrect use of
meta-characters in pathname representation reveals vulnerability
(e.g. unexpected results) only when irregular pathname is specified.
The authors of TOMOYO Linux think that approaches which adds some character
for interpreting meta-characters as normal characters (i.e. (1) and (2)) are
not suitable for security use.
Therefore, the authors of TOMOYO Linux propose (3).
----- Part 3: consideration points -----
We need to solve encoding problem.
A single character can be represented in several ways using encodings.
For Japanese language, there are "ShiftJIS", "ISO-2022-JP", "EUC-JP",
"UTF-8" and more.
Some languages (e.g. Japanese language) supports multi-byte characters
(where a single character is represented using several bytes).
Some multi-byte characters may match the escape character.
For Japanese language, some characters in "ShiftJIS" encoding match
\ character, and bothering Web's CGI developers.
It is important that the kernel string is not bothered by encoding problem.
Linus said, "I really would expect that kernel strings don't have
an encoding. They're just C strings: a NUL-terminated stream of bytes."
http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/6/142
Yes. The kernel strings are just C strings.
We are talking about how to store and carry "kernel strings" safely.
If we store "kernel string" into policy file as-is, the "kernel string" will
be interpreted differently depending on application's encoding settings.
One application may interpret "kernel string" as "UTF-8",
another application may interpret "kernel string" as "ShiftJIS".
Therefore, we propose to represent strings using ASCII encoding.
In this way, we are no longer bothered by encoding problems.
We need to avoid information loss caused by display.
It is difficult to input and display non-printable characters, but we have to
be able to handle such characters because the kernel string is a C string.
If we use only ASCII printable characters (from 0x21 to 0x7E) and space
character (0x20) and new line character (0x0A), it is easy to input from
keyboard and display on all terminals which is running Linux.
Therefore, we propose to represent strings using only characters which value
is one of "from 0x21 to 0x7E", "0x20", "0x0A".
We need to consider ease of splitting strings from a line.
If we use an approach which uses "\ " for representing a space character
within a string, we have to count the string from the beginning to check
whether this space character is accompanied with \ character or not.
As a result, we cannot monotonically split a line using space character.
If we use an approach which uses "\040" for representing a space character
within a string, we can monotonically split a line using space character.
If we use an approach which uses NUL character as a delimiter, we cannot
use string manipulation functions for splitting strings from a line.
Therefore, we propose that we represent space character as "\040".
We need to avoid wrong designations (incorrect use of special characters).
Not all users can understand and utilize POSIX's regular expressions
correctly and perfectly.
If a character acts as a wild card by default, the user will get unexpected
result if that user didn't know the meaning of that character.
Therefore, we propose that all characters but \ character act as
a normal character and let the user add \ character to make a character
act as a wild card.
In this way, users needn't to know all wild card characters beforehand.
They can learn when they encountered an unseen wild card character
for their first time.
----- Part 4: supported wild card expressions -----
At this point, we have wild card expressions listed below.
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Wild card | Meaning and example |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \* | More than or equals to 0 character other than '/'. |
| | /var/log/samba/\* |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \@ | More than or equals to 0 character other than '/' or '.'. |
| | /var/www/html/\@.html |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \? | 1 byte character other than '/'. |
| | /tmp/mail.\?\?\?\?\?\? |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \$ | More than or equals to 1 decimal digit. |
| | /proc/\$/cmdline |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \+ | 1 decimal digit. |
| | /var/tmp/my_work.\+ |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \X | More than or equals to 1 hexadecimal digit. |
| | /var/tmp/my-work.\X |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \x | 1 hexadecimal digit. |
| | /tmp/my-work.\x |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \A | More than or equals to 1 alphabet character. |
| | /var/log/my-work/\$-\A-\$.log |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \a | 1 alphabet character. |
| | /home/users/\a/\*/public_html/\*.html |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| \- | Pathname subtraction operator. |
| | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ |
| | | Example | Meaning | |
| | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ |
| | | /etc/\* | All files in /etc/ directory. | |
| | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ |
| | | /etc/\*\-\*shadow\* | /etc/\* other than /etc/\*shadow\* | |
| | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ |
| | | /\*\-proc\-sys/ | /\*/ other than /proc/ /sys/ | |
| | +---------------------+------------------------------------+ |
+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
+----------------+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Representation | Meaning and example |
+----------------+---------------------------------------------------------+
| \\ | backslash character itself. |
+----------------+---------------------------------------------------------+
| \ooo | 1 byte character. |
| | ooo is 001 <= ooo <= 040 || 177 <= ooo <= 377. |
| | |
| | \040 for space character. |
| | \177 for del character. |
| | |
+----------------+---------------------------------------------------------+
----- Part 5: Advantages -----
We can obtain extensibility.
Since our proposed approach adds \ to a character to interpret as a wild
card, we can introduce new wild card in future while maintaining backward
compatibility.
We can process monotonically.
Since our proposed approach separates strings using a space character,
we can split strings using existing string manipulation functions.
We can reliably analyze access logs.
It is guaranteed that a string doesn't contain space character (0x20) and
new line character (0x0A).
It is guaranteed that a string won't be converted by FTP and won't be damaged
by a terminal's settings.
It is guaranteed that a string won't be affected by encoding converters
(except encodings which insert NUL character (e.g. UTF-16)).
----- Part 6: conclusion -----
TOMOYO Linux is using its own encoding with reasons described above.
There is a disadvantage that we need to introduce a series of new string
manipulation functions. But TOMOYO Linux's encoding is useful for all users
(including audit and AppArmor) who want to perform pattern matching and
safely exchange string information between the kernel and the userspace.
-------------------- About policy interface --------------------
TOMOYO Linux creates the following files on securityfs (normally
mounted on /sys/kernel/security) as interfaces between kernel and
userspace. These files are for TOMOYO Linux management tools *only*,
not for general programs.
* profile
* exception_policy
* domain_policy
* manager
* meminfo
* self_domain
* version
* .domain_status
* .process_status
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile **
This file is used to read or write profiles.
"profile" means a running mode of process. A profile lists up
functions and their modes in "$number-$variable=$value" format. The
$number is profile number between 0 and 255. Each domain is assigned
one profile. To assign profile to domains, use "ccs-setprofile" or
"ccs-editpolicy" or "ccs-loadpolicy" commands.
(Example)
[root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile
0-COMMENT=-----Disabled Mode-----
0-MAC_FOR_FILE=disabled
0-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048
0-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=disabled
1-COMMENT=-----Learning Mode-----
1-MAC_FOR_FILE=learning
1-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048
1-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=disabled
2-COMMENT=-----Permissive Mode-----
2-MAC_FOR_FILE=permissive
2-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048
2-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=enabled
3-COMMENT=-----Enforcing Mode-----
3-MAC_FOR_FILE=enforcing
3-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048
3-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=enabled
- MAC_FOR_FILE:
Specifies access control level regarding file access requests.
- MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY:
Limits the max number of ACL entries that are automatically appended
during learning mode. Default is 2048.
- TOMOYO_VERBOSE:
Specifies whether to print domain policy violation messages or not.
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager **
This file is used to read or append the list of programs or domains
that can write to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo interface. By default,
only processes with both UID = 0 and EUID = 0 can modify policy via
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo interface. You can use keyword
"manage_by_non_root" to allow policy modification by non root user.
(Example)
[root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
/usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy
/usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy
/usr/lib/ccs/setlevel
/usr/lib/ccs/setprofile
/usr/lib/ccs/ld-watch
/usr/lib/ccs/ccs-queryd
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy **
This file is used to read and write system global settings. Each line
has a directive and operand pair. Directives are listed below.
- initialize_domain:
To initialize domain transition when specific program is executed,
use initialize_domain directive.
* initialize_domain "program" from "domain"
* initialize_domain "program" from "the last program part of domain"
* initialize_domain "program"
If the part "from" and after is not given, the entry is applied to
all domain. If the "domain" doesn't start with "<kernel>", the entry
is applied to all domain whose domainname ends with "the last program
part of domain".
This directive is intended to aggregate domain transitions for daemon
program and program that are invoked by the kernel on demand, by
transiting to different domain.
- keep_domain
To prevent domain transition when program is executed from specific
domain, use keep_domain directive.
* keep_domain "program" from "domain"
* keep_domain "program" from "the last program part of domain"
* keep_domain "domain"
* keep_domain "the last program part of domain"
If the part "from" and before is not given, this entry is applied to
all program. If the "domain" doesn't start with "<kernel>", the entry
is applied to all domain whose domainname ends with "the last program
part of domain".
This directive is intended to reduce total number of domains and
memory usage by suppressing unneeded domain transitions.
To declare domain keepers, use keep_domain directive followed by
domain definition.
Any process that belongs to any domain declared with this directive,
the process stays at the same domain unless any program registered
with initialize_domain directive is executed.
In order to control domain transition in detail, you can use
no_keep_domain/no_initialize_domain keywrods.
- alias:
To allow executing programs using the name of symbolic links, use
alias keyword followed by dereferenced pathname and reference
pathname. For example, /sbin/pidof is a symbolic link to
/sbin/killall5 . In normal case, if /sbin/pidof is executed, the
domain is defined as if /sbin/killall5 is executed. By specifying
"alias /sbin/killall5 /sbin/pidof", you can run /sbin/pidof in the
domain for /sbin/pidof .
(Example)
alias /sbin/killall5 /sbin/pidof
- allow_read:
To grant unconditionally readable permissions, use allow_read keyword
followed by canonicalized file. This keyword is intended to reduce
size of domain policy by granting read access to library files such
as GLIBC and locale files. Exception is, if ignore_global_allow_read
keyword is given to a domain, entries specified by this keyword are
ignored.
(Example)
allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so
- file_pattern:
To declare pathname pattern, use file_pattern keyword followed by
pathname pattern. The pathname pattern must be a canonicalized
Pathname. This keyword is not applicable to neither granting execute
permissions nor domain definitions.
For example, canonicalized pathname that contains a process ID
(i.e. /proc/PID/ files) needs to be grouped in order to make access
control work well.
(Example)
file_pattern /proc/\$/cmdline
- path_group
To declare pathname group, use path_group keyword followed by name of
the group and pathname pattern. For example, if you want to group all
files under home directory, you can define
path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\*
path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\*/\*
path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\*/\*/\*
in the exception policy and use like
allow_read @HOME-DIR-FILE
to grant file access permission.
- deny_rewrite:
To deny overwriting already written contents of file (such as log
files) by default, use deny_rewrite keyword followed by pathname
pattern. Files whose pathname match the patterns are not permitted to
open for writing without append mode or truncate unless the pathnames
are explicitly granted using allow_rewrite keyword in domain policy.
(Example)
deny_rewrite /var/log/\*
- aggregator
To deal multiple programs as a single program, use aggregator keyword
followed by name of original program and aggregated program. This
keyword is intended to aggregate similar programs.
For example, /usr/bin/tac and /bin/cat are similar. By specifying
"aggregator /usr/bin/tac /bin/cat", you can run /usr/bin/tac in the
domain for /bin/cat .
For example, /usr/sbin/logrotate for Fedora Core 3 generates programs
like /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? and run them, but TOMOYO Linux
doesn't allow using patterns for granting execute permission and
defining domains. By specifying
"aggregator /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? /tmp/logrotate.tmp", you can
run /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? as if /tmp/logrotate.tmp is running.
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy **
This file contains definition of all domains and permissions that are
granted to each domain.
Lines from the next line to a domain definition ( any lines starting
with "<kernel>") to the previous line to the next domain definitions
are interpreted as access permissions for that domain.
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo **
This file is to show the total RAM used to keep policy in the kernel
by TOMOYO Linux in bytes.
(Example)
[root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo
Shared: 61440
Private: 69632
Dynamic: 768
Total: 131840
You can set memory quota by writing to this file.
(Example)
[root@tomoyo]# echo Shared: 2097152 > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo
[root@tomoyo]# echo Private: 2097152 > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain **
This file is to show the name of domain the caller process belongs to.
(Example)
[root@etch]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain
<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/zsh /bin/cat
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version **
This file is used for getting TOMOYO Linux's version.
(Example)
[root@etch]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version
2.2.0-pre
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status **
This is a view (of a DBMS) that contains only profile number and
domainnames of domain so that "ccs-setprofile" command can do
line-oriented processing easily.
** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status **
This file is used by "ccs-ccstree" command to show "list of processes
currently running" and "domains which each process belongs to" and
"profile number which the domain is currently assigned" like "pstree"
command. This file is writable by programs that aren't registered as
policy manager.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tetsuo Handa