...as always, rename is the messiest of the bunch. We have to track
whether to retry or not via a separate flag since the error handling
is already quite complex.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
...so we can pass in LOOKUP_REVAL. For now, nothing does yet.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Where we can pass in LOOKUP_DIRECTORY or LOOKUP_REVAL. Any other flags
passed in here are currently ignored.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The code that relied on that flag was ripped out of btrfs quite some
time ago, and never added back. Josef indicated that he was going to
take a different approach to the problem in btrfs, and that we
could just eliminate this flag.
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When path_init is called with a valid dfd, that code checks permissions
on the open directory fd and returns an error if the check fails. This
permission check is redundant, however.
Both callers of path_init immediately call link_path_walk afterward. The
first thing that link_path_walk does for pathnames that do not consist
only of slashes is to check for exec permissions at the starting point of
the path walk. And this check in path_init() is on the path taken only
when *name != '/' && *name != '\0'.
In most cases, these checks are very quick, but when the dfd is for a
file on a NFS mount with the actimeo=0, each permission check goes
out onto the wire. The result is 2 identical ACCESS calls.
Given that these codepaths are fairly "hot", I think it makes sense to
eliminate the permission check in path_init and simply assume that the
caller will eventually check the permissions before proceeding.
Reported-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In commit 800179c9b8 ("This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to
the Linux VFS"), the new link protections were enabled by default, in
the hope that no actual application would care, despite it being
technically against legacy UNIX (and documented POSIX) behavior.
However, it does turn out to break some applications. It's rare, and
it's unfortunate, but it's unacceptable to break existing systems, so
we'll have to default to legacy behavior.
In particular, it has broken the way AFD distributes files, see
http://www.dwd.de/AFD/
along with some legacy scripts.
Distributions can end up setting this at initrd time or in system
scripts: if you have security problems due to link attacks during your
early boot sequence, you have bigger problems than some kernel sysctl
setting. Do:
echo 1 > /proc/sys/fs/protected_symlinks
echo 1 > /proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks
to re-enable the link protections.
Alternatively, we may at some point introduce a kernel config option
that sets these kinds of "more secure but not traditional" behavioural
options automatically.
Reported-by: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com>
Reported-by: Holger Kiehl <Holger.Kiehl@dwd.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v3.6
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In the common case where a name is much smaller than PATH_MAX, an extra
allocation for struct filename is unnecessary. Before allocating a
separate one, try to embed the struct filename inside the buffer first. If
it turns out that that's not long enough, then fall back to allocating a
separate struct filename and redoing the copy.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.
Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
...and fix up the callers. For do_file_open_root, just declare a
struct filename on the stack and fill out the .name field. For
do_filp_open, make it also take a struct filename pointer, and fix up its
callers to call it appropriately.
For filp_open, add a variant that takes a struct filename pointer and turn
filp_open into a wrapper around it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
...and make the user_path callers use that variant instead.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once,
we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names
records.
Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname
requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation
and audit_names records.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.
For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.
This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.
Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In order to accomodate retrying path-based syscalls, we need to add a
new "type" argument to audit_inode_child. This will tell us whether
we're looking for a child entry that represents a create or a delete.
If we find a parent, don't automatically assume that we need to create a
new entry. Instead, use the information we have to try to find an
existing entry first. Update it if one is found and create a new one if
not.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.
Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.
While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Most of the callers get called with an inode and dentry in the reverse
order. The compiler then has to reshuffle the arg registers and/or
stack in order to pass them on to audit_inode_child.
Reverse those arguments for a micro-optimization.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
As best I can tell, whenever retval == 0, nd->path.dentry and nd->inode
are also non-NULL. Eliminate those checks and the superfluous
audit_context check.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The follow_link() function always initializes its *p argument,
or returns an error, but when building with 'gcc -s', the compiler
gets confused by the __always_inline attribute to the function
and can no longer detect where the cookie was initialized.
The solution is to always initialize the pointer from follow_link,
even in the error path. When building with -O2, this has zero impact
on generated code and adds a single instruction in the error path
for a -Os build on ARM.
Without this patch, building with gcc-4.6 through gcc-4.8 and
CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE results in:
fs/namei.c: In function 'link_path_walk':
fs/namei.c:649:24: warning: 'cookie' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
fs/namei.c:1544:9: note: 'cookie' was declared here
fs/namei.c: In function 'path_lookupat':
fs/namei.c:649:24: warning: 'cookie' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
fs/namei.c:1934:10: note: 'cookie' was declared here
fs/namei.c: In function 'path_openat':
fs/namei.c:649:24: warning: 'cookie' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
fs/namei.c:2899:9: note: 'cookie' was declared here
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Commit "fs: add link restriction audit reporting" has added auditing of failed
attempts to follow symlinks. Unfortunately, the auditing was being done after
the struct path structure was released earlier.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull vfs update from Al Viro:
- big one - consolidation of descriptor-related logics; almost all of
that is moved to fs/file.c
(BTW, I'm seriously tempted to rename the result to fd.c. As it is,
we have a situation when file_table.c is about handling of struct
file and file.c is about handling of descriptor tables; the reasons
are historical - file_table.c used to be about a static array of
struct file we used to have way back).
A lot of stray ends got cleaned up and converted to saner primitives,
disgusting mess in android/binder.c is still disgusting, but at least
doesn't poke so much in descriptor table guts anymore. A bunch of
relatively minor races got fixed in process, plus an ext4 struct file
leak.
- related thing - fget_light() partially unuglified; see fdget() in
there (and yes, it generates the code as good as we used to have).
- also related - bits of Cyrill's procfs stuff that got entangled into
that work; _not_ all of it, just the initial move to fs/proc/fd.c and
switch of fdinfo to seq_file.
- Alex's fs/coredump.c spiltoff - the same story, had been easier to
take that commit than mess with conflicts. The rest is a separate
pile, this was just a mechanical code movement.
- a few misc patches all over the place. Not all for this cycle,
there'll be more (and quite a few currently sit in akpm's tree)."
Fix up trivial conflicts in the android binder driver, and some fairly
simple conflicts due to two different changes to the sock_alloc_file()
interface ("take descriptor handling from sock_alloc_file() to callers"
vs "net: Providing protocol type via system.sockprotoname xattr of
/proc/PID/fd entries" adding a dentry name to the socket)
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (72 commits)
MAX_LFS_FILESIZE should be a loff_t
compat: fs: Generic compat_sys_sendfile implementation
fs: push rcu_barrier() from deactivate_locked_super() to filesystems
btrfs: reada_extent doesn't need kref for refcount
coredump: move core dump functionality into its own file
coredump: prevent double-free on an error path in core dumper
usb/gadget: fix misannotations
fcntl: fix misannotations
ceph: don't abuse d_delete() on failure exits
hypfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative
vfs: delete surplus inode NULL check
switch simple cases of fget_light to fdget
new helpers: fdget()/fdput()
switch o2hb_region_dev_write() to fget_light()
proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with grabbing files
make get_file() return its argument
vhost_set_vring(): turn pollstart/pollstop into bool
switch prctl_set_mm_exe_file() to fget_light()
switch xfs_find_handle() to fget_light()
switch xfs_swapext() to fget_light()
...
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"This is a mostly modest set of changes to enable basic user namespace
support. This allows the code to code to compile with user namespaces
enabled and removes the assumption there is only the initial user
namespace. Everything is converted except for the most complex of the
filesystems: autofs4, 9p, afs, ceph, cifs, coda, fuse, gfs2, ncpfs,
nfs, ocfs2 and xfs as those patches need a bit more review.
The strategy is to push kuid_t and kgid_t values are far down into
subsystems and filesystems as reasonable. Leaving the make_kuid and
from_kuid operations to happen at the edge of userspace, as the values
come off the disk, and as the values come in from the network.
Letting compile type incompatible compile errors (present when user
namespaces are enabled) guide me to find the issues.
The most tricky areas have been the places where we had an implicit
union of uid and gid values and were storing them in an unsigned int.
Those places were converted into explicit unions. I made certain to
handle those places with simple trivial patches.
Out of that work I discovered we have generic interfaces for storing
quota by projid. I had never heard of the project identifiers before.
Adding full user namespace support for project identifiers accounts
for most of the code size growth in my git tree.
Ultimately there will be work to relax privlige checks from
"capable(FOO)" to "ns_capable(user_ns, FOO)" where it is safe allowing
root in a user names to do those things that today we only forbid to
non-root users because it will confuse suid root applications.
While I was pushing kuid_t and kgid_t changes deep into the audit code
I made a few other cleanups. I capitalized on the fact we process
netlink messages in the context of the message sender. I removed
usage of NETLINK_CRED, and started directly using current->tty.
Some of these patches have also made it into maintainer trees, with no
problems from identical code from different trees showing up in
linux-next.
After reading through all of this code I feel like I might be able to
win a game of kernel trivial pursuit."
Fix up some fairly trivial conflicts in netfilter uid/git logging code.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (107 commits)
userns: Convert the ufs filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert the udf filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ubifs to use kuid/kgid
userns: Convert squashfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert reiserfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert jfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert jffs2 to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert hpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert btrfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert bfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert affs to use kuid/kgid wherwe appropriate
userns: On alpha modify linux_to_osf_stat to use convert from kuids and kgids
userns: On ia64 deal with current_uid and current_gid being kuid and kgid
userns: On ppc convert current_uid from a kuid before printing.
userns: Convert s390 getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
userns: Convert s390 hypfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binder ipc to use kuids
userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids
userns: Add user namespace support to IMA
userns: Convert EVM to deal with kuids and kgids in it's hmac computation
...
get_write_access() is needed for nfsd, not binfmt_aout (the latter
has no business doing anything of that kind, of course)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/namei.c:
Warning(fs/namei.c:360): No description found for parameter 'inode'
Warning(fs/namei.c:672): No description found for parameter 'nd'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If ->atomic_open() returns -ENOENT, we take care to return the create
error (e.g., EACCES), if any. Do the same when ->atomic_open() returns 1
and provides a negative dentry.
This fixes a regression where an unprivileged open O_CREAT fails with
ENOENT instead of EACCES, introduced with the new atomic_open code. It
is tested by the open/08.t test in the pjd posix test suite, and was
observed on top of fuse (backed by ceph-fuse).
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Pass the umask-ed create mode to may_o_create() instead of the original one.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Don't mask S_ISREG off the create mode before passing to ->atomic_open(). Other
methods (->create, ->mknod) also get the complete file mode and filesystems
expect it.
Reported-by: Steve <steveamigauk@yahoo.co.uk>
Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Currently, mnt_want_write() is sometimes called with i_mutex held and sometimes
without it. This isn't really a problem because mnt_want_write() is a
non-blocking operation (essentially has a trylock semantics) but when the
function starts to handle also frozen filesystems, it will get a full lock
semantics and thus proper lock ordering has to be established. So move
all mnt_want_write() calls outside of i_mutex.
One non-trivial case needing conversion is kern_path_create() /
user_path_create() which didn't include mnt_want_write() but now needs to
because it acquires i_mutex. Because there are virtual file systems which
don't bother with freeze / remount-ro protection we actually provide both
versions of the function - one which calls mnt_want_write() and one which does
not.
[AV: scratch the previous, mnt_want_write() has been moved to kern_path_create()
by now]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The write ref to vfsmount taken in lookup_open()/atomic_open() is going to
be dropped; we take the one to stay in dentry_open(). Just grab the temporary
in caller if it looks like we are going to need it (create/truncate/writable open)
and pass (by value) "has it succeeded" flag. Instead of doing mnt_want_write()
inside, check that flag and treat "false" as "mnt_want_write() has just failed".
mnt_want_write() is cheap and the things get considerably simpler and more robust
that way - we get it and drop it in the same function, to start with, rather
than passing a "has something in the guts of really scary functions taken it"
back to caller.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
O_EXCL without O_CREAT has different semantics; it's "fail if already opened",
not "fail if already exists". commit 71574865 broke that...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Adds audit messages for unexpected link restriction violations so that
system owners will have some sort of potentially actionable information
about misbehaving processes.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS.
Symlinks:
A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based
time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a
root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely
incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp
The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside
a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and
follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.
Some pointers to the history of earlier discussion that I could find:
1996 Aug, Zygo Blaxell
http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=87602167419830&w=2
1996 Oct, Andrew Tridgell
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9610.2/0086.html
1997 Dec, Albert D Cahalan
http://lkml.org/lkml/1997/12/16/4
2005 Feb, Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0502.0/1896.html
2010 May, Kees Cook
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/30/144
Past objections and rebuttals could be summarized as:
- Violates POSIX.
- POSIX didn't consider this situation and it's not useful to follow
a broken specification at the cost of security.
- Might break unknown applications that use this feature.
- Applications that break because of the change are easy to spot and
fix. Applications that are vulnerable to symlink ToCToU by not having
the change aren't. Additionally, no applications have yet been found
that rely on this behavior.
- Applications should just use mkstemp() or O_CREATE|O_EXCL.
- True, but applications are not perfect, and new software is written
all the time that makes these mistakes; blocking this flaw at the
kernel is a single solution to the entire class of vulnerability.
- This should live in the core VFS.
- This should live in an LSM. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/31/135)
- This should live in an LSM.
- This should live in the core VFS. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/2/188)
Hardlinks:
On systems that have user-writable directories on the same partition
as system files, a long-standing class of security issues is the
hardlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in
world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation
of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given
hardlink (i.e. a root process follows a hardlink created by another
user). Additionally, an issue exists where users can "pin" a potentially
vulnerable setuid/setgid file so that an administrator will not actually
upgrade a system fully.
The solution is to permit hardlinks to only be created when the user is
already the existing file's owner, or if they already have read/write
access to the existing file.
Many Linux users are surprised when they learn they can link to files
they have no access to, so this change appears to follow the doctrine
of "least surprise". Additionally, this change does not violate POSIX,
which states "the implementation may require that the calling process
has permission to access the existing file"[1].
This change is known to break some implementations of the "at" daemon,
though the version used by Fedora and Ubuntu has been fixed[2] for
a while. Otherwise, the change has been undisruptive while in use in
Ubuntu for the last 1.5 years.
[1] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/linkat.html
[2] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=collab-maint/at.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4114656c3a6c6f6070e315ffdf940a49eda3279
This patch is based on the patches in Openwall and grsecurity, along with
suggestions from Al Viro. I have added a sysctl to enable the protected
behavior, and documentation.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
One side effect - attempt to create a cross-device link on a read-only fs fails
with EROFS instead of EXDEV now. Makes more sense, POSIX allows, etc.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Note that applying umask can't affect their results. While
that affects errno in cases like
mknod("/no_such_directory/a", 030000)
yielding -EINVAL (due to impossible mode_t) instead of
-ENOENT (due to inexistent directory), IMO that makes a lot
more sense, POSIX allows to return either and any software
that relies on getting -ENOENT instead of -EINVAL in that
case deserves everything it gets.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Split inode_permission() into inode- and superblock-dependent parts.
This is aimed at unionmounts where the superblock from the upper layer has to
be checked rather than the superblock from the lower layer as the upper layer
may be writable, thus allowing an unwritable file from the lower layer to be
copied up and modified.
Original-author: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (Further development)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add comments describing what the directions "up" and "down" mean and ref count
handling to the VFS mount following family of functions.
Signed-off-by: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com> (Original author)
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Jeff Layton