Commit Graph

5857 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Miaohe Lin 767b839afa KVM: x86: avoid clearing pending exception event twice
The exception pending event is cleared by kvm_clear_exception_queue(). We
shouldn't clear it again.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:44 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 66061740f1 KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in intel_find_fixed_event()
and intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc().
kvm_rdpmc() (ancestor of intel_find_fixed_event()) and
reprogram_fixed_counter() (ancestor of intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc()) are
exported symbols so KVM should treat them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: 25462f7f52 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:44 +01:00
Marios Pomonis ea740059ec KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and
kvm_get_dr().
Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are
exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: 020df0794f ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:43 +01:00
Marios Pomonis c926f2f723 KVM: x86: Protect exit_reason from being used in Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in vmx_handle_exit().
While exit_reason is set by the hardware and therefore should not be
attacker-influenced, an unknown exit_reason could potentially be used to
perform such an attack.

Fixes: 55d2375e58 ("KVM: nVMX: Move nested code to dedicated files")

Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:42 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 125ffc5e0a KVM: x86: Refactor prefix decoding to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar().  When
invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations
based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value.  Using constants
prevents the attack.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:42 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 6ec4c5eee1 KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in set_msr_mce() and
get_msr_mce().
Both functions contain index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: 890ca9aefa ("KVM: Add MCE support")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:41 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 13c5183a4e KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in the get_gp_pmc() and
get_fixed_pmc() functions.
They both contain index computations based on the (attacker-controlled)
MSR number.

Fixes: 25462f7f52 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:40 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 25a5edea71 KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: de9aef5e1a ("KVM: MTRR: introduce fixed_mtrr_segment table")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:39 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 4bf79cb089 KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in kvm_lapic_reg_write().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: 0105d1a526 ("KVM: x2apic interface to lapic")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:39 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 670564559c KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_write_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.

This patch depends on patch
"KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks".

Fixes: 70f93dae32 ("KVM: Use temporary variable to shorten lines.")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:38 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 8c86405f60 KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_read_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.

Fixes: a2c118bfab ("KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:37 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 14e32321f3 KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in picdev_write().
It replaces index computations based on the (attacked-controlled) port
number with constants through a minor refactoring.

Fixes: 85f455f7dd ("KVM: Add support for in-kernel PIC emulation")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:37 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 8618793750 KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data()
and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data().
These functions contain index computations that use the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: e7d9513b60 ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:36 +01:00
Marios Pomonis 3c9053a2ca KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in x86_decode_insn().
kvm_emulate_instruction() (an ancestor of x86_decode_insn()) is an exported
symbol, so KVM should treat it conservatively from a security perspective.

Fixes: 045a282ca4 ("KVM: emulator: implement fninit, fnstsw, fnstcw")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:35 +01:00
John Allen a47970ed74 kvm/svm: PKU not currently supported
Current SVM implementation does not have support for handling PKU. Guests
running on a host with future AMD cpus that support the feature will read
garbage from the PKRU register and will hit segmentation faults on boot as
memory is getting marked as protected that should not be. Ensure that cpuid
from SVM does not advertise the feature.

Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0556cbdc2f ("x86/pkeys: Don't check if PKRU is zero before writing it")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:35 +01:00
Sean Christopherson ddd259c9aa KVM: Drop kvm_arch_vcpu_init() and kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit()
Remove kvm_arch_vcpu_init() and kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() now that all
arch specific implementations are nops.

Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:33 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 95a0d01eef KVM: x86: Move all vcpu init code into kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last
action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
immediately thereafter).  This paves the way for removing
kvm_arch_vcpu_init() entirely.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:29 +01:00
Sean Christopherson afede96df5 KVM: Drop kvm_arch_vcpu_setup()
Remove kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() now that all arch specific implementations
are nops.

Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:28 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 5f73db112e KVM: x86: Move guts of kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() into kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
Fold setup() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code.  This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_setup().

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:25 +01:00
Sean Christopherson e529ef66e6 KVM: Move vcpu alloc and init invocation to common code
Now that all architectures tightly couple vcpu allocation/free with the
mandatory calls to kvm_{un}init_vcpu(), move the sequences verbatim to
common KVM code.

Move both allocation and initialization in a single patch to eliminate
thrash in arch specific code.  The bisection benefits of moving the two
pieces in separate patches is marginal at best, whereas the odds of
introducing a transient arch specific bug are non-zero.

Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-27 19:59:20 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 4543bdc088 KVM: Introduce kvm_vcpu_destroy()
Add kvm_vcpu_destroy() and wire up all architectures to call the common
function instead of their arch specific implementation.  The common
destruction function will be used by future patches to move allocation
and initialization of vCPUs to common KVM code, i.e. to free resources
that are allocated by arch agnostic code.

No functional change intended.

Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:19:11 +01:00
Sean Christopherson d2423b347d KVM: x86: Invoke kvm_vcpu_uninit() immediately prior to freeing vcpu
Move the call to kvm_vcpu_uninit() in kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() down a few
lines so that it is invoked immediately prior to freeing the vCPU.  This
paves the way for moving the uninit and free sequence to common KVM code
without an associated functional change.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:19:10 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 897cc38eaa KVM: Add kvm_arch_vcpu_precreate() to handle pre-allocation issues
Add a pre-allocation arch hook to handle checks that are currently done
by arch specific code prior to allocating the vCPU object.  This paves
the way for moving the allocation to common KVM code.

Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:19:07 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 50b143e1b3 KVM: x86: Drop kvm_arch_vcpu_free()
Remove the superfluous kvm_arch_vcpu_free() as it is no longer called
from commmon KVM code.  Note, kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() *is* called from
common code, i.e. choosing which function to whack is not completely
arbitrary.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:19:06 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 208050dac5 KVM: x86: Remove spurious clearing of async #PF MSR
Remove a bogus clearing of apf.msr_val from kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy().

apf.msr_val is only set to a non-zero value by kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(),
which is only reachable by kvm_set_msr_common(), i.e. by writing
MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN.  KVM does not autonomously write said MSR, i.e.
can only be written via KVM_SET_MSRS or KVM_RUN.  Since KVM_SET_MSRS and
KVM_RUN are vcpu ioctls, they require a valid vcpu file descriptor.
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() is only called if KVM_CREATE_VCPU fails, and KVM
declares KVM_CREATE_VCPU successful once the vcpu fd is installed and
thus visible to userspace.  Ergo, apf.msr_val cannot be non-zero when
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() is called.

Fixes: 344d9588a9 ("KVM: Add PV MSR to enable asynchronous page faults delivery.")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:19:05 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 9d979c7e6f KVM: x86: Remove spurious kvm_mmu_unload() from vcpu destruction path
x86 does not load its MMU until KVM_RUN, which cannot be invoked until
after vCPU creation succeeds.  Given that kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() is
called if and only if vCPU creation fails, it is impossible for the MMU
to be loaded.

Note, the bogus kvm_mmu_unload() call was added during an unrelated
refactoring of vCPU allocation, i.e. was presumably added as an
opportunstic "fix" for a perceived leak.

Fixes: fb3f0f51d9 ("KVM: Dynamically allocate vcpus")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:19:04 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 987b2594ed KVM: x86: Move kvm_vcpu_init() invocation to common code
Move the kvm_cpu_{un}init() calls to common x86 code as an intermediate
step to removing kvm_cpu_{un}init() altogether.

Note, VMX'x alloc_apic_access_page() and init_rmode_identity_map() are
per-VM allocations and are intentionally kept if vCPU creation fails.
They are freed by kvm_arch_destroy_vm().

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:57 +01:00
Sean Christopherson d813a8ba54 KVM: x86: Move allocation of pio_data page down a few lines
Allocate the pio_data page after creating the MMU and local APIC so that
all direct memory allocations are grouped together.  This allows setting
the return value to -ENOMEM prior to starting the allocations instead of
setting it in the fail path for every allocation.

The pio_data page is only consumed when KVM_RUN is invoked, i.e. moving
its allocation has no real functional impact.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:57 +01:00
Sean Christopherson fc6e2a1845 KVM: x86: Move FPU allocation to common x86 code
The allocation of FPU structs is identical across VMX and SVM, move it
to common x86 code.  Somewhat arbitrarily place the allocation so that
it resides directly above the associated initialization via fx_init(),
e.g. instead of retaining its position with respect to the overall vcpu
creation flow.  Although the names names kvm_arch_vcpu_create() and
kvm_arch_vcpu_init() might suggest otherwise, x86 does not have a clean
split between 'create' and 'init'.  Allocating the struct immediately
prior to the first use arguably improves readability *now*, and will
yield even bigger improvements when kvm_arch_vcpu_init() is removed in
a future patch.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:56 +01:00
Sean Christopherson a9dd6f09d7 KVM: x86: Allocate vcpu struct in common x86 code
Move allocation of VMX and SVM vcpus to common x86.  Although the struct
being allocated is technically a VMX/SVM struct, it can be interpreted
directly as a 'struct kvm_vcpu' because of the pre-existing requirement
that 'struct kvm_vcpu' be located at offset zero of the arch/vendor vcpu
struct.

Remove the message from the build-time assertions regarding placement of
the struct, as compatibility with the arch usercopy region is no longer
the sole dependent on 'struct kvm_vcpu' being at offset zero.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:55 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 7f27179a88 KVM: SVM: Use direct vcpu pointer during vCPU create/free
Capture the vcpu pointer in a local varaible and replace '&svm->vcpu'
references with a direct reference to the pointer in anticipation of
moving bits of the code to common x86 and passing the vcpu pointer into
svm_create_vcpu(), i.e. eliminate unnecessary noise from future patches.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:54 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 34109c0476 KVM: VMX: Use direct vcpu pointer during vCPU create/free
Capture the vcpu pointer in a local varaible and replace '&vmx->vcpu'
references with a direct reference to the pointer in anticipation of
moving bits of the code to common x86 and passing the vcpu pointer into
vmx_create_vcpu(), i.e. eliminate unnecessary noise from future patches.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:54 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 034d8e2cb9 KVM: VMX: Allocate VPID after initializing VCPU
Do VPID allocation after calling the common kvm_vcpu_init() as a step
towards doing vCPU allocation (via kmem_cache_zalloc()) and calling
kvm_vcpu_init() back-to-back.  Squishing allocation and initialization
together will eventually allow the sequence to be moved to arch-agnostic
creation code.

Note, the VPID is not consumed until KVM_RUN, slightly delaying its
allocation should have no real function impact.  VPID allocation was
arbitrarily placed in the original patch, commit 2384d2b326 ("KVM:
VMX: Enable Virtual Processor Identification (VPID)").

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:53 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 16be9ddea2 KVM: x86: Free wbinvd_dirty_mask if vCPU creation fails
Free the vCPU's wbinvd_dirty_mask if vCPU creation fails after
kvm_arch_vcpu_init(), e.g. when installing the vCPU's file descriptor.
Do the freeing by calling kvm_arch_vcpu_free() instead of open coding
the freeing.  This adds a likely superfluous, but ultimately harmless,
call to kvmclock_reset(), which only clears vcpu->arch.pv_time_enabled.
Using kvm_arch_vcpu_free() allows for additional cleanup in the future.

Fixes: f5f48ee15c ("KVM: VMX: Execute WBINVD to keep data consistency with assigned devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:52 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini 6441fa6178 KVM: x86: avoid incorrect writes to host MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
If the guest is configured to have SPEC_CTRL but the host does not
(which is a nonsensical configuration but these are not explicitly
forbidden) then a host-initiated MSR write can write vmx->spec_ctrl
(respectively svm->spec_ctrl) and trigger a #GP when KVM tries to
restore the host value of the MSR.  Add a more comprehensive check
for valid bits of SPEC_CTRL, covering host CPUID flags and,
since we are at it and it is more correct that way, guest CPUID
flags too.

For AMD, remove the unnecessary is_guest_mode check around setting
the MSR interception bitmap, so that the code looks the same as
for Intel.

Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-24 09:18:47 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini 99634e3ec0 KVM: x86: list MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV as an emulated MSR
Even if it's read-only, it can still be written to by userspace.  Let
them know by adding it to KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-23 09:51:07 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini 56871d444b KVM: x86: fix overlap between SPTE_MMIO_MASK and generation
The SPTE_MMIO_MASK overlaps with the bits used to track MMIO
generation number.  A high enough generation number would overwrite the
SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK region and cause the MMIO SPTE to be misinterpreted.

Likewise, setting bits 52 and 53 would also cause an incorrect generation
number to be read from the PTE, though this was partially mitigated by the
(useless if it weren't for the bug) removal of SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK from
the spte in get_mmio_spte_generation.  Drop that removal, and replace
it with a compile-time assertion.

Fixes: 6eeb4ef049 ("KVM: x86: assign two bits to track SPTE kinds")
Reported-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-23 09:50:34 +01:00
Sean Christopherson e30a7d623d KVM: x86/mmu: Apply max PA check for MMIO sptes to 32-bit KVM
Remove the bogus 64-bit only condition from the check that disables MMIO
spte optimization when the system supports the max PA, i.e. doesn't have
any reserved PA bits.  32-bit KVM always uses PAE paging for the shadow
MMU, and per Intel's SDM:

  PAE paging translates 32-bit linear addresses to 52-bit physical
  addresses.

The kernel's restrictions on max physical addresses are limits on how
much memory the kernel can reasonably use, not what physical addresses
are supported by hardware.

Fixes: ce88decffd ("KVM: MMU: mmio page fault support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 14:45:33 +01:00
Miaohe Lin a4d956b939 KVM: nVMX: vmread should not set rflags to specify success in case of #PF
In case writing to vmread destination operand result in a #PF, vmread
should not call nested_vmx_succeed() to set rflags to specify success.
Similar to as done in VMPTRST (See handle_vmptrst()).

Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 14:45:32 +01:00
Sean Christopherson b5c3c1b3c6 KVM: x86/mmu: Micro-optimize nEPT's bad memptype/XWR checks
Rework the handling of nEPT's bad memtype/XWR checks to micro-optimize
the checks as much as possible.  Move the check to a separate helper,
__is_bad_mt_xwr(), which allows the guest_rsvd_check usage in
paging_tmpl.h to omit the check entirely for paging32/64 (bad_mt_xwr is
always zero for non-nEPT) while retaining the bitwise-OR of the current
code for the shadow_zero_check in walk_shadow_page_get_mmio_spte().

Add a comment for the bitwise-OR usage in the mmio spte walk to avoid
future attempts to "fix" the code, which is what prompted this
optimization in the first place[*].

Opportunistically remove the superfluous '!= 0' and parantheses, and
use BIT_ULL() instead of open coding its equivalent.

The net effect is that code generation is largely unchanged for
walk_shadow_page_get_mmio_spte(), marginally better for
ept_prefetch_invalid_gpte(), and significantly improved for
paging32/64_prefetch_invalid_gpte().

Note, walk_shadow_page_get_mmio_spte() can't use a templated version of
the memtype/XRW as it works on the host's shadow PTEs, e.g. checks that
KVM hasn't borked its EPT tables.  Even if it could be templated, the
benefits of having a single implementation far outweight the few uops
that would be saved for NPT or non-TDP paging, e.g. most compilers
inline it all the way to up kvm_mmu_page_fault().

[*] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200108001859.25254-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com

Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 14:45:31 +01:00
Sean Christopherson f8052a053a KVM: x86/mmu: Reorder the reserved bit check in prefetch_invalid_gpte()
Move the !PRESENT and !ACCESSED checks in FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)
above the call to is_rsvd_bits_set().  For a well behaved guest, the
!PRESENT and !ACCESSED are far more likely to evaluate true than the
reserved bit checks, and they do not require additional memory accesses.

Before:
 Dump of assembler code for function paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte:
   0x0000000000044240 <+0>:     callq  0x44245 <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+5>
   0x0000000000044245 <+5>:     mov    %rcx,%rax
   0x0000000000044248 <+8>:     shr    $0x7,%rax
   0x000000000004424c <+12>:    and    $0x1,%eax
   0x000000000004424f <+15>:    lea    0x0(,%rax,4),%r8
   0x0000000000044257 <+23>:    add    %r8,%rax
   0x000000000004425a <+26>:    mov    %rcx,%r8
   0x000000000004425d <+29>:    and    0x120(%rsi,%rax,8),%r8
   0x0000000000044265 <+37>:    mov    0x170(%rsi),%rax
   0x000000000004426c <+44>:    shr    %cl,%rax
   0x000000000004426f <+47>:    and    $0x1,%eax
   0x0000000000044272 <+50>:    or     %rax,%r8
   0x0000000000044275 <+53>:    jne    0x4427c <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+60>
   0x0000000000044277 <+55>:    test   $0x1,%cl
   0x000000000004427a <+58>:    jne    0x4428a <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+74>
   0x000000000004427c <+60>:    mov    %rdx,%rsi
   0x000000000004427f <+63>:    callq  0x44080 <drop_spte>
   0x0000000000044284 <+68>:    mov    $0x1,%eax
   0x0000000000044289 <+73>:    retq
   0x000000000004428a <+74>:    xor    %eax,%eax
   0x000000000004428c <+76>:    and    $0x20,%ecx
   0x000000000004428f <+79>:    jne    0x44289 <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+73>
   0x0000000000044291 <+81>:    mov    %rdx,%rsi
   0x0000000000044294 <+84>:    callq  0x44080 <drop_spte>
   0x0000000000044299 <+89>:    mov    $0x1,%eax
   0x000000000004429e <+94>:    jmp    0x44289 <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+73>
 End of assembler dump.

After:
 Dump of assembler code for function paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte:
   0x0000000000044240 <+0>:     callq  0x44245 <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+5>
   0x0000000000044245 <+5>:     test   $0x1,%cl
   0x0000000000044248 <+8>:     je     0x4424f <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+15>
   0x000000000004424a <+10>:    test   $0x20,%cl
   0x000000000004424d <+13>:    jne    0x4425d <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+29>
   0x000000000004424f <+15>:    mov    %rdx,%rsi
   0x0000000000044252 <+18>:    callq  0x44080 <drop_spte>
   0x0000000000044257 <+23>:    mov    $0x1,%eax
   0x000000000004425c <+28>:    retq
   0x000000000004425d <+29>:    mov    %rcx,%rax
   0x0000000000044260 <+32>:    mov    (%rsi),%rsi
   0x0000000000044263 <+35>:    shr    $0x7,%rax
   0x0000000000044267 <+39>:    and    $0x1,%eax
   0x000000000004426a <+42>:    lea    0x0(,%rax,4),%r8
   0x0000000000044272 <+50>:    add    %r8,%rax
   0x0000000000044275 <+53>:    mov    %rcx,%r8
   0x0000000000044278 <+56>:    and    0x120(%rsi,%rax,8),%r8
   0x0000000000044280 <+64>:    mov    0x170(%rsi),%rax
   0x0000000000044287 <+71>:    shr    %cl,%rax
   0x000000000004428a <+74>:    and    $0x1,%eax
   0x000000000004428d <+77>:    mov    %rax,%rcx
   0x0000000000044290 <+80>:    xor    %eax,%eax
   0x0000000000044292 <+82>:    or     %rcx,%r8
   0x0000000000044295 <+85>:    je     0x4425c <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+28>
   0x0000000000044297 <+87>:    mov    %rdx,%rsi
   0x000000000004429a <+90>:    callq  0x44080 <drop_spte>
   0x000000000004429f <+95>:    mov    $0x1,%eax
   0x00000000000442a4 <+100>:   jmp    0x4425c <paging32_prefetch_invalid_gpte+28>
 End of assembler dump.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 14:45:30 +01:00
Tom Lendacky 52918ed5fc KVM: SVM: Override default MMIO mask if memory encryption is enabled
The KVM MMIO support uses bit 51 as the reserved bit to cause nested page
faults when a guest performs MMIO. The AMD memory encryption support uses
a CPUID function to define the encryption bit position. Given this, it is
possible that these bits can conflict.

Use svm_hardware_setup() to override the MMIO mask if memory encryption
support is enabled. Various checks are performed to ensure that the mask
is properly defined and rsvd_bits() is used to generate the new mask (as
was done prior to the change that necessitated this patch).

Fixes: 28a1f3ac1d ("kvm: x86: Set highest physical address bits in non-present/reserved SPTEs")
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 14:45:30 +01:00
Miaohe Lin d8010a779a KVM: vmx: delete meaningless nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap() declaration
The function nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap() declaration is below its
implementation. So this is meaningless and should be removed.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 14:45:29 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 87382003e3 KVM: x86: Refactor and rename bit() to feature_bit() macro
Rename bit() to __feature_bit() to give it a more descriptive name, and
add a macro, feature_bit(), to stuff the X68_FEATURE_ prefix to keep
line lengths manageable for code that hardcodes the bit to be retrieved.

No functional change intended.

Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 14:45:28 +01:00
Sean Christopherson a7c48c3f56 KVM: x86: Expand build-time assertion on reverse CPUID usage
Add build-time checks to ensure KVM isn't trying to do a reverse CPUID
lookup on Linux-defined feature bits, along with comments to explain
the gory details of X86_FEATUREs and bit().

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:58:39 +01:00
Sean Christopherson daa0d8c3a4 KVM: x86: Add CPUID_7_1_EAX to the reverse CPUID table
Add an entry for CPUID_7_1_EAX in the reserve_cpuid array in preparation
for incorporating the array in bit() build-time assertions, specifically
to avoid an assertion on F(AVX512_BF16) in do_cpuid_7_mask().

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:58:33 +01:00
Sean Christopherson a0a2260c12 KVM: x86: Move bit() helper to cpuid.h
Move bit() to cpuid.h in preparation for incorporating the reverse_cpuid
array in bit() build-time assertions.  Opportunistically use the BIT()
macro instead of open-coding the shift.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:58:27 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 5ae78e95ed KVM: x86: Add dedicated emulator helpers for querying CPUID features
Add feature-specific helpers for querying guest CPUID support from the
emulator instead of having the emulator do a full CPUID and perform its
own bit tests.  The primary motivation is to eliminate the emulator's
usage of bit() so that future patches can add more extensive build-time
assertions on the usage of bit() without having to expose yet more code
to the emulator.

Note, providing a generic guest_cpuid_has() to the emulator doesn't work
due to the existing built-time assertions in guest_cpuid_has(), which
require the feature being checked to be a compile-time constant.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:58:22 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 345599f9a2 KVM: x86: Add macro to ensure reserved cr4 bits checks stay in sync
Add a helper macro to generate the set of reserved cr4 bits for both
host and guest to ensure that adding a check on guest capabilities is
also added for host capabilities, and vice versa.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:58:16 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 96be4e069c KVM: x86: Drop special XSAVE handling from guest_cpuid_has()
Now that KVM prevents setting host-reserved CR4 bits, drop the dedicated
XSAVE check in guest_cpuid_has() in favor of open coding similar checks
in the SVM/VMX XSAVES enabling flows.

Note, checking boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) in the XSAVES flows is
technically redundant with respect to the CR4 reserved bit checks, e.g.
XSAVES #UDs if CR4.OSXSAVE=0 and arch.xsaves_enabled is consumed if and
only if CR4.OXSAVE=1 in guest.  Keep (add?) the explicit boot_cpu_has()
checks to help document KVM's usage of arch.xsaves_enabled.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:58:10 +01:00
Sean Christopherson f1cdecf580 KVM: x86: Ensure all logical CPUs have consistent reserved cr4 bits
Check the current CPU's reserved cr4 bits against the mask calculated
for the boot CPU to ensure consistent behavior across all CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:58:05 +01:00
Sean Christopherson b11306b53b KVM: x86: Don't let userspace set host-reserved cr4 bits
Calculate the host-reserved cr4 bits at runtime based on the system's
capabilities (using logic similar to __do_cpuid_func()), and use the
dynamically generated mask for the reserved bit check in kvm_set_cr4()
instead using of the static CR4_RESERVED_BITS define.  This prevents
userspace from "enabling" features in cr4 that are not supported by the
system, e.g. by ignoring KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and specifying a bogus
CPUID for the vCPU.

Allowing userspace to set unsupported bits in cr4 can lead to a variety
of undesirable behavior, e.g. failed VM-Enter, and in general increases
KVM's attack surface.  A crafty userspace can even abuse CR4.LA57 to
induce an unchecked #GP on a WRMSR.

On a platform without LA57 support:

  KVM_SET_CPUID2 // CPUID_7_0_ECX.LA57 = 1
  KVM_SET_SREGS  // CR4.LA57 = 1
  KVM_SET_MSRS   // KERNEL_GS_BASE = 0x0004000000000000
  KVM_RUN

leads to a #GP when writing KERNEL_GS_BASE into hardware:

  unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0000102 (tried to write 0x0004000000000000)
  at rIP: 0xffffffffa00f239a (vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest+0x10a/0x1d0 [kvm_intel])
  Call Trace:
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x671/0x1c70 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x36b/0x5d0 [kvm]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620
   ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  RIP: 0033:0x7fc08133bf47

Note, the above sequence fails VM-Enter due to invalid guest state.
Userspace can allow VM-Enter to succeed (after the WRMSR #GP) by adding
a KVM_SET_SREGS w/ CR4.LA57=0 after KVM_SET_MSRS, in which case KVM will
technically leak the host's KERNEL_GS_BASE into the guest.  But, as
KERNEL_GS_BASE is a userspace-defined value/address, the leak is largely
benign as a malicious userspace would simply be exposing its own data to
the guest, and attacking a benevolent userspace would require multiple
bugs in the userspace VMM.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:59 +01:00
Sean Christopherson e348ac7c9e KVM: VMX: Add helper to consolidate up PT/RTIT WRMSR fault logic
Add a helper to consolidate the common checks for writing PT MSRs,
and opportunistically clean up the formatting of the affected code.

No functional change intended.

Cc: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:54 +01:00
Sean Christopherson fe6ed369fc KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs
Reject writes to RTIT address MSRs if the data being written is a
non-canonical address as the MSRs are subject to canonical checks, e.g.
KVM will trigger an unchecked #GP when loading the values to hardware
during pt_guest_enter().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:50 +01:00
Miaohe Lin 311497e0c5 KVM: Fix some writing mistakes
Fix some writing mistakes in the comments.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:44 +01:00
Miaohe Lin 2f9f5cddb2 KVM: hyperv: Fix some typos in vcpu unimpl info
Fix some typos in vcpu unimpl info. It should be unhandled rather than
uhandled.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:41 +01:00
Miaohe Lin 00116795aa KVM: Fix some grammar mistakes
Fix some grammar mistakes in the comments.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:37 +01:00
Miaohe Lin 67b0ae43df KVM: Fix some comment typos and missing parentheses
Fix some typos and add missing parentheses in the comments.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:32 +01:00
Miaohe Lin 4d516fe7d3 KVM: Fix some out-dated function names in comment
Since commit b1346ab2af ("KVM: nVMX: Rename prepare_vmcs02_*_full to
prepare_vmcs02_*_rare"), prepare_vmcs02_full has been renamed to
prepare_vmcs02_rare.
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap is renamed to nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap
since commit c992384bde ("KVM: vmx: speed up MSR bitmap merge").

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:27 +01:00
Miaohe Lin 668effb63d KVM: Fix some wrong function names in comment
Fix some wrong function names in comment. mmu_check_roots is a typo for
mmu_check_root, vmcs_read_any should be vmcs12_read_any and so on.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:23 +01:00
Miaohe Lin cad23e72b7 KVM: x86: check kvm_pit outside kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject()
check kvm_pit outside kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject() to keep codestyle consistent
with other kvm_pit func and prepare for futher cleanups.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:18 +01:00
Wanpeng Li dfd146fcae KVM: LAPIC: micro-optimize fixed mode ipi delivery
This patch optimizes redundancy logic before fixed mode ipi is delivered
in the fast path, broadcast handling needs to go slow path, so the delivery
mode repair can be delayed to before slow path.

Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:15 +01:00
Wanpeng Li 1e9e2622a1 KVM: VMX: FIXED+PHYSICAL mode single target IPI fastpath
ICR and TSCDEADLINE MSRs write cause the main MSRs write vmexits in our
product observation, multicast IPIs are not as common as unicast IPI like
RESCHEDULE_VECTOR and CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR etc.

This patch introduce a mechanism to handle certain performance-critical
WRMSRs in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler.

This mechanism is specifically used for accelerating writes to x2APIC ICR
that attempt to send a virtual IPI with physical destination-mode, fixed
delivery-mode and single target. Which was found as one of the main causes
of VMExits for Linux workloads.

The reason this mechanism significantly reduce the latency of such virtual
IPIs is by sending the physical IPI to the target vCPU in a very early stage
of KVM VMExit handler, before host interrupts are enabled and before expensive
operations such as reacquiring KVM’s SRCU lock.
Latency is reduced even more when KVM is able to use APICv posted-interrupt
mechanism (which allows to deliver the virtual IPI directly to target vCPU
without the need to kick it to host).

Testing on Xeon Skylake server:

The virtual IPI latency from sender send to receiver receive reduces
more than 200+ cpu cycles.

Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-21 13:57:12 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 8f63aaf5c4 KVM: VMX: Allow KVM_INTEL when building for Centaur and/or Zhaoxin CPUs
Change the dependency for KVM_INTEL, i.e. KVM w/ VMX, from Intel CPUs to
any CPU that supports the IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR and thus VMX functionality.
This effectively allows building KVM_INTEL for Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-20-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13 19:35:33 +01:00
Sean Christopherson ff10e22e65 KVM: VMX: Check for full VMX support when verifying CPU compatibility
Explicitly check the current CPU's IA32_FEAT_CTL and VMX feature flags
when verifying compatibility across physical CPUs.  This effectively
adds a check on IA32_FEAT_CTL to ensure that VMX is fully enabled on
all CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-17-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13 19:26:58 +01:00
Sean Christopherson a4d0b2fdbc KVM: VMX: Use VMX feature flag to query BIOS enabling
Replace KVM's manual checks on IA32_FEAT_CTL with a query on the boot
CPU's MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL and VMX feature flags.  The MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL
indicates that IA32_FEAT_CTL has been configured and that dependent
features are accurately reflected in cpufeatures, e.g. the VMX flag is
now cleared during boot if VMX isn't fully enabled via IA32_FEAT_CTL,
including the case where the MSR isn't supported.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-16-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13 19:19:32 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 21bd3467a5 KVM: VMX: Drop initialization of IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR
Remove KVM's code to initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR when KVM is loaded now
that the MSR is initialized during boot on all CPUs that support VMX,
i.e. on all CPUs that can possibly load kvm_intel.

Note, don't WARN if IA32_FEAT_CTL is unlocked, even though the MSR is
unconditionally locked by init_ia32_feat_ctl().  KVM isn't tied directly
to a CPU vendor detection, whereas init_ia32_feat_ctl() is invoked if
and only if the CPU vendor is recognized and known to support VMX.  As a
result, vmx_disabled_by_bios() may be reached without going through
init_ia32_feat_ctl() and thus without locking IA32_FEAT_CTL.  This quirk
will be eliminated in a future patch.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-15-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13 19:04:37 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 32ad73db7f x86/msr-index: Clean up bit defines for IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR
As pointed out by Boris, the defines for bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
are quite a mouthful, especially the VMX bits which must differentiate
between enabling VMX inside and outside SMX (TXT) operation.  Rename the
MSR and its bit defines to abbreviate FEATURE_CONTROL as FEAT_CTL to
make them a little friendlier on the eyes.

Arguably, the MSR itself should keep the full IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL name
to match Intel's SDM, but a future patch will add a dedicated Kconfig,
file and functions for the MSR. Using the full name for those assets is
rather unwieldy, so bite the bullet and use IA32_FEAT_CTL so that its
nomenclature is consistent throughout the kernel.

Opportunistically, fix a few other annoyances with the defines:

  - Relocate the bit defines so that they immediately follow the MSR
    define, e.g. aren't mistaken as belonging to MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL.
  - Add whitespace around the block of feature control defines to make
    it clear they're all related.
  - Use BIT() instead of manually encoding the bit shift.
  - Use "VMX" instead of "VMXON" to match the SDM.
  - Append "_ENABLED" to the LMCE (Local Machine Check Exception) bit to
    be consistent with the kernel's verbiage used for all other feature
    control bits.  Note, the SDM refers to the LMCE bit as LMCE_ON,
    likely to differentiate it from IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL.LMCE_EN.  Ignore
    the (literal) one-off usage of _ON, the SDM is simply "wrong".

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13 17:23:08 +01:00
Ingo Molnar 57ad87ddce Merge branch 'x86/mm' into efi/core, to pick up dependencies
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-01-10 18:53:14 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 6948199a9a KVM: x86/mmu: WARN if root_hpa is invalid when handling a page fault
WARN if root_hpa is invalid when handling a page fault.  The check on
root_hpa exists for historical reasons that no longer apply to the
current KVM code base.

Remove an equivalent debug-only warning in direct_page_fault(), whose
existence more or less confirms that root_hpa should always be valid
when handling a page fault.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:09 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 0c7a98e34d KVM: x86/mmu: WARN on an invalid root_hpa
WARN on the existing invalid root_hpa checks in __direct_map() and
FNAME(fetch).  The "legitimate" path that invalidated root_hpa in the
middle of a page fault is long since gone, i.e. it should no longer be
impossible to invalidate in the middle of a page fault[*].

The root_hpa checks were added by two related commits

  989c6b34f6 ("KVM: MMU: handle invalid root_hpa at __direct_map")
  37f6a4e237 ("KVM: x86: handle invalid root_hpa everywhere")

to fix a bug where nested_vmx_vmexit() could be called *in the middle*
of a page fault.  At the time, vmx_interrupt_allowed(), which was and
still is used by kvm_can_do_async_pf() via ->interrupt_allowed(),
directly invoked nested_vmx_vmexit() to switch from L2 to L1 to emulate
a VM-Exit on a pending interrupt.  Emulating the nested VM-Exit resulted
in root_hpa being invalidated by kvm_mmu_reset_context() without
explicitly terminating the page fault.

Now that root_hpa is checked for validity by kvm_mmu_page_fault(), WARN
on an invalid root_hpa to detect any flows that reset the MMU while
handling a page fault.  The broken vmx_interrupt_allowed() behavior has
long since been fixed and resetting the MMU during a page fault should
not be considered legal behavior.

[*] It's actually technically possible in FNAME(page_fault)() because it
    calls inject_page_fault() when the guest translation is invalid, but
    in that case the page fault handling is immediately terminated.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:08 +01:00
Sean Christopherson ddce620821 KVM: x86/mmu: Move root_hpa validity checks to top of page fault handler
Add a check on root_hpa at the beginning of the page fault handler to
consolidate several checks on root_hpa that are scattered throughout the
page fault code.  This is a preparatory step towards eventually removing
such checks altogether, or at the very least WARNing if an invalid root
is encountered.  Remove only the checks that can be easily audited to
confirm that root_hpa cannot be invalidated between their current
location and the new check in kvm_mmu_page_fault(), and aren't currently
protected by mmu_lock, i.e. keep the checks in __direct_map() and
FNAME(fetch) for the time being.

The root_hpa checks that are consolidate were all added by commit

  37f6a4e237 ("KVM: x86: handle invalid root_hpa everywhere")

which was a follow up to a bug fix for __direct_map(), commit

  989c6b34f6 ("KVM: MMU: handle invalid root_hpa at __direct_map")

At the time, nested VMX had, in hindsight, crazy handling of nested
interrupts and would trigger a nested VM-Exit in ->interrupt_allowed(),
and thus unexpectedly reset the MMU in flows such as can_do_async_pf().

Now that the wonky nested VM-Exit behavior is gone, the root_hpa checks
are bogus and confusing, e.g. it's not at all obvious what they actually
protect against, and at first glance they appear to be broken since many
of them run without holding mmu_lock.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:07 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 4cd071d13c KVM: x86/mmu: Move calls to thp_adjust() down a level
Move the calls to thp_adjust() down a level from the page fault handlers
to the map/fetch helpers and remove the page count shuffling done in
thp_adjust().

Despite holding a reference to the underlying page while processing a
page fault, the page fault flows don't actually rely on holding a
reference to the page when thp_adjust() is called.  At that point, the
fault handlers hold mmu_lock, which prevents mmu_notifier from completing
any invalidations, and have verified no invalidations from mmu_notifier
have occurred since the page reference was acquired (which is done prior
to taking mmu_lock).

The kvm_release_pfn_clean()/kvm_get_pfn() dance in thp_adjust() is a
quirk that is necessitated because thp_adjust() modifies the pfn that is
consumed by its caller.  Because the page fault handlers call
kvm_release_pfn_clean() on said pfn, thp_adjust() needs to transfer the
reference to the correct pfn purely for correctness when the pfn is
released.

Calling thp_adjust() from __direct_map() and FNAME(fetch) means the pfn
adjustment doesn't change the pfn as seen by the page fault handlers,
i.e. the pfn released by the page fault handlers is the same pfn that
was returned by gfn_to_pfn().

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:07 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 0885904d4f KVM: x86/mmu: Move transparent_hugepage_adjust() above __direct_map()
Move thp_adjust() above __direct_map() in preparation of calling
thp_adjust() from  __direct_map() and FNAME(fetch).

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:07 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 0f90e1c10d KVM: x86/mmu: Consolidate tdp_page_fault() and nonpaging_page_fault()
Consolidate the direct MMU page fault handlers into a common helper,
direct_page_fault().  Except for unique max level conditions, the tdp
and nonpaging fault handlers are functionally identical.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:06 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 2cb70fd441 KVM: x86/mmu: Rename lpage_disallowed to account_disallowed_nx_lpage
Rename __direct_map()'s param that controls whether or not a disallowed
NX large page should be accounted to match what it actually does.  The
nonpaging_page_fault() case unconditionally passes %false for the param
even though it locally sets lpage_disallowed.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:06 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 2f57b7051f KVM: x86/mmu: Persist gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() to max_level
Persist the max page level calculated via gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() to
the max level "returned" by mapping_level() so that its naturally taken
into account by the max level check that conditions calling
transparent_hugepage_adjust().

Drop the gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() check in thp_adjust() as it's now
handled by mapping_level() and its callers.

Add a comment to document the behavior of host_mapping_level() and its
interaction with max level and transparent huge pages.

Note, transferring the gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() from thp_adjust() to
mapping_level() superficially affects how changes to a memslot's
disallow_lpage count will be handled due to thp_adjust() being run while
holding mmu_lock.

In the more common case where a different vCPU increments the count via
account_shadowed(), gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() is rechecked by set_spte()
to ensure a writable large page isn't created.

In the less common case where the count is decremented to zero due to
all shadow pages in the memslot being zapped, THP behavior now matches
hugetlbfs behavior in the sense that a small page will be created when a
large page could be used if the count reaches zero in the miniscule
window between mapping_level() and acquiring mmu_lock.

Lastly, the new THP behavior also follows hugetlbfs behavior in the
absurdly unlikely scenario of a memslot being moved such that the
memslot's compatibility with respect to large pages changes, but without
changing the validity of the gpf->pfn walk.  I.e. if a memslot is moved
between mapping_level() and snapshotting mmu_seq, it's theoretically
possible to consume a stale disallow_lpage count.  But, since KVM zaps
all shadow pages when moving a memslot and forces all vCPUs to reload a
new MMU, the inserted spte will always be thrown away prior to
completing the memslot move, i.e. whether or not the spte accurately
reflects disallow_lpage is irrelevant.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:05 +01:00
Sean Christopherson cbe1e6f035 KVM: x86/mmu: Incorporate guest's page level into max level for shadow MMU
Restrict the max level for a shadow page based on the guest's level
instead of capping the level after the fact for host-mapped huge pages,
e.g. hugetlbfs pages.  Explicitly capping the max level using the guest
mapping level also eliminates FNAME(page_fault)'s subtle dependency on
THP only supporting 2mb pages.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:05 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 39ca1ecb78 KVM: x86/mmu: Refactor handling of forced 4k pages in page faults
Refactor the page fault handlers and mapping_level() to track the max
allowed page level instead of only tracking if a 4k page is mandatory
due to one restriction or another.  This paves the way for cleanly
consolidating tdp_page_fault() and nonpaging_page_fault(), and for
eliminating a redundant check on mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed().

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:05 +01:00
Sean Christopherson f0f37e229c KVM: x86/mmu: Refactor the per-slot level calculation in mapping_level()
Invert the loop which adjusts the allowed page level based on what's
compatible with the associated memslot to use a largest-to-smallest
page size walk.  This paves the way for passing around a "max level"
variable instead of having redundant checks and/or multiple booleans.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:04 +01:00
Sean Christopherson cb9b88c669 KVM: x86/mmu: Refactor handling of cache consistency with TDP
Pre-calculate the max level for a TDP page with respect to MTRR cache
consistency in preparation of replacing force_pt_level with max_level,
and eventually combining the bulk of nonpaging_page_fault() and
tdp_page_fault() into a common helper.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:03 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 9f1a8526fb KVM: x86/mmu: Move nonpaging_page_fault() below try_async_pf()
Move nonpaging_page_fault() below try_async_pf() to eliminate the
forward declaration of try_async_pf() and to prepare for combining the
bulk of nonpaging_page_fault() and tdp_page_fault() into a common
helper.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:03 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 367fd790b1 KVM: x86/mmu: Fold nonpaging_map() into nonpaging_page_fault()
Fold nonpaging_map() into its sole caller, nonpaging_page_fault(), in
preparation for combining the bulk of nonpaging_page_fault() and
tdp_page_fault() into a common helper.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:03 +01:00
Sean Christopherson ba7888dde6 KVM: x86/mmu: Move definition of make_mmu_pages_available() up
Move make_mmu_pages_available() above its first user to put it closer
to related code and eliminate a forward declaration.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:02 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 736c291c9f KVM: x86: Use gpa_t for cr2/gpa to fix TDP support on 32-bit KVM
Convert a plethora of parameters and variables in the MMU and page fault
flows from type gva_t to gpa_t to properly handle TDP on 32-bit KVM.

Thanks to PSE and PAE paging, 32-bit kernels can access 64-bit physical
addresses.  When TDP is enabled, the fault address is a guest physical
address and thus can be a 64-bit value, even when both KVM and its guest
are using 32-bit virtual addressing, e.g. VMX's VMCS.GUEST_PHYSICAL is a
64-bit field, not a natural width field.

Using a gva_t for the fault address means KVM will incorrectly drop the
upper 32-bits of the GPA.  Ditto for gva_to_gpa() when it is used to
translate L2 GPAs to L1 GPAs.

Opportunistically rename variables and parameters to better reflect the
dual address modes, e.g. use "cr2_or_gpa" for fault addresses and plain
"addr" instead of "vaddr" when the address may be either a GVA or an L2
GPA.  Similarly, use "gpa" in the nonpaging_page_fault() flows to avoid
a confusing "gpa_t gva" declaration; this also sets the stage for a
future patch to combing nonpaging_page_fault() and tdp_page_fault() with
minimal churn.

Sprinkle in a few comments to document flows where an address is known
to be a GVA and thus can be safely truncated to a 32-bit value.  Add
WARNs in kvm_handle_page_fault() and FNAME(gva_to_gpa_nested)() to help
document such cases and detect bugs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:02 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 95145c25a7 KVM: x86: Add a WARN on TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD in kvm_load_guest_fpu()
WARN once in kvm_load_guest_fpu() if TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is observed, as
that would mean that KVM is corrupting userspace's FPU by saving
unknown register state into arch.user_fpu.  Add a comment to explain
why KVM WARNs on TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD instead of implementing logic
similar to fpu__copy().

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:02 +01:00
Sean Christopherson f958bd2314 KVM: x86: Fix potential put_fpu() w/o load_fpu() on MPX platform
Unlike most state managed by XSAVE, MPX is initialized to zero on INIT.
Because INITs are usually recognized in the context of a VCPU_RUN call,
kvm_vcpu_reset() puts the guest's FPU so that the FPU state is resident
in memory, zeros the MPX state, and reloads FPU state to hardware.  But,
in the unlikely event that an INIT is recognized during
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate() via kvm_apic_accept_events(),
kvm_vcpu_reset() will call kvm_put_guest_fpu() without a preceding
kvm_load_guest_fpu() and corrupt the guest's FPU state (and possibly
userspace's FPU state as well).

Given that MPX is being removed from the kernel[*], fix the bug with the
simple-but-ugly approach of loading the guest's FPU during
KVM_GET_MP_STATE.

[*] See commit f240652b60 ("x86/mpx: Remove MPX APIs").

Fixes: f775b13eed ("x86,kvm: move qemu/guest FPU switching out to vcpu_run")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:01 +01:00
Jim Mattson c90f4d03cc kvm: nVMX: Aesthetic cleanup of handle_vmread and handle_vmwrite
Apply reverse fir tree declaration order, shorten some variable names
to avoid line wrap, reformat a block comment, delete an extra blank
line, and use BIT(10) instead of (1u << 10).

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jon Cargille <jcargill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:00 +01:00
Jim Mattson 693e02cc24 kvm: nVMX: VMWRITE checks unsupported field before read-only field
According to the SDM, VMWRITE checks to see if the secondary source
operand corresponds to an unsupported VMCS field before it checks to
see if the secondary source operand corresponds to a VM-exit
information field and the processor does not support writing to
VM-exit information fields.

Fixes: 49f705c532 ("KVM: nVMX: Implement VMREAD and VMWRITE")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jon Cargille <jcargill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:00 +01:00
Jim Mattson dd2d6042b7 kvm: nVMX: VMWRITE checks VMCS-link pointer before VMCS field
According to the SDM, a VMWRITE in VMX non-root operation with an
invalid VMCS-link pointer results in VMfailInvalid before the validity
of the VMCS field in the secondary source operand is checked.

For consistency, modify both handle_vmwrite and handle_vmread, even
though there was no problem with the latter.

Fixes: 6d894f498f ("KVM: nVMX: vmread/vmwrite: Use shadow vmcs12 if running L2")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jon Cargille <jcargill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:16:00 +01:00
Xiaoyao Li 5e3d394fdd KVM: VMX: Fix the spelling of CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING
The mis-spelling is found by checkpatch.pl, so fix them.

Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:15:59 +01:00
Xiaoyao Li 4e2a0bc56a KVM: VMX: Rename NMI_PENDING to NMI_WINDOW
Rename the NMI-window exiting related definitions to match the latest
Intel SDM. No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:15:59 +01:00
Xiaoyao Li 9dadc2f918 KVM: VMX: Rename INTERRUPT_PENDING to INTERRUPT_WINDOW
Rename interrupt-windown exiting related definitions to match the
latest Intel SDM. No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:15:59 +01:00
Miaohe Lin 0a03cbdac1 KVM: x86: Fix some comment typos
Fix some typos in comment.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 18:15:58 +01:00
Peter Xu 150a84fee8 KVM: X86: Convert the last users of "shorthand = 0" to use macros
Change the last users of "shorthand = 0" to use APIC_DEST_NOSHORT.

Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:16 +01:00
Peter Xu 5c69d5c113 KVM: X86: Fix callers of kvm_apic_match_dest() to use correct macros
Callers of kvm_apic_match_dest() should always pass in APIC_DEST_*
macros for either dest_mode and short_hand parameters.  Fix up all the
callers of kvm_apic_match_dest() that are not following the rule.

Since at it, rename the parameter from short_hand to shorthand in
kvm_apic_match_dest(), as suggested by Vitaly.

Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reported-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:15 +01:00
Peter Xu ac8ef992cd KVM: X86: Drop KVM_APIC_SHORT_MASK and KVM_APIC_DEST_MASK
We have both APIC_SHORT_MASK and KVM_APIC_SHORT_MASK defined for the
shorthand mask.  Similarly, we have both APIC_DEST_MASK and
KVM_APIC_DEST_MASK defined for the destination mode mask.

Drop the KVM_APIC_* macros and replace the only user of them to use
the APIC_DEST_* macros instead.  At the meantime, move APIC_SHORT_MASK
and APIC_DEST_MASK from lapic.c to lapic.h.

Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:15 +01:00
Peter Xu c96001c570 KVM: X86: Use APIC_DEST_* macros properly in kvm_lapic_irq.dest_mode
We were using either APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL|APIC_DEST_LOGICAL or 0|1 to
fill in kvm_lapic_irq.dest_mode.  It's fine only because in most cases
when we check against dest_mode it's against APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL (which
equals to 0).  However, that's not consistent.  We'll have problem
when we want to start checking against APIC_DEST_LOGICAL, which does
not equals to 1.

This patch firstly introduces kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode() helper to take
any boolean of destination mode and return the APIC_DEST_* macro.
Then, it replaces the 0|1 settings of irq.dest_mode with the helper.

Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:14 +01:00
Peter Xu 59508b303e KVM: X86: Move irrelevant declarations out of ioapic.h
kvm_apic_match_dest() is declared in both ioapic.h and lapic.h.
Remove the declaration in ioapic.h.

kvm_apic_compare_prio() is declared in ioapic.h but defined in
lapic.c.  Move the declaration to lapic.h.

kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic() is declared in ioapic.h but defined in
irq_comm.c.  Move the declaration to irq.h.

hyperv.c needs to use kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(). Include irq.h in
hyperv.c.

Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:14 +01:00
Peter Xu b4b2963616 KVM: X86: Fix kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus() to use irq shorthand
The 3rd parameter of kvm_apic_match_dest() is the irq shorthand,
rather than the irq delivery mode.

Fixes: 7ee30bc132 ("KVM: x86: deliver KVM IOAPIC scan request to target vCPUs")
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:14 +01:00
Miaohe Lin fe3c2b4c22 KVM: explicitly set rmap_head->val to 0 in pte_list_desc_remove_entry()
When we reach here, we have desc->sptes[j] = NULL with j = 0.
So we can replace desc->sptes[0] with 0 to make it more clear.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:13 +01:00
Miaohe Lin 4fb7b452ce KVM: vmx: remove unreachable statement in vmx_get_msr_feature()
We have no way to reach the final statement, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:12 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini 7adacf5eb2 KVM: x86: use CPUID to locate host page table reserved bits
The comment in kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits refers to MKTME, but the same is actually
true of SME and SEV.  Just use CPUID[0x8000_0008].EAX[7:0] unconditionally if
available, it is simplest and works even if memory is not encrypted.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-01-08 17:33:12 +01:00
Linus Torvalds a313c8e056 PPC:
* Fix a bug where we try to do an ultracall on a system without an ultravisor.
 
 KVM:
 - Fix uninitialised sysreg accessor
 - Fix handling of demand-paged device mappings
 - Stop spamming the console on IMPDEF sysregs
 - Relax mappings of writable memslots
 - Assorted cleanups
 
 MIPS:
 - Now orphan, James Hogan is stepping down
 
 x86:
 - MAINTAINERS change, so long Radim and thanks for all the fish
 - supported CPUID fixes for AMD machines without SPEC_CTRL
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
 
 iQEcBAABAgAGBQJd/1+WAAoJEL/70l94x66DFuYH/A8x/P6BuCpppdGoEw+VGy7X
 E8141dHTd7b1Wgi0kDNLRREr4QIfArvavGe0z0W8p4fGtcVjXdyhhfPd0UK6dfKG
 9P66phY4AGPjde/8q/qSdFup9yshpcFwSVYdRC0L1w86dBRlXwuqk6K5zsRyCU4b
 38v5Q3rPdMnWWB0K88/GMvAyQmPkgMOXJvhoecKeDQ+9IZ3ub6DBBNGM/xTJ9Y3z
 vUe2BoYkZ3KKn6sfP66PdprBVI1EOrrAoj/l4BSuo/yUPcQsxTihXMkh5iGl18TF
 h7TN9eq2Bn2ryh0TsaSK8opuePcotVvx7oll3ERtSV4e+89z5FDt4vVcY1VyRuc=
 =adm7
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "PPC:
   - Fix a bug where we try to do an ultracall on a system without an
     ultravisor

  KVM:
   - Fix uninitialised sysreg accessor
   - Fix handling of demand-paged device mappings
   - Stop spamming the console on IMPDEF sysregs
   - Relax mappings of writable memslots
   - Assorted cleanups

  MIPS:
   - Now orphan, James Hogan is stepping down

  x86:
   - MAINTAINERS change, so long Radim and thanks for all the fish
   - supported CPUID fixes for AMD machines without SPEC_CTRL"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  MAINTAINERS: remove Radim from KVM maintainers
  MAINTAINERS: Orphan KVM for MIPS
  kvm: x86: Host feature SSBD doesn't imply guest feature AMD_SSBD
  kvm: x86: Host feature SSBD doesn't imply guest feature SPEC_CTRL_SSBD
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't do ultravisor calls on systems without ultravisor
  KVM: arm/arm64: Properly handle faulting of device mappings
  KVM: arm64: Ensure 'params' is initialised when looking up sys register
  KVM: arm/arm64: Remove excessive permission check in kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region
  KVM: arm64: Don't log IMP DEF sysreg traps
  KVM: arm64: Sanely ratelimit sysreg messages
  KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Use wrapper function to lock/unlock all vcpus in kvm_vgic_create()
  KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Fix potential double free dist->spis in __kvm_vgic_destroy()
  KVM: arm/arm64: Get rid of unused arg in cpu_init_hyp_mode()
2019-12-22 10:26:59 -08:00
Paolo Bonzini d68321dec1 PPC KVM fix for 5.5
- Fix a bug where we try to do an ultracall on a system without an
   ultravisor.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQEzBAABCgAdFiEEv0VLfXa2m9eKuaRpnZrqdyxjcZ8FAl35s5kACgkQnZrqdyxj
 cZ8cwwf/UPCvZIYPSeYvzrCrlA+wlhBAh3bh47+ZXaNybOpss1xZ7QOFGkgoVBkn
 ES2Sdx3qgLvhmbR+nEKon8YCDVSwUj2ehwJu1nzAUzuVYw+m8OHGjdW07+go5KKi
 xZOndwBQGYaaWxch2O8Qw27TZU4lcVY/FNQiti5Ahg9dKK98CLyMsWnTms23ZjGD
 JMN/jCoMxa6godxWk3mSLaIwXj8P1P4pH3oiMFF8ngRTqyMgi1l02wim+DV10rD4
 5JoAF2kzSYngDlrhhQAsSOWrsWst1X2txcHA2QsoL7ZGYUQzzKyHH6zC6dS9eWk4
 ni70RLEnJj8YpsjwT52tFYokxwTPfQ==
 =kPkE
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'kvm-ppc-fixes-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulus/powerpc into kvm-master

PPC KVM fix for 5.5

- Fix a bug where we try to do an ultracall on a system without an
  ultravisor.
2019-12-22 13:18:15 +01:00
Jim Mattson 8715f05269 kvm: x86: Host feature SSBD doesn't imply guest feature AMD_SSBD
The host reports support for the synthetic feature X86_FEATURE_SSBD
when any of the three following hardware features are set:
  CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.SSBD[bit 31]
  CPUID.80000008H:EBX.AMD_SSBD[bit 24]
  CPUID.80000008H:EBX.VIRT_SSBD[bit 25]

Either of the first two hardware features implies the existence of the
IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR, but CPUID.80000008H:EBX.VIRT_SSBD[bit 25] does
not. Therefore, CPUID.80000008H:EBX.AMD_SSBD[bit 24] should only be
set in the guest if CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.SSBD[bit 31] or
CPUID.80000008H:EBX.AMD_SSBD[bit 24] is set on the host.

Fixes: 4c6903a0f9 ("KVM: x86: fix reporting of AMD speculation bug CPUID leaf")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-12-18 17:46:35 +01:00
Jim Mattson 396d2e878f kvm: x86: Host feature SSBD doesn't imply guest feature SPEC_CTRL_SSBD
The host reports support for the synthetic feature X86_FEATURE_SSBD
when any of the three following hardware features are set:
  CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.SSBD[bit 31]
  CPUID.80000008H:EBX.AMD_SSBD[bit 24]
  CPUID.80000008H:EBX.VIRT_SSBD[bit 25]

Either of the first two hardware features implies the existence of the
IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR, but CPUID.80000008H:EBX.VIRT_SSBD[bit 25] does
not. Therefore, CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.SSBD[bit 31] should only be
set in the guest if CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.SSBD[bit 31] or
CPUID.80000008H:EBX.AMD_SSBD[bit 24] is set on the host.

Fixes: 0c54914d0c ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-12-18 17:46:23 +01:00
Ingo Molnar eb243d1d28 x86/mm/pat: Rename <asm/pat.h> => <asm/memtype.h>
pat.h is a file whose main purpose is to provide the memtype_*() APIs.

PAT is the low level hardware mechanism - but the high level abstraction
is memtype.

So name the header <memtype.h> as well - this goes hand in hand with memtype.c
and memtype_interval.c.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-12-10 10:12:55 +01:00
Linus Torvalds aedc0650f9 * PPC secure guest support
* small x86 cleanup
 * fix for an x86-specific out-of-bounds write on a ioctl (not guest triggerable,
   data not attacker-controlled)
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
 
 iQEcBAABAgAGBQJd551cAAoJEL/70l94x66D+JkH/R3eEOyvckPmYmzd0lnV8mQ/
 7e0n2G/aD+iLZkcCbUnMaImdmSJmoEEJCPjgPk/5nJ3zUi5b/ABWyidEM5uf19Hl
 rzKBg0DR7BiQptPnZv2JMwEVKu3JOTchMykqu9xXChQlICocZ0xjdOA6nQ19p0Lv
 FulDw5MUaWrXevIzCBskQ38zJejRQA6CpD1lQkHn7LKS9p3p+BsAOd/Ouy87RfWG
 b3ktECNbXyO6KStrrhgm+z8pviWY+kqYklyBlDOOwxWif0x8WvNDpQLoVo+ZuhLU
 Me8YJ1BN75vFlxzh6ZK5exBUnm9E3fGVKIaaF+dpuds2x+j4HnYl+lZCm89MdqY=
 =Q4v7
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull more KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:

 - PPC secure guest support

 - small x86 cleanup

 - fix for an x86-specific out-of-bounds write on a ioctl (not guest
   triggerable, data not attacker-controlled)

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  kvm: vmx: Stop wasting a page for guest_msrs
  KVM: x86: fix out-of-bounds write in KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID (CVE-2019-19332)
  Documentation: kvm: Fix mention to number of ioctls classes
  powerpc: Ultravisor: Add PPC_UV config option
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Support reset of secure guest
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Radix changes for secure guest
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Shared pages support for secure guests
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Support for running secure guests
  mm: ksm: Export ksm_madvise()
  KVM x86: Move kvm cpuid support out of svm
2019-12-04 11:08:30 -08:00
Jim Mattson 7d73710d9c kvm: vmx: Stop wasting a page for guest_msrs
We will never need more guest_msrs than there are indices in
vmx_msr_index. Thus, at present, the guest_msrs array will not exceed
168 bytes.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-12-04 12:23:27 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini 433f4ba190 KVM: x86: fix out-of-bounds write in KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID (CVE-2019-19332)
The bounds check was present in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID but not
KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID.

Reported-by: syzbot+e3f4897236c4eeb8af4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 84cffe499b ("kvm: Emulate MOVBE", 2013-10-29)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-12-04 12:14:41 +01:00
Peter Gonda c1de0f2522 KVM x86: Move kvm cpuid support out of svm
Memory encryption support does not have module parameter dependencies
and can be moved into the general x86 cpuid __do_cpuid_ent function.
This changes maintains current behavior of passing through all of
CPUID.8000001F.

Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-27 11:39:18 +01:00
Linus Torvalds 1ae78780ed Merge branch 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Dynamic tick (nohz) updates, perhaps most notably changes to force
     the tick on when needed due to lengthy in-kernel execution on CPUs
     on which RCU is waiting.

   - Linux-kernel memory consistency model updates.

   - Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_prepace_pointer().

   - Torture-test updates.

   - Documentation updates.

   - Miscellaneous fixes"

* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (51 commits)
  security/safesetid: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  net/sched: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  net/netfilter: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  net/core: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  bpf/cgroup: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  fs/afs: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  drivers/scsi: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  drm/i915: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  x86/kvm/pmu: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
  rcu: Upgrade rcu_swap_protected() to rcu_replace_pointer()
  rcu: Suppress levelspread uninitialized messages
  rcu: Fix uninitialized variable in nocb_gp_wait()
  rcu: Update descriptions for rcu_future_grace_period tracepoint
  rcu: Update descriptions for rcu_nocb_wake tracepoint
  rcu: Remove obsolete descriptions for rcu_barrier tracepoint
  rcu: Ensure that ->rcu_urgent_qs is set before resched IPI
  workqueue: Convert for_each_wq to use built-in list check
  rcu: Several rcu_segcblist functions can be static
  rcu: Remove unused function hlist_bl_del_init_rcu()
  Documentation: Rename rcu_node_context_switch() to rcu_note_context_switch()
  ...
2019-11-26 15:42:43 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 3f59dbcace Merge branch 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main kernel side changes in this cycle were:

   - Various Intel-PT updates and optimizations (Alexander Shishkin)

   - Prohibit kprobes on Xen/KVM emulate prefixes (Masami Hiramatsu)

   - Add support for LSM and SELinux checks to control access to the
     perf syscall (Joel Fernandes)

   - Misc other changes, optimizations, fixes and cleanups - see the
     shortlog for details.

  There were numerous tooling changes as well - 254 non-merge commits.
  Here are the main changes - too many to list in detail:

   - Enhancements to core tooling infrastructure, perf.data, libperf,
     libtraceevent, event parsing, vendor events, Intel PT, callchains,
     BPF support and instruction decoding.

   - There were updates to the following tools:

        perf annotate
        perf diff
        perf inject
        perf kvm
        perf list
        perf maps
        perf parse
        perf probe
        perf record
        perf report
        perf script
        perf stat
        perf test
        perf trace

   - And a lot of other changes: please see the shortlog and Git log for
     more details"

* 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (279 commits)
  perf parse: Fix potential memory leak when handling tracepoint errors
  perf probe: Fix spelling mistake "addrees" -> "address"
  libtraceevent: Fix memory leakage in copy_filter_type
  libtraceevent: Fix header installation
  perf intel-bts: Does not support AUX area sampling
  perf intel-pt: Add support for decoding AUX area samples
  perf intel-pt: Add support for recording AUX area samples
  perf pmu: When using default config, record which bits of config were changed by the user
  perf auxtrace: Add support for queuing AUX area samples
  perf session: Add facility to peek at all events
  perf auxtrace: Add support for dumping AUX area samples
  perf inject: Cut AUX area samples
  perf record: Add aux-sample-size config term
  perf record: Add support for AUX area sampling
  perf auxtrace: Add support for AUX area sample recording
  perf auxtrace: Move perf_evsel__find_pmu()
  perf record: Add a function to test for kernel support for AUX area sampling
  perf tools: Add kernel AUX area sampling definitions
  perf/core: Make the mlock accounting simple again
  perf report: Jump to symbol source view from total cycles view
  ...
2019-11-26 15:04:47 -08:00
Linus Torvalds ab851d49f6 Merge branch 'x86-iopl-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 iopl updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "This implements a nice simplification of the iopl and ioperm code that
  Thomas Gleixner discovered: we can implement the IO privilege features
  of the iopl system call by using the IO permission bitmap in
  permissive mode, while trapping CLI/STI/POPF/PUSHF uses in user-space
  if they change the interrupt flag.

  This implements that feature, with testing facilities and related
  cleanups"

[ "Simplification" may be an over-statement. The main goal is to avoid
  the cli/sti of iopl by effectively implementing the IO port access
  parts of iopl in terms of ioperm.

  This may end up not workign well in case people actually depend on
  cli/sti being available, or if there are mixed uses of iopl and
  ioperm. We will see..       - Linus ]

* 'x86-iopl-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (22 commits)
  x86/ioperm: Fix use of deprecated config option
  x86/entry/32: Clarify register saving in __switch_to_asm()
  selftests/x86/iopl: Extend test to cover IOPL emulation
  x86/ioperm: Extend IOPL config to control ioperm() as well
  x86/iopl: Remove legacy IOPL option
  x86/iopl: Restrict iopl() permission scope
  x86/iopl: Fixup misleading comment
  selftests/x86/ioperm: Extend testing so the shared bitmap is exercised
  x86/ioperm: Share I/O bitmap if identical
  x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped
  x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work
  x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence number
  x86/ioperm: Move iobitmap data into a struct
  x86/tss: Move I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct
  x86/io: Speedup schedule out of I/O bitmap user
  x86/ioperm: Avoid bitmap allocation if no permissions are set
  x86/ioperm: Simplify first ioperm() invocation logic
  x86/iopl: Cleanup include maze
  x86/tss: Fix and move VMX BUILD_BUG_ON()
  x86/cpu: Unify cpu_init()
  ...
2019-11-26 11:12:02 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 1d87200446 Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Cross-arch changes to move the linker sections for NOTES and
     EXCEPTION_TABLE into the RO_DATA area, where they belong on most
     architectures. (Kees Cook)

   - Switch the x86 linker fill byte from x90 (NOP) to 0xcc (INT3), to
     trap jumps into the middle of those padding areas instead of
     sliding execution. (Kees Cook)

   - A thorough cleanup of symbol definitions within x86 assembler code.
     The rather randomly named macros got streamlined around a
     (hopefully) straightforward naming scheme:

        SYM_START(name, linkage, align...)
        SYM_END(name, sym_type)

        SYM_FUNC_START(name)
        SYM_FUNC_END(name)

        SYM_CODE_START(name)
        SYM_CODE_END(name)

        SYM_DATA_START(name)
        SYM_DATA_END(name)

     etc - with about three times of these basic primitives with some
     label, local symbol or attribute variant, expressed via postfixes.

     No change in functionality intended. (Jiri Slaby)

   - Misc other changes, cleanups and smaller fixes"

* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (67 commits)
  x86/entry/64: Remove pointless jump in paranoid_exit
  x86/entry/32: Remove unused resume_userspace label
  x86/build/vdso: Remove meaningless CFLAGS_REMOVE_*.o
  m68k: Convert missed RODATA to RO_DATA
  x86/vmlinux: Use INT3 instead of NOP for linker fill bytes
  x86/mm: Report actual image regions in /proc/iomem
  x86/mm: Report which part of kernel image is freed
  x86/mm: Remove redundant address-of operators on addresses
  xtensa: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  powerpc: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  parisc: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  microblaze: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  ia64: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  h8300: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  c6x: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  arm64: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  alpha: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  x86/vmlinux: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
  x86/vmlinux: Actually use _etext for the end of the text segment
  vmlinux.lds.h: Allow EXCEPTION_TABLE to live in RO_DATA
  ...
2019-11-26 10:42:40 -08:00
Ingo Molnar ceb9e77324 Merge branch 'x86/core' into perf/core, to resolve conflicts and to pick up completed topic tree
Conflicts:
	tools/perf/check-headers.sh

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-11-25 09:09:27 +01:00
Jim Mattson 85c9aae9ac kvm: nVMX: Relax guest IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL constraints
Commit 37e4c997da ("KVM: VMX: validate individual bits of guest
MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL") broke the KVM_SET_MSRS ABI by instituting
new constraints on the data values that kvm would accept for the guest
MSR, IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL. Perhaps these constraints should have been
opt-in via a new KVM capability, but they were applied
indiscriminately, breaking at least one existing hypervisor.

Relax the constraints to allow either or both of
FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX and
FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX to be set when nVMX is
enabled. This change is sufficient to fix the aforementioned breakage.

Fixes: 37e4c997da ("KVM: VMX: validate individual bits of guest MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-23 11:34:46 +01:00
Sean Christopherson ad5996d9a0 KVM: x86: Grab KVM's srcu lock when setting nested state
Acquire kvm->srcu for the duration of ->set_nested_state() to fix a bug
where nVMX derefences ->memslots without holding ->srcu or ->slots_lock.

The other half of nested migration, ->get_nested_state(), does not need
to acquire ->srcu as it is a purely a dump of internal KVM (and CPU)
state to userspace.

Detected as an RCU lockdep splat that is 100% reproducible by running
KVM's state_test selftest with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y.  Note that the
failing function, kvm_is_visible_gfn(), is only checking the validity of
a gfn, it's not actually accessing guest memory (which is more or less
unsupported during vmx_set_nested_state() due to incorrect MMU state),
i.e. vmx_set_nested_state() itself isn't fundamentally broken.  In any
case, setting nested state isn't a fast path so there's no reason to go
out of our way to avoid taking ->srcu.

  =============================
  WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
  5.4.0-rc7+ #94 Not tainted
  -----------------------------
  include/linux/kvm_host.h:626 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

               other info that might help us debug this:

  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
  1 lock held by evmcs_test/10939:
   #0: ffff88826ffcb800 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x85/0x630 [kvm]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 1 PID: 10939 Comm: evmcs_test Not tainted 5.4.0-rc7+ #94
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x68/0x9b
   kvm_is_visible_gfn+0x179/0x180 [kvm]
   mmu_check_root+0x11/0x30 [kvm]
   fast_cr3_switch+0x40/0x120 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_new_cr3+0x34/0x60 [kvm]
   nested_vmx_load_cr3+0xbd/0x1f0 [kvm_intel]
   nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode+0xab8/0x1d60 [kvm_intel]
   vmx_set_nested_state+0x256/0x340 [kvm_intel]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x491/0x11a0 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xde/0x630 [kvm]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6c0
   ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x54/0x200
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  RIP: 0033:0x7f59a2b95f47

Fixes: 8fcc4b5923 ("kvm: nVMX: Introduce KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-23 11:30:15 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 05c19c2fe1 KVM: x86: Open code shared_msr_update() in its only caller
Fold shared_msr_update() into its sole user to eliminate its pointless
bounds check, its godawful printk, its misleading comment (it's called
under a global lock), and its woefully inaccurate name.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-23 11:29:38 +01:00
Sean Christopherson 24885d1d79 KVM: x86: Remove a spurious export of a static function
A recent change inadvertently exported a static function, which results
in modpost throwing a warning.  Fix it.

Fixes: cbbaa2727a ("KVM: x86: fix presentation of TSX feature in ARCH_CAPABILITIES")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-23 11:28:59 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini c50d8ae3a1 KVM: x86: create mmu/ subdirectory
Preparatory work for shattering mmu.c into multiple files.  Besides making it easier
to follow, this will also make it possible to write unit tests for various parts.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 12:03:50 +01:00
Liran Alon 0155b2b91b KVM: nVMX: Remove unnecessary TLB flushes on L1<->L2 switches when L1 use apic-access-page
According to Intel SDM section 28.3.3.3/28.3.3.4 Guidelines for Use
of the INVVPID/INVEPT Instruction, the hypervisor needs to execute
INVVPID/INVEPT X in case CPU executes VMEntry with VPID/EPTP X and
either: "Virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control was changed
from 0 to 1, OR the value of apic_access_page was changed.

In the nested case, the burden falls on L1, unless L0 enables EPT in
vmcs02 but L1 enables neither EPT nor VPID in vmcs12.  For this reason
prepare_vmcs02() and load_vmcs12_host_state() have special code to
request a TLB flush in case L1 does not use EPT but it uses
"virtualize APIC accesses".

This special case however is not necessary. On a nested vmentry the
physical TLB will already be flushed except if all the following apply:

* L0 uses VPID

* L1 uses VPID

* L0 can guarantee TLB entries populated while running L1 are tagged
differently than TLB entries populated while running L2.

If the first condition is false, the processor will flush the TLB
on vmentry to L2.  If the second or third condition are false,
prepare_vmcs02() will request KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH.  However, even
if both are true, no extra TLB flush is needed to handle the APIC
access page:

* if L1 doesn't use VPID, the second condition doesn't hold and the
TLB will be flushed anyway.

* if L1 uses VPID, it has to flush the TLB itself with INVVPID and
section 28.3.3.3 doesn't apply to L0.

* even INVEPT is not needed because, if L0 uses EPT, it uses different
EPTP when running L2 than L1 (because guest_mode is part of mmu-role).
In this case SDM section 28.3.3.4 doesn't apply.

Similarly, examining nested_vmx_vmexit()->load_vmcs12_host_state(),
one could note that L0 won't flush TLB only in cases where SDM sections
28.3.3.3 and 28.3.3.4 don't apply.  In particular, if L0 uses different
VPIDs for L1 and L2 (i.e. vmx->vpid != vmx->nested.vpid02), section
28.3.3.3 doesn't apply.

Thus, remove this flush from prepare_vmcs02() and nested_vmx_vmexit().

Side-note: This patch can be viewed as removing parts of commit
fb6c819843 ("kvm: vmx: Flush TLB when the APIC-access address changes”)
that is not relevant anymore since commit
1313cc2bd8 ("kvm: mmu: Add guest_mode to kvm_mmu_page_role”).
i.e. The first commit assumes that if L0 use EPT and L1 doesn’t use EPT,
then L0 will use same EPTP for both L0 and L1. Which indeed required
L0 to execute INVEPT before entering L2 guest. This assumption is
not true anymore since when guest_mode was added to mmu-role.

Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 12:03:50 +01:00
Mao Wenan db5a95ec16 KVM: x86: remove set but not used variable 'called'
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c: In function kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request_mask:
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7911:7: warning: variable called set but not
used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]

It is not used since commit 7ee30bc132 ("KVM: x86: deliver KVM
IOAPIC scan request to target vCPUs")

Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Fixes: 7ee30bc132 ("KVM: x86: deliver KVM IOAPIC scan request to target vCPUs")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 12:03:49 +01:00
Liran Alon b11494bcab KVM: nVMX: Do not mark vmcs02->apic_access_page as dirty when unpinning
vmcs->apic_access_page is simply a token that the hypervisor puts into
the PFN of a 4KB EPTE (or PTE if using shadow-paging) that triggers
APIC-access VMExit or APIC virtualization logic whenever a CPU running
in VMX non-root mode read/write from/to this PFN.

As every write either triggers an APIC-access VMExit or write is
performed on vmcs->virtual_apic_page, the PFN pointed to by
vmcs->apic_access_page should never actually be touched by CPU.

Therefore, there is no need to mark vmcs02->apic_access_page as dirty
after unpin it on L2->L1 emulated VMExit or when L1 exit VMX operation.

Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 12:03:48 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini 46f4f0aabc Merge branch 'kvm-tsx-ctrl' into HEAD
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
2019-11-21 12:03:40 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini b07a5c53d4 KVM: vmx: use MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL to hard-disable TSX on guest that lack it
If X86_FEATURE_RTM is disabled, the guest should not be able to access
MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL.  We can therefore use it in KVM to force all
transactions from the guest to abort.

Tested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 10:01:02 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini c11f83e062 KVM: vmx: implement MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL disable RTM functionality
The current guest mitigation of TAA is both too heavy and not really
sufficient.  It is too heavy because it will cause some affected CPUs
(those that have MDS_NO but lack TAA_NO) to fall back to VERW and
get the corresponding slowdown.  It is not really sufficient because
it will cause the MDS_NO bit to disappear upon microcode update, so
that VMs started before the microcode update will not be runnable
anymore afterwards, even with tsx=on.

Instead, if tsx=on on the host, we can emulate MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL for
the guest and let it run without the VERW mitigation.  Even though
MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is quite heavyweight, and we do not want to write
it on every vmentry, we can use the shared MSR functionality because
the host kernel need not protect itself from TSX-based side-channels.

Tested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 10:00:59 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini edef5c36b0 KVM: x86: implement MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL effect on CPUID
Because KVM always emulates CPUID, the CPUID clear bit
(bit 1) of MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL must be emulated "manually"
by the hypervisor when performing said emulation.

Right now neither kvm-intel.ko nor kvm-amd.ko implement
MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL but this will change in the next patch.

Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Tested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 09:59:31 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini de1fca5d6e KVM: x86: do not modify masked bits of shared MSRs
"Shared MSRs" are guest MSRs that are written to the host MSRs but
keep their value until the next return to userspace.  They support
a mask, so that some bits keep the host value, but this mask is
only used to skip an unnecessary MSR write and the value written
to the MSR is always the guest MSR.

Fix this and, while at it, do not update smsr->values[slot].curr if
for whatever reason the wrmsr fails.  This should only happen due to
reserved bits, so the value written to smsr->values[slot].curr
will not match when the user-return notifier and the host value will
always be restored.  However, it is untidy and in rare cases this
can actually avoid spurious WRMSRs on return to userspace.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Tested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 09:59:22 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini cbbaa2727a KVM: x86: fix presentation of TSX feature in ARCH_CAPABILITIES
KVM does not implement MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, so it must not be presented
to the guests.  It is also confusing to have !ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR &&
!RTM && ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO: lack of MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL suggests TSX was not
hidden (it actually was), yet the value says that TSX is not vulnerable
to microarchitectural data sampling.  Fix both.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 09:59:10 +01:00
Liran Alon 992edeaefe KVM: nVMX: Assume TLB entries of L1 and L2 are tagged differently if L0 use EPT
Since commit 1313cc2bd8 ("kvm: mmu: Add guest_mode to kvm_mmu_page_role"),
guest_mode was added to mmu-role and therefore if L0 use EPT, it will
always run L1 and L2 with different EPTP. i.e. EPTP01!=EPTP02.

Because TLB entries are tagged with EP4TA, KVM can assume
TLB entries populated while running L2 are tagged differently
than TLB entries populated while running L1.

Therefore, update nested_has_guest_tlb_tag() to consider if
L0 use EPT instead of if L1 use EPT.

Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-20 14:23:27 +01:00
Liran Alon 5637f60b68 KVM: x86: Unexport kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page()
The function is only used in kvm.ko module.

Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-20 14:23:26 +01:00
Chenyi Qiang c79eb77554 KVM: nVMX: add CR4_LA57 bit to nested CR4_FIXED1
When L1 guest uses 5-level paging, it fails vm-entry to L2 due to
invalid host-state. It needs to add CR4_LA57 bit to nested CR4_FIXED1
MSR.

Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-20 14:23:26 +01:00
Liran Alon cc87767097 KVM: nVMX: Use semi-colon instead of comma for exit-handlers initialization
Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-20 14:23:25 +01:00
Nitesh Narayan Lal 9a2ae9f6b6 KVM: x86: Zero the IOAPIC scan request dest vCPUs bitmap
Not zeroing the bitmap used for identifying the destination vCPUs for an
IOAPIC scan request in fixed delivery mode could lead to waking up unwanted
vCPUs. This patch zeroes the vCPU bitmap before passing it to
kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus(), which is responsible for setting the bitmap
with the bits corresponding to the destination vCPUs.

Fixes: 7ee30bc132c6("KVM: x86: deliver KVM IOAPIC scan request to target vCPUs")
Signed-off-by: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-20 14:23:24 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 6b546e1c9a x86/tss: Fix and move VMX BUILD_BUG_ON()
The BUILD_BUG_ON(IO_BITMAP_OFFSET - 1 == 0x67) in the VMX code is bogus in
two aspects:

1) This wants to be in generic x86 code simply to catch issues even when
   VMX is disabled in Kconfig.

2) The IO_BITMAP_OFFSET is not the right thing to check because it makes
   asssumptions about the layout of tss_struct. Nothing requires that the
   I/O bitmap is placed right after x86_tss, which is the hardware mandated
   tss structure. It pointlessly makes restrictions on the struct
   tss_struct layout.

The proper thing to check is:

    - Offset of x86_tss in tss_struct is 0
    - Size of x86_tss == 0x68

Move it to the other build time TSS checks and make it do the right thing.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16 11:24:00 +01:00
Nitesh Narayan Lal 7ee30bc132 KVM: x86: deliver KVM IOAPIC scan request to target vCPUs
In IOAPIC fixed delivery mode instead of flushing the scan
requests to all vCPUs, we should only send the requests to
vCPUs specified within the destination field.

This patch introduces kvm_get_dest_vcpus_mask() API which
retrieves an array of target vCPUs by using
kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic() and then based on the
vcpus_idx, it sets the bit in a bitmap. However, if the above
fails kvm_get_dest_vcpus_mask() finds the target vCPUs by
traversing all available vCPUs. Followed by setting the
bits in the bitmap.

If we had different vCPUs in the previous request for the
same redirection table entry then bits corresponding to
these vCPUs are also set. This to done to keep
ioapic_handled_vectors synchronized.

This bitmap is then eventually passed on to
kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask() to generate a masked request
only for the target vCPUs.

This would enable us to reduce the latency overhead on isolated
vCPUs caused by the IPI to process due to KVM_REQ_IOAPIC_SCAN.

Suggested-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:22 +01:00
Aaron Lewis 662f1d1d19 KVM: nVMX: Add support for capturing highest observable L2 TSC
The L1 hypervisor may include the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR in the
vmcs12 MSR VM-exit MSR-store area as a way of determining the highest
TSC value that might have been observed by L2 prior to VM-exit. The
current implementation does not capture a very tight bound on this
value.  To tighten the bound, add the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR to the
vmcs02 VM-exit MSR-store area whenever it appears in the vmcs12 VM-exit
MSR-store area.  When L0 processes the vmcs12 VM-exit MSR-store area
during the emulation of an L2->L1 VM-exit, special-case the
IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR, using the value stored in the vmcs02
VM-exit MSR-store area to derive the value to be stored in the vmcs12
VM-exit MSR-store area.

Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:20 +01:00
Aaron Lewis ef0fbcac3f kvm: vmx: Rename function find_msr() to vmx_find_msr_index()
Rename function find_msr() to vmx_find_msr_index() in preparation for an
upcoming patch where we export it and use it in nested.c.

Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:20 +01:00
Aaron Lewis 7cfe0526fd kvm: vmx: Rename NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS to NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS
Rename NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS to NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS.  This needs to be done
due to the addition of the MSR-autostore area that will be added in a
future patch.  After that the name AUTOLOAD will no longer make sense.

Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:19 +01:00
Aaron Lewis 365d3d55d6 kvm: nested: Introduce read_and_check_msr_entry()
Add the function read_and_check_msr_entry() which just pulls some code
out of nested_vmx_store_msr().  This will be useful as reusable code in
upcoming patches.

Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:18 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini d4069dbeb5 KVM: nVMX: mark functions in the header as "static inline"
Correct a small inaccuracy in the shattering of vmx.c, which becomes
visible now that pmu_intel.c includes nested.h.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:17 +01:00
Oliver Upton 03a8871add KVM: nVMX: Expose load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL VM-{Entry,Exit} control
The "load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL" bit for VM-entry and VM-exit should
only be exposed to the guest if IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is a valid MSR.
Create a new helper to allow pmu_refresh() to update the VM-Entry and
VM-Exit controls to ensure PMU values are initialized when performing
the is_valid_msr() check.

Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:16 +01:00
Oliver Upton 71f7347025 KVM: nVMX: Load GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR on VM-Entry
Add condition to prepare_vmcs02 which loads IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on
VM-entry if the "load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL" bit on the VM-entry control
is set. Use SET_MSR_OR_WARN() rather than directly writing to the field
to avoid overwrite by atomic_switch_perf_msrs().

Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:16 +01:00
Oliver Upton 458151f65b KVM: nVMX: Use kvm_set_msr to load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on VM-Exit
The existing implementation for loading the IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR
on VM-exit was incorrect, as the next call to atomic_switch_perf_msrs()
could cause this value to be overwritten. Instead, call kvm_set_msr()
which will allow atomic_switch_perf_msrs() to correctly set the values.

Define a macro, SET_MSR_OR_WARN(), to set the MSR with kvm_set_msr()
and WARN on failure.

Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:15 +01:00
Oliver Upton c547cb6f78 KVM: nVMX: Check HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on VM-Entry
Add a consistency check on nested vm-entry for host's
IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL from vmcs12. Per Intel's SDM Vol 3 26.2.2:

  If the "load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL"
  VM-exit control is 1, bits reserved in the IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL
  MSR must be 0 in the field for that register"

Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:14 +01:00
Oliver Upton bfc6ad6ab3 KVM: nVMX: Check GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on VM-Entry
Add condition to nested_vmx_check_guest_state() to check the validity of
GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL. Per Intel's SDM Vol 3 26.3.1.1:

  If the "load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL" VM-entry control is 1, bits
  reserved in the IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR must be 0 in the field for that
  register.

Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:13 +01:00
Oliver Upton 9477f4449b KVM: VMX: Add helper to check reserved bits in IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL
Create a helper function to check the validity of a proposed value for
IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL from the existing check in intel_pmu_set_msr().

Per Intel's SDM, the reserved bits in IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL must be
cleared for the corresponding host/guest state fields.

Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:13 +01:00
Liran Alon 1924242b2a KVM: x86: Optimization: Requst TLB flush in fast_cr3_switch() instead of do it directly
When KVM emulates a nested VMEntry (L1->L2 VMEntry), it switches mmu root
page. If nEPT is used, this will happen from
kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu()->__kvm_mmu_new_cr3() and otherwise it will
happpen from nested_vmx_load_cr3()->kvm_mmu_new_cr3(). Either case,
__kvm_mmu_new_cr3() will use fast_cr3_switch() in attempt to switch to a
previously cached root page.

In case fast_cr3_switch() finds a matching cached root page, it will
set it in mmu->root_hpa and request KVM_REQ_LOAD_CR3 such that on
next entry to guest, KVM will set root HPA in appropriate hardware
fields (e.g. vmcs->eptp). In addition, fast_cr3_switch() calls
kvm_x86_ops->tlb_flush() in order to flush TLB as MMU root page
was replaced.

This works as mmu->root_hpa, which vmx_flush_tlb() use, was
already replaced in cached_root_available(). However, this may
result in unnecessary INVEPT execution because a KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH
may have already been requested. For example, by prepare_vmcs02()
in case L1 don't use VPID.

Therefore, change fast_cr3_switch() to just request TLB flush on
next entry to guest.

Reviewed-by: Bhavesh Davda <bhavesh.davda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:11 +01:00