Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.6:
API:
- Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert
blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher.
- Remove crypto_hash interface.
- Remove crypto_pcomp interface.
- Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers.
- Add akcipher documentation.
- Add skcipher documentation.
Algorithms:
- Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32.
- Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer.
Drivers:
- Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver.
- Add PIC32 hwrng driver.
- Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver.
- Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat.
- Use crypto engine in omap-aes.
- Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha.
- Make atmel-sha available again.
- Make sahara hashing available again.
- Make ccp hashing available again.
- Make sha1-mb available again.
- Add support for multiple devices in ccp.
- Improve DMA performance in caam.
- Add hashing support to rockchip"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits)
crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration
crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype
hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions
crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls
crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support
crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs
crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model
crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import
lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline"
lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning
hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility
crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode.
crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number
lib/mpi: Endianness fix
crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288
crypto: xts - fix compile errors
crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation
crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling
...
The setup_ntlmv2_rsp() function may return positive value ENOMEM instead
of -ENOMEM in case of kmalloc failure.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Linux cifs mount with ntlmssp against an Mac OS X (Yosemite
10.10.5) share fails in case the clocks differ more than +/-2h:
digest-service: digest-request: od failed with 2 proto=ntlmv2
digest-service: digest-request: kdc failed with -1561745592 proto=ntlmv2
Fix this by (re-)using the given server timestamp for the
ntlmv2 authentication (as Windows 7 does).
A related problem was also reported earlier by Namjae Jaen (see below):
Windows machine has extended security feature which refuse to allow
authentication when there is time difference between server time and
client time when ntlmv2 negotiation is used. This problem is prevalent
in embedded enviornment where system time is set to default 1970.
Modern servers send the server timestamp in the TargetInfo Av_Pair
structure in the challenge message [see MS-NLMP 2.2.2.1]
In [MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.2] it is explicitly mentioned that the client must
use the server provided timestamp if present OR current time if it is
not
Reported-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
remove impossible check
Pointed out by Coverity (CID 115422)
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
This allows directory listings to Mac to display filenames
correctly which have been created with illegal (to Windows)
characters in their filename. It does not allow
converting the other direction yet ie opening files with
these characters (followon patch).
There are seven reserved characters that need to be remapped when
mounting to Windows, Mac (or any server without Unix Extensions) which
are valid in POSIX but not in the other OS.
: \ < > ? * |
We used the normal UCS-2 remap range for this in order to convert this
to/from UTF8 as did Windows Services for Unix (basically add 0xF000 to
any of the 7 reserved characters), at least when the "mapchars" mount
option was specified.
Mac used a very slightly different "Services for Mac" remap range
0xF021 through 0xF027. The attached patch allows cifs.ko (the kernel
client) to read directories on macs containing files with these
characters and display their names properly. In theory this even
might be useful on mounts to Samba when the vfs_catia or new
"vfs_fruit" module is loaded.
Currently the 7 reserved characters look very strange in directory
listings from cifs.ko to Mac server. This patch allows these file
name characters to be read (requires specifying mapchars on mount).
Two additional changes are needed:
1) Make it more automatic: a way of detecting enough info so that
we know to try to always remap these characters or not. Various
have suggested that the SFM approach be made the default when
the server does not support POSIX Unix extensions (cifs mounts
to Samba for example) so need to make SFM remapping the default
unless mapchars (SFU style mapping) specified on mount or no
mapping explicitly requested or no mapping needed (cifs mounts to Samba).
2) Adding a patch to map the characters the other direction
(ie UTF-8 to UCS-2 on open). This patch does it for translating
readdir entries (ie UCS-2 to UTF-8)
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
A bit of cleanup plus some gratuitous variable renaming. I think using
structures instead of numeric offsets makes this code much more
understandable.
Also added a comment about current time range expected by
the server.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length
is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName'
length may be "255 + '\0'".
The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related
buffer enough to hold all things.
It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than
256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Updated patch to try to prevent allocation of cifs, smb2 or smb3 crypto
secmech structures unless needed. Currently cifs allocates all crypto
mechanisms when the first session is established (4 functions and
4 contexts), rather than only allocating these when needed (smb3 needs
two, the rest of the dialects only need one).
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
SMB3 uses a much faster method of signing (which is also better in other ways),
AES-CMAC. With the kernel now supporting AES-CMAC since last release, we
are overdue to allow SMB3 signing (today only CIFS and SMB2 and SMB2.1,
but not SMB3 and SMB3.1 can sign) - and we need this also for checking
secure negotation and also per-share encryption (two other new SMB3 features
which we need to implement).
This patch needs some work in a few areas - for example we need to
move signing for SMB2/SMB3 from per-socket to per-user (we may be able to
use the "nosharesock" mount option in the interim for the multiuser case),
and Shirish found a bug in the earlier authentication overhaul
(setting signing flags properly) - but those can be done in followon
patches.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
This is RH bug 970891
Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails
because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars.
Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage.
[To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed
this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated
by sparse -- steve f.]
Reported-by: steve <sanpatr1@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop
mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth.
Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype
a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on
a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response.
With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that
info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
It turns out that CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE == CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE, so this
memset doesn't do anything useful.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Currently, the signing routines take a pointer to a place to store the
expected sequence number for the mid response. It then stores a value
that's one below what that sequence number should be, and then adds one
to it when verifying the signature on the response.
Increment the sequence number before storing the value in the mid, and
eliminate the "+1" when checking the signature.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
It's not obvious from reading the macro names that these macros
are for debugging. Convert the names to a single more typical
kernel style cifs_dbg macro.
cERROR(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(VFS, ...)
cFYI(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(FYI, ...)
cFYI(DBG2, ...) -> cifs_dbg(NOISY, ...)
Move the terminating format newline from the macro to the call site.
Add CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG function cifs_vfs_err to emit the
"CIFS VFS: " prefix for VFS messages.
Size is reduced ~ 1% when CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is set (default y)
$ size fs/cifs/cifs.ko*
text data bss dec hex filename
265245 2525 132 267902 4167e fs/cifs/cifs.ko.new
268359 2525 132 271016 422a8 fs/cifs/cifs.ko.old
Other miscellaneous changes around these conversions:
o Miscellaneous typo fixes
o Add terminating \n's to almost all formats and remove them
from the macros to be more kernel style like. A few formats
previously had defective \n's
o Remove unnecessary OOM messages as kmalloc() calls dump_stack
o Coalesce formats to make grep easier,
added missing spaces when coalescing formats
o Use %s, __func__ instead of embedded function name
o Removed unnecessary "cifs: " prefixes
o Convert kzalloc with multiply to kcalloc
o Remove unused cifswarn macro
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Use the smb_send_rqst helper function to kmap each page in the array
and update the hash for that chunk.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
We need a way to represent a call to be sent on the wire that does not
require having all of the page data kmapped. Behold the smb_rqst struct.
This new struct represents an array of kvecs immediately followed by an
array of pages.
Convert the signing routines to use these structs under the hood and
turn the existing functions for this into wrappers around that. For now,
we're just changing these functions to take different args. Later, we'll
teach them how to deal with arrays of pages.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Use hmac-sha256 and rather than hmac-md5 that is used for CIFS/SMB.
Signature field in SMB2 header is 16 bytes instead of 8 bytes.
Automatically enable signing by client when requested by the server
when signing ability is available to the client.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
"smb2" makes me think of the SMB2.x protocol, which isn't at all what
this function is for...
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Those macros add a newline on their own, so there's not any need to
embed one in the message itself.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL
vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't.
Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that
all the callers check for that.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after
rebasing on 3.2.
Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according
to iocharset. Before this patch passwords would be treated as
raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible
(at least passwords with characters > 0xFF).
The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with
ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1. Software which
relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also
uses iocharset=iso8859-1. (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so
it will work as expected.)
Signed-off-by: Oskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Tested-by: A <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
We have two versions of signature generating code. A vectorized and
non-vectorized version. Eliminate a large chunk of cut-and-paste
code by turning the non-vectorized version into a wrapper around the
vectorized one.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Fix sec=ntlmv2/i authentication option during mount of Samba shares.
cifs client was coding ntlmv2 response incorrectly.
All that is needed in temp as specified in MS-NLMP seciton 3.3.2
"Define ComputeResponse(NegFlg, ResponseKeyNT, ResponseKeyLM,
CHALLENGE_MESSAGE.ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge, Time, ServerName)
as
Set temp to ConcatenationOf(Responserversion, HiResponserversion,
Z(6), Time, ClientChallenge, Z(4), ServerName, Z(4)"
is MsvAvNbDomainName.
For sec=ntlmsspi, build_av_pair is not used, a blob is plucked from
type 2 response sent by the server to use in authentication.
I tested sec=ntlmv2/i and sec=ntlmssp/i mount options against
Samba (3.6) and Windows - XP, 2003 Server and 7.
They all worked.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Sniffing traffic on the wire shows that windows clients send a zeroed
out signature field in a NEGOTIATE request, and send "BSRSPYL" in the
signature field during SESSION_SETUP. Make the cifs client behave the
same way.
It doesn't seem to make much difference in any server that I've tested
against, but it's probably best to follow windows behavior as closely as
possible here.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Check return codes of crypto api calls and either log an error or log
an error and return from the calling function with error.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
When signing is enabled, the first session that's established on a
socket will cause a printk like this to pop:
CIFS VFS: Unexpected SMB signature
This is because the key exchange hasn't happened yet, so the signature
field is bogus. Don't try to check the signature on the socket until the
first session has been established. Also, eliminate the specific check
for SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE since this check covers that case too.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
There is one big endian field in the cifs protocol, the RFC1001
length, which cifs code (unlike in the smb2 code) had been handling as
u32 until the last possible moment, when it was converted to be32 (its
native form) before sending on the wire. To remove the last sparse
endian warning, and to make this consistent with the smb2
implementation (which always treats the fields in their
native size and endianness), convert all uses of smb_buf_length to
be32.
This version incorporates Christoph's comment about
using be32_add_cpu, and fixes a typo in the second
version of the patch.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
local cifs functions (repost)
Using kernel crypto APIs for DES encryption during LM and NT hash generation
instead of local functions within cifs.
Source file smbdes.c is deleted sans four functions, one of which
uses ecb des functionality provided by kernel crypto APIs.
Remove function SMBOWFencrypt.
Add return codes to various functions such as calc_lanman_hash,
SMBencrypt, and SMBNTencrypt. Includes fix noticed by Dan Carpenter.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
CC: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
While testing my patchset to fix asynchronous writes, I hit a bunch
of signature problems when testing with signing on. The problem seems
to be that signature checks on receive can be running at the same
time as a process that is sending, or even that multiple receives can
be checking signatures at the same time, clobbering the same data
structures.
While we're at it, clean up the comments over cifs_calculate_signature
and add a note that the srv_mutex should be held when calling this
function.
This patch seems to fix the problems for me, but I'm not clear on
whether it's the best approach. If it is, then this should probably
go to stable too.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle
larger. Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name
string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure.
Also clean up old checkpatch warning.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Missed one change as per earlier suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Replaced md4 hashing function local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs.
As a result, md4 hashing function and its supporting functions in
file md4.c are not needed anymore.
Cleaned up function declarations, removed forward function declarations,
and removed a header file that is being deleted from being included.
Verified that sec=ntlm/i, sec=ntlmv2/i, and sec=ntlmssp/i work correctly.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Replace remaining use of md5 hash functions local to cifs module
with kernel crypto APIs.
Remove header and source file containing those local functions.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
The server->sequence_number is already protected by the srv_mutex. The
GlobalMid_lock is unneeded here.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Removed following fields from smb session structure
cryptkey, ntlmv2_hash, tilen, tiblob
and ntlmssp_auth structure is allocated dynamically only if the auth mech
in NTLMSSP.
response field within a session_key structure is used to initially store the
target info (either plucked from type 2 challenge packet in case of NTLMSSP
or fabricated in case of NTLMv2 without extended security) and then to store
Message Authentication Key (mak) (session key + client response).
Server challenge or cryptkey needed during a NTLMSSP authentication
is now part of ntlmssp_auth structure which gets allocated and freed
once authenticaiton process is done.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Need to have cryptkey or server challenge in smb connection
(struct TCP_Server_Info) for ntlm and ntlmv2 auth types for which
cryptkey (Encryption Key) is supplied just once in Negotiate Protocol
response during an smb connection setup for all the smb sessions over
that smb connection.
For ntlmssp, cryptkey or server challenge is provided for every
smb session in type 2 packet of ntlmssp negotiation, the cryptkey
provided during Negotiation Protocol response before smb connection
does not count.
Rename cryptKey to cryptkey and related changes.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Minor cleanup - Fix spelling mistake, make meaningful (goto) label
In function setup_ntlmv2_rsp(), do not return 0 and leak memory,
let the tiblob get freed.
For function find_domain_name(), pass already available nls table pointer
instead of loading and unloading the table again in this function.
For ntlmv2, the case sensitive password length is the length of the
response, so subtract session key length (16 bytes) from the .len.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Use kernel crypto sync hash apis insetead of cifs crypto functions.
The calls typically corrospond one to one except that insead of
key init, setkey is used.
Use crypto apis to generate smb signagtures also.
Use hmac-md5 to genereate ntlmv2 hash, ntlmv2 response, and HMAC (CR1 of
ntlmv2 auth blob.
User crypto apis to genereate signature and to verify signature.
md5 hash is used to calculate signature.
Use secondary key to calculate signature in case of ntlmssp.
For ntlmv2 within ntlmssp, during signature calculation, only 16 bytes key
(a nonce) stored within session key is used. during smb signature calculation.
For ntlm and ntlmv2 without extended security, 16 bytes key
as well as entire response (24 bytes in case of ntlm and variable length
in case of ntlmv2) is used for smb signature calculation.
For kerberos, there is no distinction between key and response.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig.
Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store
crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection
and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures.
Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective
contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established.
Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down.
md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used
throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that
calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc.
structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection.
ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of
secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key
field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp
negotiation/exchange
A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in
type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp
negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in
type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field.
The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using
ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4.
Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within
the server structure needs to be zero until session is established
i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first
smb session on that smb connection is sent.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Start calculating auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet
data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in
a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session
before copying session key and response over to server data
structures because a session setup can fail.
Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copy/make its
session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with
the smb connection throughout its life.
sequence_number within server is set to 0x2.
The authentication Message Authentication Key (mak) which consists
of session key followed by client response within structure session_key
is now dynamic. Every authentication type allocates the key + response
sized memory within its session structure and later either assigns or
frees it once the client response is sent and if session's session key
becomes connetion's session key.
ntlm/ntlmi authentication functions are rearranged. A function
named setup_ntlm_resp(), similar to setup_ntlmv2_resp(), replaces
function cifs_calculate_session_key().
size of CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE is changed to 16, to reflect the byte size
of the key it holds.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Start calculation auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet
data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in
a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session
before copying session key and response over to server data
structures because a session setup can fail.
Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copies/makes its
session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with
the smb connection throughout its life.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Build an av pair blob as part of ntlmv2 (without extended security) auth
request. Include netbios and dns names for domain and server and
a timestamp in the blob.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
find_domain_name() uses load_nls_default which takes a module reference
on the appropriate NLS module, but doesn't put it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Change name of variable mac_key to session key.
The reason mac_key was changed to session key is, this structure does not
hold message authentication code, it holds the session key (for ntlmv2,
ntlmv1 etc.). mac is generated as a signature in cifs_calc* functions.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Linus Torvalds