Commit Graph

138 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Heiko Carstens bdc480e3be [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 10
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:22 +01:00
Heiko Carstens 6673e0c3fb [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrapper special cases
System calls with an unsigned long long argument can't be converted with
the standard wrappers since that would include a cast to long, which in
turn means that we would lose the upper 32 bit on 32 bit architectures.
Also semctl can't use the standard wrapper since it has a 'union'
parameter.

So we handle them as special case and add some extra wrappers instead.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:18 +01:00
Al Viro acfa4380ef inode->i_op is never NULL
We used to have rather schizophrenic set of checks for NULL ->i_op even
though it had been eliminated years ago.  You'd need to go out of your
way to set it to NULL explicitly _and_ a bunch of code would die on
such inodes anyway.  After killing two remaining places that still
did that bogosity, all that crap can go away.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-05 11:54:28 -05:00
Kentaro Takeda be6d3e56a6 introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks.  Call them on directory-modifying
operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-31 18:07:37 -05:00
David Howells d84f4f992c CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
David Howells 745ca2475a CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.

The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:22 +11:00
David Howells b6dff3ec5e CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11:00
David Howells 1cdcbec1a3 CRED: Neuter sys_capset()
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.

This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.

This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:

 (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.

 (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:14 +11:00
Al Viro aeb5d72706 [PATCH] introduce fmode_t, do annotations
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-10-21 07:47:06 -04:00
Alan Cox 2cb5998b5f tty: the vhangup syscall is racy
We now have the infrastructure to sort this out but rather than teaching
the syscall tty lock rules we move the hard work into a tty helper

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-13 09:51:41 -07:00
Al Viro 1027abe882 [PATCH] merge locate_fd() and get_unused_fd()
New primitive: alloc_fd(start, flags).  get_unused_fd() and
get_unused_fd_flags() become wrappers on top of it.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-01 11:25:23 -04:00
Al Viro 4e1e018ecc [PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling
* dup2() should return -EBADF on exceeded sysctl_nr_open
* dup() should *not* return -EINVAL even if you have rlimit set to 0;
  it should get -EMFILE instead.

Check for orig_start exceeding rlimit taken to sys_fcntl().
Failing expand_files() in dup{2,3}() now gets -EMFILE remapped to -EBADF.
Consequently, remaining checks for rlimit are taken to expand_files().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:45 -04:00
Al Viro 2d8f30380a [PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.
* do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want.
* switch to new helpers:
	user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path)
	user_path(pathname, &path)
	user_lpath(pathname, &path)
	user_path_dir(pathname, &path)  (fail if not a directory)
  The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one.
* remove nameidata in callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:34 -04:00
Al Viro 256984a838 [PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanup
Almost all users __user_walk_fd() and friends care only about struct path.
Get rid of the few that do not.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:32 -04:00
Al Viro 30524472c2 [PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that care
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:30 -04:00
Miklos Szeredi beb29e058c [patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanup
Move the immutable and append-only checks from chmod, chown and utimes
into notify_change().  Checks for immutable and append-only files are
always performed by the VFS and not by the filesystem (see
permission() and may_...() in namei.c), so these belong in
notify_change(), and not in inode_change_ok().

This should be completely equivalent.

CC: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
CC: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:28 -04:00
Al Viro a110343f0d [PATCH] fix MAY_CHDIR/MAY_ACCESS/LOOKUP_ACCESS mess
* MAY_CHDIR is redundant - it's an equivalent of MAY_ACCESS
* MAY_ACCESS on fuse should affect only the last step of pathname resolution
* fchdir() and chroot() should pass MAY_ACCESS, for the same reason why
  chdir() needs that.
* now that we pass MAY_ACCESS explicitly in all cases, LOOKUP_ACCESS can be
  removed; it has no business being in nameidata.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:21 -04:00
Al Viro 7f2da1e7d0 [PATCH] kill altroot
long overdue...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:20 -04:00
Al Viro 8bb79224b8 [PATCH] permission checks for chdir need special treatment only on the last step
... so we ought to pass MAY_CHDIR to vfs_permission() instead of having
it triggered on every step of preceding pathname resolution.  LOOKUP_CHDIR
is killed by that.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:19 -04:00
Miklos Szeredi c82e42da8a [patch 1/5] vfs: truncate: dont check immutable twice
vfs_permission(MAY_WRITE) already checked for the inode being
immutable, so no need to repeat it.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2008-07-26 20:53:15 -04:00
Jon Tollefson f4a67cceee fs: check for statfs overflow
Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is
checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that
it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0.

Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 10:47:19 -07:00
Andrew G. Morgan 086f7316f0 security: filesystem capabilities: fix fragile setuid fixup code
This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the
case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()).  The effect
of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing
securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is
configured.)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-04 10:40:08 -07:00
Al Viro 9f3acc3140 [PATCH] split linux/file.h
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-05-01 13:08:16 -04:00
Nick Piggin 70688e4dd1 xip: support non-struct page backed memory
Convert XIP to support non-struct page backed memory, using VM_MIXEDMAP for
the user mappings.

This requires the get_xip_page API to be changed to an address based one.
Improve the API layering a little bit too, while we're here.

This is required in order to support XIP filesystems on memory that isn't
backed with struct page (but memory with struct page is still supported too).

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Acked-by: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:23 -07:00
Dave Hansen ad775f5a8f [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: debugging for missed calls
There have been a few oopses caused by 'struct file's with NULL f_vfsmnts.
There was also a set of potentially missed mnt_want_write()s from
dentry_open() calls.

This patch provides a very simple debugging framework to catch these kinds of
bugs.  It will WARN_ON() them, but should stop us from having any oopses or
mnt_writer count imbalances.

I'm quite convinced that this is a good thing because it found bugs in the
stuff I was working on as soon as I wrote it.

[hch: made it conditional on a debug option.
      But it's still a little bit too ugly]

[hch: merged forced remount r/o fix from Dave and akpm's fix for the fix]

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:28 -04:00
Dave Hansen 2f676cbc0d [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: make access() use new r/o helper
It is OK to let access() go without using a mnt_want/drop_write() pair because
it doesn't actually do writes to the filesystem, and it is inherently racy
anyway.  This is a rare case when it is OK to use __mnt_is_readonly()
directly.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:26 -04:00
Dave Hansen 9ac9b8474c [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: write counts for truncate()
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:25 -04:00
Dave Hansen 2af482a7ed [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: elevate write count for chmod/chown callers
chown/chmod,etc...  don't call permission in the same way that the normal
"open for write" calls do.  They still write to the filesystem, so bump the
write count during these operations.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:25 -04:00
Dave Hansen 4a3fd211cc [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: elevate write count for open()s
This is the first really tricky patch in the series.  It elevates the writer
count on a mount each time a non-special file is opened for write.

We used to do this in may_open(), but Miklos pointed out that __dentry_open()
is used as well to create filps.  This will cover even those cases, while a
call in may_open() would not have.

There is also an elevated count around the vfs_create() call in open_namei().
See the comments for more details, but we need this to fix a 'create, remount,
fail r/w open()' race.

Some filesystems forego the use of normal vfs calls to create
struct files.   Make sure that these users elevate the mnt
writer count because they will get __fput(), and we need
to make sure they're balanced.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:25 -04:00
Christoph Hellwig a70e65df88 [PATCH] merge open_namei() and do_filp_open()
open_namei() will, in the future, need to take mount write counts
over its creation and truncation (via may_open()) operations.  It
needs to keep these write counts until any potential filp that is
created gets __fput()'d.

This gets complicated in the error handling and becomes very murky
as to how far open_namei() actually got, and whether or not that
mount write count was taken.  That makes it a bad interface.

All that the current do_filp_open() really does is allocate the
nameidata on the stack, then call open_namei().

So, this merges those two functions and moves filp_open() over
to namei.c so it can be close to its buddy: do_filp_open().  It
also gets a kerneldoc comment in the process.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:25:32 -04:00
Dave Hansen d57999e152 [PATCH] do namei_flags calculation inside open_namei()
My end goal here is to make sure all users of may_open()
return filps.  This will ensure that we properly release
mount write counts which were taken for the filp in
may_open().

This patch moves the sys_open flags to namei flags
calculation into fs/namei.c.  We'll shortly be moving
the nameidata_to_filp() calls into namei.c, and this
gets the sys_open flags to a place where we can get
at them when we need them.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:25:31 -04:00
Roland McGrath 54a0151041 asmlinkage_protect replaces prevent_tail_call
The prevent_tail_call() macro works around the problem of the compiler
clobbering argument words on the stack, which for asmlinkage functions
is the caller's (user's) struct pt_regs.  The tail/sibling-call
optimization is not the only way that the compiler can decide to use
stack argument words as scratch space, which we have to prevent.
Other optimizations can do it too.

Until we have new compiler support to make "asmlinkage" binding on the
compiler's own use of the stack argument frame, we have work around all
the manifestations of this issue that crop up.

More cases seem to be prevented by also keeping the incoming argument
variables live at the end of the function.  This makes their original
stack slots attractive places to leave those variables, so the compiler
tends not clobber them for something else.  It's still no guarantee, but
it handles some observed cases that prevent_tail_call() did not.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-10 17:28:26 -07:00
Christoph Hellwig 322ee5b36e [PATCH] check for null vfsmount in dentry_open()
Make sure no-one calls dentry_open with a NULL vfsmount argument and crap
out with a stacktrace otherwise.  A NULL file->f_vfsmnt has always been
problematic, but with the per-mount r/o tracking we can't accept anymore
at all.

[AV] the last place that passed NULL had been eliminated by the previous
patch (reiserfs xattr stuff)

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-03-19 06:50:44 -04:00
Jan Blunck ac748a09fc Make set_fs_{root,pwd} take a struct path
In nearly all cases the set_fs_{root,pwd}() calls work on a struct
path. Change the function to reflect this and use path_get() here.

Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14 21:13:33 -08:00
Jan Blunck 1d957f9bf8 Introduce path_put()
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
  vfsmount of a struct path in the right order

* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path)

* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14 21:13:33 -08:00
Jan Blunck 4ac9137858 Embed a struct path into struct nameidata instead of nd->{dentry,mnt}
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.

Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
  <dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
  struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:

without patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5321639  858418  715768 6895825  6938d1 vmlinux

with patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5320026  858418  715768 6894212  693284 vmlinux

This patch:

Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14 21:13:33 -08:00
Arjan van de Ven 3287629eff remove the unused exports of sys_open/sys_read
These exports (which aren't used and which are in fact dangerous to use
because they pretty much form a security hole to use) have been marked
_UNUSED since 2.6.24 with removal in 2.6.25.  This patch is their final
departure from the Linux kernel tree.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 09:22:36 -08:00
Harvey Harrison fc9b52cd8f fs: remove fastcall, it is always empty
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 09:22:31 -08:00
Arjan van de Ven cb51f973bc mark sys_open/sys_read exports unused
sys_open / sys_read were used in the early 1.2 days to load firmware from
disk inside drivers.  Since 2.0 or so this was deprecated behavior, but
several drivers still were using this.  Since a few years we have a
request_firmware() API that implements this in a nice, consistent way.
Only some old ISA sound drivers (pre-ALSA) still straggled along for some
time....  however with commit c2b1239a9f the
last user is now gone.

This is a good thing, since using sys_open / sys_read etc for firmware is a
very buggy to dangerous thing to do; these operations put an fd in the
process file descriptor table....  which then can be tampered with from
other threads for example.  For those who don't want the firmware loader,
filp_open()/vfs_read are the better APIs to use, without this security
issue.

The patch below marks sys_open and sys_read unused now that they're
really not used anymore, and for deletion in the 2.6.25 timeframe.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-14 18:45:42 -08:00
Al Viro 5a190ae697 [PATCH] pass dentry to audit_inode()/audit_inode_child()
makes caller simpler *and* allows to scan ancestors

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2007-10-21 02:37:18 -04:00
Serge E. Hallyn b53767719b Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.

This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

Changelog:
	Nov 27:
	Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
	(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
	security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
	Fix Kconfig dependency.
	Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.

	Nov 13:
	Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
	capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.

	Nov 13:
	Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
	Dobriyan.

	Nov 09:
	Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
	when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
	up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
	function.

	Nov 08:
	For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
	them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

	Nov 07:
	Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
	check_cap_sanity().

	Nov 07:
	Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
	capabilities are the default.
	Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
	Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
	audit messages.

	Nov 05:
	Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
	task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
	cap support can be stacked.

	Sep 05:
	As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
	for capability code.

	Sep 01:
	Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
	task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
	they called a program with some fscaps.

	One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
	ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
	cpuset?

	It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
	allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since
	it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
	CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
	fixing it might be tough.

	     task_setscheduler
		 note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with
		     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
	     task_setioprio
	     task_setnice
		 sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
		 process.  Need same checks as setrlimit

	Aug 21:
	Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
	euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
	might still have elevated caps.

	Aug 15:
	Handle endianness of xattrs.
	Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
	Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
	set, else return -EPERM.
	With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
	doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
	d_instantiate.

	Aug 10:
	Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
	caching it at d_instantiate.

[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Alan Cox a9c62a18a2 fs: correct SuS compliance for open of large file without options
The early LFS work that Linux uses favours EFBIG in various places. SuSv3
specifically uses EOVERFLOW for this as noted by Michael (Bug 7253)

[EOVERFLOW]
    The named file is a regular file and the size of the file cannot be
represented correctly in an object of type off_t. We should therefore
transition to the proper error return code

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:43:01 -07:00
Yuichi Nakamura 788e7dd4c2 SELinux: Improve read/write performance
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check.  A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.

(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)

Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-10-17 08:59:31 +10:00
david m. richter 9700382c3c VFS: fix a race in lease-breaking during truncate
It is possible that another process could acquire a new file lease right
after break_lease() is called during a truncate, but before lease-granting
is disabled by the subsequent get_write_access().  Merely switching the
order of the break_lease() and get_write_access() calls prevents this race.

Signed-off-by: David M. Richter <richterd@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-31 15:39:42 -07:00
Ulrich Drepper 0d786d4a27 fallocate syscall interface deficiency
The fallocate syscall returns ENOSYS in case the filesystem does not support
the operation and expects the userlevel code to fill in.  This is good in
concept.

The problem is that the libc code for old kernels should be able to
distinguish the case where the syscall is not at all available vs not
functioning for a specific mount point.  As is this is not possible and we
always have to invoke the syscall even if the kernel doesn't support it.

I suggest the following patch.  Using EOPNOTSUPP is IMO the right thing to do.

Cc: Amit Arora <aarora@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-24 12:24:58 -07:00
Amit Arora 97ac73506c sys_fallocate() implementation on i386, x86_64 and powerpc
fallocate() is a new system call being proposed here which will allow
applications to preallocate space to any file(s) in a file system.
Each file system implementation that wants to use this feature will need
to support an inode operation called ->fallocate().
Applications can use this feature to avoid fragmentation to certain
level and thus get faster access speed. With preallocation, applications
also get a guarantee of space for particular file(s) - even if later the
the system becomes full.

Currently, glibc provides an interface called posix_fallocate() which
can be used for similar cause. Though this has the advantage of working
on all file systems, but it is quite slow (since it writes zeroes to
each block that has to be preallocated). Without a doubt, file systems
can do this more efficiently within the kernel, by implementing
the proposed fallocate() system call. It is expected that
posix_fallocate() will be modified to call this new system call first
and incase the kernel/filesystem does not implement it, it should fall
back to the current implementation of writing zeroes to the new blocks.
ToDos:
1. Implementation on other architectures (other than i386, x86_64,
   and ppc). Patches for s390(x) and ia64 are already available from
   previous posts, but it was decided that they should be added later
   once fallocate is in the mainline. Hence not including those patches
   in this take.
2. Changes to glibc,
   a) to support fallocate() system call
   b) to make posix_fallocate() and posix_fallocate64() call fallocate()

Signed-off-by: Amit Arora <aarora@in.ibm.com>
2007-07-17 21:42:44 -04:00
Ulrich Drepper 4a19542e5f O_CLOEXEC for SCM_RIGHTS
Part two in the O_CLOEXEC saga: adding support for file descriptors received
through Unix domain sockets.

The patch is once again pretty minimal, it introduces a new flag for recvmsg
and passes it just like the existing MSG_CMSG_COMPAT flag.  I think this bit
is not used otherwise but the networking people will know better.

This new flag is not recognized by recvfrom and recv.  These functions cannot
be used for that purpose and the asymmetry this introduces is not worse than
the already existing MSG_CMSG_COMPAT situations.

The patch must be applied on the patch which introduced O_CLOEXEC.  It has to
remove static from the new get_unused_fd_flags function but since scm.c cannot
live in a module the function still hasn't to be exported.

Here's a test program to make sure the code works.  It's so much longer than
the actual patch...

#include <errno.h>
#include <error.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>

#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
# define O_CLOEXEC 02000000
#endif
#ifndef MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC
# define MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC 0x40000000
#endif

int
main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
  if (argc > 1)
    {
      int fd = atol (argv[1]);
      printf ("child: fd = %d\n", fd);
      if (fcntl (fd, F_GETFD) == 0 || errno != EBADF)
        {
          puts ("file descriptor valid in child");
          return 1;
        }
      return 0;

    }

  struct sockaddr_un sun;
  strcpy (sun.sun_path, "./testsocket");
  sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX;

  char databuf[] = "hello";
  struct iovec iov[1];
  iov[0].iov_base = databuf;
  iov[0].iov_len = sizeof (databuf);

  union
  {
    struct cmsghdr hdr;
    char bytes[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (int))];
  } buf;
  struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = iov, .msg_iovlen = 1,
                        .msg_control = buf.bytes,
                        .msg_controllen = sizeof (buf) };
  struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg);

  cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
  cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
  cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN (sizeof (int));

  msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;

  pid_t child = fork ();
  if (child == -1)
    error (1, errno, "fork");
  if (child == 0)
    {
      int sock = socket (PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
      if (sock < 0)
        error (1, errno, "socket");

      if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sun, sizeof (sun)) < 0)
        error (1, errno, "bind");
      if (listen (sock, SOMAXCONN) < 0)
        error (1, errno, "listen");

      int conn = accept (sock, NULL, NULL);
      if (conn == -1)
        error (1, errno, "accept");

      *(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg) = sock;
      if (sendmsg (conn, &msg, MSG_NOSIGNAL) < 0)
        error (1, errno, "sendmsg");

      return 0;
    }

  /* For a test suite this should be more robust like a
     barrier in shared memory.  */
  sleep (1);

  int sock = socket (PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
  if (sock < 0)
    error (1, errno, "socket");

  if (connect (sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sun, sizeof (sun)) < 0)
    error (1, errno, "connect");
  unlink (sun.sun_path);

  *(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg) = -1;

  if (recvmsg (sock, &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) < 0)
    error (1, errno, "recvmsg");

  int fd = *(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg);
  if (fd == -1)
    error (1, 0, "no descriptor received");

  char fdname[20];
  snprintf (fdname, sizeof (fdname), "%d", fd);
  execl ("/proc/self/exe", argv[0], fdname, NULL);
  puts ("execl failed");
  return 1;
}

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: Fix fastcall inconsistency noted by Michael Buesch]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 09:05:45 -07:00
Ulrich Drepper f23513e8d9 Introduce O_CLOEXEC
The problem is as follows: in multi-threaded code (or more correctly: all
code using clone() with CLONE_FILES) we have a race when exec'ing.

   thread #1                       thread #2

   fd=open()

                                   fork + exec

  fcntl(fd,F_SETFD,FD_CLOEXEC)

In some applications this can happen frequently.  Take a web browser.  One
thread opens a file and another thread starts, say, an external PDF viewer.
 The result can even be a security issue if that open file descriptor
refers to a sensitive file and the external program can somehow be tricked
into using that descriptor.

Just adding O_CLOEXEC support to open() doesn't solve the whole set of
problems.  There are other ways to create file descriptors (socket,
epoll_create, Unix domain socket transfer, etc).  These can and should be
addressed separately though.  open() is such an easy case that it makes not
much sense putting the fix off.

The test program:

#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
# define O_CLOEXEC 02000000
#endif

int
main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
  int fd;
  if (argc > 1)
    {
      fd = atol (argv[1]);
      printf ("child: fd = %d\n", fd);
      if (fcntl (fd, F_GETFD) == 0 || errno != EBADF)
        {
          puts ("file descriptor valid in child");
          return 1;
        }
      return 0;
    }

  fd = open ("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
  printf ("in parent: new fd = %d\n", fd);
  char buf[20];
  snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%d", fd);
  execl ("/proc/self/exe", argv[0], buf, NULL);
  puts ("execl failed");
  return 1;
}

[kyle@parisc-linux.org: parisc fix]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@parisc-linux.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 09:05:45 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 7b82dc0e64 Remove suid/sgid bits on [f]truncate()
.. to match what we do on write().  This way, people who write to files
by using [f]truncate + writable mmap have the same semantics as if they
were using the write() family of system calls.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 20:10:00 -07:00
Randy Dunlap e63340ae6b header cleaning: don't include smp_lock.h when not used
Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.

Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 11:15:07 -07:00
Vadim Lobanov bbea9f6966 [PATCH] fdtable: Make fdarray and fdsets equal in size
Currently, each fdtable supports three dynamically-sized arrays of data: the
fdarray and two fdsets.  The code allows the number of fds supported by the
fdarray (fdtable->max_fds) to differ from the number of fds supported by each
of the fdsets (fdtable->max_fdset).

In practice, it is wasteful for these two sizes to differ: whenever we hit a
limit on the smaller-capacity structure, we will reallocate the entire fdtable
and all the dynamic arrays within it, so any delta in the memory used by the
larger-capacity structure will never be touched at all.

Rather than hogging this excess, we shouldn't even allocate it in the first
place, and keep the capacities of the fdarray and the fdsets equal.  This
patch removes fdtable->max_fdset.  As an added bonus, most of the supporting
code becomes simpler.

Signed-off-by: Vadim Lobanov <vlobanov@speakeasy.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-10 09:57:22 -08:00
Josef "Jeff" Sipek 0f7fc9e4d0 [PATCH] VFS: change struct file to use struct path
This patch changes struct file to use struct path instead of having
independent pointers to struct dentry and struct vfsmount, and converts all
users of f_{dentry,vfsmnt} in fs/ to use f_path.{dentry,mnt}.

Additionally, it adds two #define's to make the transition easier for users of
the f_dentry and f_vfsmnt.

Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:41 -08:00
Peter Zijlstra 24ec839c43 [PATCH] tty: ->signal->tty locking
Fix the locking of signal->tty.

Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used
by most other members of ->signal/->sighand.  And unless we are 'current'
or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway.

(NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules)

Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding
tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid.  Otherwise the lifetime of ttys
are governed by their open file handles.  This leaves some holes for tty
access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access).

It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing.

(NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to
       be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think
       it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info
       invocations)

[schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:38 -08:00
Dave Hansen 6902d925d5 [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: prepare for write access checks: collapse if()
We're shortly going to be adding a bunch more permission checks in these
functions.  That requires adding either a bunch of new if() conditions, or
some gotos.  This patch collapses existing if()s and uses gotos instead to
prepare for the upcoming changes.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 00:39:30 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan 82b0547cfa [PATCH] Create fs/utimes.c
* fs/open.c is getting bit crowdy
* preparation to lutimes(2)

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 00:39:19 -07:00
Ernie Petrides ee731f4f78 [PATCH] fix wrong error code on interrupted close syscalls
The problem is that close() syscalls can call a file system's flush
handler, which in turn might sleep interruptibly and ultimately pass back
an -ERESTARTSYS return value.  This happens for files backed by an
interruptible NFS mount under nfs_file_flush() when a large file has just
been written and nfs_wait_bit_interruptible() detects that there is a
signal pending.

I have a test case where the "strace" command is used to attach to a
process sleeping in such a close().  Since the SIGSTOP is forced onto the
victim process (removing it from the thread's "blocked" mask in
force_sig_info()), the RPC wait is interrupted and the close() is
terminated early.

But the file table entry has already been cleared before the flush handler
was called.  Thus, when the syscall is restarted, the file descriptor
appears closed and an EBADF error is returned (which is wrong).  What's
worse, there is the hypothetical case where another thread of a
multi-threaded application might have reused the file descriptor, in which
case that file would be mistakenly closed.

The bottom line is that close() syscalls are not restartable, and thus
-ERESTARTSYS return values should be mapped to -EINTR.  This is consistent
with the close(2) manual page.  The fix is below.

Signed-off-by: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:13 -07:00
Miklos Szeredi 650a898342 [PATCH] vfs: define new lookup flag for chdir
In the "operation does permission checking" model used by fuse, chdir
permission is not checked, since there's no chdir method.

For this case set a lookup flag, which will be passed to ->permission(), so
fuse can distinguish it from permission checks for other operations.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:08 -07:00
Peter Staubach 6e656be899 [PATCH] ftruncate does not always update m/ctime
In the course of trying to track down a bug where a file mtime was not
being updated correctly, it was discovered that the m/ctime updates were
not quite being handled correctly for ftruncate() calls.

Quoth SUSv3:

open(2):

        If O_TRUNC is set and the file did previously exist, upon
        successful completion, open() shall mark for update the st_ctime
        and st_mtime fields of the file.

truncate(2):

        Upon successful completion, if the file size is changed, this
        function shall mark for update the st_ctime and st_mtime fields
        of the file, and the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits of the file mode
        may be cleared.

ftruncate(2):

        Upon successful completion, if fildes refers to a regular file,
        the ftruncate() function shall mark for update the st_ctime and
        st_mtime fields of the file and the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits of
        the file mode may be cleared. If the ftruncate() function is
        unsuccessful, the file is unaffected.

The open(O_TRUNC) and truncate cases were being handled correctly, but the
ftruncate case was being handled like the truncate case.  The semantics of
truncate and ftruncate don't quite match, so ftruncate needs to be handled
slightly differently.

The attached patch addresses this issue for ftruncate(2).

My thanx to Stephen Tweedie and Trond Myklebust for their help in
understanding the situation and semantics.

Signed-off-by: Peter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com>
Cc: "Stephen C. Tweedie" <sct@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-25 10:01:15 -07:00
Miklos Szeredi 75e1fcc0b1 [PATCH] vfs: add lock owner argument to flush operation
Pass the POSIX lock owner ID to the flush operation.

This is useful for filesystems which don't want to store any locking state
in inode->i_flock but want to handle locking/unlocking POSIX locks
internally.  FUSE is one such filesystem but I think it possible that some
network filesystems would need this also.

Also add a flag to indicate that a POSIX locking request was generated by
close(), so filesystems using the above feature won't send an extra locking
request in this case.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 07:43:02 -07:00
David Howells 726c334223 [PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to perform statfs with a known root dentry
Give the statfs superblock operation a dentry pointer rather than a superblock
pointer.

This complements the get_sb() patch.  That reduced the significance of
sb->s_root, allowing NFS to place a fake root there.  However, NFS does
require a dentry to use as a target for the statfs operation.  This permits
the root in the vfsmount to be used instead.

linux/mount.h has been added where necessary to make allyesconfig build
successfully.

Interest has also been expressed for use with the FUSE and XFS filesystems.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 07:42:45 -07:00
Amy Griffis 9c937dcc71 [PATCH] log more info for directory entry change events
When an audit event involves changes to a directory entry, include
a PATH record for the directory itself.  A few other notable changes:

    - fixed audit_inode_child() hooks in fsnotify_move()
    - removed unused flags arg from audit_inode()
    - added audit log routines for logging a portion of a string

Here's some sample output.

before patch:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1149821605.320:26): arch=40000003 syscall=39 success=yes exit=0 a0=bf8d3c7c a1=1ff a2=804e1b8 a3=bf8d3c7c items=1 ppid=739 pid=800 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c255
type=CWD msg=audit(1149821605.320:26):  cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1149821605.320:26): item=0 name="foo" parent=164068 inode=164010 dev=03:00 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=root:object_r:user_home_t:s0

after patch:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1149822032.332:24): arch=40000003 syscall=39 success=yes exit=0 a0=bfdd9c7c a1=1ff a2=804e1b8 a3=bfdd9c7c items=2 ppid=714 pid=777 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c255
type=CWD msg=audit(1149822032.332:24):  cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1149822032.332:24): item=0 name="/root" inode=164068 dev=03:00 mode=040750 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=root:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0
type=PATH msg=audit(1149822032.332:24): item=1 name="foo" inode=164010 dev=03:00 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=root:object_r:user_home_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-06-20 05:25:28 -04:00
Adrian Bunk 6aff5cb8ec [PATCH] fs/open.c: unexport sys_openat
Remove the unused EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sys_openat).

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-05-15 11:20:54 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 385910f2b2 x86: be careful about tailcall breakage for sys_open[at] too
Came up through a quick grep for other cases similar to the ftruncate()
one in commit 0a489cb3b6.

Also, add a comment, so that people who read the code understand why we
do what looks like a no-op.

(Again, this won't actually matter to any sane user, since libc will
save and restore the register gcc stomps on, but it's still wrong to
stomp on it)

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-04-18 13:22:59 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 0a489cb3b6 x86: don't allow tail-calls in sys_ftruncate[64]()
Gcc thinks it owns the incoming argument stack, but that's not true for
"asmlinkage" functions, and it corrupts the caller-set-up argument stack
when it pushes the third argument onto the stack.  Which can result in
%ebx getting corrupted in user space.

Now, normally nobody sane would ever notice, since libc will save and
restore %ebx anyway over the system call, but it's still wrong.

I'd much rather have "asmlinkage" tell gcc directly that it doesn't own
the stack, but no such attribute exists, so we're stuck with our hacky
manual "prevent_tail_call()" macro once more (we've had the same issue
before with sys_waitpid() and sys_wait4()).

Thanks to Hans-Werner Hilse <hilse@sub.uni-goettingen.de> for reporting
the issue and testing the fix.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-04-18 13:02:48 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 1b9a391736 Merge branch 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current
* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
  [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
  [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
  [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
  [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
  [PATCH] Fix audit operators
  [PATCH] promiscuous mode
  [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
  [PATCH] add/remove rule update
  [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
  [PATCH] SE Linux audit events
  [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
  [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
  [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
  [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
  [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
  [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
  [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
  [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
  [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
  [PATCH] Filter rule comparators
  ...

Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
2006-03-25 09:24:53 -08:00
Oleg Drokin 9a56c21392 [PATCH] Add lookup_instantiate_filp usage warning
I think it would be nice to put an usage warning in header of
lookup_instantiate_filp() to indicate it is unsafe to use it on anything
but regular files (even that is potentially unsafe, but there your ->open()
is usually in your hands anyway), so that others won't fall into the same
trap I did.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-25 08:22:51 -08:00
Eric Dumazet 0c9e63fd38 [PATCH] Shrinks sizeof(files_struct) and better layout
1) Reduce the size of (struct fdtable) to exactly 64 bytes on 32bits
   platforms, lowering kmalloc() allocated space by 50%.

2) Reduce the size of (files_struct), using a special 32 bits (or
   64bits) embedded_fd_set, instead of a 1024 bits fd_set for the
   close_on_exec_init and open_fds_init fields.  This save some ram (248
   bytes per task) as most tasks dont open more than 32 files.  D-Cache
   footprint for such tasks is also reduced to the minimum.

3) Reduce size of allocated fdset.  Currently two full pages are
   allocated, that is 32768 bits on x86 for example, and way too much.  The
   minimum is now L1_CACHE_BYTES.

UP and SMP should benefit from this patch, because most tasks will touch
only one cache line when open()/close() stdin/stdout/stderr (0/1/2),
(next_fd, close_on_exec_init, open_fds_init, fd_array[0 ..  2] being in the
same cache line)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-23 07:38:09 -08:00
Amy Griffis 73241ccca0 [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
This patch augments the collection of inode info during syscall
processing. It represents part of the functionality that was provided
by the auditfs patch included in RHEL4.

Specifically, it:

- Collects information for target inodes created or removed during
  syscalls.  Previous code only collects information for the target
  inode's parent.

- Adds the audit_inode() hook to syscalls that operate on a file
  descriptor (e.g. fchown), enabling audit to do inode filtering for
  these calls.

- Modifies filtering code to check audit context for either an inode #
  or a parent inode # matching a given rule.

- Modifies logging to provide inode # for both parent and child.

- Protect debug info from NULL audit_names.name.

[AV: folded a later typo fix from the same author]

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-03-20 14:08:53 -05:00
Ulrich Drepper 5590ff0d55 [PATCH] vfs: *at functions: core
Here is a series of patches which introduce in total 13 new system calls
which take a file descriptor/filename pair instead of a single file
name.  These functions, openat etc, have been discussed on numerous
occasions.  They are needed to implement race-free filesystem traversal,
they are necessary to implement a virtual per-thread current working
directory (think multi-threaded backup software), etc.

We have in glibc today implementations of the interfaces which use the
/proc/self/fd magic.  But this code is rather expensive.  Here are some
results (similar to what Jim Meyering posted before).

The test creates a deep directory hierarchy on a tmpfs filesystem.  Then
rm -fr is used to remove all directories.  Without syscall support I get
this:

real    0m31.921s
user    0m0.688s
sys     0m31.234s

With syscall support the results are much better:

real    0m20.699s
user    0m0.536s
sys     0m20.149s

The interfaces are for obvious reasons currently not much used.  But they'll
be used.  coreutils (and Jeff's posixutils) are already using them.
Furthermore, code like ftw/fts in libc (maybe even glob) will also start using
them.  I expect a patch to make follow soon.  Every program which is walking
the filesystem tree will benefit.

Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-18 19:20:29 -08:00
Randy Dunlap 16f7e0fe2e [PATCH] capable/capability.h (fs/)
fs: Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Acked-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-11 18:42:13 -08:00
Jes Sorensen 1b1dcc1b57 [PATCH] mutex subsystem, semaphore to mutex: VFS, ->i_sem
This patch converts the inode semaphore to a mutex. I have tested it on
XFS and compiled as much as one can consider on an ia64. Anyway your
luck with it might be different.

Modified-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

(finished the conversion)

Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2006-01-09 15:59:24 -08:00
Matt Mackall b01ec0ef63 [PATCH] tiny: Uninline some open.c functions
uninline some open.c functions

add/remove: 3/0 grow/shrink: 0/6 up/down: 679/-1166 (-487)
function                                     old     new   delta
do_sys_truncate                                -     336    +336
do_sys_ftruncate                               -     317    +317
__put_unused_fd                                -      26     +26
put_unused_fd                                 57      49      -8
sys_close                                    150     119     -31
sys_ftruncate64                              260      26    -234
sys_ftruncate                                272      24    -248
sys_truncate                                 339      25    -314
sys_truncate64                               336       5    -331

Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 20:14:10 -08:00
NeilBrown 4a30131e7d [PATCH] Fix some problems with truncate and mtime semantics.
SUS requires that when truncating a file to the size that it currently
is:
  truncate and ftruncate should NOT modify ctime or mtime
  O_TRUNC SHOULD modify ctime and mtime.

Currently mtime and ctime are always modified on most local
filesystems (side effect of ->truncate) or never modified (on NFS).

With this patch:
  ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_MTIME are sent with ATTR_SIZE precisely when
    an update of these times is required whether size changes or not
    (via a new argument to do_truncate).  This allows NFS to do
    the right thing for O_TRUNC.
  inode_setattr nolonger forces ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME when the ATTR_SIZE
    sets the size to it's current value.  This allows local filesystems
    to do the right thing for f?truncate.

Also, the logic in inode_setattr is changed a bit so there are two return
points.  One returns the error from vmtruncate if it failed, the other
returns 0 (there can be no other failure).

Finally, if vmtruncate succeeds, and ATTR_SIZE is the only change
requested, we now fall-through and mark_inode_dirty.  If a filesystem did
not have a ->truncate function, then vmtruncate will have changed i_size,
without marking the inode as 'dirty', and I think this is wrong.

Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 20:13:52 -08:00
Christoph Hellwig 8c744fb83d [PATCH] add a file_permission helper
A few more callers of permission() just want to check for a different access
pattern on an already open file.  This patch adds a wrapper for permission()
that takes a file in preparation of per-mount read-only support and to clean
up the callers a little.  The helper is not intended for new code, everything
without the interface set in stone should use vfs_permission()

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-11-09 07:55:59 -08:00
Christoph Hellwig e4543eddfd [PATCH] add a vfs_permission helper
Most permission() calls have a struct nameidata * available.  This helper
takes that as an argument and thus makes sure we pass it down for lookup
intents and prepares for per-mount read-only support where we need a struct
vfsmount for checking whether a file is writeable.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-11-09 07:55:58 -08:00
Miklos Szeredi cc4e69dee4 [PATCH] VFS: pass file pointer to filesystem from ftruncate()
This patch extends the iattr structure with a file pointer memeber, and adds
an ATTR_FILE validity flag for this member.

This is set if do_truncate() is invoked from ftruncate() or from
do_coredump().

The change is source and binary compatible.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-11-07 07:53:42 -08:00
Peter Staubach 6fdcc21622 [PATCH] memory leak in dentry_open()
There is a memory leak possible in dentry_open().  If get_empty_filp()
fails, then the references to dentry and mnt need to be released.  The
attached patch adds the calls to dput() and mntput() to release these two
references.

Signed-off-by: Peter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-11-07 07:53:39 -08:00
Trond Myklebust 834f2a4a15 VFS: Allow the filesystem to return a full file pointer on open intent
This is needed by NFSv4 for atomicity reasons: our open command is in
 fact a lookup+open, so we need to be able to propagate open context
 information from lookup() into the resulting struct file's
 private_data field.

 Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2005-10-18 14:20:16 -07:00
Peter Staubach a1a5b3d93c [PATCH] open returns ENFILE but creates file anyway
When open(O_CREAT) is called and the error, ENFILE, is returned, the file
may be created anyway.  This is counter intuitive, against the SUS V3
specification, and may cause applications to misbehave if they are not
coded correctly to handle this semantic.  The SUS V3 specification
explicitly states "No files shall be created or modified if the function
returns -1.".

The error, ENFILE, is used to indicate the system wide open file table is
full and no more file structs can be allocated.

This is due to an ordering problem.  The entry in the directory is created
before the file struct is allocated.  If the allocation for the file struct
fails, then the system call must return an error, but the directory entry
was already created and can not be safely removed.

The solution to this situation is relatively easy.  The file struct should
be allocated before the directory entry is created.  If the allocation
fails, then the error can be returned directly.  If the creation of the
directory entry fails, then the file struct can be easily freed.

Signed-off-by: Peter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-13 08:22:28 -07:00
Dipankar Sarma ab2af1f500 [PATCH] files: files struct with RCU
Patch to eliminate struct files_struct.file_lock spinlock on the reader side
and use rcu refcounting rcuref_xxx api for the f_count refcounter.  The
updates to the fdtable are done by allocating a new fdtable structure and
setting files->fdt to point to the new structure.  The fdtable structure is
protected by RCU thereby allowing lock-free lookup.  For fd arrays/sets that
are vmalloced, we use keventd to free them since RCU callbacks can't sleep.  A
global list of fdtable to be freed is not scalable, so we use a per-cpu list.
If keventd is already handling the current cpu's work, we use a timer to defer
queueing of that work.

Since the last publication, this patch has been re-written to avoid using
explicit memory barriers and use rcu_assign_pointer(), rcu_dereference()
premitives instead.  This required that the fd information is kept in a
separate structure (fdtable) and updated atomically.

Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:57:55 -07:00
Dipankar Sarma badf16621c [PATCH] files: break up files struct
In order for the RCU to work, the file table array, sets and their sizes must
be updated atomically.  Instead of ensuring this through too many memory
barriers, we put the arrays and their sizes in a separate structure.  This
patch takes the first step of putting the file table elements in a separate
structure fdtable that is embedded withing files_struct.  It also changes all
the users to refer to the file table using files_fdtable() macro.  Subsequent
applciation of RCU becomes easier after this.

Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:57:55 -07:00
Miklos Szeredi e922efc342 [PATCH] remove duplicated sys_open32() code from 64bit archs
64 bit architectures all implement their own compatibility sys_open(),
when in fact the difference is simply not forcing the O_LARGEFILE
flag.  So use the a common function instead.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-07 16:57:43 -07:00
Robert Love 0eeca28300 [PATCH] inotify
inotify is intended to correct the deficiencies of dnotify, particularly
its inability to scale and its terrible user interface:

        * dnotify requires the opening of one fd per each directory
          that you intend to watch. This quickly results in too many
          open files and pins removable media, preventing unmount.
        * dnotify is directory-based. You only learn about changes to
          directories. Sure, a change to a file in a directory affects
          the directory, but you are then forced to keep a cache of
          stat structures.
        * dnotify's interface to user-space is awful.  Signals?

inotify provides a more usable, simple, powerful solution to file change
notification:

        * inotify's interface is a system call that returns a fd, not SIGIO.
	  You get a single fd, which is select()-able.
        * inotify has an event that says "the filesystem that the item
          you were watching is on was unmounted."
        * inotify can watch directories or files.

Inotify is currently used by Beagle (a desktop search infrastructure),
Gamin (a FAM replacement), and other projects.

See Documentation/filesystems/inotify.txt.

Signed-off-by: Robert Love <rml@novell.com>
Cc: John McCutchan <ttb@tentacle.dhs.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-07-12 20:38:38 -07:00
Carsten Otte ceffc07852 [PATCH] xip: fs/mm: execute in place
- generic_file* file operations do no longer have a xip/non-xip split
- filemap_xip.c implements a new set of fops that require get_xip_page
  aop to work proper. all new fops are exported GPL-only (don't like to
  see whatever code use those except GPL modules)
- __xip_unmap now uses page_check_address, which is no longer static
  in rmap.c, and defined in linux/rmap.h
- mm/filemap.h is now much more clean, plainly having just Linus'
  inline funcs moved here from filemap.c
- fix includes in filemap_xip to make it build cleanly on i386

Signed-off-by: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 00:06:41 -07:00
Telemaque Ndizihiwe fed2fc18a4 [PATCH] sys_open() cleanup
Clean up tortured logic in sys_open().

Signed-off-by: Telemaque Ndizihiwe <telendiz@eircom.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 09:45:36 -07:00
Christoph Lameter 45778ca819 [PATCH] Remove f_error field from struct file
The following patch removes the f_error field and all checks of f_error.

Trond said:

  f_error was introduced for NFS, and made sense when we were guaranteed
  always to have a file pointer around when write errors occurred.  Since
  then, we have (for various reasons) had to introduce the nfs_open_context in
  order to track the file read/write state, and it made sense to move our
  f_error tracking there too.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <christoph@lameter.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 09:45:33 -07:00
Yoav Zach ef3daeda7b [PATCH] Don't force O_LARGEFILE for 32 bit processes on ia64
In ia64 kernel, the O_LARGEFILE flag is forced when opening a file.  This
is problematic for execution of 32 bit processes, which are not largefile
aware, either by SW emulation or by HW execution.

For such processes, the problem is two-fold:

1) When trying to open a file that is larger than 4G
   the operation should fail, but it's not
2) Writing to offset larger than 4G should fail, but
   it's not

The proposed patch takes advantage of the way 32 bit processes are
identified in ia64 systems.  Such processes have PER_LINUX32 for their
personality.  With the patch, the ia64 kernel will not enforce the
O_LARGEFILE flag if the current process has PER_LINUX32 set.  The behavior
for all other architectures remains unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Yoav Zach <yoav.zach@intel.com>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 09:45:28 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00