State recovery currently relies on being able to find a valid
nfs_open_context in the inode->open_files list.
We therefore need to put the nfs_open_context on the list while
we're still protected by the sp->so_reclaim_seqcount in order
to avoid reboot races.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
All the callers have an open_context at this point, and since we always
need one in order to do state recovery, it makes sense to use it as the
basis for the nfs4_do_open() call.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Use the EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID exchange_id flag to enable
stateid protection. This means that if we create a stateid using a
particular principal, then we must use the same principal if we
want to change that state.
IOW: if we OPEN a file using a particular credential, then we have
to use the same credential in subsequent OPEN_DOWNGRADE, CLOSE,
or DELEGRETURN operations that use that stateid.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This is not strictly needed, since get_deviceinfo is not allowed to
return NFS4ERR_ACCESS or NFS4ERR_WRONG_CRED, but lets do it anyway
for consistency with other pNFS operations.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We want to use the same credential for reclaim_complete as we used
for the exchange_id call.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We need to use the same credential as was used for the layoutget
and/or layoutcommit operations.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> reports:
> I have a kvm-based testing setup that netboots VMs over NFS, the
> client end of which seems to have broken somehow in 3.10-rc1. The
> server's exports file looks like this:
>
> /storage/mtr/x64 192.168.122.0/24(ro,sync,no_root_squash,no_subtree_check)
>
> On the client end (inside the VM), the initrd runs the following
> command to try to mount the rootfs over NFS:
>
> # mount -o nolock -o ro -o retrans=10 192.168.122.1:/storage/mtr/x64/ /root
>
> (Note: This is the busybox mount command.)
>
> The mount fails with -EINVAL.
Commit 4580a92d44 "NFS: Use server-recommended security flavor by
default (NFSv3)" introduced a behavior regression for NFS mounts
done via a legacy binary mount(2) call.
Ensure that a default security flavor is specified for legacy binary
mount requests, since they do not invoke nfs_select_flavor() in the
kernel.
Busybox uses klibc's nfsmount command, which performs NFS mounts
using the legacy binary mount data format. /sbin/mount.nfs is not
affected by this regression.
Reported-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We need to pass the full open mode flags to nfs_may_open() when doing
a delegated open.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Commit 79d852bf "NFS: Retry SETCLIENTID with AUTH_SYS instead of
AUTH_NONE" did not take into account commit 23631227 "NFSv4: Fix the
fallback to AUTH_NULL if krb5i is not available".
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Currently there is no way to truncate partial page where the end
truncate point is not at the end of the page. This is because it was not
needed and the functionality was enough for file system truncate
operation to work properly. However more file systems now support punch
hole feature and it can benefit from mm supporting truncating page just
up to the certain point.
Specifically, with this functionality truncate_inode_pages_range() can
be changed so it supports truncating partial page at the end of the
range (currently it will BUG_ON() if 'end' is not at the end of the
page).
This commit changes the invalidatepage() address space operation
prototype to accept range to be invalidated and update all the instances
for it.
We also change the block_invalidatepage() in the same way and actually
make a use of the new length argument implementing range invalidation.
Actual file system implementations will follow except the file systems
where the changes are really simple and should not change the behaviour
in any way .Implementation for truncate_page_range() which will be able
to accept page unaligned ranges will follow as well.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
On a CB_RECALL the callback service thread flushes the inode using
filemap_flush prior to scheduling the state manager thread to return the
delegation. When pNFS is used and I/O has not yet gone to the data server
servicing the inode, a LAYOUTGET can preceed the I/O. Unlike the async
filemap_flush call, the LAYOUTGET must proceed to completion.
If the state manager starts to recover data while the inode flush is sending
the LAYOUTGET, a deadlock occurs as the callback service thread holds the
single callback session slot until the flushing is done which blocks the state
manager thread, and the state manager thread has set the session draining bit
which puts the inode flush LAYOUTGET RPC to sleep on the forechannel slot
table waitq.
Separate the draining of the back channel from the draining of the fore channel
by moving the NFS4_SESSION_DRAINING bit from session scope into the fore
and back slot tables. Drain the back channel first allowing the LAYOUTGET
call to proceed (and fail) so the callback service thread frees the callback
slot. Then proceed with draining the forechannel.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
NFS calls the freezable helpers with locks held, which is unsafe
and will cause lockdep warnings when 6aa9707 "lockdep: check
that no locks held at freeze time" is reapplied (it was reverted
in dbf520a). NFS shouldn't be doing this, but it has
long-running syscalls that must hold a lock but also shouldn't
block suspend. Until NFS freeze handling is rewritten to use a
signal to exit out of the critical section, add new *_unsafe
versions of the helpers that will not run the lockdep test when
6aa9707 is reapplied, and call them from NFS.
In practice the likley result of holding the lock while freezing
is that a second task blocked on the lock will never freeze,
aborting suspend, but it is possible to manufacture a case using
the cgroup freezer, the lock, and the suspend freezer to create
a deadlock. Silencing the lockdep warning here will allow
problems to be found in other drivers that may have a more
serious deadlock risk, and prevent new problems from being added.
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
- Ensure that we match the 'sec=' mount flavour against the server list
- Fix the NFSv4 byte range locking in the presence of delegations
- Ensure that we conform to the NFSv4.1 spec w.r.t. freeing lock stateids
- Fix a pNFS data server connection race
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.10-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull more NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
- Ensure that we match the 'sec=' mount flavour against the server list
- Fix the NFSv4 byte range locking in the presence of delegations
- Ensure that we conform to the NFSv4.1 spec w.r.t. freeing lock
stateids
- Fix a pNFS data server connection race
* tag 'nfs-for-3.10-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
NFS4.1 Fix data server connection race
NFSv3: match sec= flavor against server list
NFSv4.1: Ensure that we free the lock stateid on the server
NFSv4: Convert nfs41_free_stateid to use an asynchronous RPC call
SUNRPC: Don't spam syslog with "Pseudoflavor not found" messages
NFSv4.x: Fix handling of partially delegated locks
Unlike meta data server mounts which support multiple mount points to
the same server via struct nfs_server, data servers support a single connection.
Concurrent calls to setup the data server connection can race where the first
call allocates the nfs_client struct, and before the cache struct nfs_client
pointer can be set, a second call also tries to setup the connection, finds the
already allocated nfs_client, bumps the reference count, re-initializes the
session,etc. This results in a hanging data server session after umount.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
same story as with the previous patches - note that return
value of blkdev_close() is lost, since there's nowhere the
caller (__fput()) could return it to.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Older linux clients match the 'sec=' mount option flavor against the server's
flavor list (if available) and return EPERM if the specified flavor or AUTH_NULL
(which "matches" any flavor) is not found.
Recent changes skip this step and allow the vfs mount even though no operations
will succeed, creating a 'dud' mount.
This patch reverts back to the old behavior of matching specified flavors
against the server list and also returns EPERM when no sec= is specified and
none of the flavors returned by the server are supported by the client.
Example of behavior change:
the server's /etc/exports:
/export/krb5 *(sec=krb5,rw,no_root_squash)
old client behavior:
$ uname -a
Linux one.apikia.fake 3.8.8-202.fc18.x86_64 #1 SMP Wed Apr 17 23:25:17 UTC 2013 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
$ sudo mount -v -o sec=sys,vers=3 zero:/export/krb5 /mnt
mount.nfs: timeout set for Sun May 5 17:32:04 2013
mount.nfs: trying text-based options 'sec=sys,vers=3,addr=192.168.100.10'
mount.nfs: prog 100003, trying vers=3, prot=6
mount.nfs: trying 192.168.100.10 prog 100003 vers 3 prot TCP port 2049
mount.nfs: prog 100005, trying vers=3, prot=17
mount.nfs: trying 192.168.100.10 prog 100005 vers 3 prot UDP port 20048
mount.nfs: mount(2): Permission denied
mount.nfs: access denied by server while mounting zero:/export/krb5
recently changed behavior:
$ uname -a
Linux one.apikia.fake 3.9.0-testing+ #2 SMP Fri May 3 20:29:32 EDT 2013 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
$ sudo mount -v -o sec=sys,vers=3 zero:/export/krb5 /mnt
mount.nfs: timeout set for Sun May 5 17:37:17 2013
mount.nfs: trying text-based options 'sec=sys,vers=3,addr=192.168.100.10'
mount.nfs: prog 100003, trying vers=3, prot=6
mount.nfs: trying 192.168.100.10 prog 100003 vers 3 prot TCP port 2049
mount.nfs: prog 100005, trying vers=3, prot=17
mount.nfs: trying 192.168.100.10 prog 100005 vers 3 prot UDP port 20048
$ ls /mnt
ls: cannot open directory /mnt: Permission denied
$ sudo ls /mnt
ls: cannot open directory /mnt: Permission denied
$ sudo df /mnt
df: ‘/mnt’: Permission denied
df: no file systems processed
$ sudo umount /mnt
$
Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This ensures that the server doesn't need to keep huge numbers of
lock stateids waiting around for the final CLOSE.
See section 8.2.4 in RFC5661.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The main reason for doing this is will be to allow for an asynchronous
RPC mode that we can use for freeing lock stateids as per section
8.2.4 of RFC5661.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If a NFS client receives a delegation for a file after it has taken
a lock on that file, we can currently end up in a situation where
we mistakenly skip unlocking that file.
The following patch swaps an erroneous check in nfs4_proc_unlck for
whether or not the file has a delegation to one which checks whether
or not we hold a lock stateid for that file.
Reported-by: Chuck Lever <Chuck.Lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.7]
Tested-by: Chuck Lever <Chuck.Lever@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"Just some minor updates across the subsystem"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement()
TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files
tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C)
char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes
Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c
selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch
seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions.
Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir()
Smack: add support for modification of existing rules
smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h
Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm()
Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
- NLM: stable fix for NFSv2/v3 blocking locks
- NFSv4.x: stable fixes for the delegation recall error handling code
- NFSv4.x: Security flavour negotiation fixes and cleanups by Chuck Lever
- SUNRPC: A number of RPCSEC_GSS fixes and cleanups also from Chuck
- NFSv4.x assorted state management and reboot recovery bugfixes
- NFSv4.1: In cases where we have already looked up a file, and hold a
valid filehandle, use the new open-by-filehandle operation instead of
opening by name.
- Allow the NFSv4.1 callback thread to freeze
- NFSv4.x: ensure that file unlock waits for readahead to complete
- NFSv4.1: ensure that the RPC layer doesn't override the NFS session
table size negotiation by limiting the number of slots.
- NFSv4.x: Fix SETATTR spec compatibility issues
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.10-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull NFS client bugfixes and cleanups from Trond Myklebust:
- NLM: stable fix for NFSv2/v3 blocking locks
- NFSv4.x: stable fixes for the delegation recall error handling code
- NFSv4.x: Security flavour negotiation fixes and cleanups by Chuck
Lever
- SUNRPC: A number of RPCSEC_GSS fixes and cleanups also from Chuck
- NFSv4.x assorted state management and reboot recovery bugfixes
- NFSv4.1: In cases where we have already looked up a file, and hold a
valid filehandle, use the new open-by-filehandle operation instead of
opening by name.
- Allow the NFSv4.1 callback thread to freeze
- NFSv4.x: ensure that file unlock waits for readahead to complete
- NFSv4.1: ensure that the RPC layer doesn't override the NFS session
table size negotiation by limiting the number of slots.
- NFSv4.x: Fix SETATTR spec compatibility issues
* tag 'nfs-for-3.10-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (67 commits)
NFSv4: Warn once about servers that incorrectly apply open mode to setattr
NFSv4: Servers should only check SETATTR stateid open mode on size change
NFSv4: Don't recheck permissions on open in case of recovery cached open
NFSv4.1: Don't do a delegated open for NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_DELEG_CUR_FH modes
NFSv4.1: Use the more efficient open_noattr call for open-by-filehandle
NFS: Retry SETCLIENTID with AUTH_SYS instead of AUTH_NONE
NFSv4: Ensure that we clear the NFS_OPEN_STATE flag when appropriate
LOCKD: Ensure that nlmclnt_block resets block->b_status after a server reboot
NFSv4: Ensure the LOCK call cannot use the delegation stateid
NFSv4: Use the open stateid if the delegation has the wrong mode
nfs: Send atime and mtime as a 64bit value
NFSv4: Record the OPEN create mode used in the nfs4_opendata structure
NFSv4.1: Set the RPC_CLNT_CREATE_INFINITE_SLOTS flag for NFSv4.1 transports
SUNRPC: Allow rpc_create() to request that TCP slots be unlimited
SUNRPC: Fix a livelock problem in the xprt->backlog queue
NFSv4: Fix handling of revoked delegations by setattr
NFSv4 release the sequence id in the return on close case
nfs: remove unnecessary check for NULL inode->i_flock from nfs_delegation_claim_locks
NFS: Ensure that NFS file unlock waits for readahead to complete
NFS: Add functionality to allow waiting on all outstanding reads to complete
...
Debugging aid to help identify servers that incorrectly apply open mode
checks to setattr requests that are not changing the file size.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The NFSv4 and NFSv4.1 specs are both clear that the server should only check
stateid open mode if a SETATTR specifies the size attribute. If the
open mode is not one that allows writing, then it returns NFS4ERR_OPENMODE.
In the case where the SETATTR is not changing the size, the client will
still pass it the delegation stateid to ensure that the server does not
recall that delegation. In that case, the server should _ignore_ the
delegation open mode, and simply apply standard permission checks.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* rpcsec_gss-from_cel: (21 commits)
NFS: Retry SETCLIENTID with AUTH_SYS instead of AUTH_NONE
NFSv4: Don't clear the machine cred when client establish returns EACCES
NFSv4: Fix issues in nfs4_discover_server_trunking
NFSv4: Fix the fallback to AUTH_NULL if krb5i is not available
NFS: Use server-recommended security flavor by default (NFSv3)
SUNRPC: Don't recognize RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR
NFS: Use "krb5i" to establish NFSv4 state whenever possible
NFS: Try AUTH_UNIX when PUTROOTFH gets NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC
NFS: Use static list of security flavors during root FH lookup recovery
NFS: Avoid PUTROOTFH when managing leases
NFS: Clean up nfs4_proc_get_rootfh
NFS: Handle missing rpc.gssd when looking up root FH
SUNRPC: Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() from GSS mech switch
SUNRPC: Make gss_mech_get() static
SUNRPC: Refactor nfsd4_do_encode_secinfo()
SUNRPC: Consider qop when looking up pseudoflavors
SUNRPC: Load GSS kernel module by OID
SUNRPC: Introduce rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor()
SUNRPC: Define rpcsec_gss_info structure
NFS: Remove unneeded forward declaration
...
If we already checked the user access permissions on the original open,
then don't bother checking again on recovery. Doing so can cause a
deadlock with NFSv4.1, since the may_open() operation is not privileged.
Furthermore, we can't report an access permission failure here anyway.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
When we're doing open-by-filehandle in NFSv4.1, we shouldn't need to
do the cache consistency revalidation on the directory. It is
therefore more efficient to just use open_noattr, which returns the
file attributes, but not the directory attributes.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Recently I changed the SETCLIENTID code to use AUTH_GSS(krb5i), and
then retry with AUTH_NONE if that didn't work. This was to enable
Kerberos NFS mounts to work without forcing Linux NFS clients to
have a keytab on hand.
Rick Macklem reports that the FreeBSD server accepts AUTH_NONE only
for NULL operations (thus certainly not for SETCLIENTID). Falling
back to AUTH_NONE means our proposed 3.10 NFS client will not
interoperate with FreeBSD servers over NFSv4 unless Kerberos is
fully configured on both ends.
If the Linux client falls back to using AUTH_SYS instead for
SETCLIENTID, all should work fine as long as the NFS server is
configured to allow AUTH_SYS for SETCLIENTID.
This may still prevent access to Kerberos-only FreeBSD servers by
Linux clients with no keytab. Rick is of the opinion that the
security settings the server applies to its pseudo-fs should also
apply to the SETCLIENTID operation.
Linux and Solaris NFS servers do not place that limitation on
SETCLIENTID. The security settings for the server's pseudo-fs are
determined automatically as the union of security flavors allowed on
real exports, as recommended by RFC 3530bis; and the flavors allowed
for SETCLIENTID are all flavors supported by the respective server
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We should always clear it before initiating file recovery.
Also ensure that we clear it after a CLOSE and/or after TEST_STATEID fails.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Defensive patch to ensure that we copy the state->open_stateid, which
can never be set to the delegation stateid.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Fix nfs4_select_rw_stateid() so that it chooses the open stateid
(or an all-zero stateid) if the delegation does not match the selected
read/write mode.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
RFC 3530 says that the seconds value of a nfstime4 structure is a 64bit
value, but we are instead sending a 32-bit 0 and then a 32bit conversion
of the 64bit Linux value. This means that if we try to set atime to a
value before the epoch (touch -t 196001010101) the client will only send
part of the new value due to lost precision.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If we're doing NFSv4.1 against a server that has persistent sessions,
then we should not need to call SETATTR in order to reset the file
attributes immediately after doing an exclusive create.
Note that since the create mode depends on the type of session that
has been negotiated with the server, we should not choose the
mode until after we've got a session slot.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Currently, _nfs4_do_setattr() will use the delegation stateid if no
writeable open file stateid is available.
If the server revokes that delegation stateid, then the call to
nfs4_handle_exception() will fail to handle the error due to the
lack of a struct nfs4_state, and will just convert the error into
an EIO.
This patch just removes the requirement that we must have a
struct nfs4_state in order to invalidate the delegation and
retry.
Reported-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Otherwise we deadlock if state recovery is initiated while we
sleep.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The second check was added in commit 65b62a29 but it will never be true.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
- Fix a brain fart in nfs41_walk_client_list
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.9-5' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull another nfs fixlet from Trond Myklebust:
"I suddenly noticed that a one-line issue that I _thought_ I had fixed
with the nfs41_walk_client_list patch was apparently still there in
the pull request I sent earlier today. I'm very sorry for not
catching that in time.
- Fix a brain fart in nfs41_walk_client_list"
* tag 'nfs-for-3.9-5' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
NFSv4: Doh! Typo in the fix to nfs41_walk_client_list
Make sure that we set the status to 0 on success. Missed in testing
because it never appears when doing multiple mounts to _different_
servers.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7.x: 7b1f1fd: NFSv4/4.1: Fix bugs in nfs4[01]_walk_client_list
- Stable fix for memory corruption issues in nfs4[01]_walk_client_list
- Stable fix for an Oopsable bug in rpc_clone_client
- Another state manager deadlock in the NFSv4 open code
- Memory leaks in nfs4_discover_server_trunking and rpc_new_client
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.9-4' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
- fix for memory corruption issues in nfs4[01]_walk_client_list (stable)
- fix for an Oopsable bug in rpc_clone_client (stable)
- another state manager deadlock in the NFSv4 open code
- memory leaks in nfs4_discover_server_trunking and rpc_new_client
* tag 'nfs-for-3.9-4' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
NFSv4: Fix another potential state manager deadlock
SUNRPC: Fix a potential memory leak in rpc_new_client
NFSv4/4.1: Fix bugs in nfs4[01]_walk_client_list
NFSv4: Fix a memory leak in nfs4_discover_server_trunking
SUNRPC: Remove extra xprt_put()
Don't hold the NFSv4 sequence id while we check for open permission.
The call to ACCESS may block due to reboot recovery.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This will later allow NFS locking code to wait for readahead to complete
before releasing byte range locks.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
When we send a RENEW or SEQUENCE operation in order to probe if the
lease is still valid, we want it to be able to time out since the
lease we are probing is likely to time out too. Currently, because
we use soft mount semantics for these RPC calls, the return value
is EIO, which causes the state manager to exit with an "unhandled
error" message.
This patch changes the call semantics, so that the RPC layer returns
ETIMEDOUT instead of EIO. We then have the state manager default to
a simple retry instead of exiting.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the state manager thread is already running, we may end up
racing with it in nfs_client_return_marked_delegations. Better to
just allow the state manager thread to do the job.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Currently, if the application that holds the file open isn't doing
I/O, we may end up returning the delegation. This means that we can
no longer cache the file as aggressively, and often also that we
multiply the state that both the server and the client needs to track.
This patch adds a check for open files to the routine that scans
for delegations that are unreferenced.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
All error cases are handled by the switch() statement, meaning that the
call to nfs4_handle_exception() is unreachable.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
A server shouldn't normally return NFS4ERR_GRACE if the client holds a
delegation, since no conflicting lock reclaims can be granted, however
the spec does not require the server to grant the open in this
instance
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
A server shouldn't normally return NFS4ERR_GRACE if the client holds a
delegation, since no conflicting lock reclaims can be granted, however
the spec does not require the server to grant the lock in this
instance.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The v4.1 callback thread has set_freezable() at the top, but it doesn't
ever try to freeze within the loop. Have it call try_to_freeze() at the
top of the loop. If a freeze event occurs, recheck kthread_should_stop()
after thawing.
Reported-by: Yanchuan Nian <ycnian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
It is unsafe to use list_for_each_entry_safe() here, because
when we drop the nn->nfs_client_lock, we pin the _current_ list
entry and ensure that it stays in the list, but we don't do the
same for the _next_ list entry. Use of list_for_each_entry() is
therefore the correct thing to do.
Also fix the refcounting in nfs41_walk_client_list().
Finally, ensure that the nfs_client has finished being initialised
and, in the case of NFSv4.1, that the session is set up.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>= 3.7]
When we assign a new rpc_client to clp->cl_rpcclient, we need to destroy
the old one.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.7]
The expected behaviour is that the client will decide at mount time
whether or not to use a krb5i machine cred, or AUTH_NULL.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
- Ensure that we exit with ENOENT if the call to ops->get_clid_cred()
fails.
- Handle the case where ops->detect_trunking() exits with an
unexpected error, and return EIO.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the rpcsec_gss_krb5 module cannot be loaded, the attempt to create
an rpc_client in nfs4_init_client will currently fail with an EINVAL.
Fix is to retry with AUTH_NULL.
Regression introduced by the commit "NFS: Use "krb5i" to establish NFSv4
state whenever possible"
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Since commit ec88f28d in 2009, checking if the user-specified flavor
is in the server's flavor list has been the source of a few
noticeable regressions (now fixed), but there is one that is still
vexing.
An NFS server can list AUTH_NULL in its flavor list, which suggests
a client should try to mount the server with the flavor of the
client's choice, but the server will squash all accesses. In some
cases, our client fails to mount a server because of this check,
when the mount could have proceeded successfully.
Skip this check if the user has specified "sec=" on the mount
command line. But do consult the server-provided flavor list to
choose a security flavor if no sec= option is specified on the mount
command.
If a server lists Kerberos pseudoflavors before "sys" in its export
options, our client now chooses Kerberos over AUTH_UNIX for mount
points, when no security flavor is specified by the mount command.
This could be surprising to some administrators or users, who would
then need to have Kerberos credentials to access the export.
Or, a client administrator may not have enabled rpc.gssd. In this
case, auth_rpcgss.ko might still be loadable, which is enough for
the new logic to choose Kerberos over AUTH_UNIX. But the mount
would fail since no GSS context can be created without rpc.gssd
running.
To retain the use of AUTH_UNIX by default:
o The server administrator can ensure that "sys" is listed before
Kerberos flavors in its export security options (see
exports(5)),
o The client administrator can explicitly specify "sec=sys" on
its mount command line (see nfs(5)),
o The client administrator can use "Sec=sys" in an appropriate
section of /etc/nfsmount.conf (see nfsmount.conf(5)), or
o The client administrator can blacklist auth_rpcgss.ko.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:
# mount server:/export /mnt/test1
# mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
# ls -dZ /mnt/test1
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1
# ls -dZ /mnt/test2
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2
When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.
This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.
Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.
For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:
# mount server:/ /mnt/test1
# mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified
...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.
OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:
# cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
-bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy
The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Currently our client uses AUTH_UNIX for state management on Kerberos
NFS mounts in some cases. For example, if the first mount of a
server specifies "sec=sys," the SETCLIENTID operation is performed
with AUTH_UNIX. Subsequent mounts using stronger security flavors
can not change the flavor used for lease establishment. This might
be less security than an administrator was expecting.
Dave Noveck's migration issues draft recommends the use of an
integrity-protecting security flavor for the SETCLIENTID operation.
Let's ignore the mount's sec= setting and use krb5i as the default
security flavor for SETCLIENTID.
If our client can't establish a GSS context (eg. because it doesn't
have a keytab or the server doesn't support Kerberos) we fall back
to using AUTH_NULL. For an operation that requires a
machine credential (which never represents a particular user)
AUTH_NULL is as secure as AUTH_UNIX.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Most NFSv4 servers implement AUTH_UNIX, and administrators will
prefer this over AUTH_NULL. It is harmless for our client to try
this flavor in addition to the flavors mandated by RFC 3530/5661.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the Linux NFS client receives an NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC error while
trying to look up an NFS server's root file handle, it retries the
lookup operation with various security flavors to see what flavor
the NFS server will accept for pseudo-fs access.
The list of flavors the client uses during retry consists only of
flavors that are currently registered in the kernel RPC client.
This list may not include any GSS pseudoflavors if auth_rpcgss.ko
has not yet been loaded.
Let's instead use a static list of security flavors that the NFS
standard requires the server to implement (RFC 3530bis, section
3.2.1). The RPC client should now be able to load support for
these dynamically; if not, they are skipped.
Recovery behavior here is prescribed by RFC 3530bis, section
15.33.5:
> For LOOKUPP, PUTROOTFH and PUTPUBFH, the client will be unable to
> use the SECINFO operation since SECINFO requires a current
> filehandle and none exist for these two [sic] operations. Therefore,
> the client must iterate through the security triples available at
> the client and reattempt the PUTROOTFH or PUTPUBFH operation. In
> the unfortunate event none of the MANDATORY security triples are
> supported by the client and server, the client SHOULD try using
> others that support integrity. Failing that, the client can try
> using AUTH_NONE, but because such forms lack integrity checks,
> this puts the client at risk.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Currently, the compound operation the Linux NFS client sends to the
server to confirm a client ID looks like this:
{ SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM; PUTROOTFH; GETATTR(lease_time) }
Once the lease is confirmed, it makes sense to know how long before
the client will have to renew it. And, performing these operations
in the same compound saves a round trip.
Unfortunately, this arrangement assumes that the security flavor
used for establishing a client ID can also be used to access the
server's pseudo-fs.
If the server requires a different security flavor to access its
pseudo-fs than it allowed for the client's SETCLIENTID operation,
the PUTROOTFH in this compound fails with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC. Even
though the SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM succeeded, our client's trunking
detection logic interprets the failure of the compound as a failure
by the server to confirm the client ID.
As part of server trunking detection, the client then begins another
SETCLIENTID pass with the same nfs4_client_id. This fails with
NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE because the first SETCLIENTID/SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM
already succeeded in confirming that client ID -- it was the
PUTROOTFH operation that caused the SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM compound to
fail.
To address this issue, separate the "establish client ID" step from
the "accessing the server's pseudo-fs root" step. The first access
of the server's pseudo-fs may require retrying the PUTROOTFH
operation with different security flavors. This access is done in
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh().
That leaves the matter of how to retrieve the server's lease time.
nfs4_proc_fsinfo() already retrieves the lease time value, though
none of its callers do anything with the retrieved value (nor do
they mark the lease as "renewed").
Note that NFSv4.1 state recovery invokes nfs4_proc_get_lease_time()
using the lease management security flavor. This may cause some
heartburn if that security flavor isn't the same as the security
flavor the server requires for accessing the pseudo-fs.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The long lines with no vertical white space make this function
difficult for humans to read. Add a proper documenting comment
while we're here.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
When rpc.gssd is not running, any NFS operation that needs to use a
GSS security flavor of course does not work.
If looking up a server's root file handle results in an
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, nfs4_find_root_sec() is called to try a bunch of
security flavors until one works or all reasonable flavors have
been tried. When rpc.gssd isn't running, this loop seems to fail
immediately after rpcauth_create() craps out on the first GSS
flavor.
When the rpcauth_create() call in nfs4_lookup_root_sec() fails
because rpc.gssd is not available, nfs4_lookup_root_sec()
unconditionally returns -EIO. This prevents nfs4_find_root_sec()
from retrying any other flavors; it drops out of its loop and fails
immediately.
Having nfs4_lookup_root_sec() return -EACCES instead allows
nfs4_find_root_sec() to try all flavors in its list.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
A SECINFO reply may contain flavors whose kernel module is not
yet loaded by the client's kernel. A new RPC client API, called
rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor(), is introduced to do proper checking
for support of a security flavor.
When this API is invoked, the RPC client now tries to load the
module for each flavor first before performing the "is this
supported?" check. This means if a module is available on the
client, but has not been loaded yet, it will be loaded and
registered automatically when the SECINFO reply is processed.
The new API can take a full GSS tuple (OID, QoP, and service).
Previously only the OID and service were considered.
nfs_find_best_sec() is updated to verify all flavors requested in a
SECINFO reply, including AUTH_NULL and AUTH_UNIX. Previously these
two flavors were simply assumed to be supported without consulting
the RPC client.
Note that the replaced version of nfs_find_best_sec() can return
RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if the server returns a recognized OID but an
unsupported "service" value. nfs_find_best_sec() now returns
RPC_AUTH_UNIX in this case.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The NFSv4 SECINFO procedure returns a list of security flavors. Any
GSS flavor also has a GSS tuple containing an OID, a quality-of-
protection value, and a service value, which specifies a particular
GSS pseudoflavor.
For simplicity and efficiency, I'd like to return each GSS tuple
from the NFSv4 SECINFO XDR decoder and pass it straight into the RPC
client.
Define a data structure that is visible to both the NFS client and
the RPC client. Take structure and field names from the relevant
standards to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the server sends us a pathname with more components than the client
limit of NFS4_PATHNAME_MAXCOMPONENTS, more server entries than the client
limit of NFS4_FS_LOCATION_MAXSERVERS, or sends a total number of
fs_locations entries than the client limit of NFS4_FS_LOCATIONS_MAXENTRIES
then we will currently Oops because the limit checks are done _after_ we've
decoded the data into the arrays.
Reported-by: fanchaoting<fanchaoting@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the open_context for the file is not yet fully initialised,
then open recovery cannot succeed, and since nfs4_state_find_open_context
returns an ENOENT, we end up treating the file as being irrecoverable.
What we really want to do, is just defer the recovery until later.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
With unlink is an asynchronous operation in the sillyrename case, it
expects nfs4_async_handle_error() to map the error correctly.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
- Fix an NFSv4 idmapper regression
- Fix an Oops in the pNFS blocks client
- Fix up various issues with pNFS layoutcommit
- Ensure correct read ordering of variables in rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.9-3' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
- Fix an NFSv4 idmapper regression
- Fix an Oops in the pNFS blocks client
- Fix up various issues with pNFS layoutcommit
- Ensure correct read ordering of variables in
rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked
* tag 'nfs-for-3.9-3' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
SUNRPC: Add barriers to ensure read ordering in rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked
NFSv4.1: Add a helper pnfs_commit_and_return_layout
NFSv4.1: Always clear the NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT in layoutreturn
NFSv4.1: Fix a race in pNFS layoutcommit
pnfs-block: removing DM device maybe cause oops when call dev_remove
NFSv4: Fix the string length returned by the idmapper
Now that we do CLAIM_FH opens, we may run into situations where we
get a delegation but don't have perfect knowledge of the file path.
When returning the delegation, we might therefore not be able to
us CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR opens to convert the delegation into OPEN
stateids and locks.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Sometimes, we actually _want_ to do open-by-filehandle, for instance
when recovering opens after a network partition, or when called
from nfs4_file_open.
Enable that functionality using a new capability NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN_V1,
and which is only enabled for NFSv4.1 servers that support it.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Follow the practice described in section 8.2.2 of RFC5661: When sending a
read/write or setattr stateid, set the seqid field to zero in order to
signal that the NFS server should apply the most recent locking state.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Clean up the setting of the nfs_server->caps, by shoving it all
into nfs4_server_common_setup().
Then add an 'initial capabilities' field into struct nfs4_minor_version_ops.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Adds logic to ensure that if the server returns a BAD_STATEID,
or other state related error, then we check if the stateid has
already changed. If it has, then rather than start state recovery,
we should just resend the failed RPC call with the new stateid.
Allow nfs4_select_rw_stateid to notify that the stateid is unstable by
having it return -EWOULDBLOCK if an RPC is underway that might change the
stateid.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If we replay a READ or WRITE call, we should not be changing the
stateid. Currently, we may end up doing so, because the stateid
is only selected at xdr encode time.
This patch ensures that we select the stateid after we get an NFSv4.1
session slot, and that we keep that same stateid across retries.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Currently, we're forcing an unnecessary duplication of the
initial nfs_lock_context in calls to nfs_get_lock_context, since
__nfs_find_lock_context ignores the ctx->lock_context.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the state recovery failed, we want to ensure that the application
doesn't try to use the same file descriptor for more reads or writes.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If state recovery fails with an ESTALE or a ENOENT, then we shouldn't
keep retrying. Instead, mark the stateid as being invalid and
fail the I/O with an EIO error.
For other operations such as POSIX and BSD file locking, truncate
etc, fail with an EBADF to indicate that this file descriptor is no
longer valid.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
In order to be able to safely return the layout in nfs4_proc_setattr,
we need to block new uses of the layout, wait for all outstanding
users of the layout to complete, commit the layout and then return it.
This patch adds a helper in order to do all this safely.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Note that clearing NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT is tricky, since it requires
you to also clear the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bits from the layout
segments.
The only two sites that need to do this are the ones that call
pnfs_return_layout() without first doing a layout commit.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Benny Halevy <bhalevy@tonian.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
We need to clear the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bits atomically with the
NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT bit, otherwise we may end up with situations
where the two are out of sync.
The first half of the problem is to ensure that pnfs_layoutcommit_inode
clears the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bit through pnfs_list_write_lseg.
We still need to keep the reference to those segments until the RPC call
is finished, so in order to make it clear _where_ those references come
from, we add a helper pnfs_list_write_lseg_done() that cleans up after
pnfs_list_write_lseg.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Benny Halevy <bhalevy@tonian.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
when pnfs block using device mapper,if umounting later,it maybe
cause oops. we apply "1 + sizeof(bl_umount_request)" memory for
msg->data, the memory maybe overflow when we do "memcpy(&dataptr
[sizeof(bl_msg)], &bl_umount_request, sizeof(bl_umount_request))",
because the size of bl_msg is more than 1 byte.
Signed-off-by: fanchaoting<fanchaoting@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Functions like nfs_map_uid_to_name() and nfs_map_gid_to_group() are
expected to return a string without any terminating NUL character.
Regression introduced by commit 57e62324e4
(NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring).
Reported-by: Dave Chiluk <dave.chiluk@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.4]
I had assumed that the only use of module aliases for filesystems
prior to "fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules."
was in request_module. It turns out I was wrong. At least mkinitcpio
in Arch linux uses these aliases.
So readd the preexising aliases, to keep from breaking userspace.
Userspace eventually will have to follow and use the same aliases the
kernel does. So at some point we may be delete these aliases without
problems. However that day is not today.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.
A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.
Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.
Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives. Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.
This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work. While writing this patch I saw a handful of such
cases. The most significant being autofs that lives in the module
autofs4.
This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request
module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and
people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case
the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module.
After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any
particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond
making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem
module. The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module()
without regards to the users permissions. In general all a filesystem
module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep.
Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a
filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted. In a user
namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
which most filesystems do not set today.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Trond Myklebust