Pull seccomp updates from James Morris:
"Add support for retrieving seccomp metadata"
* 'next-seccomp' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ptrace, seccomp: add support for retrieving seccomp metadata
seccomp: hoist out filter resolving logic
The function clear_siginfo is just a nice wrapper around memset so
this results in no functional change. This change makes mistakes
a little more difficult and it makes it clearer what is going on.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
With the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, we need to be able to extract these
flags for checkpoint restore, since they describe the state of a filter.
So, let's add PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA, similar to ..._GET_FILTER, which
returns the metadata of the nth filter (right now, just the flags).
Hopefully this will be future proof, and new per-filter metadata can be
added to this struct.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Hoist out the nth filter resolving logic that ptrace uses into a new
function. We'll use this in the next patch to implement the new
PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_FLAGS command.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
READ_ONCE() now has an implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() call, so it
can be used instead of lockless_dereference() without any change in
semantics.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508840570-22169-4-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The function __get_seccomp_filter is local to the source and does
not need to be in global scope, so make it static.
Cleans up sparse warning:
symbol '__get_seccomp_filter' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Fixes: 66a733ea6b ("seccomp: fix the usage of get/put_seccomp_filter() in seccomp_get_filter()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
As Chris explains, get_seccomp_filter() and put_seccomp_filter() can end
up using different filters. Once we drop ->siglock it is possible for
task->seccomp.filter to have been replaced by SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC.
Fixes: f8e529ed94 ("seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters")
Reported-by: Chris Salls <chrissalls5@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # needs s/refcount_/atomic_/ for v4.12 and earlier
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
[tycho: add __get_seccomp_filter vs. open coding refcount_inc()]
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
[kees: tweak commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Right now, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (neé SECCOMP_RET_KILL) kills the
current thread. There have been a few requests for this to kill the entire
process (the thread group). This cannot be just changed (discovered when
adding coredump support since coredumping kills the entire process)
because there are userspace programs depending on the thread-kill
behavior.
Instead, implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS, which is 0x80000000, and can
be processed as "-1" by the kernel, below the existing RET_KILL that is
ABI-set to "0". For userspace, SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL is added to expand
the mask to the signed bit. Old userspace using the SECCOMP_RET_ACTION
mask will see SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as 0 still, but this would only
be visible when examining the siginfo in a core dump from a RET_KILL_*,
where it will think it was thread-killed instead of process-killed.
Attempts to introduce this behavior via other ways (filter flags,
seccomp struct flags, masked RET_DATA bits) all come with weird
side-effects and baggage. This change preserves the central behavioral
expectations of the seccomp filter engine without putting too great
a burden on changes needed in userspace to use the new action.
The new action is discoverable by userspace through either the new
actions_avail sysctl or through the SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL seccomp
operation. If used without checking for availability, old kernels
will treat RET_KILL_PROCESS as RET_KILL_THREAD (since the old mask
will produce RET_KILL_THREAD).
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Fabricio Voznika <fvoznika@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This introduces the BPF return value for SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS to kill
an entire process. This cannot yet be reached by seccomp, but it changes
the default-kill behavior (for unknown return values) from kill-thread to
kill-process.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In preparation for adding SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS, rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL
to the more accurate SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD.
The existing selftest values are intentionally left as SECCOMP_RET_KILL
just to be sure we're exercising the alias.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Add a new action, SECCOMP_RET_LOG, that logs a syscall before allowing
the syscall. At the implementation level, this action is identical to
the existing SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW action. However, it can be very useful when
initially developing a seccomp filter for an application. The developer
can set the default action to be SECCOMP_RET_LOG, maybe mark any
obviously needed syscalls with SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, and then put the
application through its paces. A list of syscalls that triggered the
default action (SECCOMP_RET_LOG) can be easily gleaned from the logs and
that list can be used to build the syscall whitelist. Finally, the
developer can change the default action to the desired value.
This provides a more friendly experience than seeing the application get
killed, then updating the filter and rebuilding the app, seeing the
application get killed due to a different syscall, then updating the
filter and rebuilding the app, etc.
The functionality is similar to what's supported by the various LSMs.
SELinux has permissive mode, AppArmor has complain mode, SMACK has
bring-up mode, etc.
SECCOMP_RET_LOG is given a lower value than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW as allow
while logging is slightly more restrictive than quietly allowing.
Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_RET_LOG are not capable of
inspecting the audit log to verify that the syscall was logged.
With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
log
else if action == RET_LOG && RET_LOG in actions_logged:
log
else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
log
else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not log
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Add a new filter flag, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, that enables logging for
all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW for the given filter.
SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are always logged, when "kill" is in the
actions_logged sysctl, and SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions are never logged,
regardless of this flag.
This flag can be used to create noisy filters that result in all
non-allowed actions to be logged. A process may have one noisy filter,
which is loaded with this flag, as well as a quiet filter that's not
loaded with this flag. This allows for the actions in a set of filters
to be selectively conveyed to the admin.
Since a system could have a large number of allocated seccomp_filter
structs, struct packing was taken in consideration. On 64 bit x86, the
new log member takes up one byte of an existing four byte hole in the
struct. On 32 bit x86, the new log member creates a new four byte hole
(unavoidable) and consumes one of those bytes.
Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG are not
capable of inspecting the audit log to verify that the actions taken in
the filter were logged.
With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
log
else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
log
else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not log
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Adminstrators can write to this sysctl to set the seccomp actions that
are allowed to be logged. Any actions not found in this sysctl will not
be logged.
For example, all SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, and
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO actions would be loggable if "kill trap errno" were
written to the sysctl. SECCOMP_RET_TRACE actions would not be logged
since its string representation ("trace") wasn't present in the sysctl
value.
The path to the sysctl is:
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged
The actions_avail sysctl can be read to discover the valid action names
that can be written to the actions_logged sysctl with the exception of
"allow". SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions cannot be configured for logging.
The default setting for the sysctl is to allow all actions to be logged
except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW. While only SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are
currently logged, an upcoming patch will allow applications to request
additional actions to be logged.
There's one important exception to this sysctl. If a task is
specifically being audited, meaning that an audit context has been
allocated for the task, seccomp will log all actions other than
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW despite the value of actions_logged. This exception
preserves the existing auditing behavior of tasks with an allocated
audit context.
With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
log
else if audit_enabled && task-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not log
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Userspace code that needs to check if the kernel supports a given action
may not be able to use the /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail
sysctl. The process may be running in a sandbox and, therefore,
sufficient filesystem access may not be available. This patch adds an
operation to the seccomp(2) syscall that allows userspace code to ask
the kernel if a given action is available.
If the action is supported by the kernel, 0 is returned. If the action
is not supported by the kernel, -1 is returned with errno set to
-EOPNOTSUPP. If this check is attempted on a kernel that doesn't support
this new operation, -1 is returned with errno set to -EINVAL meaning
that userspace code will have the ability to differentiate between the
two error cases.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This patch creates a read-only sysctl containing an ordered list of
seccomp actions that the kernel supports. The ordering, from left to
right, is the lowest action value (kill) to the highest action value
(allow). Currently, a read of the sysctl file would return "kill trap
errno trace allow". The contents of this sysctl file can be useful for
userspace code as well as the system administrator.
The path to the sysctl is:
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail
libseccomp and other userspace code can easily determine which actions
the current kernel supports. The set of actions supported by the current
kernel may be different than the set of action macros found in kernel
headers that were installed where the userspace code was built.
In addition, this sysctl will allow system administrators to know which
actions are supported by the kernel and make it easier to configure
exactly what seccomp logs through the audit subsystem. Support for this
level of logging configuration will come in a future patch.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Both the upcoming logging improvements and changes to RET_KILL will need
to know which filter a given seccomp return value originated from. In
order to delay logic processing of result until after the seccomp loop,
this adds a single pointer assignment on matches. This will allow both
log and RET_KILL logic to work off the filter rather than doing more
expensive tests inside the time-critical run_filters loop.
Running tight cycles of getpid() with filters attached shows no measurable
difference in speed.
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
This switches the seccomp usage tracking from atomic_t to refcount_t to
gain refcount overflow protections.
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <hans.liljestrand@aalto.fi>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task_stack.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task_stack.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The SECCOMP_RET_KILL filter return code has always killed the current
thread, not the entire process. Changing this as a side-effect of dumping
core isn't a safe thing to do (a few test suites have already flagged this
behavioral change). Instead, restore the RET_KILL semantics, but still
dump core when a RET_KILL delivers SIGSYS to a single-threaded process.
Fixes: b25e67161c ("seccomp: dump core when using SECCOMP_RET_KILL")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The SECCOMP_RET_KILL mode is documented as immediately killing the
process as if a SIGSYS had been sent and not caught (similar to a
SIGKILL). However, a SIGSYS is documented as triggering a coredump
which does not happen today.
This has the advantage of being able to more easily debug a process
that fails a seccomp filter. Today, most apps need to recompile and
change their filter in order to get detailed info out, or manually run
things through strace, or enable detailed kernel auditing. Now we get
coredumps that fit into existing system-wide crash reporting setups.
From a security pov, this shouldn't be a problem. Unhandled signals
can already be sent externally which trigger a coredump independent of
the status of the seccomp filter. The act of dumping core itself does
not cause change in execution of the program.
URL: https://crbug.com/676357
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights:
Yama:
- allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting
TPM:
- add documentation
- many bugfixes & cleanups
- define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Integrity:
- Harden against malformed xattrs
SELinux:
- bugfixes & cleanups
Smack:
- Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label
- Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook
- parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits)
Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent
tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log
tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister
tpm: Fix handling of missing event log
tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it
tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set
tpm: cleanup of printk error messages
tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property
tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime
tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops
tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip
tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister)
tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array
tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files
char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo
tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT
tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV
tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent
tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation
...
Since long already bpf_func is not only about struct sk_buff * as
input anymore. Make it generic as void *, so that callers don't
need to cast for it each time they call BPF_PROG_RUN().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This fixes a ptrace vs fatal pending signals bug as manifested in
seccomp now that seccomp was reordered to happen after ptrace. The
short version is that seccomp should not attempt to call do_exit()
while fatal signals are pending under a tracer. The existing code was
trying to be as defensively paranoid as possible, but it now ends up
confusing ptrace. Instead, the syscall can just be skipped (which solves
the original concern that the do_exit() was addressing) and normal signal
handling, tracer notification, and process death can happen.
Paraphrasing from the original bug report:
If a tracee task is in a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP trap, or has been resumed
after such a trap but not yet been scheduled, and another task in the
thread-group calls exit_group(), then the tracee task exits without the
ptracer receiving a PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT notification. Test case here:
https://gist.github.com/khuey/3c43ac247c72cef8c956ca73281c9be7
The bug happens because when __seccomp_filter() detects
fatal_signal_pending(), it calls do_exit() without dequeuing the fatal
signal. When do_exit() sends the PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT notification and
that task is descheduled, __schedule() notices that there is a fatal
signal pending and changes its state from TASK_TRACED to TASK_RUNNING.
That prevents the ptracer's waitpid() from returning the ptrace event.
A more detailed analysis is here:
https://github.com/mozilla/rr/issues/1762#issuecomment-237396255.
Reported-by: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org>
Reported-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Tested-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Fixes: 93e35efb8d ("x86/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The use of config_enabled() against config options is ambiguous. In
practical terms, config_enabled() is equivalent to IS_BUILTIN(), but the
author might have used it for the meaning of IS_ENABLED(). Using
IS_ENABLED(), IS_BUILTIN(), IS_MODULE() etc. makes the intention
clearer.
This commit replaces config_enabled() with IS_ENABLED() where possible.
This commit is only touching bool config options.
I noticed two cases where config_enabled() is used against a tristate
option:
- config_enabled(CONFIG_HWMON)
[ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/thermal.c ]
- config_enabled(CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE)
[ drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/opregion.c ]
I did not touch them because they should be converted to IS_BUILTIN()
in order to keep the logic, but I was not sure it was the authors'
intention.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465215656-20569-1-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru>
Cc: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
Cc: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: yu-cheng yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Nikolay Martynov <mar.kolya@gmail.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Leonid Yegoshin <Leonid.Yegoshin@imgtec.com>
Cc: Rafal Milecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Cc: James Cowgill <James.Cowgill@imgtec.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex.smith@imgtec.com>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@imgtec.com>
Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@do-not-panic.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: Tony Wu <tung7970@gmail.com>
Cc: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When RET_TRACE triggers, a tracer may change a syscall into something that
should be filtered by seccomp. This re-runs seccomp after a trace event
to make sure things continue to pass.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Since nothing is using the 2-phase API, and it adds more complexity than
benefit, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Currently, if arch code wants to supply seccomp_data directly to
seccomp (which is generally much faster than having seccomp do it
using the syscall_get_xyz() API), it has to use the two-phase
seccomp hooks. Add it to the easy hooks, too.
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Pull MIPS updates from Ralf Baechle:
"This is the main pull request for MIPS for 4.7. Here's the summary of
the changes:
- ATH79: Support for DTB passuing using the UHI boot protocol
- ATH79: Remove support for builtin DTB.
- ATH79: Add zboot debug serial support.
- ATH79: Add initial support for Dragino MS14 (Dragine 2), Onion Omega
and DPT-Module.
- ATH79: Update devicetree clock support for AR9132 and AR9331.
- ATH79: Cleanup the DT code.
- ATH79: Support newer SOCs in ath79_ddr_ctrl_init.
- ATH79: Fix regression in PCI window initialization.
- BCM47xx: Move SPROM driver to drivers/firmware/
- BCM63xx: Enable partition parser in defconfig.
- BMIPS: BMIPS5000 has I cache filing from D cache
- BMIPS: BMIPS: Add cpu-feature-overrides.h
- BMIPS: Add Whirlwind support
- BMIPS: Adjust mips-hpt-frequency for BCM7435
- BMIPS: Remove maxcpus from BCM97435SVMB DTS
- BMIPS: Add missing 7038 L1 register cells to BCM7435
- BMIPS: Various tweaks to initialization code.
- BMIPS: Enable partition parser in defconfig.
- BMIPS: Cache tweaks.
- BMIPS: Add UART, I2C and SATA devices to DT.
- BMIPS: Add BCM6358 and BCM63268support
- BMIPS: Add device tree example for BCM6358.
- BMIPS: Improve Improve BCM6328 and BCM6368 device trees
- Lantiq: Add support for device tree file from boot loader
- Lantiq: Allow build with no built-in DT.
- Loongson 3: Reserve 32MB for RS780E integrated GPU.
- Loongson 3: Fix build error after ld-version.sh modification
- Loongson 3: Move chipset ACPI code from drivers to arch.
- Loongson 3: Speedup irq processing.
- Loongson 3: Add basic Loongson 3A support.
- Loongson 3: Set cache flush handlers to nop.
- Loongson 3: Invalidate special TLBs when needed.
- Loongson 3: Fast TLB refill handler.
- MT7620: Fallback strategy for invalid syscfg0.
- Netlogic: Fix CP0_EBASE redefinition warnings
- Octeon: Initialization fixes
- Octeon: Add DTS files for the D-Link DSR-1000N and EdgeRouter Lite
- Octeon: Enable add Octeon-drivers in cavium_octeon_defconfig
- Octeon: Correctly handle endian-swapped initramfs images.
- Octeon: Support CN73xx, CN75xx and CN78xx.
- Octeon: Remove dead code from cvmx-sysinfo.
- Octeon: Extend number of supported CPUs past 32.
- Octeon: Remove some code limiting NR_IRQS to 255.
- Octeon: Simplify octeon_irq_ciu_gpio_set_type.
- Octeon: Mark some functions __init in smp.c
- Octeon: Octeon: Add Octeon III CN7xxx interface detection
- PIC32: Add serial driver and bindings for it.
- PIC32: Add PIC32 deadman timer driver and bindings.
- PIC32: Add PIC32 clock timer driver and bindings.
- Pistachio: Determine SoC revision during boot
- Sibyte: Fix Kconfig dependencies of SIBYTE_BUS_WATCHER.
- Sibyte: Strip redundant comments from bcm1480_regs.h.
- Panic immediately if panic_on_oops is set.
- module: fix incorrect IS_ERR_VALUE macro usage.
- module: Make consistent use of pr_*
- Remove no longer needed work_on_cpu() call.
- Remove CONFIG_IPV6_PRIVACY from defconfigs.
- Fix registers of non-crashing CPUs in dumps.
- Handle MIPSisms in new vmcore_elf32_check_arch.
- Select CONFIG_HANDLE_DOMAIN_IRQ and make it work.
- Allow RIXI to be used on non-R2 or R6 cores.
- Reserve nosave data for hibernation
- Fix siginfo.h to use strict POSIX types.
- Don't unwind user mode with EVA.
- Fix watchpoint restoration
- Ptrace watchpoints for R6.
- Sync icache when it fills from dcache
- I6400 I-cache fills from dcache.
- Various MSA fixes.
- Cleanup MIPS_CPU_* definitions.
- Signal: Move generic copy_siginfo to signal.h
- Signal: Fix uapi include in exported asm/siginfo.h
- Timer fixes for sake of KVM.
- XPA TLB refill fixes.
- Treat perf counter feature
- Update John Crispin's email address
- Add PIC32 watchdog and bindings.
- Handle R10000 LL/SC bug in set_pte()
- cpufreq: Various fixes for Longson1.
- R6: Fix R2 emulation.
- mathemu: Cosmetic fix to ADDIUPC emulation, plenty of other small fixes
- ELF: ABI and FP fixes.
- Allow for relocatable kernel and use that to support KASLR.
- Fix CPC_BASE_ADDR mask
- Plenty fo smp-cps, CM, R6 and M6250 fixes.
- Make reset_control_ops const.
- Fix kernel command line handling of leading whitespace.
- Cleanups to cache handling.
- Add brcm, bcm6345-l1-intc device tree bindings.
- Use generic clkdev.h header
- Remove CLK_IS_ROOT usage.
- Misc small cleanups.
- CM: Fix compilation error when !MIPS_CM
- oprofile: Fix a preemption issue
- Detect DSP ASE v3 support:1"
* 'upstream' of git://git.linux-mips.org/pub/scm/ralf/upstream-linus: (275 commits)
MIPS: pic32mzda: fix getting timer clock rate.
MIPS: ath79: fix regression in PCI window initialization
MIPS: ath79: make ath79_ddr_ctrl_init() compatible for newer SoCs
MIPS: Fix VZ probe gas errors with binutils <2.24
MIPS: perf: Fix I6400 event numbers
MIPS: DEC: Export `ioasic_ssr_lock' to modules
MIPS: MSA: Fix a link error on `_init_msa_upper' with older GCC
MIPS: CM: Fix compilation error when !MIPS_CM
MIPS: Fix genvdso error on rebuild
USB: ohci-jz4740: Remove obsolete driver
MIPS: JZ4740: Probe OHCI platform device via DT
MIPS: JZ4740: Qi LB60: Remove support for AVT2 variant
MIPS: pistachio: Determine SoC revision during boot
MIPS: BMIPS: Adjust mips-hpt-frequency for BCM7435
mips: mt7620: fallback to SDRAM when syscfg0 does not have a valid value for the memory type
MIPS: Prevent "restoration" of MSA context in non-MSA kernels
MIPS: cevt-r4k: Dynamically calculate min_delta_ns
MIPS: malta-time: Take seconds into account
MIPS: malta-time: Start GIC count before syncing to RTC
MIPS: Force CPUs to lose FP context during mode switches
...
Move retrieval of compat syscall numbers into inline function defined in
asm-generic header so that arches may override it.
[ralf@linux-mips.org: Resolve merge conflict.]
Suggested-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: IMG-MIPSLinuxKerneldevelopers@imgtec.com
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/12978/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Drop accidentally repeated word in comment.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Seccomp wants to know the syscall bitness, not the caller task bitness,
when it selects the syscall whitelist.
As far as I know, this makes no difference on any architecture, so it's
not a security problem. (It generates identical code everywhere except
sparc, and, on sparc, the syscall numbering is the same for both ABIs.)
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Before this patch, a process with some permissive seccomp filter
that was applied by root without NO_NEW_PRIVS was able to add
more filters to itself without setting NO_NEW_PRIVS by setting
the new filter from a throwaway thread with NO_NEW_PRIVS.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp
filters via ptrace.
PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF
seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp
filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct
sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case
the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of
BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors.
Command specific errors are ENOENT: which indicates that there is no ith
filter in this seccomp tree, and EMEDIUMTYPE, which indicates that the ith
filter was not installed as a classic BPF filter.
A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at
the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to
decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of
the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface.
v2: * make save_orig const
* check that the orig_prog exists (not necessary right now, but when
grows eBPF support it will be)
* s/n/filter_off and make it an unsigned long to match ptrace
* count "down" the tree instead of "up" when passing a filter offset
v3: * don't take the current task's lock for inspecting its seccomp mode
* use a 0x42** constant for the ptrace command value
v4: * don't copy to userspace while holding spinlocks
v5: * add another condition to WARN_ON
v6: * rebase on net-next
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The current ongoing effort to dump existing cBPF seccomp filters back
to user space requires to hold the pre-transformed instructions like
we do in case of socket filters from sk_attach_filter() side, so they
can be reloaded in original form at a later point in time by utilities
such as criu.
To prepare for this, simply extend the bpf_prog_create_from_user()
API to hold a flag that tells whether we should store the original
or not. Also, fanout filters could make use of that in future for
things like diag. While fanout filters already use bpf_prog_destroy(),
move seccomp over to them as well to handle original programs when
present.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Tested-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
For clarity, if CONFIG_SECCOMP isn't defined, seccomp_mode() is returning
"disabled". This makes that more clear, along with another 0-use, and
results in no operational change.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
with seccomp enabled.
One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.
This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.
Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
filters resumed as well.
v2 changes:
* require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
* drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
* change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.
v3 changes:
* get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere
* report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly
used
v4 changes:
* get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace
directly
v5 changes:
* check that seccomp is not enabled (or suspended) on the tracer
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
CC: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
[kees: access seccomp.mode through seccomp_mode() instead]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Recently lockless_dereference() was added which can be used in place of
hard-coding smp_read_barrier_depends(). The following PATCH makes the change.
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Seccomp has always been a special candidate when it comes to preparation
of its filters in seccomp_prepare_filter(). Due to the extra checks and
filter rewrite it partially duplicates code and has BPF internals exposed.
This patch adds a generic API inside the BPF code code that seccomp can use
and thus keep it's filter preparation code minimal and better maintainable.
The other side-effect is that now classic JITs can add seccomp support as
well by only providing a BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS translation.
Tested with seccomp and BPF test suites.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Nicolas Schichan <nschichan@freebox.fr>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Remove the calls to bpf_check_classic(), bpf_convert_filter() and
bpf_migrate_runtime() and let bpf_prepare_filter() take care of that
instead.
seccomp_check_filter() is passed to bpf_prepare_filter() so that it
gets called from there, after bpf_check_classic().
We can now remove exposure of two internal classic BPF functions
previously used by seccomp. The export of bpf_check_classic() symbol,
previously known as sk_chk_filter(), was there since pre git times,
and no in-tree module was using it, therefore remove it.
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Schichan <nschichan@freebox.fr>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The value resulting from the SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask could exceed MAX_ERRNO
when setting errno during a SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO filter action. This makes
sure we have a reliable value being set, so that an invalid errno will not
be ignored by userspace.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x86 seccomp changes from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree includes x86 seccomp filter speedups and related preparatory
work, which touches core seccomp facilities as well.
The main idea is to split seccomp into two phases, to be able to enter
a simple fast path for syscalls with ptrace side effects.
There's no substantial user-visible (and ABI) effects expected from
this, except a change in how we emit a better audit record for
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE events"
* 'x86-seccomp-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86_64, entry: Use split-phase syscall_trace_enter for 64-bit syscalls
x86_64, entry: Treat regs->ax the same in fastpath and slowpath syscalls
x86: Split syscall_trace_enter into two phases
x86, entry: Only call user_exit if TIF_NOHZ
x86, x32, audit: Fix x32's AUDIT_ARCH wrt audit
seccomp: Document two-phase seccomp and arch-provided seccomp_data
seccomp: Allow arch code to provide seccomp_data
seccomp: Refactor the filter callback and the API
seccomp,x86,arm,mips,s390: Remove nr parameter from secure_computing
With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way,
hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow
seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to
read-only pages.
In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g.
caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only
provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls
as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not
change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable
made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea
is derived from commit 314beb9bca ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit
against spraying attacks").
This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore.
After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents
any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT
image pointer).
Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call
bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image
as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(),
including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the
eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no
performance penalty.
Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual
inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea
via Twitter during development of this patch.
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
populate_seccomp_data is expensive: it works by inspecting
task_pt_regs and various other bits to piece together all the
information, and it's does so in multiple partially redundant steps.
Arch-specific code in the syscall entry path can do much better.
Admittedly this adds a bit of additional room for error, but the
speedup should be worth it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The reason I did this is to add a seccomp API that will be usable
for an x86 fast path. The x86 entry code needs to use a rather
expensive slow path for a syscall that might be visible to things
like ptrace. By splitting seccomp into two phases, we can check
whether we need the slow path and then use the fast path in if the
filter allows the syscall or just returns some errno.
As a side effect, I think the new code is much easier to understand
than the old code.
This has one user-visible effect: the audit record written for
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE is now a simple indication that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
happened. It used to depend in a complicated way on what the tracer
did. I couldn't make much sense of it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Linus Torvalds