If a seccomp user is not interested in Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
by default, it can set the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW flag when
adding filters.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
With the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, we need to be able to extract these
flags for checkpoint restore, since they describe the state of a filter.
So, let's add PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA, similar to ..._GET_FILTER, which
returns the metadata of the nth filter (right now, just the flags).
Hopefully this will be future proof, and new per-filter metadata can be
added to this struct.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add a new filter flag, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, that enables logging for
all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW for the given filter.
SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are always logged, when "kill" is in the
actions_logged sysctl, and SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions are never logged,
regardless of this flag.
This flag can be used to create noisy filters that result in all
non-allowed actions to be logged. A process may have one noisy filter,
which is loaded with this flag, as well as a quiet filter that's not
loaded with this flag. This allows for the actions in a set of filters
to be selectively conveyed to the admin.
Since a system could have a large number of allocated seccomp_filter
structs, struct packing was taken in consideration. On 64 bit x86, the
new log member takes up one byte of an existing four byte hole in the
struct. On 32 bit x86, the new log member creates a new four byte hole
(unavoidable) and consumes one of those bytes.
Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG are not
capable of inspecting the audit log to verify that the actions taken in
the filter were logged.
With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
log
else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
log
else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not log
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Since nothing is using the 2-phase API, and it adds more complexity than
benefit, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Currently, if arch code wants to supply seccomp_data directly to
seccomp (which is generally much faster than having seccomp do it
using the syscall_get_xyz() API), it has to use the two-phase
seccomp hooks. Add it to the easy hooks, too.
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp
filters via ptrace.
PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF
seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp
filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct
sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case
the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of
BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors.
Command specific errors are ENOENT: which indicates that there is no ith
filter in this seccomp tree, and EMEDIUMTYPE, which indicates that the ith
filter was not installed as a classic BPF filter.
A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at
the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to
decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of
the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface.
v2: * make save_orig const
* check that the orig_prog exists (not necessary right now, but when
grows eBPF support it will be)
* s/n/filter_off and make it an unsigned long to match ptrace
* count "down" the tree instead of "up" when passing a filter offset
v3: * don't take the current task's lock for inspecting its seccomp mode
* use a 0x42** constant for the ptrace command value
v4: * don't copy to userspace while holding spinlocks
v5: * add another condition to WARN_ON
v6: * rebase on net-next
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
For clarity, if CONFIG_SECCOMP isn't defined, seccomp_mode() is returning
"disabled". This makes that more clear, along with another 0-use, and
results in no operational change.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
populate_seccomp_data is expensive: it works by inspecting
task_pt_regs and various other bits to piece together all the
information, and it's does so in multiple partially redundant steps.
Arch-specific code in the syscall entry path can do much better.
Admittedly this adds a bit of additional room for error, but the
speedup should be worth it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The reason I did this is to add a seccomp API that will be usable
for an x86 fast path. The x86 entry code needs to use a rather
expensive slow path for a syscall that might be visible to things
like ptrace. By splitting seccomp into two phases, we can check
whether we need the slow path and then use the fast path in if the
filter allows the syscall or just returns some errno.
As a side effect, I think the new code is much easier to understand
than the old code.
This has one user-visible effect: the audit record written for
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE is now a simple indication that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
happened. It used to depend in a complicated way on what the tracer
did. I couldn't make much sense of it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The secure_computing function took a syscall number parameter, but
it only paid any attention to that parameter if seccomp mode 1 was
enabled. Rather than coming up with a kludge to get the parameter
to work in mode 2, just remove the parameter.
To avoid churn in arches that don't have seccomp filters (and may
not even support syscall_get_nr right now), this leaves the
parameter in secure_computing_strict, which is now a real function.
For ARM, this is a bit ugly due to the fact that ARM conditionally
supports seccomp filters. Fixing that would probably only be a
couple of lines of code, but it should be coordinated with the audit
maintainers.
This will be a slight slowdown on some arches. The right fix is to
pass in all of seccomp_data instead of trying to make just the
syscall nr part be fast.
This is a prerequisite for making two-phase seccomp work cleanly.
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Applying restrictive seccomp filter programs to large or diverse
codebases often requires handling threads which may be started early in
the process lifetime (e.g., by code that is linked in). While it is
possible to apply permissive programs prior to process start up, it is
difficult to further restrict the kernel ABI to those threads after that
point.
This change adds a new seccomp syscall flag to SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER for
synchronizing thread group seccomp filters at filter installation time.
When calling seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
filter) an attempt will be made to synchronize all threads in current's
threadgroup to its new seccomp filter program. This is possible iff all
threads are using a filter that is an ancestor to the filter current is
attempting to synchronize to. NULL filters (where the task is running as
SECCOMP_MODE_NONE) are also treated as ancestors allowing threads to be
transitioned into SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER. If prctrl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,
...) has been set on the calling thread, no_new_privs will be set for
all synchronized threads too. On success, 0 is returned. On failure,
the pid of one of the failing threads will be returned and no filters
will have been applied.
The race conditions against another thread are:
- requesting TSYNC (already handled by sighand lock)
- performing a clone (already handled by sighand lock)
- changing its filter (already handled by sighand lock)
- calling exec (handled by cred_guard_mutex)
The clone case is assisted by the fact that new threads will have their
seccomp state duplicated from their parent before appearing on the tasklist.
Holding cred_guard_mutex means that seccomp filters cannot be assigned
while in the middle of another thread's exec (potentially bypassing
no_new_privs or similar). The call to de_thread() may kill threads waiting
for the mutex.
Changes across threads to the filter pointer includes a barrier.
Based on patches by Will Drewry.
Suggested-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Normally, task_struct.seccomp.filter is only ever read or modified by
the task that owns it (current). This property aids in fast access
during system call filtering as read access is lockless.
Updating the pointer from another task, however, opens up race
conditions. To allow cross-thread filter pointer updates, writes to the
seccomp fields are now protected by the sighand spinlock (which is shared
by all threads in the thread group). Read access remains lockless because
pointer updates themselves are atomic. However, writes (or cloning)
often entail additional checking (like maximum instruction counts)
which require locking to perform safely.
In the case of cloning threads, the child is invisible to the system
until it enters the task list. To make sure a child can't be cloned from
a thread and left in a prior state, seccomp duplication is additionally
moved under the sighand lock. Then parent and child are certain have
the same seccomp state when they exit the lock.
Based on patches by Will Drewry and David Drysdale.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
This patch replaces/reworks the kernel-internal BPF interpreter with
an optimized BPF instruction set format that is modelled closer to
mimic native instruction sets and is designed to be JITed with one to
one mapping. Thus, the new interpreter is noticeably faster than the
current implementation of sk_run_filter(); mainly for two reasons:
1. Fall-through jumps:
BPF jump instructions are forced to go either 'true' or 'false'
branch which causes branch-miss penalty. The new BPF jump
instructions have only one branch and fall-through otherwise,
which fits the CPU branch predictor logic better. `perf stat`
shows drastic difference for branch-misses between the old and
new code.
2. Jump-threaded implementation of interpreter vs switch
statement:
Instead of single table-jump at the top of 'switch' statement,
gcc will now generate multiple table-jump instructions, which
helps CPU branch predictor logic.
Note that the verification of filters is still being done through
sk_chk_filter() in classical BPF format, so filters from user- or
kernel space are verified in the same way as we do now, and same
restrictions/constraints hold as well.
We reuse current BPF JIT compilers in a way that this upgrade would
even be fine as is, but nevertheless allows for a successive upgrade
of BPF JIT compilers to the new format.
The internal instruction set migration is being done after the
probing for JIT compilation, so in case JIT compilers are able to
create a native opcode image, we're going to use that, and in all
other cases we're doing a follow-up migration of the BPF program's
instruction set, so that it can be transparently run in the new
interpreter.
In short, the *internal* format extends BPF in the following way (more
details can be taken from the appended documentation):
- Number of registers increase from 2 to 10
- Register width increases from 32-bit to 64-bit
- Conditional jt/jf targets replaced with jt/fall-through
- Adds signed > and >= insns
- 16 4-byte stack slots for register spill-fill replaced
with up to 512 bytes of multi-use stack space
- Introduction of bpf_call insn and register passing convention
for zero overhead calls from/to other kernel functions
- Adds arithmetic right shift and endianness conversion insns
- Adds atomic_add insn
- Old tax/txa insns are replaced with 'mov dst,src' insn
Performance of two BPF filters generated by libpcap resp. bpf_asm
was measured on x86_64, i386 and arm32 (other libpcap programs
have similar performance differences):
fprog #1 is taken from Documentation/networking/filter.txt:
tcpdump -i eth0 port 22 -dd
fprog #2 is taken from 'man tcpdump':
tcpdump -i eth0 'tcp port 22 and (((ip[2:2] - ((ip[0]&0xf)<<2)) -
((tcp[12]&0xf0)>>2)) != 0)' -dd
Raw performance data from BPF micro-benchmark: SK_RUN_FILTER on the
same SKB (cache-hit) or 10k SKBs (cache-miss); time in ns per call,
smaller is better:
--x86_64--
fprog #1 fprog #1 fprog #2 fprog #2
cache-hit cache-miss cache-hit cache-miss
old BPF 90 101 192 202
new BPF 31 71 47 97
old BPF jit 12 34 17 44
new BPF jit TBD
--i386--
fprog #1 fprog #1 fprog #2 fprog #2
cache-hit cache-miss cache-hit cache-miss
old BPF 107 136 227 252
new BPF 40 119 69 172
--arm32--
fprog #1 fprog #1 fprog #2 fprog #2
cache-hit cache-miss cache-hit cache-miss
old BPF 202 300 475 540
new BPF 180 270 330 470
old BPF jit 26 182 37 202
new BPF jit TBD
Thus, without changing any userland BPF filters, applications on
top of AF_PACKET (or other families) such as libpcap/tcpdump, cls_bpf
classifier, netfilter's xt_bpf, team driver's load-balancing mode,
and many more will have better interpreter filtering performance.
While we are replacing the internal BPF interpreter, we also need
to convert seccomp BPF in the same step to make use of the new
internal structure since it makes use of lower-level API details
without being further decoupled through higher-level calls like
sk_unattached_filter_{create,destroy}(), for example.
Just as for normal socket filtering, also seccomp BPF experiences
a time-to-verdict speedup:
05-sim-long_jumps.c of libseccomp was used as micro-benchmark:
seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx,...
seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx,...
rc = seccomp_load(ctx);
for (i = 0; i < 10000000; i++)
syscall(199, 100);
'short filter' has 2 rules
'large filter' has 200 rules
'short filter' performance is slightly better on x86_64/i386/arm32
'large filter' is much faster on x86_64 and i386 and shows no
difference on arm32
--x86_64-- short filter
old BPF: 2.7 sec
39.12% bench libc-2.15.so [.] syscall
8.10% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sk_run_filter
6.31% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] system_call
5.59% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] trace_hardirqs_on_caller
4.37% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] trace_hardirqs_off_caller
3.70% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __secure_computing
3.67% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] lock_is_held
3.03% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] seccomp_bpf_load
new BPF: 2.58 sec
42.05% bench libc-2.15.so [.] syscall
6.91% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] system_call
6.25% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] trace_hardirqs_on_caller
6.07% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __secure_computing
5.08% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sk_run_filter_int_seccomp
--arm32-- short filter
old BPF: 4.0 sec
39.92% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] vector_swi
16.60% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sk_run_filter
14.66% bench libc-2.17.so [.] syscall
5.42% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] seccomp_bpf_load
5.10% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __secure_computing
new BPF: 3.7 sec
35.93% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] vector_swi
21.89% bench libc-2.17.so [.] syscall
13.45% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sk_run_filter_int_seccomp
6.25% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __secure_computing
3.96% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] syscall_trace_exit
--x86_64-- large filter
old BPF: 8.6 seconds
73.38% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sk_run_filter
10.70% bench libc-2.15.so [.] syscall
5.09% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] seccomp_bpf_load
1.97% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] system_call
new BPF: 5.7 seconds
66.20% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sk_run_filter_int_seccomp
16.75% bench libc-2.15.so [.] syscall
3.31% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] system_call
2.88% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __secure_computing
--i386-- large filter
old BPF: 5.4 sec
new BPF: 3.8 sec
--arm32-- large filter
old BPF: 13.5 sec
73.88% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sk_run_filter
10.29% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] vector_swi
6.46% bench libc-2.17.so [.] syscall
2.94% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] seccomp_bpf_load
1.19% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __secure_computing
0.87% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sys_getuid
new BPF: 13.5 sec
76.08% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sk_run_filter_int_seccomp
10.98% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] vector_swi
5.87% bench libc-2.17.so [.] syscall
1.77% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __secure_computing
0.93% bench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sys_getuid
BPF filters generated by seccomp are very branchy, so the new
internal BPF performance is better than the old one. Performance
gains will be even higher when BPF JIT is committed for the
new structure, which is planned in future work (as successive
JIT migrations).
BPF has also been stress-tested with trinity's BPF fuzzer.
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
This change is inspired by
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/4/16/14
which fixes the build warnings for arches that don't support
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.
In particular, there is no requirement for the return value of
secure_computing() to be checked unless the architecture supports
seccomp filter. Instead of silencing the warnings with (void)
a new static inline is added to encode the expected behavior
in a compiler and human friendly way.
v2: - cleans things up with a static inline
- removes sfr's signed-off-by since it is a different approach
v1: - matches sfr's original change
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Fixes this error message when CONFIG_SECCOMP is not set:
arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c: In function 'do_syscall_trace_enter':
arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c:1713:2: error: statement with no effect [-Werror=unused-value]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@ozlabs.au.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP,
and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.
When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the
tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that
results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. The 16-bit
SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as
the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.
If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no
system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified.
If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno
will be returned to userspace.
This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path. Any future
efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to
address this restriction.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: - rebase
- comment fatal_signal check
- acked-by
- drop secure_computing_int comment
v17: - ...
v16: - update PT_TRACE_MASK to 0xbf4 so that STOP isn't clear on SETOPTIONS call (indan@nul.nu)
[note PT_TRACE_MASK disappears in linux-next]
v15: - add audit support for non-zero return codes
- clean up style (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda615
(Brings back a change to ptrace.c and the masks.)
v12: - rebase to linux-next
- use ptrace_event and update arch/Kconfig to mention slow-path dependency
- drop all tracehook changes and inclusion (oleg@redhat.com)
v11: - invert the logic to just make it a PTRACE_SYSCALL accelerator
(indan@nul.nu)
v10: - moved to PTRACE_O_SECCOMP / PT_TRACE_SECCOMP
v9: - n/a
v8: - guarded PTRACE_SECCOMP use with an ifdef
v7: - introduced
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Adds a new return value to seccomp filters that triggers a SIGSYS to be
delivered with the new SYS_SECCOMP si_code.
This allows in-process system call emulation, including just specifying
an errno or cleanly dumping core, rather than just dying.
Suggested-by: Markus Gutschke <markus@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: - acked-by, rebase
- don't mention secure_computing_int() anymore
v15: - use audit_seccomp/skip
- pad out error spacing; clean up switch (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - n/a
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda615
v12: - rebase on to linux-next
v11: - clarify the comment (indan@nul.nu)
- s/sigtrap/sigsys
v10: - use SIGSYS, syscall_get_arch, updates arch/Kconfig
note suggested-by (though original suggestion had other behaviors)
v9: - changes to SIGILL
v8: - clean up based on changes to dependent patches
v7: - introduction
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This change adds the SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO as a valid return value from a
seccomp filter. Additionally, it makes the first use of the lower
16-bits for storing a filter-supplied errno. 16-bits is more than
enough for the errno-base.h calls.
Returning errors instead of immediately terminating processes that
violate seccomp policy allow for broader use of this functionality
for kernel attack surface reduction. For example, a linux container
could maintain a whitelist of pre-existing system calls but drop
all new ones with errnos. This would keep a logically static attack
surface while providing errnos that may allow for graceful failure
without the downside of do_exit() on a bad call.
This change also changes the signature of __secure_computing. It
appears the only direct caller is the arm entry code and it clobbers
any possible return value (register) immediately.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: - fix up comments and rebase
- fix bad var name which was fixed in later revs
- remove _int() and just change the __secure_computing signature
v16-v17: ...
v15: - use audit_seccomp and add a skip label. (eparis@redhat.com)
- clean up and pad out return codes (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - no change/rebase
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda615
v12: - move to WARN_ON if filter is NULL
(oleg@redhat.com, luto@mit.edu, keescook@chromium.org)
- return immediately for filter==NULL (keescook@chromium.org)
- change evaluation to only compare the ACTION so that layered
errnos don't result in the lowest one being returned.
(keeschook@chromium.org)
v11: - check for NULL filter (keescook@chromium.org)
v10: - change loaders to fn
v9: - n/a
v8: - update Kconfig to note new need for syscall_set_return_value.
- reordered such that TRAP behavior follows on later.
- made the for loop a little less indent-y
v7: - introduced
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
[This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264
The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here:
https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp
Complete diff here:
https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp
]
This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the
ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering
policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program.
This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call
the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format
of struct seccomp_data.
A filter program may be installed by calling:
struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... };
...
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog);
The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is
allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed
allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly
by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached
programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to
proceed.
Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve.
However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged
(!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This
ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect
privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary).
There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are
as follows:
- BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time
- BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood
- Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired
arguments
- No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible.
- system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying
required for system call policy decisions.
Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable
HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on
syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will
add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series.
Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be
the desired additional functionality.
No architectures are enabled in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2
- s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org)
- allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu)
- add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@)
- fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@)
- added acked-by
v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com)
- tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000
v16: - no change
v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter
size (indan@nul.nu)
- drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu)
- return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu)
- move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu)
- drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu)
- only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu)
- exit_code -> exit_sig
v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct
(indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org)
- adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user
- add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c
- lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB
- moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation
(all of the above: indan@nul.nu)
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda615
v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com)
- removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu)
- reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu)
v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com)
- style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu)
- do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu)
- pare down Kconfig doc reference.
- extra comment clean up
v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing
(hpa@zytor.com)
- calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch.
This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters.
(hpa@zytor.com)
- lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!)
v9: - n/a
v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns
- Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu:
-- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code,
-- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat.
-- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch
dependencies
v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others)
- added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
- merged into seccomp.c
- minimal seccomp_filter.h
- no config option (part of seccomp)
- no new prctl
- doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h
(works but arg access always fails)
- dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ...
- dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths
- merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter
v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure
- require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter
installation. (luto@mit.edu)
- s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com)
- cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com)
- on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something)
v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments
(indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org)
- uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to
handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate
proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for
endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof().
(mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu)
- update Kconfig description
- add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation
- (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading
- drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com)
v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
- now uses current->no_new_privs
(luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com)
- assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
- fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
- reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com)
- init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com)
- drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com)
- alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com)
- adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per
torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu
v2: - (patch 2 only)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Replaces the seccomp_t typedef with struct seccomp to match modern
kernel style.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: rebase
...
v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda615
v12: rebase on to linux-next
v8-v11: no changes
v7: struct seccomp_struct -> struct seccomp
v6: original inclusion in this series.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
There's a fair amount of code in the vsyscall page. It contains
a syscall instruction (in the gettimeofday fallback) and who
knows what will happen if an exploit jumps into the middle of
some other code.
Reduce the risk by replacing the vsyscalls with short magic
incantations that cause the kernel to emulate the real
vsyscalls. These incantations are useless if entered in the
middle.
This causes vsyscalls to be a little more expensive than real
syscalls. Fortunately sensible programs don't use them.
The only exception is time() which is still called by glibc
through the vsyscall - but calling time() millions of times
per second is not sensible. glibc has this fixed in the
development tree.
This patch is not perfect: the vread_tsc and vread_hpet
functions are still at a fixed address. Fixing that might
involve making alternative patching work in the vDSO.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
Cc: richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
Cc: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Louis Rilling <Louis.Rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: pageexec@freemail.hu
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e64e1b3c64858820d12c48fa739efbd1485e79d5.1307292171.git.luto@mit.edu
[ Removed the CONFIG option - it's simpler to just do it unconditionally. Tidied up the code as well. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
<linux/seccomp.h> uses EINVAL so should include <linux/errno.h>. This
fixes a build error on 64-bit MIPS if CONFIG_SECCOMP is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This follows a suggestion from Chuck Ebbert on how to make seccomp
absolutely zerocost in schedule too. The only remaining footprint of
seccomp is in terms of the bzImage size that becomes a few bytes (perhaps
even a few kbytes) larger, measure it if you care in the embedded.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This reduces the memory footprint and it enforces that only the current
task can enable seccomp on itself (this is a requirement for a
strightforward [modulo preempt ;) ] TIF_NOTSC implementation).
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove various things which were checking for gcc-1.x and gcc-2.x compilers.
From: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Some documentation updates and removes some code paths for gcc < 3.2.
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
I believe at least for seccomp it's worth to turn off the tsc, not just for
HT but for the L2 cache too. So it's up to you, either you turn it off
completely (which isn't very nice IMHO) or I recommend to apply this below
patch.
This has been tested successfully on x86-64 against current cogito
repository (i686 compiles so I didn't bother testing ;). People selling
the cpu through cpushare may appreciate this bit for a peace of mind.
There's no way to get any timing info anymore with this applied
(gettimeofday is forbidden of course). The seccomp environment is
completely deterministic so it can't be allowed to get timing info, it has
to be deterministic so in the future I can enable a computing mode that
does a parallel computing for each task with server side transparent
checkpointing and verification that the output is the same from all the 2/3
seller computers for each task, without the buyer even noticing (for now
the verification is left to the buyer client side and there's no
checkpointing, since that would require more kernel changes to track the
dirty bits but it'll be easy to extend once the basic mode is finished).
Eliminating a cold-cache read of the cr4 global variable will save one
cacheline during the tlb flush while making the code per-cpu-safe at the
same time. Thanks to Mikael Pettersson for noticing the tlb flush wasn't
per-cpu-safe.
The global tlb flush can run from irq (IPI calling do_flush_tlb_all) but
it'll be transparent to the switch_to code since the IPI won't make any
change to the cr4 contents from the point of view of the interrupted code
and since it's now all per-cpu stuff, it will not race. So no need to
disable irqs in switch_to slow path.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
Kees Cook