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Merge branch 'ima-buffer-measurement-changes-v4' into next-integrity 

Based on cover letter "ima: Provide more info about buffer measurement":

Providing more information about buffer measurements requires
modification of the existing functions ima_measure_critical_data()
and process_buffer_measurement().  Unlike for file measurements,
there is no integrity_iint_cache structure for storing and retrieving
buffer measurements.

With these changes, kernel subsystems relying on IMA to measure
critical data don't have to duplicate the function to calculate the
buffer digest but, instead, can get directly the one that IMA would
insert, depending on the policy, in the new measurement list entry.
This commit is contained in:
Mimi Zohar 2021-07-23 09:39:52 -04:00
parent a32ad90426 ca3c9bdb10
commit e37be5343a
8 changed files with 79 additions and 38 deletions
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23
include/linux/ima.h
View File

@ -11,9 +11,11 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
struct linux_binprm;
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
@ -33,10 +35,10 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
const char *event_name,
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
bool hash);
extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
const char *event_name,
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
@ -64,6 +66,11 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
#endif
#else
static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
{
return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
}
static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
@ -137,10 +144,14 @@ static inline int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size
static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
const char *event_name,
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
bool hash) {}
bool hash, u8 *digest,
size_t digest_len)
{
return -ENOENT;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */

10
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
View File

@ -264,11 +264,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
bool buf_hash);
int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,

2
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
View File

@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
pcr, NULL, false);
pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0);
}
return rc;

2
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
View File

@ -62,5 +62,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
*/
process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, payload, payload_len,
keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
keyring->description, false);
keyring->description, false, NULL, 0);
}

3
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
View File

@ -154,7 +154,8 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
ima_init_key_queue();
ima_measure_critical_data("kernel_info", "kernel_version",
UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE), false);
UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE), false,
NULL, 0);
return rc;
}

69
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
View File

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
int ima_appraise;
#endif
int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
static int hash_setup_done;
static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = {
@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ out:
}
__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
{
return ima_hash_algo;
}
/* Prevent mmap'ing a file execute that is already mmap'ed write */
static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
char **pathbuf, const char **pathname,
@ -822,7 +827,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
return 0;
}
/*
/**
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
@ -833,14 +838,20 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
* @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
* @buf_hash: measure buffer data hash
* @digest: buffer digest will be written to
* @digest_len: buffer length
*
* Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
*
* Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
* has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
* a negative value otherwise.
*/
void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
bool buf_hash)
int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
{
int ret = 0;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@ -861,8 +872,11 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int action = 0;
u32 secid;
if (!ima_policy_flag)
return;
if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
return -EINVAL;
if (!ima_policy_flag && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
template = ima_template_desc_buf();
if (!template) {
@ -883,8 +897,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
}
if (!pcr)
@ -914,6 +928,12 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
event_data.buf_len = digest_hash_len;
}
if (digest)
memcpy(digest, iint.ima_hash->digest, digest_hash_len);
if (!ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE)))
return 1;
ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
if (ret < 0) {
audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
@ -932,7 +952,7 @@ out:
func_measure_str(func),
audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
return;
return ret;
}
/**
@ -956,7 +976,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
NULL, false);
NULL, false, NULL, 0);
fdput(f);
}
@ -967,23 +987,30 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
* @buf: pointer to buffer data
* @buf_len: length of buffer data (in bytes)
* @hash: measure buffer data hash
* @digest: buffer digest will be written to
* @digest_len: buffer length
*
* Measure data critical to the integrity of the kernel into the IMA log
* and extend the pcr. Examples of critical data could be various data
* structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can
* impact the integrity of the system.
*
* Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
* has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
* a negative value otherwise.
*/
void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
const char *event_name,
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
bool hash)
int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
const char *event_name,
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
{
if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
return;
return -ENOPARAM;
process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_label,
hash);
return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
event_label, hash, digest,
digest_len);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)

2
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
View File

@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
entry->keyring_name,
KEY_CHECK, 0,
entry->keyring_name,
false);
false, NULL, 0);
list_del(&entry->list);
ima_free_key_entry(entry);
}

6
security/selinux/ima.c
View File

@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
}
ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-state",
state_str, strlen(state_str), false);
state_str, strlen(state_str), false,
NULL, 0);
kfree(state_str);
@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
}
ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-policy-hash",
policy, policy_len, true);
policy, policy_len, true,
NULL, 0);
vfree(policy);
}