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Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (30 commits)
  MAINTAINERS: Add tomoyo-dev-en ML.
  SELinux: define permissions for DCB netlink messages
  encrypted-keys: style and other cleanup
  encrypted-keys: verify datablob size before converting to binary
  trusted-keys: kzalloc and other cleanup
  trusted-keys: additional TSS return code and other error handling
  syslog: check cap_syslog when dmesg_restrict
  Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories
  selinux: cache sidtab_context_to_sid results
  SELinux: do not compute transition labels on mountpoint labeled filesystems
  This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running.
  SELinux: merge policydb_index_classes and policydb_index_others
  selinux: convert part of the sym_val_to_name array to use flex_array
  selinux: convert type_val_to_struct to flex_array
  flex_array: fix flex_array_put_ptr macro to be valid C
  SELinux: do not set automatic i_ino in selinuxfs
  selinux: rework security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid
  SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
  SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
  SELinux: standardize return code handling in policydb.c
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2011-01-10 11:18:59 -08:00
parent a08948812b aeda4ac3ef
commit e0e736fc0d
37 changed files with 3918 additions and 1078 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

145
Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
Trusted and Encrypted Keys
Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel
key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetic keys,
and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees,
stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability
of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for greater security, while Encrypted
Keys can be used on any system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded
in hex ascii for convenience, and are integrity verified.
Trusted Keys use a TPM both to generate and to seal the keys. Keys are sealed
under a 2048 bit RSA key in the TPM, and optionally sealed to specified PCR
(integrity measurement) values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob
integrity verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
(future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new pcr values, such as
when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can have many saved
blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are easily supported.
By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the default
authorization value (20 zeros). This can be set at takeownership time with the
trouser's utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z".
Usage:
keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring
keyctl update key "update [options]"
keyctl print keyid
options:
keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK)
keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
(40 ascii zeros)
blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
(40 ascii zeros)
blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
(40 ascii zeros)
pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
default 1 (resealing allowed)
"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit
within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding.
Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they use AES for
encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel generated random
numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified 'master' key. The
'master' key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main
disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key,
they are only as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key
should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in
boot.
Usage:
keyctl add encrypted name "new key-type:master-key-name keylen" ring
keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"
where 'key-type' is either 'trusted' or 'user'.
Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage:
Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes:
$ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u
440502848
$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: _ses
97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.500
440502848 --alswrv 500 500 \_ trusted: kmk
$ keyctl print 440502848
0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
$ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob
Load a trusted key from the saved blob:
$ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u
268728824
$ keyctl print 268728824
0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values:
$ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`"
$ keyctl print 268728824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Create and save an encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk":
$ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u
159771175
$ keyctl print 159771175
trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55
be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64
5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
$ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob
Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:
$ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u
831684262
$ keyctl print 831684262
trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55
be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64
5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high
quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a
trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been
compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to specific boot PCR
values, protects against boot and offline attacks. Other uses for trusted and
encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption are anticipated.

2
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
View File

@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ dmesg_restrict:
This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from using
dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log buffer. When
dmesg_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions. When
dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use
dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYSLOG to use
dmesg(8).
The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT sets the default

3
MAINTAINERS
View File

@ -5930,7 +5930,8 @@ F: drivers/net/tlan.*
TOMOYO SECURITY MODULE
M: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
M: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and users in English)
L: tomoyo-dev-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in English)
L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in English)
L: tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese)
L: tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese)
W: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/

20
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
View File

@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
if (chip == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, pcr_idx, res_buf);
module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
tpm_chip_put(chip);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
@ -775,11 +775,27 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
tpm_chip_put(chip);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend);
int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip;
int rc;
chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
if (chip == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
rc = transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, "attempting tpm_cmd");
tpm_chip_put(chip);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send);
ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{

5
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
View File

@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ struct tpm_chip {
#define to_tpm_chip(n) container_of(n, struct tpm_chip, vendor)
static inline void tpm_chip_put(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
}
static inline int tpm_read_index(int base, int index)
{
outb(index, base);

29
include/keys/encrypted-type.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
* Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*/
#ifndef _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H
#define _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
struct encrypted_key_payload {
struct rcu_head rcu;
char *master_desc; /* datablob: master key name */
char *datalen; /* datablob: decrypted key length */
u8 *iv; /* datablob: iv */
u8 *encrypted_data; /* datablob: encrypted data */
unsigned short datablob_len; /* length of datablob */
unsigned short decrypted_datalen; /* decrypted data length */
u8 decrypted_data[0]; /* decrypted data + datablob + hmac */
};
extern struct key_type key_type_encrypted;
#endif /* _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H */

31
include/keys/trusted-type.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
* Author: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*/
#ifndef _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H
#define _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32
#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 320
struct trusted_key_payload {
struct rcu_head rcu;
unsigned int key_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
unsigned char migratable;
unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1];
unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
};
extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
#endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */

7
include/linux/capability.h
View File

@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
/* Allow administration of the random device */
/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
/* Allow setting the domainname */
/* Allow setting the hostname */
/* Allow calling bdflush() */
@ -352,7 +351,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_MAC_ADMIN
/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
#define CAP_SYSLOG 34
#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYSLOG
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)

2
include/linux/flex_array.h
View File

@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ void *flex_array_get(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr);
int flex_array_shrink(struct flex_array *fa);
#define flex_array_put_ptr(fa, nr, src, gfp) \
flex_array_put(fa, nr, &(void *)(src), gfp)
flex_array_put(fa, nr, (void *)&(src), gfp)
void *flex_array_get_ptr(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr);

3
include/linux/kernel.h
View File

@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
#define FIELD_SIZEOF(t, f) (sizeof(((t*)0)->f))
#define DIV_ROUND_UP(n,d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d))
/* The `const' in roundup() prevents gcc-3.3 from calling __divdi3 */
#define roundup(x, y) ( \
{ \
const typeof(y) __y = y; \
@ -263,6 +265,7 @@ static inline char *pack_hex_byte(char *buf, u8 byte)
}
extern int hex_to_bin(char ch);
extern void hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count);
/*
* General tracing related utility functions - trace_printk(),

3
include/linux/security.h
View File

@ -1058,8 +1058,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to
* evaluate the security data on the key.
* @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
* Return 1 if permission granted, 0 if permission denied and -ve it the
* normal permissions model should be effected.
* Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
* @key_getsecurity:
* Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
* for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function

4
include/linux/tpm.h
View File

@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen);
#else
static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
return -ENODEV;
@ -38,5 +39,8 @@ static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) {
return -ENODEV;
}
static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) {
return -ENODEV;
}
#endif
#endif

28
include/linux/tpm_command.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__
#define __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__
/*
* TPM Command constants from specifications at
* http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
*/
/* Command TAGS */
#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193
#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND 194
#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND 195
#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND 196
#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND 197
#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND 198
/* Command Ordinals */
#define TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM 70
#define TPM_ORD_OSAP 11
#define TPM_ORD_OIAP 10
#define TPM_ORD_SEAL 23
#define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL 24
/* Other constants */
#define SRKHANDLE 0x40000000
#define TPM_NONCE_SIZE 20
#endif

4
include/linux/xattr.h
View File

@ -40,9 +40,13 @@
#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT"
#define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC"
#define XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE "SMACK64TRANSMUTE"
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX

14
kernel/printk.c
View File

@ -273,12 +273,12 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
* at open time.
*/
if (type == SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN || !from_file) {
if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */
if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
!capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */
}
error = security_syslog(type);
@ -422,6 +422,12 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
}
out:
return error;
warn:
/* remove after 2.6.39 */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
"but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated and denied).\n");
return -EPERM;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len)

16
lib/hexdump.c
View File

@ -33,6 +33,22 @@ int hex_to_bin(char ch)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex_to_bin);
/**
* hex2bin - convert an ascii hexadecimal string to its binary representation
* @dst: binary result
* @src: ascii hexadecimal string
* @count: result length
*/
void hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count)
{
while (count--) {
*dst = hex_to_bin(*src++) << 4;
*dst += hex_to_bin(*src++);
dst++;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex2bin);
/**
* hex_dump_to_buffer - convert a blob of data to "hex ASCII" in memory
* @buf: data blob to dump

31
security/Kconfig
View File

@ -21,6 +21,37 @@ config KEYS
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config TRUSTED_KEYS
tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA1
help
This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever
see encrypted blobs.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
depends on KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS
select CRYPTO_AES
select CRYPTO_CBC
select CRYPTO_SHA256
select CRYPTO_RNG
help
This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
depends on KEYS

2
security/keys/Makefile
View File

@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ obj-y := \
request_key_auth.o \
user_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o

903
security/keys/encrypted_defined.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,903 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
*
* Author:
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
* See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
*/
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include "encrypted_defined.h"
static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:";
static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:";
static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256";
static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)";
static const char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)";
static unsigned int ivsize;
static int blksize;
#define KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
#define KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
#define HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
#define MAX_DATA_SIZE 4096
#define MIN_DATA_SIZE 20
struct sdesc {
struct shash_desc shash;
char ctx[];
};
static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
enum {
Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update
};
static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{Opt_new, "new"},
{Opt_load, "load"},
{Opt_update, "update"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
static int aes_get_sizes(void)
{
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to alloc_cipher (%ld)\n",
PTR_ERR(tfm));
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
ivsize = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
blksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm);
return 0;
}
/*
* valid_master_desc - verify the 'key-type:desc' of a new/updated master-key
*
* key-type:= "trusted:" | "encrypted:"
* desc:= master-key description
*
* Verify that 'key-type' is valid and that 'desc' exists. On key update,
* only the master key description is permitted to change, not the key-type.
* The key-type remains constant.
*
* On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
*/
static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
{
if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
goto out;
if (orig_desc)
if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
goto out;
} else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
goto out;
if (orig_desc)
if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
goto out;
} else
goto out;
return 0;
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data
*
* datablob format:
* new <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
* load <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv + data>
* update <new-master-key name>
*
* Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token,
* which is null terminated.
*
* On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
*/
static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, char **master_desc,
char **decrypted_datalen, char **hex_encoded_iv)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int ret = -EINVAL;
int key_cmd;
char *p;
p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!p)
return ret;
key_cmd = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
*master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!*master_desc)
goto out;
if (valid_master_desc(*master_desc, NULL) < 0)
goto out;
if (decrypted_datalen) {
*decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!*decrypted_datalen)
goto out;
}
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_new:
if (!decrypted_datalen)
break;
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_load:
if (!decrypted_datalen)
break;
*hex_encoded_iv = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
if (!*hex_encoded_iv)
break;
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_update:
if (decrypted_datalen)
break;
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_err:
break;
}
out:
return ret;
}
/*
* datablob_format - format as an ascii string, before copying to userspace
*/
static char *datablob_format(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
size_t asciiblob_len)
{
char *ascii_buf, *bufp;
u8 *iv = epayload->iv;
int len;
int i;
ascii_buf = kmalloc(asciiblob_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ascii_buf)
goto out;
ascii_buf[asciiblob_len] = '\0';
/* copy datablob master_desc and datalen strings */
len = sprintf(ascii_buf, "%s %s ", epayload->master_desc,
epayload->datalen);
/* convert the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data and HMAC to ascii */
bufp = &ascii_buf[len];
for (i = 0; i < (asciiblob_len - len) / 2; i++)
bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, iv[i]);
out:
return ascii_buf;
}
/*
* request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
*
* Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
* manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
* data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
*/
static struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
struct key *tkey;
tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(tkey))
goto error;
down_read(&tkey->sem);
tpayload = rcu_dereference(tkey->payload.data);
*master_key = tpayload->key;
*master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
error:
return tkey;
}
/*
* request_user_key - request the user key
*
* Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key.
*/
static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key,
size_t *master_keylen)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload;
struct key *ukey;
ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ukey))
goto error;
down_read(&ukey->sem);
upayload = rcu_dereference(ukey->payload.data);
*master_key = upayload->data;
*master_keylen = upayload->datalen;
error:
return ukey;
}
static struct sdesc *alloc_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
{
struct sdesc *sdesc;
int size;
size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sdesc)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
return sdesc;
}
static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
struct sdesc *sdesc;
int ret;
sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hmacalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
if (!ret)
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest);
kfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
static int calc_hash(u8 *digest, const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
{
struct sdesc *sdesc;
int ret;
sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
}
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest);
kfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */
static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
{
u8 *derived_buf;
unsigned int derived_buf_len;
int ret;
derived_buf_len = strlen("AUTH_KEY") + 1 + master_keylen;
if (derived_buf_len < HASH_SIZE)
derived_buf_len = HASH_SIZE;
derived_buf = kzalloc(derived_buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!derived_buf) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: out of memory\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (key_type)
strcpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY");
else
strcpy(derived_buf, "ENC_KEY");
memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
master_keylen);
ret = calc_hash(derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
kfree(derived_buf);
return ret;
}
static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const u8 *key,
unsigned int key_len, const u8 *iv,
unsigned int ivsize)
{
int ret;
desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform (%ld)\n",
blkcipher_alg, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
return PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
}
desc->flags = 0;
ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, key, key_len);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to setkey (%d)\n", ret);
crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
return ret;
}
crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(desc->tfm, iv, ivsize);
return 0;
}
static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
{
struct key *mkey = NULL;
if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
mkey = request_trusted_key(epayload->master_desc +
KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN,
master_key, master_keylen);
} else if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX,
KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
mkey = request_user_key(epayload->master_desc +
KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN,
master_key, master_keylen);
} else
goto out;
if (IS_ERR(mkey))
pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not found",
epayload->master_desc);
if (mkey)
dump_master_key(*master_key, *master_keylen);
out:
return mkey;
}
/* Before returning data to userspace, encrypt decrypted data. */
static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const u8 *derived_key,
unsigned int derived_keylen)
{
struct scatterlist sg_in[2];
struct scatterlist sg_out[1];
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
unsigned int padlen;
char pad[16];
int ret;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen;
ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen,
epayload->iv, ivsize);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen);
crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
if (ret < 0)
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to encrypt (%d)\n", ret);
else
dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
out:
return ret;
}
static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
{
u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
u8 *digest;
int ret;
ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
digest = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len;
ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len);
if (!ret)
dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
out:
return ret;
}
/* verify HMAC before decrypting encrypted key */
static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
{
u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
u8 digest[HASH_SIZE];
int ret;
ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len,
sizeof digest);
if (ret) {
ret = -EINVAL;
dump_hmac("datablob",
epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len,
HASH_SIZE);
dump_hmac("calc", digest, HASH_SIZE);
}
out:
return ret;
}
static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const u8 *derived_key,
unsigned int derived_keylen)
{
struct scatterlist sg_in[1];
struct scatterlist sg_out[2];
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
char pad[16];
int ret;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen,
epayload->iv, ivsize);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 2);
sg_set_buf(sg_in, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof pad);
ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen);
crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
out:
return ret;
}
/* Allocate memory for decrypted key and datablob. */
static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
const char *master_desc,
const char *datalen)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
unsigned short datablob_len;
unsigned short decrypted_datalen;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
long dlen;
int ret;
ret = strict_strtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
decrypted_datalen = dlen;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize);
datablob_len = strlen(master_desc) + 1 + strlen(datalen) + 1
+ ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen;
ret = key_payload_reserve(key, decrypted_datalen + datablob_len
+ HASH_SIZE + 1);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + decrypted_datalen +
datablob_len + HASH_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!epayload)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
epayload->decrypted_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
epayload->datablob_len = datablob_len;
return epayload;
}
static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const char *hex_encoded_iv)
{
struct key *mkey;
u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
u8 *master_key;
u8 *hmac;
const char *hex_encoded_data;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
size_t master_keylen;
size_t asciilen;
int ret;
encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
asciilen = (ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen + HASH_SIZE) * 2;
if (strlen(hex_encoded_iv) != asciilen)
return -EINVAL;
hex_encoded_data = hex_encoded_iv + (2 * ivsize) + 2;
hex2bin(epayload->iv, hex_encoded_iv, ivsize);
hex2bin(epayload->encrypted_data, hex_encoded_data, encrypted_datalen);
hmac = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len;
hex2bin(hmac, hex_encoded_data + (encrypted_datalen * 2), HASH_SIZE);
mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
if (IS_ERR(mkey))
return PTR_ERR(mkey);
ret = datablob_hmac_verify(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: bad hmac (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = derived_key_decrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
if (ret < 0)
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to decrypt key (%d)\n", ret);
out:
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
return ret;
}
static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const char *master_desc, const char *datalen)
{
epayload->master_desc = epayload->decrypted_data
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen;
epayload->datalen = epayload->master_desc + strlen(master_desc) + 1;
epayload->iv = epayload->datalen + strlen(datalen) + 1;
epayload->encrypted_data = epayload->iv + ivsize + 1;
memcpy(epayload->master_desc, master_desc, strlen(master_desc));
memcpy(epayload->datalen, datalen, strlen(datalen));
}
/*
* encrypted_init - initialize an encrypted key
*
* For a new key, use a random number for both the iv and data
* itself. For an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
*/
static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
const char *master_desc, const char *datalen,
const char *hex_encoded_iv)
{
int ret = 0;
__ekey_init(epayload, master_desc, datalen);
if (!hex_encoded_iv) {
get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
} else
ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, hex_encoded_iv);
return ret;
}
/*
* encrypted_instantiate - instantiate an encrypted key
*
* Decrypt an existing encrypted datablob or create a new encrypted key
* based on a kernel random number.
*
* On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
*/
static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
size_t datalen)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
char *datablob = NULL;
char *master_desc = NULL;
char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
int ret;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
datablob[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &master_desc, &decrypted_datalen,
&hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, master_desc, decrypted_datalen);
if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
goto out;
}
ret = encrypted_init(epayload, master_desc, decrypted_datalen,
hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(epayload);
goto out;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, epayload);
out:
kfree(datablob);
return ret;
}
static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
kfree(epayload);
}
/*
* encrypted_update - update the master key description
*
* Change the master key description for an existing encrypted key.
* The next read will return an encrypted datablob using the new
* master key description.
*
* On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
*/
static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
char *buf;
char *new_master_desc = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
return -EINVAL;
buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(buf, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = valid_master_desc(new_master_desc, epayload->master_desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, new_master_desc,
epayload->datalen);
if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
goto out;
}
__ekey_init(new_epayload, new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
memcpy(new_epayload->iv, epayload->iv, ivsize);
memcpy(new_epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_epayload);
call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
out:
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
/*
* encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace
*
* The resulting datablob format is:
* <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data>
*
* On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size.
*/
static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
size_t buflen)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
struct key *mkey;
u8 *master_key;
size_t master_keylen;
char derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
char *ascii_buf;
size_t asciiblob_len;
int ret;
epayload = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
/* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */
asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1
+ roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize)
+ (HASH_SIZE * 2);
if (!buffer || buflen < asciiblob_len)
return asciiblob_len;
mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
if (IS_ERR(mkey))
return PTR_ERR(mkey);
ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = derived_key_encrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = datablob_hmac_append(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ascii_buf = datablob_format(epayload, asciiblob_len);
if (!ascii_buf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
kfree(ascii_buf);
return asciiblob_len;
out:
up_read(&mkey->sem);
key_put(mkey);
return ret;
}
/*
* encrypted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
*
* Before freeing the key, clear the memory containing the decrypted
* key data.
*/
static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
if (!epayload)
return;
memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
kfree(key->payload.data);
}
struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
.name = "encrypted",
.instantiate = encrypted_instantiate,
.update = encrypted_update,
.match = user_match,
.destroy = encrypted_destroy,
.describe = user_describe,
.read = encrypted_read,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_encrypted);
static void encrypted_shash_release(void)
{
if (hashalg)
crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
if (hmacalg)
crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
}
static int __init encrypted_shash_alloc(void)
{
int ret;
hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
hmac_alg);
return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
}
hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
hash_alg);
ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
goto hashalg_fail;
}
return 0;
hashalg_fail:
crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
return ret;
}
static int __init init_encrypted(void)
{
int ret;
ret = encrypted_shash_alloc();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
return aes_get_sizes();
out:
encrypted_shash_release();
return ret;
}
static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
{
encrypted_shash_release();
unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
}
late_initcall(init_encrypted);
module_exit(cleanup_encrypted);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

54
security/keys/encrypted_defined.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
#ifndef __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
#define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
#define ENCRYPTED_DEBUG 0
#if ENCRYPTED_DEBUG
static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
{
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "master key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
master_key, master_keylen, 0);
}
static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload)
{
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "decrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen, 0);
}
static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
unsigned int encrypted_datalen)
{
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "encrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen, 0);
}
static inline void dump_hmac(const char *str, const u8 *digest,
unsigned int hmac_size)
{
if (str)
pr_info("encrypted_key: %s", str);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "hmac: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1, digest,
hmac_size, 0);
}
#else
static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
{
}
static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload)
{
}
static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
unsigned int encrypted_datalen)
{
}
static inline void dump_hmac(const char *str, const u8 *digest,
unsigned int hmac_size)
{
}
#endif
#endif

1175
security/keys/trusted_defined.c Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

134
security/keys/trusted_defined.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H
#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H
/* implementation specific TPM constants */
#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64
#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512
#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36
#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10
#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87
#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104
#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
struct tpm_buf {
int len;
unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE];
};
#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)
struct osapsess {
uint32_t handle;
unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
};
/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
enum {
SEAL_keytype = 1,
SRK_keytype = 4
};
struct trusted_key_options {
uint16_t keytype;
uint32_t keyhandle;
unsigned char keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char blobauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
int pcrlock;
};
#define TPM_DEBUG 0
#if TPM_DEBUG
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
}
static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
{
pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
{
print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n");
print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
}
static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
{
int len;
pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n");
len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
}
#else
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
}
static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
{
}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
{
}
static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
{
}
#endif
static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value)
{
buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
}
static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value)
{
*(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
buf->len += sizeof value;
}
static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value)
{
*(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
buf->len += sizeof value;
}
static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in,
const int len)
{
memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
buf->len += len;
}
#endif

5
security/selinux/hooks.c
View File

@ -2525,7 +2525,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);

2
security/selinux/include/classmap.h
View File

@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } },
{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } },
{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },

2
security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
View File

@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
{ RTM_NEWADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ RTM_DELADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ RTM_GETADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_GETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_SETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_firewall_perms[] =

661
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

6
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
View File

@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
struct policydb *p;
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
struct flex_array *fa;
booldatum = datum;
p = datap;
@ -200,7 +201,10 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
p->p_bool_val_to_name[booldatum->value - 1] = key;
fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS];
if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, booldatum->value - 1, key,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
BUG();
p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
return 0;

25
security/selinux/ss/mls.c
View File

@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
len += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[index_sens - 1]);
len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
/* categories */
head = -2;
@ -55,17 +55,17 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
if (i - prev > 1) {
/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
if (head != prev) {
nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i];
nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
head = i;
}
prev = i;
}
if (prev != head) {
nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
if (l == 0) {
@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
scontextp++;
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
strcpy(scontextp,
policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS,
context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
/* categories */
@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
*scontextp++ = ':';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i];
nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
head = i;
@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
return 0;
levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
p->p_sens_val_to_name[l->sens - 1]);
sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, l->sens - 1));
if (!levdatum)
return 0;
@ -482,7 +482,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
levdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_levels.table,
oldp->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
c->range.level[l].sens - 1));
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
@ -493,7 +494,7 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
int rc;
catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
if (!catdatum)
return -EINVAL;
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);

699
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

19
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
View File

@ -203,21 +203,13 @@ struct policydb {
#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
/* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
#define p_common_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS]
#define p_class_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES]
#define p_role_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES]
#define p_type_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES]
#define p_user_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS]
#define p_bool_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS]
#define p_sens_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS]
#define p_cat_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS]
struct flex_array *sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
/* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct;
struct flex_array *type_val_to_struct_array;
/* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
struct avtab te_avtab;
@ -321,6 +313,13 @@ static inline int put_entry(void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file
return 0;
}
static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num, unsigned int element_nr)
{
struct flex_array *fa = p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num];
return flex_array_get_ptr(fa, element_nr);
}
extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);

423
security/selinux/ss/services.c
View File

@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
if (!permissions)
return;
tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
@ -530,12 +530,18 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
struct context lo_scontext;
struct context lo_tcontext;
struct av_decision lo_avd;
struct type_datum *source
= policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
struct type_datum *target
= policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
struct type_datum *source;
struct type_datum *target;
u32 masked = 0;
source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
scontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!source);
target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
tcontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!target);
if (source->bounds) {
memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
@ -701,16 +707,16 @@ static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
goto out;
if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
goto out;
if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
"security_validate_transition: denied for"
" oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
out:
kfree(o);
kfree(n);
@ -801,10 +807,11 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
struct context *old_context, *new_context;
struct type_datum *type;
int index;
int rc = -EINVAL;
int rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EINVAL;
old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
if (!old_context) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
@ -812,6 +819,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
goto out;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
if (!new_context) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
@ -819,28 +827,27 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
/* type/domain unchanged */
if (old_context->type == new_context->type) {
rc = 0;
if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
goto out;
}
index = new_context->type;
while (true) {
type = policydb.type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
index - 1);
BUG_ON(!type);
/* not bounded anymore */
if (!type->bounds) {
rc = -EPERM;
rc = -EPERM;
if (!type->bounds)
break;
}
/* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
if (type->bounds == old_context->type) {
rc = 0;
rc = 0;
if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
break;
}
index = type->bounds;
}
@ -1005,9 +1012,9 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
}
/* Compute the size of the context. */
*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
if (!scontext)
@ -1023,12 +1030,12 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
* Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
*/
sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
scontextp += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) +
1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) +
1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
@ -1187,16 +1194,13 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
if (rc)
goto out;
if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) {
rc = -EINVAL;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
goto out;
}
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc)
@ -1235,27 +1239,26 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
if (force) {
/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
rc = -ENOMEM;
str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
if (!str) {
kfree(scontext2);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (!str)
goto out;
}
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab,
scontext2, scontext_len,
&context, def_sid);
rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
context.str = str;
context.len = scontext_len;
str = NULL;
} else if (rc)
goto out;
goto out_unlock;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
context_destroy(&context);
out:
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
out:
kfree(scontext2);
kfree(str);
return rc;
@ -1319,18 +1322,18 @@ static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
goto out;
if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
goto out;
if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
"security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
" for scontext=%s"
" tcontext=%s"
" tclass=%s",
n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
out:
kfree(s);
kfree(t);
@ -1569,22 +1572,17 @@ static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
{
int rc = 0;
char *s;
u32 len;
if (selinux_enforcing) {
rc = -EINVAL;
} else {
char *s;
u32 len;
if (selinux_enforcing)
return -EINVAL;
if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
s);
kfree(s);
}
if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
kfree(s);
}
return rc;
return 0;
}
struct convert_context_args {
@ -1621,17 +1619,17 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
if (c->str) {
struct context ctx;
rc = -ENOMEM;
s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
if (!s)
goto out;
}
rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(s);
if (!rc) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
c->str);
/* Replace string with mapped representation. */
kfree(c->str);
@ -1643,8 +1641,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
goto out;
} else {
/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
c->str, -rc);
goto out;
}
@ -1654,25 +1651,26 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
/* Convert the user. */
rc = -EINVAL;
usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
if (!usrdatum)
goto bad;
c->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Convert the role. */
rc = -EINVAL;
role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
if (!role)
goto bad;
c->role = role->value;
/* Convert the type. */
rc = -EINVAL;
typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
if (!typdatum)
goto bad;
c->type = typdatum->value;
@ -1700,6 +1698,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
oc = oc->next;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!oc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
" the initial SIDs list\n");
@ -1719,19 +1718,20 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
}
context_destroy(&oldc);
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
bad:
/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len))
return -ENOMEM;
rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
if (rc)
return rc;
context_destroy(&oldc);
context_destroy(c);
c->str = s;
c->len = len;
printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
c->str);
rc = 0;
goto out;
@ -2012,7 +2012,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
u32 addrlen,
u32 *out_sid)
{
int rc = 0;
int rc;
struct ocontext *c;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
@ -2021,10 +2021,9 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
case AF_INET: {
u32 addr;
if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
goto out;
}
addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
@ -2038,10 +2037,9 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
}
case AF_INET6:
if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
rc = -EINVAL;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
goto out;
}
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
while (c) {
if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
@ -2052,6 +2050,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
break;
default:
rc = 0;
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
goto out;
}
@ -2069,6 +2068,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
}
rc = 0;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
@ -2113,24 +2113,22 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
context_init(&usercon);
rc = -EINVAL;
fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
if (!fromcon) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!fromcon)
goto out_unlock;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
if (!user) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!user)
goto out_unlock;
}
usercon.user = user->value;
rc = -ENOMEM;
mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mysids) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
if (!mysids)
goto out_unlock;
}
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
@ -2147,12 +2145,11 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
if (mynel < maxnel) {
mysids[mynel++] = sid;
} else {
rc = -ENOMEM;
maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mysids2) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
if (!mysids2)
goto out_unlock;
}
memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
kfree(mysids);
mysids = mysids2;
@ -2160,7 +2157,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
}
}
}
rc = 0;
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc || !mynel) {
@ -2168,9 +2165,9 @@ out_unlock:
goto out;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mysids2) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
kfree(mysids);
goto out;
}
@ -2211,7 +2208,7 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
int rc, cmp = 0;
while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
path++;
@ -2219,6 +2216,7 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
@ -2226,11 +2224,9 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
break;
}
if (!genfs || cmp) {
*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
rc = -ENOENT;
rc = -ENOENT;
if (!genfs || cmp)
goto out;
}
for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
len = strlen(c->u.name);
@ -2239,21 +2235,18 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
break;
}
if (!c) {
*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
rc = -ENOENT;
rc = -ENOENT;
if (!c)
goto out;
}
if (!c->sid[0]) {
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
&c->context[0],
&c->sid[0]);
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
*sid = c->sid[0];
rc = 0;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
@ -2285,8 +2278,7 @@ int security_fs_use(
if (c) {
*behavior = c->v.behavior;
if (!c->sid[0]) {
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
&c->context[0],
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
&c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
@ -2309,34 +2301,39 @@ out:
int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
{
int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
int i, rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
*names = NULL;
*values = NULL;
rc = 0;
*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
if (!*len) {
rc = 0;
if (!*len)
goto out;
}
*names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
rc = -ENOMEM;
*names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*names)
goto err;
*values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
rc = -ENOMEM;
*values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*values)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
size_t name_len;
(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
(*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
name_len = strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i)) + 1;
rc = -ENOMEM;
(*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!(*names)[i])
goto err;
strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
strncpy((*names)[i], sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), name_len);
(*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
}
rc = 0;
@ -2355,24 +2352,23 @@ err:
int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
{
int i, rc = 0;
int i, rc;
int lenp, seqno = 0;
struct cond_node *cur;
write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EFAULT;
lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
if (len != lenp) {
rc = -EFAULT;
if (len != lenp)
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
!!values[i],
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
audit_get_loginuid(current),
@ -2391,7 +2387,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
}
seqno = ++latest_granting;
rc = 0;
out:
write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
if (!rc) {
@ -2405,16 +2401,15 @@ out:
int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
{
int rc = 0;
int rc;
int len;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EFAULT;
len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
if (bool >= len) {
rc = -EFAULT;
if (bool >= len)
goto out;
}
rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
out:
@ -2464,8 +2459,9 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
struct context newcon;
char *s;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
int rc;
rc = 0;
if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
*new_sid = sid;
goto out;
@ -2474,19 +2470,20 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
context_init(&newcon);
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EINVAL;
context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!context1) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
if (!context2) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, mls_sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
@ -2500,20 +2497,17 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
if (rc)
goto bad;
if (rc) {
if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
"security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
kfree(s);
}
goto out_unlock;
}
}
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
goto out_unlock;
bad:
if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
"security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
kfree(s);
}
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
context_destroy(&newcon);
@ -2549,6 +2543,8 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
struct context *nlbl_ctx;
struct context *xfrm_ctx;
*peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
/* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
* right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
* single or absent peer SID/label */
@ -2567,40 +2563,37 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
/* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
* nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
* security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
if (!policydb.mls_enabled) {
*peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
return 0;
}
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EINVAL;
nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
if (!nlbl_ctx) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, nlbl_sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_slowpath;
goto out;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
if (!xfrm_ctx) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, xfrm_sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_slowpath;
goto out;
}
rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
if (rc)
goto out;
out_slowpath:
/* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
* information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
* matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
* then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
* expressive */
*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc == 0)
/* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
* information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
* matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
* then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
* expressive */
*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
else
*peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
return rc;
}
@ -2619,10 +2612,11 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
{
int rc = -ENOMEM;
int rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -ENOMEM;
*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*classes)
@ -2630,7 +2624,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
*classes);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
kfree((*classes)[i]);
@ -2657,19 +2651,20 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
{
int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
int rc, i;
struct class_datum *match;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EINVAL;
match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
if (!match) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
__func__, class);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
*nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
*perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*perms)
@ -2678,13 +2673,13 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
if (match->comdatum) {
rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
get_permissions_callback, *perms);
if (rc < 0)
if (rc)
goto err;
}
rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
*perms);
if (rc < 0)
if (rc)
goto err;
out:
@ -2796,36 +2791,39 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
rc = -EINVAL;
userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
if (!userdatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
else
tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
goto out;
tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
rc = -EINVAL;
roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
if (!roledatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
else
tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
goto out;
tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
rc = -EINVAL;
typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
if (!typedatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
else
tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
goto out;
tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
}
rc = 0;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc) {
@ -3050,7 +3048,7 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
u32 *sid)
{
int rc = -EIDRM;
int rc;
struct context *ctx;
struct context ctx_new;
@ -3061,16 +3059,15 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
rc = 0;
} else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
rc = 0;
} else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
goto out;
context_init(&ctx_new);
ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
@ -3078,34 +3075,35 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0)
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
secattr->attr.mls.cat);
if (rc)
goto out;
memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
}
if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1)
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
rc = -EIDRM;
if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
goto out_free;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
if (rc != 0)
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
if (rc)
goto out_free;
security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
} else {
} else
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
rc = 0;
}
netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return 0;
out_free:
ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
}
/**
@ -3127,28 +3125,23 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
return 0;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -ENOENT;
ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (ctx == NULL) {
rc = -ENOENT;
goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
}
secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (secattr->domain == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
}
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
secattr->attr.secid = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
if (rc != 0)
goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return 0;
netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}

39
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
View File

@ -147,6 +147,17 @@ out:
return rc;
}
static void sidtab_update_cache(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_node *n, int loc)
{
BUG_ON(loc >= SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN);
while (loc > 0) {
s->cache[loc] = s->cache[loc - 1];
loc--;
}
s->cache[0] = n;
}
static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
struct context *context)
{
@ -156,14 +167,33 @@ static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
cur = s->htable[i];
while (cur) {
if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context))
if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context)) {
sidtab_update_cache(s, cur, SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN - 1);
return cur->sid;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
}
return 0;
}
static inline u32 sidtab_search_cache(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context)
{
int i;
struct sidtab_node *node;
for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN; i++) {
node = s->cache[i];
if (unlikely(!node))
return 0;
if (context_cmp(&node->context, context)) {
sidtab_update_cache(s, node, i);
return node->sid;
}
}
return 0;
}
int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
struct context *context,
u32 *out_sid)
@ -174,7 +204,9 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
*out_sid = SECSID_NULL;
sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
sid = sidtab_search_cache(s, context);
if (!sid)
sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
if (!sid) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
/* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */
@ -259,12 +291,15 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src)
{
unsigned long flags;
int i;
spin_lock_irqsave(&src->lock, flags);
dst->htable = src->htable;
dst->nel = src->nel;
dst->next_sid = src->next_sid;
dst->shutdown = 0;
for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN; i++)
dst->cache[i] = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->lock, flags);
}

2
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
View File

@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct sidtab {
unsigned int nel; /* number of elements */
unsigned int next_sid; /* next SID to allocate */
unsigned char shutdown;
#define SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN 3
struct sidtab_node *cache[SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN];
spinlock_t lock;
};

45
security/smack/smack.h
View File

@ -51,11 +51,18 @@ struct socket_smack {
*/
struct inode_smack {
char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
char *smk_task; /* label of the task */
struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */
int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
};
struct task_smack {
char *smk_task; /* label used for access control */
char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
};
#define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */
/*
* A label access rule.
@ -160,6 +167,10 @@ struct smack_known {
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL 255 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM 239 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
/*
* Flag for transmute access
*/
#define MAY_TRANSMUTE 64
/*
* Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
*/
@ -191,6 +202,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
/*
* These functions are in smack_access.c
*/
int smk_access_entry(char *, char *);
int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
@ -233,6 +245,15 @@ static inline void smack_catset_bit(int cat, char *catsetp)
catsetp[(cat - 1) / 8] |= 0x80 >> ((cat - 1) % 8);
}
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
{
struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
}
/*
* Present a pointer to the smack label in an inode blob.
*/
@ -242,6 +263,30 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
return sip->smk_inode;
}
/*
* Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob.
*/
static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
{
return tsp->smk_task;
}
/*
* Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob.
*/
static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
{
return tsp->smk_forked;
}
/*
* Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
*/
static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
{
return smk_of_task(current_security());
}
/*
* logging functions
*/

58
security/smack/smack_access.c
View File

@ -66,6 +66,46 @@ static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
*/
int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
/**
* smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
* @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
* @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
*
* This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
* access rule list and returns pointer to the matching rule if found,
* NULL otherwise.
*
* NOTE:
* Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list
* labels that come in off the network can't be imported
* and added to the list for locking reasons.
*
* Therefore, it is necessary to check the contents of the labels,
* not just the pointer values. Of course, in most cases the labels
* will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
* optimization.
*/
int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
{
u32 may = MAY_NOT;
struct smack_rule *srp;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) {
may = srp->smk_access;
break;
}
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return may;
}
/**
* smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
* @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
@ -90,7 +130,6 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
u32 may = MAY_NOT;
struct smack_rule *srp;
int rc = 0;
/*
@ -144,18 +183,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
* access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
* good.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) {
may = srp->smk_access;
break;
}
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label);
/*
* This is a bit map operation.
*/
@ -185,7 +213,7 @@ out_audit:
int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
int rc;
char *sp = current_security();
char *sp = smk_of_current();
rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
@ -196,7 +224,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
* only one that gets privilege and current does not
* have that label.
*/
if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security)
if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
goto out_audit;
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))

354
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
View File

@ -3,12 +3,14 @@
*
* This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
*
* Author:
* Authors:
* Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
* Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@ -35,6 +37,9 @@
#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
/**
* smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
* @ip: a pointer to the inode
@ -43,7 +48,7 @@
* Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
* or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
*/
static char *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
{
int rc;
char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
@ -51,7 +56,7 @@ static char *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
return NULL;
rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
if (rc < 0)
return NULL;
@ -103,8 +108,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
sp = current_security();
tsp = task_security(ctp);
sp = smk_of_current();
tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
@ -138,8 +143,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
sp = current_security();
tsp = task_security(ptp);
sp = smk_of_current();
tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
/* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
@ -160,7 +165,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
{
int rc = 0;
char *sp = current_security();
char *sp = smk_of_current();
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
@ -390,6 +395,40 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/*
* BPRM hooks
*/
static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = bprm->cred->security;
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct dentry *dp;
int rc;
rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
if (bprm->file == NULL || bprm->file->f_dentry == NULL)
return 0;
dp = bprm->file->f_dentry;
if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
return 0;
isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
if (isp->smk_task != NULL)
tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
return 0;
}
/*
* Inode hooks
*/
@ -402,7 +441,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
*/
static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current_security());
inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
if (inode->i_security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
@ -434,6 +473,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
{
char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
u32 may;
if (name) {
*name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
@ -442,6 +483,16 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
}
if (value) {
may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp);
/*
* If the access rule allows transmutation and
* the directory requests transmutation then
* by all means transmute.
*/
if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
isp = dsp;
*value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
if (*value == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
@ -664,7 +715,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
/*
@ -674,6 +726,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
rc = -EINVAL;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
rc = -EINVAL;
} else
rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@ -700,26 +758,23 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inode_smack *isp;
char *nsp;
struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
/*
* Not SMACK
*/
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
return;
isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
/*
* No locking is done here. This is a pointer
* assignment.
*/
nsp = smk_import(value, size);
if (nsp != NULL)
isp->smk_inode = nsp;
else
isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
nsp = smk_import(value, size);
if (nsp != NULL)
isp->smk_inode = nsp;
else
isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
nsp = smk_import(value, size);
if (nsp != NULL)
isp->smk_task = nsp;
else
isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
return;
}
@ -752,12 +807,15 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
*/
static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
} else
@ -768,6 +826,11 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
if (rc == 0)
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc == 0) {
isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
isp->smk_task = NULL;
}
return rc;
}
@ -895,7 +958,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
*/
static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
file->f_security = current_security();
file->f_security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
@ -1005,7 +1068,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
*/
static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
file->f_security = current_security();
file->f_security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
@ -1025,7 +1088,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
struct file *file;
int rc;
char *tsp = tsk->cred->security;
char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
/*
@ -1082,7 +1145,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
*/
static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
cred->security = NULL;
cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
if (cred->security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
@ -1097,7 +1162,7 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
*/
static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
cred->security = NULL;
kfree(cred->security);
}
/**
@ -1111,7 +1176,16 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
new->security = old->security;
struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
struct task_smack *new_tsp;
new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
if (new_tsp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
new->security = new_tsp;
return 0;
}
@ -1124,7 +1198,11 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
new->security = old->security;
struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
}
/**
@ -1136,12 +1214,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*/
static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
if (smack == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
new->security = smack;
new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
return 0;
}
@ -1157,8 +1236,10 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
new->security = isp->smk_inode;
tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
return 0;
}
@ -1175,7 +1256,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access)
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
return smk_curacc(task_security(p), access, &ad);
return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
}
/**
@ -1221,7 +1302,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
*secid = smack_to_secid(task_security(p));
*secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
}
/**
@ -1333,14 +1414,15 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* can write the receiver.
*/
if (secid == 0)
return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
&ad);
/*
* If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p),
MAY_WRITE, &ad);
return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
@ -1352,12 +1434,12 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
char *sp = current_security();
char *tsp = task_security(p);
char *sp = smk_of_current();
char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
int rc;
/* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
goto out_log;
@ -1378,7 +1460,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
out_log:
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
return rc;
}
@ -1392,7 +1474,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
isp->smk_inode = task_security(p);
isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
}
/*
@ -1411,7 +1493,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
*/
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
char *csp = current_security();
char *csp = smk_of_current();
struct socket_smack *ssp;
ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
@ -1667,10 +1749,13 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
ssp->smk_in = sp;
else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
ssp->smk_out = sp;
rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
__func__, -rc);
if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING
"Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
__func__, -rc);
}
} else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@ -1749,7 +1834,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
*/
static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
msg->security = current_security();
msg->security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
@ -1785,7 +1870,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
isp->security = current_security();
isp->security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
@ -1908,7 +1993,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
isp->security = current_security();
isp->security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
@ -2026,7 +2111,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
kisp->security = current_security();
kisp->security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
@ -2198,9 +2283,11 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
struct super_block *sbp;
struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
struct inode_smack *isp;
char *csp = current_security();
char *csp = smk_of_current();
char *fetched;
char *final;
char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
int transflag = 0;
struct dentry *dp;
if (inode == NULL)
@ -2267,9 +2354,10 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
break;
case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
/*
* Casey says sockets get the smack of the task.
* Socket access is controlled by the socket
* structures associated with the task involved.
*/
final = csp;
final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
break;
case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
/*
@ -2296,7 +2384,16 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
/*
* This isn't an understood special case.
* Get the value from the xattr.
*
*/
/*
* UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
*/
if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
break;
}
/*
* No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
* Use the aforeapplied default.
* It would be curious if the label of the task
@ -2308,9 +2405,21 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
* Get the dentry for xattr.
*/
dp = dget(opt_dentry);
fetched = smk_fetch(inode, dp);
if (fetched != NULL)
fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
if (fetched != NULL) {
final = fetched;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
trattr[0] = '\0';
inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
trattr, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
if (strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) == 0)
transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
}
}
isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
dput(dp);
break;
}
@ -2320,7 +2429,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
else
isp->smk_inode = final;
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
unlockandout:
mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
@ -2345,7 +2454,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
cp = kstrdup(task_security(p), GFP_KERNEL);
cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (cp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
@ -2369,6 +2478,8 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct task_smack *tsp;
struct task_smack *oldtsp;
struct cred *new;
char *newsmack;
@ -2398,10 +2509,18 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
return -EPERM;
oldtsp = p->cred->security;
new = prepare_creds();
if (new == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
new->security = newsmack;
tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tsp == NULL) {
kfree(new);
return -ENOMEM;
}
tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked;
new->security = tsp;
commit_creds(new);
return size;
}
@ -2418,14 +2537,18 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
{
struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock->sk_socket);
struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other->sk_socket);
struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op),
MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
return rc;
}
/**
@ -2438,13 +2561,18 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
return rc;
}
/**
@ -2629,7 +2757,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
/**
* smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
* @sock: the socket
* @sock: the peer socket
* @skb: packet data
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
*
@ -2640,41 +2768,39 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sock *sk;
struct socket_smack *sp;
char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
int family = PF_INET;
u32 s;
int family = PF_UNSPEC;
u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
int rc;
/*
* Only works for families with packets.
*/
if (sock != NULL) {
sk = sock->sk;
if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
return 0;
family = sk->sk_family;
if (skb != NULL) {
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
family = PF_INET;
else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
family = PF_INET6;
}
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0)
smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
family = sock->sk->sk_family;
/*
* Give up if we couldn't get anything
*/
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
s = smack_to_secid(smack);
if (family == PF_UNIX) {
sp = sock->sk->sk_security;
s = smack_to_secid(sp->smk_out);
} else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
s = smack_to_secid(smack);
}
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
}
*secid = s;
if (s == 0)
return -EINVAL;
*secid = s;
return 0;
}
@ -2695,7 +2821,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
return;
ssp = sk->sk_security;
ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security();
ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
}
@ -2816,7 +2942,7 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
key->security = cred->security;
key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
return 0;
}
@ -2845,6 +2971,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
{
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (keyp == NULL)
@ -2858,14 +2985,14 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
/*
* This should not occur
*/
if (cred->security == NULL)
if (tsp == NULL)
return -EACCES;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
#endif
return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security,
return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
@ -3067,6 +3194,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.sb_mount = smack_sb_mount,
.sb_umount = smack_sb_umount,
.bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds,
.inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security,
.inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security,
.inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security,
@ -3203,9 +3332,16 @@ static __init void init_smack_know_list(void)
static __init int smack_init(void)
{
struct cred *cred;
struct task_smack *tsp;
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tsp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) {
kfree(tsp);
return 0;
}
printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
@ -3213,7 +3349,9 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
* Set the security state for the initial task.
*/
cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
cred->security = tsp;
/* initialize the smack_know_list */
init_smack_know_list();

41
security/smack/smackfs.c
View File

@ -109,9 +109,12 @@ const char *smack_cipso_option = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
* SMK_ACCESSLEN: Maximum length for a rule access field
* SMK_LOADLEN: Smack rule length
*/
#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxa"
#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
#define SMK_OACCESS "rwxa"
#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxat"
#define SMK_OACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_OACCESS) - 1)
#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
#define SMK_OLOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_OACCESSLEN)
#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
/**
* smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct
@ -121,7 +124,7 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
{
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
nap->secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current());
}
/*
@ -175,6 +178,8 @@ static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
seq_putc(s, 'x');
if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
seq_putc(s, 'a');
if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
seq_putc(s, 't');
if (srp->smk_access == 0)
seq_putc(s, '-');
@ -273,10 +278,15 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0 || count != SMK_LOADLEN)
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Minor hack for backward compatability
*/
if (count < (SMK_OLOADLEN) || count > SMK_LOADLEN)
return -EINVAL;
data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
data = kzalloc(SMK_LOADLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
@ -285,6 +295,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
/*
* More on the minor hack for backward compatability
*/
if (count == (SMK_OLOADLEN))
data[SMK_OLOADLEN] = '-';
rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
if (rule == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
@ -345,6 +361,17 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out_free_rule;
}
switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 4]) {
case '-':
break;
case 't':
case 'T':
rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
break;
default:
goto out_free_rule;
}
rc = smk_set_access(rule);
if (!rc)
@ -1160,7 +1187,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
char *sp = current->cred->security;
char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;