ipv4: Remove the 'publish' logic in tcp_fastopen_init_key_once

The 'publish' logic is not necessary after commit dfea2aa654 ("tcp:
Do not call tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher from interrupt context"), because
in tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen,it wouldn't call tcp_fastopen_init_key_once.

Signed-off-by: Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Haishuang Yan 2017-09-27 11:35:41 +08:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent e1cfcbe82b
commit dd000598a3
5 changed files with 5 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ void tcp_fastopen_add_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
struct sock *tcp_try_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *tcp_try_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req, struct request_sock *req,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc); struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc);
void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish); void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(void);
bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_check(struct sock *sk, u16 *mss, bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_check(struct sock *sk, u16 *mss,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *cookie); struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *cookie);
bool tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(struct sock *sk, int *err); bool tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(struct sock *sk, int *err);

View File

@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ int inet_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
(tcp_fastopen & TFO_SERVER_ENABLE) && (tcp_fastopen & TFO_SERVER_ENABLE) &&
!inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq.max_qlen) { !inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq.max_qlen) {
fastopen_queue_tune(sk, backlog); fastopen_queue_tune(sk, backlog);
tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(true); tcp_fastopen_init_key_once();
} }
err = inet_csk_listen_start(sk, backlog); err = inet_csk_listen_start(sk, backlog);

View File

@ -282,11 +282,6 @@ static int proc_tcp_fastopen_key(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
ret = -EINVAL; ret = -EINVAL;
goto bad_key; goto bad_key;
} }
/* Generate a dummy secret but don't publish it. This
* is needed so we don't regenerate a new key on the
* first invocation of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen
*/
tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(false);
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(user_key, TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH); tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(user_key, TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
} }

View File

@ -2749,7 +2749,7 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
case TCP_FASTOPEN: case TCP_FASTOPEN:
if (val >= 0 && ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | if (val >= 0 && ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE |
TCPF_LISTEN))) { TCPF_LISTEN))) {
tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(true); tcp_fastopen_init_key_once();
fastopen_queue_tune(sk, val); fastopen_queue_tune(sk, val);
} else { } else {

View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish) void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(void)
{ {
static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH]; static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish)
* All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check * All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check
* for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk. * for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk.
*/ */
if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)) && publish) if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)))
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key)); tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
} }