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security: Minor improvements to no_new_privs documentation 

The documentation didn't actually mention how to enable no_new_privs.
This also adds a note about possible interactions between
no_new_privs and LSMs (i.e. why teaching systemd to set no_new_privs
is not necessarily a good idea), and it references the new docs
from include/linux/prctl.h.

Suggested-by: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andy Lutomirski 2012-07-05 11:23:24 -07:00 committed by James Morris
parent 26c439d400
commit c540521bba
2 changed files with 9 additions and 0 deletions
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7
Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt
View File

@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ bits will no longer change the uid or gid; file capabilities will not
add to the permitted set, and LSMs will not relax constraints after add to the permitted set, and LSMs will not relax constraints after
execve. execve.
To set no_new_privs, use prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0).
Be careful, though: LSMs might also not tighten constraints on exec
in no_new_privs mode. (This means that setting up a general-purpose
service launcher to set no_new_privs before execing daemons may
interfere with LSM-based sandboxing.)
Note that no_new_privs does not prevent privilege changes that do not Note that no_new_privs does not prevent privilege changes that do not
involve execve. An appropriately privileged task can still call involve execve. An appropriately privileged task can still call
setuid(2) and receive SCM_RIGHTS datagrams. setuid(2) and receive SCM_RIGHTS datagrams.

2
include/linux/prctl.h
View File

@ -141,6 +141,8 @@
* Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example, * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example,
* asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
* in execve returning -EPERM. * in execve returning -EPERM.
*
* See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
*/ */
#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38 #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39 #define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39