From b925585039cf39275c2e0e57512e5df27fa73aad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2009 14:01:32 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] mm: Adjust do_pages_stat() so gcc can see copy_from_user() is
safe
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Slightly adjust the logic for determining the size of the
copy_form_user() in do_pages_stat(); with this change, gcc can see
that the copying is safe.
Without this, we get a build error for i386 allyesconfig:
/home/hpa/kernel/linux-2.6-tip.urgent/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:213:
error: call to ‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute
error: copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct
Unlike an earlier patch from Arjan, this doesn't introduce new
variables; merely reshuffles the compare so that gcc can see that an
overflow cannot happen.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Brice Goglin <Brice.Goglin@inria.fr>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090926205406.30d55b08@infradead.org>
---
mm/migrate.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c
index 7dbcb22316d2..0bc640fd68fa 100644
--- a/mm/migrate.c
+++ b/mm/migrate.c
@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ static int do_pages_stat(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_pages,
int err;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i += chunk_nr) {
- if (chunk_nr + i > nr_pages)
+ if (chunk_nr > nr_pages - i)
chunk_nr = nr_pages - i;
err = copy_from_user(chunk_pages, &pages[i],