Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next

Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt

@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ Usage:
                      (40 ascii zeros)
        blobauth=     ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
                      (40 ascii zeros)
-       blobauth=     ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
-                     (40 ascii zeros)
        pcrinfo=	     ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
        pcrlock=	     pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
        migratable=   0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,

security/integrity/digsig.c

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata;
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
 {
-	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
+	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!keyring[id]) {

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 	/* check value type */
 	switch (xattr_data->type) {
 	case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
+		if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				   xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
 		if (rc)

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c

@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 				 int xattr_len)
 {
 	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
+	enum hash_algo ret;
 
 	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
 		/* return default hash algo */
@@ -143,7 +144,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 		return sig->hash_algo;
 		break;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
-		return xattr_value->digest[0];
+		ret = xattr_value->digest[0];
+		if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			return ret;
 		break;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
 		/* this is for backward compatibility */
@@ -384,14 +387,10 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				   xattr_value_len);
 	if (result == 1) {
-		bool digsig;
-
 		if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
-		if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
-			return -EPERM;
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
+			 (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;

security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c

@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
 
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
-		return 0;
+		return seq_release(inode, file);
 
 	if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) {
 		cause = "failed";

security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c

@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 		ima_used_chip = 1;
 
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
-		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n",
+			rc);
 
 	rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
 	if (rc)