seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
This change adds the SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO as a valid return value from a
seccomp filter. Additionally, it makes the first use of the lower
16-bits for storing a filter-supplied errno. 16-bits is more than
enough for the errno-base.h calls.
Returning errors instead of immediately terminating processes that
violate seccomp policy allow for broader use of this functionality
for kernel attack surface reduction. For example, a linux container
could maintain a whitelist of pre-existing system calls but drop
all new ones with errnos. This would keep a logically static attack
surface while providing errnos that may allow for graceful failure
without the downside of do_exit() on a bad call.
This change also changes the signature of __secure_computing. It
appears the only direct caller is the arm entry code and it clobbers
any possible return value (register) immediately.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: - fix up comments and rebase
- fix bad var name which was fixed in later revs
- remove _int() and just change the __secure_computing signature
v16-v17: ...
v15: - use audit_seccomp and add a skip label. (eparis@redhat.com)
- clean up and pad out return codes (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - no change/rebase
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda615
v12: - move to WARN_ON if filter is NULL
(oleg@redhat.com, luto@mit.edu, keescook@chromium.org)
- return immediately for filter==NULL (keescook@chromium.org)
- change evaluation to only compare the ACTION so that layered
errnos don't result in the lowest one being returned.
(keeschook@chromium.org)
v11: - check for NULL filter (keescook@chromium.org)
v10: - change loaders to fn
v9: - n/a
v8: - update Kconfig to note new need for syscall_set_return_value.
- reordered such that TRAP behavior follows on later.
- made the for loop a little less indent-y
v7: - introduced
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
3dc1c1b2d2
commit
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@ -220,8 +220,10 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
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bool
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help
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This symbol should be selected by an architecure if it provides
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asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments() and
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syscall_get_arch().
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asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments(),
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syscall_get_arch(), and syscall_set_return_value(). Additionally,
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its system call entry path must respect a return value of -1 from
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__secure_computing() and/or secure_computing().
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config SECCOMP_FILTER
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def_bool y
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@ -12,13 +12,14 @@
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/*
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* All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
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* The bottom 16-bits are reserved for future use.
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* The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.
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* The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most.
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*
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* The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always
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* selects the least permissive choice.
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*/
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#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL 0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
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#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
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#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
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/* Masks for the return value sections. */
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@ -64,11 +65,12 @@ struct seccomp {
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struct seccomp_filter *filter;
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};
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extern void __secure_computing(int);
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static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
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extern int __secure_computing(int);
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static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall)
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{
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if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
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__secure_computing(this_syscall);
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return __secure_computing(this_syscall);
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return 0;
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}
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extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
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@ -199,15 +199,20 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
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static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
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{
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struct seccomp_filter *f;
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u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
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u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
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/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
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if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
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return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
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/*
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* All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
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* value always takes priority.
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* value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
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*/
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for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
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ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns);
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if (ret != SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
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break;
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u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns);
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if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
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ret = cur_ret;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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@ -346,11 +351,13 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
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};
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#endif
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void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
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int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
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{
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int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
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int exit_sig = 0;
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int *syscall;
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u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
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int data;
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switch (mode) {
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case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
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@ -361,14 +368,26 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
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#endif
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do {
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if (*syscall == this_syscall)
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return;
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return 0;
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} while (*++syscall);
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exit_sig = SIGKILL;
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break;
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
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case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
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if (seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall) == SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
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return;
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ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
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data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
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switch (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) {
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case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
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/* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */
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syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
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-data, 0);
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goto skip;
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case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
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return 0;
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case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
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default:
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break;
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}
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exit_sig = SIGSYS;
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break;
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#endif
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@ -379,8 +398,11 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
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#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
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dump_stack();
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#endif
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audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_code, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
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audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
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do_exit(exit_sig);
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skip:
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audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
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return -1;
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}
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long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
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