Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch moves cap_file_mmap into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability checks are done. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
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extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
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extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
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extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
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extern int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
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unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only);
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extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags);
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extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
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unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
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@ -2197,9 +2200,7 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long addr,
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unsigned long addr_only)
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{
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if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
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return -EACCES;
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return 0;
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return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
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}
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static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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@ -330,15 +330,6 @@ static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command,
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return 0;
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}
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static int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
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unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
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{
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if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
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return -EACCES;
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return 0;
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}
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static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long prot)
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{
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@ -984,3 +984,33 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
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cap_sys_admin = 1;
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return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
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}
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/*
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* cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
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* @file: unused
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* @reqprot: unused
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* @prot: unused
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* @flags: unused
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* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
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* @addr_only: unused
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*
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* If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need
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* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
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* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
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* -EPERM if not.
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*/
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int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
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unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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if (addr < mmap_min_addr) {
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ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
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SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
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if (ret == 0)
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current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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