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The sweeping change is to make add_taint() explicitly indicate whether to disable 

lockdep, but it's a mechanical change.
 
 Cheers,
 Rusty.
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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux

Pull module update from Rusty Russell:
 "The sweeping change is to make add_taint() explicitly indicate whether
  to disable lockdep, but it's a mechanical change."

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  MODSIGN: Add option to not sign modules during modules_install
  MODSIGN: Add -s <signature> option to sign-file
  MODSIGN: Specify the hash algorithm on sign-file command line
  MODSIGN: Simplify Makefile with a Kconfig helper
  module: clean up load_module a little more.
  modpost: Ignore ARC specific non-alloc sections
  module: constify within_module_*
  taint: add explicit flag to show whether lock dep is still OK.
  module: printk message when module signature fail taints kernel.
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2013-02-25 15:41:43 -08:00
parent ab7826595e d9d8d7ed49
commit 9043a2650c
43 changed files with 236 additions and 202 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
Makefile
View File

@ -720,11 +720,11 @@ endif # INSTALL_MOD_STRIP
export mod_strip_cmd
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL
MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv
MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509
export MODPUBKEY
mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
else
mod_sign_cmd = true
endif

2
arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err, unsigned long *r9_15)
#endif
printk("%s(%d): %s %ld\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, err);
dik_show_regs(regs, r9_15);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
dik_show_trace((unsigned long *)(regs+1));
dik_show_code((unsigned int *)regs->pc);

2
arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
bust_spinlocks(0);
die_owner = -1;
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
die_nest_count--;
if (!die_nest_count)
/* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */

2
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
crash_kexec(regs);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();

2
arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
show_regs_log_lvl(regs, KERN_EMERG);
show_stack_log_lvl(current, regs->sp, regs, KERN_EMERG);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
if (in_interrupt())

2
arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
do_show_stack(current, &regs->r30, pt_elr(regs));
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock);

2
arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ die (const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
bust_spinlocks(0);
die.lock_owner = -1;
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock);
if (!regs)

2
arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ void die_if_kernel (char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, int nr)
console_verbose();
printk("%s: %08x\n",str,nr);
show_registers(fp);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}

2
arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ void __noreturn die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
printk("%s[#%d]:\n", str, ++die_counter);
show_registers(regs);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();

2
arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
show_regs(regs);
dump_stack();
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");

2
arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs,
{
bust_spinlocks(0);
die_owner = -1;
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
die_nest_count--;
oops_exit();
printk("\n");

2
arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
print_modules();
show_regs(regs);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");

2
arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, 255, SIGSEGV);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();

2
arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
View File

@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void __init process_switch(char c)
break;
}
cheetah_pcache_forced_on = 1;
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
cheetah_enable_pcache();
break;

2
arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
View File

@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
printk("%s(%d): %s [#%d]\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, ++die_counter);
show_regs(regs);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
__SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE;
__SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE;

2
arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
View File

@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, 0, 255, SIGSEGV);
__asm__ __volatile__("flushw");
show_regs(regs);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) {
struct thread_info *tp = current_thread_info();
struct reg_window *rw = (struct reg_window *)

2
arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
ret = __die(str, err, thread, regs);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();

3
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
View File

@ -219,8 +219,7 @@ static void __cpuinit amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
" processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
if (!test_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP))
add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP);
add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
valid_k7:
;

2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
View File

@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
/*
* Set taint even when machine check was not enabled.
*/
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
severity = mce_severity(&m, cfg->tolerant, NULL);

2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c
View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
smp_processor_id());
}
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
/* Set up machine check reporting for processors with Intel style MCE: */

2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c
View File

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
static void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
printk(KERN_EMERG "CPU0: Machine Check Exception.\n");
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
/* Set up machine check reporting on the Winchip C6 series */

2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
View File

@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static void generic_get_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
if (tmp != mask_lo) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "mtrr: your BIOS has configured an incorrect mask, fixing it.\n");
add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND);
add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
mask_lo = tmp;
}
}

2
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
View File

@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
bust_spinlocks(0);
die_owner = -1;
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
die_nest_count--;
if (!die_nest_count)
/* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */

2
arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
if (!user_mode(regs))
show_stack(NULL, (unsigned long*)regs->areg[1]);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
if (in_interrupt())

2
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
View File

@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
buf = NULL;
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
return -EINVAL;
add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE);
add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
return count;

2
drivers/acpi/osl.c
View File

@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void acpi_table_taint(struct acpi_table_header *table)
pr_warn(PREFIX
"Override [%4.4s-%8.8s], this is unsafe: tainting kernel\n",
table->signature, table->oem_table_id);
add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE);
add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}

2
drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c
View File

@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static ssize_t regmap_map_write_file(struct file *file,
return -EINVAL;
/* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */
add_taint(TAINT_USER);
add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
regmap_write(map, reg, value);
return buf_size;

6
include/linux/kernel.h
View File

@ -398,7 +398,11 @@ extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi;
extern int panic_on_io_nmi;
extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow;
extern const char *print_tainted(void);
extern void add_taint(unsigned flag);
enum lockdep_ok {
LOCKDEP_STILL_OK,
LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE
};
extern void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok);
extern int test_taint(unsigned flag);
extern unsigned long get_taint(void);
extern int root_mountflags;

4
include/linux/module.h
View File

@ -396,13 +396,13 @@ bool is_module_address(unsigned long addr);
bool is_module_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
bool is_module_text_address(unsigned long addr);
static inline int within_module_core(unsigned long addr, struct module *mod)
static inline int within_module_core(unsigned long addr, const struct module *mod)
{
return (unsigned long)mod->module_core <= addr &&
addr < (unsigned long)mod->module_core + mod->core_size;
}
static inline int within_module_init(unsigned long addr, struct module *mod)
static inline int within_module_init(unsigned long addr, const struct module *mod)
{
return (unsigned long)mod->module_init <= addr &&
addr < (unsigned long)mod->module_init + mod->init_size;

20
init/Kconfig
View File

@ -1670,6 +1670,17 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
config MODULE_SIG_ALL
bool "Automatically sign all modules"
default y
depends on MODULE_SIG
help
Sign all modules during make modules_install. Without this option,
modules must be signed manually, using the scripts/sign-file tool.
comment "Do not forget to sign required modules with scripts/sign-file"
depends on MODULE_SIG_FORCE && !MODULE_SIG_ALL
choice
prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
depends on MODULE_SIG
@ -1702,6 +1713,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_SHA512
endchoice
config MODULE_SIG_HASH
string
depends on MODULE_SIG
default "sha1" if MODULE_SIG_SHA1
default "sha224" if MODULE_SIG_SHA224
default "sha256" if MODULE_SIG_SHA256
default "sha384" if MODULE_SIG_SHA384
default "sha512" if MODULE_SIG_SHA512
endif # MODULES
config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE

22
kernel/Makefile
View File

@ -153,23 +153,7 @@ kernel/modsign_certificate.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates
# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards.
#
###############################################################################
sign_key_with_hash :=
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1),y)
sign_key_with_hash := -sha1
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224),y)
sign_key_with_hash := -sha224
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256),y)
sign_key_with_hash := -sha256
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384),y)
sign_key_with_hash := -sha384
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512),y)
sign_key_with_hash := -sha512
endif
ifeq ($(sign_key_with_hash),)
ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH
$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config)
endif
@ -182,8 +166,8 @@ signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey
@echo "### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random"
@echo "### number generator if one is available."
@echo "###"
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 $(sign_key_with_hash) -days 36500 -batch \
-x509 -config x509.genkey \
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
-batch -x509 -config x509.genkey \
-outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
-keyout signing_key.priv
@echo "###"

140
kernel/module.c
View File

@ -197,9 +197,10 @@ static inline int strong_try_module_get(struct module *mod)
return -ENOENT;
}
static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag)
static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag,
enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
{
add_taint(flag);
add_taint(flag, lockdep_ok);
mod->taints |= (1U << flag);
}
@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ static inline int try_force_unload(unsigned int flags)
{
int ret = (flags & O_TRUNC);
if (ret)
add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD);
add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
return ret;
}
#else
@ -1138,7 +1139,7 @@ static int try_to_force_load(struct module *mod, const char *reason)
if (!test_taint(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: %s: kernel tainted.\n",
mod->name, reason);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
return 0;
#else
return -ENOEXEC;
@ -2147,7 +2148,8 @@ static void set_license(struct module *mod, const char *license)
if (!test_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module license '%s' taints "
"kernel.\n", mod->name, license);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
}
@ -2700,10 +2702,10 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags)
}
if (!get_modinfo(info, "intree"))
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module is from the staging directory,"
" the quality is unknown, you have been warned.\n",
mod->name);
@ -2869,15 +2871,17 @@ static int check_module_license_and_versions(struct module *mod)
* using GPL-only symbols it needs.
*/
if (strcmp(mod->name, "ndiswrapper") == 0)
add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
/* driverloader was caught wrongly pretending to be under GPL */
if (strcmp(mod->name, "driverloader") == 0)
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
/* lve claims to be GPL but upstream won't provide source */
if (strcmp(mod->name, "lve") == 0)
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
#ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS
if ((mod->num_syms && !mod->crcs)
@ -3141,12 +3145,72 @@ static int may_init_module(void)
return 0;
}
/*
* We try to place it in the list now to make sure it's unique before
* we dedicate too many resources. In particular, temporary percpu
* memory exhaustion.
*/
static int add_unformed_module(struct module *mod)
{
int err;
struct module *old;
mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED;
again:
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
if ((old = find_module_all(mod->name, true)) != NULL) {
if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
|| old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
/* Wait in case it fails to load. */
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
finished_loading(mod->name));
if (err)
goto out_unlocked;
goto again;
}
err = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
list_add_rcu(&mod->list, &modules);
err = 0;
out:
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
out_unlocked:
return err;
}
static int complete_formation(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
{
int err;
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
/* Find duplicate symbols (must be called under lock). */
err = verify_export_symbols(mod);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
/* This relies on module_mutex for list integrity. */
module_bug_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod);
/* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us,
* but kallsyms etc. can see us. */
mod->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING;
out:
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
return err;
}
/* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always
zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */
static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
int flags)
{
struct module *mod, *old;
struct module *mod;
long err;
err = module_sig_check(info);
@ -3164,36 +3228,20 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
goto free_copy;
}
/*
* We try to place it in the list now to make sure it's unique
* before we dedicate too many resources. In particular,
* temporary percpu memory exhaustion.
*/
mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED;
again:
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
if ((old = find_module_all(mod->name, true)) != NULL) {
if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
|| old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
/* Wait in case it fails to load. */
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
finished_loading(mod->name));
if (err)
goto free_module;
goto again;
}
err = -EEXIST;
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
/* Reserve our place in the list. */
err = add_unformed_module(mod);
if (err)
goto free_module;
}
list_add_rcu(&mod->list, &modules);
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
mod->sig_ok = info->sig_ok;
if (!mod->sig_ok)
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
if (!mod->sig_ok) {
printk_once(KERN_NOTICE
"%s: module verification failed: signature and/or"
" required key missing - tainting kernel\n",
mod->name);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
#endif
/* Now module is in final location, initialize linked lists, etc. */
@ -3236,21 +3284,11 @@ again:
dynamic_debug_setup(info->debug, info->num_debug);
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
/* Find duplicate symbols (must be called under lock). */
err = verify_export_symbols(mod);
if (err < 0)
/* Finally it's fully formed, ready to start executing. */
err = complete_formation(mod, info);
if (err)
goto ddebug_cleanup;
/* This relies on module_mutex for list integrity. */
module_bug_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod);
/* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us,
* but kallsyms etc. can see us. */
mod->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING;
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
/* Module is ready to execute: parsing args may do that. */
err = parse_args(mod->name, mod->args, mod->kp, mod->num_kp,
-32768, 32767, &ddebug_dyndbg_module_param_cb);
@ -3274,8 +3312,8 @@ again:
/* module_bug_cleanup needs module_mutex protection */
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
module_bug_cleanup(mod);
ddebug_cleanup:
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
ddebug_cleanup:
dynamic_debug_remove(info->debug);
synchronize_sched();
kfree(mod->args);

34
kernel/panic.c
View File

@ -259,26 +259,19 @@ unsigned long get_taint(void)
return tainted_mask;
}
void add_taint(unsigned flag)
/**
* add_taint: add a taint flag if not already set.
* @flag: one of the TAINT_* constants.
* @lockdep_ok: whether lock debugging is still OK.
*
* If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want @lockdebug_ok = false, but for
* some notewortht-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to true.
*/
void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
{
/*
* Can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore.
* We don't call directly debug_locks_off() because the issue
* is not necessarily serious enough to set oops_in_progress to 1
* Also we want to keep up lockdep for staging/out-of-tree
* development and post-warning case.
*/
switch (flag) {
case TAINT_CRAP:
case TAINT_OOT_MODULE:
case TAINT_WARN:
case TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND:
break;
default:
if (__debug_locks_off())
printk(KERN_WARNING "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
}
if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off())
printk(KERN_WARNING
"Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
}
@ -421,7 +414,8 @@ static void warn_slowpath_common(const char *file, int line, void *caller,
print_modules();
dump_stack();
print_oops_end_marker();
add_taint(taint);
/* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...)

2
kernel/sched/core.c
View File

@ -2796,7 +2796,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
if (irqs_disabled())
print_irqtrace_events(prev);
dump_stack();
add_taint(TAINT_WARN);
add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
/*

2
kernel/sysctl.c
View File

@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
int i;
for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {
if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
add_taint(i);
add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
}

3
lib/bug.c
View File

@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned long bugaddr, struct pt_regs *regs)
print_modules();
show_regs(regs);
print_oops_end_marker();
add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug));
/* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug), LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
return BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN;
}

2
mm/memory.c
View File

@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void print_bad_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
print_symbol(KERN_ALERT "vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: %s\n",
(unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap);
dump_stack();
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags)

2
mm/page_alloc.c
View File

@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static void bad_page(struct page *page)
out:
/* Leave bad fields for debug, except PageBuddy could make trouble */
page_mapcount_reset(page); /* remove PageBuddy */
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
/*

2
mm/slab.c
View File

@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ static void __slab_error(const char *function, struct kmem_cache *cachep,
printk(KERN_ERR "slab error in %s(): cache `%s': %s\n",
function, cachep->name, msg);
dump_stack();
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
#endif

2
mm/slub.c
View File

@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static void slab_bug(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...)
printk(KERN_ERR "----------------------------------------"
"-------------------------------------\n\n");
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
static void slab_fix(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...)

2
scripts/mod/modpost.c
View File

@ -830,6 +830,8 @@ static const char *section_white_list[] =
".toc*",
".xt.prop", /* xtensa */
".xt.lit", /* xtensa */
".arcextmap*", /* arc */
".gnu.linkonce.arcext*", /* arc : modules */
NULL
};

136
scripts/sign-file
View File

@ -2,50 +2,44 @@
#
# Sign a module file using the given key.
#
# Format:
#
# ./scripts/sign-file [-v] <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]
#
#
my $USAGE =
"Usage: scripts/sign-file [-v] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n" .
" scripts/sign-file [-v] -s <raw sig> <hash algo> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n";
use strict;
use FileHandle;
use IPC::Open2;
use Getopt::Std;
my $verbose = 0;
if ($#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] eq "-v") {
$verbose = 1;
shift;
my %opts;
getopts('vs:', \%opts) or die $USAGE;
my $verbose = $opts{'v'};
my $signature_file = $opts{'s'};
die $USAGE if ($#ARGV > 4);
die $USAGE if (!$signature_file && $#ARGV < 3 || $signature_file && $#ARGV < 2);
my $dgst = shift @ARGV;
my $private_key;
if (!$signature_file) {
$private_key = shift @ARGV;
}
my $x509 = shift @ARGV;
my $module = shift @ARGV;
my ($dest, $keep_orig);
if (@ARGV) {
$dest = $ARGV[0];
$keep_orig = 1;
} else {
$dest = $module . "~";
}
die "Format: ./scripts/sign-file [-v] <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n"
if ($#ARGV != 2 && $#ARGV != 3);
my $private_key = $ARGV[0];
my $x509 = $ARGV[1];
my $module = $ARGV[2];
my $dest = ($#ARGV == 3) ? $ARGV[3] : $ARGV[2] . "~";
die "Can't read private key\n" unless (-r $private_key);
die "Can't read private key\n" if (!$signature_file && !-r $private_key);
die "Can't read signature file\n" if ($signature_file && !-r $signature_file);
die "Can't read X.509 certificate\n" unless (-r $x509);
die "Can't read module\n" unless (-r $module);
#
# Read the kernel configuration
#
my %config = (
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 => 1
);
if (-r ".config") {
open(FD, "<.config") || die ".config";
while (<FD>) {
if ($_ =~ /^(CONFIG_.*)=[ym]/) {
$config{$1} = 1;
}
}
close(FD);
}
#
# Function to read the contents of a file into a variable.
#
@ -321,72 +315,70 @@ my $id_type = 1; # Identifier type: X.509
#
# Digest the data
#
my ($dgst, $prologue) = ();
if (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1"}) {
my $prologue;
if ($dgst eq "sha1") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14);
$dgst = "-sha1";
$hash = 2;
} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224"}) {
} elsif ($dgst eq "sha224") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C);
$dgst = "-sha224";
$hash = 7;
} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256"}) {
} elsif ($dgst eq "sha256") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20);
$dgst = "-sha256";
$hash = 4;
} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384"}) {
} elsif ($dgst eq "sha384") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30);
$dgst = "-sha384";
$hash = 5;
} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512"}) {
} elsif ($dgst eq "sha512") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40);
$dgst = "-sha512";
$hash = 6;
} else {
die "Can't determine hash algorithm";
die "Unknown hash algorithm: $dgst\n";
}
#
# Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
#
my $digest;
$digest = readpipe("openssl dgst $dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
#
# Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that comprises
# the signature with no metadata attached.
#
my $pid;
$pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
"openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
die "openssl rsautl";
binmode write_to;
print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
binmode read_from;
my $signature;
read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
$signature = pack("n", length($signature)) . $signature,
if ($signature_file) {
$signature = read_file($signature_file);
} else {
#
# Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
#
my $digest;
$digest = readpipe("openssl dgst -$dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
#
# Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that
# comprises the signature with no metadata attached.
#
my $pid;
$pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
"openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
die "openssl rsautl";
binmode write_to;
print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
binmode read_from;
read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
}
$signature = pack("n", length($signature)) . $signature,
#
# Build the signed binary
@ -424,6 +416,6 @@ print FD
;
close FD || die $dest;
if ($#ARGV != 3) {
if (!$keep_orig) {
rename($dest, $module) || die $module;
}

2
sound/soc/soc-core.c
View File

@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static ssize_t codec_reg_write_file(struct file *file,
return -EINVAL;
/* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */
add_taint(TAINT_USER);
add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
snd_soc_write(codec, reg, value);
return buf_size;