diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/ath3k.c b/drivers/bluetooth/ath3k.c index f98380648cb3..f50dffc0374f 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/ath3k.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/ath3k.c @@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ static const struct usb_device_id ath3k_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x0b05, 0x17d0) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x0036) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x3004) }, - { USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x3005) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x3008) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x311D) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x311E) }, @@ -140,7 +139,6 @@ static const struct usb_device_id ath3k_blist_tbl[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x0b05, 0x17d0), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x0036), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3004), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, - { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3005), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3008), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311D), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311E), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c index a1c80b0c7663..6250fc2fb93a 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -162,7 +162,6 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blacklist_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x0b05, 0x17d0), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x0036), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3004), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, - { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3005), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3008), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311d), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311e), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_h5.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_h5.c index 04680ead9275..fede8ca7147c 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_h5.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_h5.c @@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ static int h5_rx_3wire_hdr(struct hci_uart *hu, unsigned char c) H5_HDR_PKT_TYPE(hdr) != HCI_3WIRE_LINK_PKT) { BT_ERR("Non-link packet received in non-active state"); h5_reset_rx(h5); + return 0; } h5->rx_func = h5_rx_payload; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index ca01d1861854..a7a27bc2c0b1 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -289,10 +289,20 @@ static void hci_conn_timeout(struct work_struct *work) { struct hci_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct hci_conn, disc_work.work); + int refcnt = atomic_read(&conn->refcnt); BT_DBG("hcon %p state %s", conn, state_to_string(conn->state)); - if (atomic_read(&conn->refcnt)) + WARN_ON(refcnt < 0); + + /* FIXME: It was observed that in pairing failed scenario, refcnt + * drops below 0. Probably this is because l2cap_conn_del calls + * l2cap_chan_del for each channel, and inside l2cap_chan_del conn is + * dropped. After that loop hci_chan_del is called which also drops + * conn. For now make sure that ACL is alive if refcnt is higher then 0, + * otherwise drop it. + */ + if (refcnt > 0) return; switch (conn->state) { diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index f2829a7932e2..e33a982161c1 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -385,6 +385,16 @@ static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP }, }; +static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) +{ + /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */ + if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || + remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) + return JUST_WORKS; + + return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; +} + static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) { @@ -401,14 +411,11 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io); /* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */ - /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */ /* Otherwise, look up method from the table */ - if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) || - local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || - remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) + if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) method = JUST_WORKS; else - method = gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; + method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); /* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */ if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM) @@ -669,7 +676,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; struct smp_chan *smp; - u8 key_size, auth; + u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; int ret; BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); @@ -695,7 +702,19 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ auth = req->auth_req; - conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); + sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); + if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) + conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; + + /* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */ + if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { + u8 method; + + method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability, + req->io_capability); + if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) + return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; + } build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth); @@ -743,6 +762,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; + /* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */ + if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { + u8 method; + + method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability, + rsp->io_capability); + if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) + return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; + } + get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; @@ -838,6 +867,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct smp_chan *smp; + u8 sec_level; BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); @@ -847,7 +877,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)) return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; - hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req); + sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req); + if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) + hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) return 0; @@ -901,9 +933,12 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level)) return 1; + if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) + hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; + if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) - if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, sec_level)) - goto done; + if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) + return 0; if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags)) return 0; @@ -918,7 +953,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) * requires it. */ if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || - sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) + hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) { @@ -937,9 +972,6 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); -done: - hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; - return 0; }