From 79d852bf5e7691dc78cc6322ecd1860c50940785 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2013 15:42:48 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] NFS: Retry SETCLIENTID with AUTH_SYS instead of AUTH_NONE Recently I changed the SETCLIENTID code to use AUTH_GSS(krb5i), and then retry with AUTH_NONE if that didn't work. This was to enable Kerberos NFS mounts to work without forcing Linux NFS clients to have a keytab on hand. Rick Macklem reports that the FreeBSD server accepts AUTH_NONE only for NULL operations (thus certainly not for SETCLIENTID). Falling back to AUTH_NONE means our proposed 3.10 NFS client will not interoperate with FreeBSD servers over NFSv4 unless Kerberos is fully configured on both ends. If the Linux client falls back to using AUTH_SYS instead for SETCLIENTID, all should work fine as long as the NFS server is configured to allow AUTH_SYS for SETCLIENTID. This may still prevent access to Kerberos-only FreeBSD servers by Linux clients with no keytab. Rick is of the opinion that the security settings the server applies to its pseudo-fs should also apply to the SETCLIENTID operation. Linux and Solaris NFS servers do not place that limitation on SETCLIENTID. The security settings for the server's pseudo-fs are determined automatically as the union of security flavors allowed on real exports, as recommended by RFC 3530bis; and the flavors allowed for SETCLIENTID are all flavors supported by the respective server implementation. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/nfs4state.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c index c54600962bc6..a75e712490f4 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c @@ -1884,7 +1884,7 @@ again: break; case -NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE: case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC: - clnt = rpc_clone_client_set_auth(clnt, RPC_AUTH_NULL); + clnt = rpc_clone_client_set_auth(clnt, RPC_AUTH_UNIX); if (IS_ERR(clnt)) { status = PTR_ERR(clnt); break;